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Preface 
 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century dynamic 
emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India 
have joined the major industrial nations of North 
America, Europe, and Japan as the principal consum-
ers of mineral raw materials – and their pre-eminent 
producers. As well as bringing together the world’s 
most populous, economically powerful states and 
biggest trading nations, the Group of 20 unites the 
most important producers and consumers of mineral 
raw materials. 
The uneven distribution of mineral deposits across 
the earth’s surface created by geological processes 
raises central geopolitical questions, particularly 
concerning raw material access and their trading con-
ditions. Extraction and processing of raw materials, 
as well as the ensuing production of manufactured 
goods, take place within a global division of labour 
and are generally distributed throughout different 
world regions. 
Many governments of industrial nations that are 
dependent on imports (of metal raw materials) have 
responded to fluctuations in demand and price by 
implementing national raw materials strategies, while 
even major mineral raw material producing countries 
are seen to be coordinating their political strategies 
internally and externally. Countries that both produce 
and consume large amounts of mineral raw materials 
face particular challenges in formulating a coherent 
raw materials policy. The G20 countries are marked 
by very different mineral economy and industrial 
development starting conditions. This is reflected in 
the ways the subject of raw materials is perceived and 
which raw materials policies are implemented. They 
operate in between unilateral initiatives and inter-
national cooperation. 
 
The present study is based on the following questions: 
 Which interests and objectives do the G20 countries 
pursue with their strategies for raw materials? 
 Which tools are available for the G20 countries to 
implement their strategies? 
 Are there any opportunities for a more coordinated 
international raw materials policy? 
International raw materials policy is a cross-cutting 
issue that combines central global challenges with 
regard to economic policy, trade, environmental pro-
tection, and development. Because of its economic 
policy coordinating function, the forum of the G20 
offers an opportunity to deal with global questions 
relating to raw material production, consumption, 
and trade. It is in that context that the G20 was chosen 
as the object of study. 
The present study was conducted on behalf of the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) in a collaborative project in-
volving the German Federal Institute for Geosciences 
and Natural Resources (BGR) and the German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs (SWP). The study 
was initiated by the Sector Project Policy Advice Miner-
al and Energy Resources that is advising the BMZ on 
issues relating to development cooperation policies in 
the raw materials sector. 
Dr. Manfred Dalheimer – BGR 
Head of Section General and European Cooperation 
Henri Pierre Gebauer – BGR 
Head of Sector Project Policy Advice Mineral and En-
ergy Resources 
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Problems and Recommendations 
Fragmentation or Cooperation in 
Global Resource Governance? 
A Comparative Analysis of the 
Raw Materials Strategies of the G20 
Developments on the markets for metals and minerals 
pose major challenges to companies and governments 
alike. Prices have risen sharply since the turn of the 
millennium – a trend that was interrupted only tem-
porarily during the financial and economic crisis of 
"#	$%&
$%$'
	$%*%%
many other emerging economies, technological devel-
opments, and the growing world population were 
particularly responsible for the price surge. But raw 
materials markets are not simply characterized by 
high or rising prices. For some minerals, prices have 
fluctuated considerably. Moreover, the price mecha-
nism often fails to function to full satisfaction. Raw 
materials markets are generally prone to the “pork 
cycle.” The basic problems are production lag and 
rigid expectations. When prices are high, new mining 
investments are made. But their effects are delayed 
due to the long lead times involved in developing new 
mining and production facilities. When production 
finally does kick in, the market becomes saturated, 
prices decline again, and so does investment. As a 
result, production capacities will again be too low to 
meet the next surge in demand. In general, mining 
companies expand their production capacity only 
slowly because of high capital requirements, long 
start-up times, sometimes opaque market structures, 
distorted expectations, and at times contradictory 
signals from governments. Furthermore, many min-
erals and metals are characterized by a high concen-
tration of production in terms of geography and busi-
nesses. Finally, prices are not only determined by the 
real economy, but – at least in the short term – also by 
financial markets. Raw materials have become attrac-
tive objects of speculation. 
These challenges cannot be solved by one nation 
acting alone. Policy measures that at first sight may 
seem rational on the national level, can, in the worst 
case, lead to collectively adverse outcomes on the 
global level. But multilateral governance approaches 
for metals and minerals markets are practically non-
existent. Differences in interests, objectives, and 
instruments of choice between the major producer 
and consumer countries have, so far, obstructed effec-
Problems and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin / BGR Hannover 
A Comparative Analysis of the  
Raw Materials Strategies of the G20 
March 2013 
 
 
8 
tive international raw materials governance. Never-
theless, attempts to improve the governance of global 
minerals and metals markets should be intensified. 
 G20 as an agenda-setter: While the G20 is not the 
proper forum for raw materials governance due to 
its lack of institutional capacity, it could serve well 
as an agenda-setter. The G20 Working Group on 
Energy and Raw Materials could be tasked with 
analyzing and discussing production, consumption, 
trade, and investment trends in the mineral mar-
kets. The Working Group could also initiate a first 
exchange concerning the interests, objectives, and 
policies of the G20 countries in the area of minerals 
and metals and develop recommendations for insti-
tutional reforms in global mineral governance. 
 International metals and minerals forum: It would be 
desirable to establish an international platform 
where producer and consumer countries could 
meet regularly to exchange views and develop joint 
solutions to market challenges. The current lack of 
a critical mass of support in the G20 for founding 
such a platform should not prevent the German 
government from promoting this idea. In the long 
run such an initiative could develop into an inter-
national institution like the International Energy 
Forum (IEF) or the recently founded International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 
 Data transparency: An international data initiative to 
improve transparency on market actors, reserves, 
traded volumes, and prices of minerals and metals 
would be desirable. The Joint Organizations Data 
Initiative (JODI) of the IEF, which makes a signifi-
cant contribution to transparency on the oil mar-
kets and is expanding into the gas markets, could 
serve as a model. Without doubt, collecting data on 
minerals and metals is a much more complex busi-
ness, as there are significant differences in produc-
tion, demand, consumption, and trade patterns 
between them. This problem could be overcome by 
more strongly pooling the resources of major raw 
materials companies and specialist national institu-
tions (such as the geological surveys). The interna-
tional study groups on lead and zinc, copper, and 
nickel, which are headquartered in Lisbon, could 
supply a basis for intensifying collaboration be-
tween companies and geological surveys. 
 Transparency of financial flows and due diligence in 
supply chains of mineral resources: National, legal 
require'&%+4+
++&
$%+%$8
the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act) and voluntary international 
transparency and certification initiatives (such as 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
EITI, or the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Con-
flict-Affected and High-Risk Areas) are important 
instruments for countering the illegal trade in 
so-called conflict minerals, corruption, and poor 
governance. At the same time, implementing the 
numerous certification schemes and reporting 
obligations requires considerable financial and per-
sonnel resources. It would therefore be desirable to 
more closely harmonize these different initiatives. 
 Strengthening international trade rules on export restric-
tions: Export restrictions are increasingly becoming 
a problem in international trade. Although export 
restrictions can be a useful instrument to secure 
developing countries a share of the resource rent, 
they often result in a misallocation of resources. 
WTO rules do not yet adequately curb export re-
strictions. While strengthening the rules would be 
desirable, it is rather unlikely to occur, given the 
opposition of most emerging economies and devel-
oping countries. The OECD inventory on export 
barriers is at least a first step in the right direction 
to raise awareness. 
 
Aside from these multilateral approaches, bilateral 
and plurilateral cooperation should be strengthened, 
possibly also in regional contexts such the EU, 
MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. 
 Research and development: Given that many coun-
tries face the same challenges, joining forces could 
reduce costs and increase effectiveness. Research 
and development is one potential area of cooper-
ation. For example, the trilateral cooperation 
between the EU, the United States, and Japan on 
developing substitutes, recycling, and raw material 
and product efficiency could be strengthened. It 
would also be conceivable to involve other coun-
tries such as South Korea, which takes a strong 
interest in ensuring a secure supply for its indus-
tries and has accordingly been intensifying its 
recycling efforts for several years. 
 Development cooperation: The raw materials sector is 
an important component of development coopera-
tion for many OECD countries. It is thus all the 
more important that initiatives to support capacity 
development or deal with regulatory issues are 
closely coordinated among donor countries repre-
sented in the OECD’s Development Assistance Com-
mittee. One way to integrate the large emerging 
Problems and Recommendations 
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9 
economies more strongly into these efforts would 
be triangular cooperation projects. For instance, 
Germany and Brazil could pool mining sector 
capacity-building efforts in a third country. Bi-
lateral dialogs such as the Africa dialogue with 
China should also be intensified. 
 Coordination of stockpiling programs: Maintaining 
national mineral and metal contingency reserves, 
in particular for critical materials, is a strategy 
pursued especially by East Asian countries, but is 
not recommendable. To avoid further tightening 
the markets, stockpiling efforts should at least be 
coordinated internationally, for example along 
the lines of energy cooperation within the IEA. 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
Stormy-Annika Mildner 
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Introduction: Global Raw Materials Markets – 
National Raw Materials Policies 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Stormy-Annika Mildner 
 
Trends on the Raw Materials Markets and 
Policy Responses 
Since the turn of the millennium, increasing and 
sometimes volatile prices in combination with tem-
porary supply shortages have moved minerals and 
metals high up the agendas of policymakers around 
the world. Numerous documents published by govern-
ments across the world document the urgency of the 
issue – the raw materials strategy of the German Fed-
eral Government being just one of them. 
One reason why the state is currently experiencing 
a renaissance in the raw materials sector lies in the 
surge in demand, which came as a surprise to many 
market participants.1
 
1  For a more extensive discussion, see Hanns Günther 
Hilpert, Gitta Lauster, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Florian 
Wassenberg, “Wettlauf um Metalle: Eisenerz und Seltene 
Erden,” in Konfliktrisiko Rohstoffe? Herausforderungen und Chancen 
im Umgang mit knappen Ressourcen, SWP-Studie 5/2011, ed. 
Stormy-Annika Mildner, pp. 131–70 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2011); Hanns Günther 
Hilpert, Gitta Lauster, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Florian 
Wassenberg, “Metals: The Case of Rare Earths,” in Resource 
Scarcity – A Global Security Threat? SWP Research Paper 2/2011, 
ed. Stormy-Annika Mildner, Solveig Richter, and Gitta 
Lauster, pp. 25–27 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
March 2011). 
 While there is no reason to fear 
exhaustion of minerals and metals from a geological 
perspective, prices cannot be expected to return to 
the 
$'	<&=$&<&+$8&+%+– 
even if a cyclical downturn is quite conceivable. 
Driven by growing demand from China and other 
emerging economies, the former buyers’ market has 
turned into a veritable sellers’ market. Changing in-
dustrial demand structures, strong geographical and 
business concentration of supply, political inter-
ventions in the markets (such as export controls), and 
ecologically, politically, and socially driven conflicts 
in many poorer producing countries have further 
increased prices. Moreover, raw materials have 
become an attractive object of financial speculation. 
Due to the exhaustion of certain traditional mining 
sites, high development costs for new projects, long 
phase-in times, and high investment risks, global 
supply has not been able to adapt quickly to rising 
demand and prices. As a consequence, the most recent 
boom (2003 to early 2012) proved to be the longest 
+%
&4+&&>	&, p. 12). 
Prices fell temporarily in the course of the financial 
%&
$%$'

	++$8"Q$%=$	&X$% 
shortly thereafter. For example, the price of a tonne of 

$&	Q
X&&%	$%Y[Q%\%	=
Q&$Y[Q%\%	=#2 The price of 
$%%&$8	$%$	&	$+&8	$'Y[#$Y[#
during the same period.3
Although the raw materials sector has always been 
one in which states and state-owned enterprises oper-
ate, state interventions have increased in number and 
intensity since the mid-2000s. The laissez-faire attitude 
towards international raw materials markets is in-
creasingly on the retreat. 
 Prices fell between late 2011/ 
early 2012 and mid-2012 due to depressed economic 
prospects in Europe and China. Since mid-2012, how-
ever, prices of important industrial minerals have 
risen again. Most analysts expect prices to remain at a 
generally high level in the medium term – providing 
the euro crisis is resolved and stronger growth returns 
to emerging economies. 
The strategic objectives and instruments of national 
raw materials policies vary according to the domestic 
raw materials base, domestic demand, and depend-
ence on international markets. Accordingly, the inter-
ests of consumer and producer countries contrast 
sharply. Import-dependent countries are interested 
primarily in a secure supply of minerals and metals 
at affordable prices, and employ a wide range of 
measures to secure this. Some governments seek to 
arrange exclusive supply contracts or support national 
enterprises in bidding for contracts overseas. Others 
rely on strategic stockpiling to become less vulnerable 
in case of supply disruptions, or seek to diversify sup-
ply sources by concluding resource partnerships and 
supporting producer countries through investment in 
training, infrastructure, and industrial processing. 
 
2  BGR Database 2012. 
3  IMF, Primary Commodity Prices, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/res/commod/index.asp (accessed August 21, 2012). 
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Figure 1 
Price indices of selected metals, in U.S. dollars at current market prices, January 2003 to August 2012  
(Index: 2003 = 1) 
Source: BGR Database 2012. 
 
Others still work to develop substitutes, efficiency, 
and recycling. 
The interests of resource-rich countries are more 
diverse, and resource strategies and measures differ 
widely. Some countries seek to increase the contribu-
tion of the raw materials sector to economic growth 
and development. Some are interested in maximizing 
exports while others are more concerned with secur-
ing supplies for domestic manufacturing. And some 
governments use raw materials to achieve broader 
foreign policy goals. Governments employ very dif-
ferent instruments to pursue these various interests. 
Some impose taxes on mineral and metal exports 
(such as export tariffs), sometimes even limiting ex-
ports using quotas.
 
4  WTO, WTO Document WT/TPR/OV/14, November 2011. 
 Others subsidize imports or im-
pose resource taxes, while yet others enact national 
minimum ownership quotas for mining companies 
or support the global market activities of domestic 
mining companies. In some cases, raw materials pol-
icies follow internal political and foreign policy objec-
tives rather than economic rationale. Resource nation-
alism usually results in discrimination against all 
or some foreign consumers (or countries), and in its 
strongest form can lead to nationalization of the 
resource sector. 
The government activities in consumer countries 
present a typical case of the competition paradox.5 At 
first sight, a state can improve its supply security by 
imposing export restrictions, subsidizing imports, and 
establishing raw materials stockpiles or supporting 
domestic companies investing in mining abroad. How-
ever, this strategy promises success only as long as 
other states are not employing the same measures 
(or at least not to the same degree). In the worst case, 
a prisoners’ dilemma emerges, where rational politi-
cal decisions on the national level lead to collectively 
adverse results on the global level.6
 
5  Wolfgang Stützel and Rolf-Dieter Grass, Volkswirtschaftslehre 
4]%
^_&%Q`Q#–59. 
 Unintended con-
sequences would include raw materials becoming 
6  Robert Axelrod, Die Evolution der Kooperation (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2000). 
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even scarcer on international markets, fueling price 
surges and price volatility and intensifying conflicts. 
The adverse effects in this case would not be re-
stricted to consumer countries. Although producer 
countries would benefit from higher prices and 
improved terms of trade, they would also be exposed 
to greater risks. If high resource rents coincided with 
poor governance and weak institutions, corruption, 
rent-seeking, and mismanagement, intra-state con-
flicts could soon follow. Additionally, rising exchange 
rates due to growing demand can become a hindrance 
to export-oriented manufacturing industries (the 
“Dutch disease”). Finally, environmental and resource 
protection as well as social aspects are often neglected 
as a consequence and states do not invest sufficiently 
in infrastructure, education, and health in order to 
create a solid basis for sustainable economic growth. 
An abundance of raw materials can then quickly turn 
from an engine for economic and social development 
into a curse. 
The Need for Global Governance 
“Global governance” of raw materials can counter 
the risk of a prisoners’ dilemma, keep rivalry for min-
erals and metals at bay, and strengthen the markets’ 
allocation mechanisms. Functioning international 
raw material markets require a solid framework, with 
a reliable legal system, secure transport routes, effi-
cient market platforms (raw materials exchanges), and 
reliable information (for example, from geological 
surveys). Governments also play a decisive role. For 
example, trade and competition policy can counteract 
market failures. Government action is also indispen-
sable when it comes to promoting an environmentally 
friendly and economically sustainable raw materials 
economy, developing a recycling economy, preventing 
cartels and market disruptions, and curbing local and 
international potential for conflict. While existing 
(inter)national raw materials governance may have 
been adequate during the twentieth century, in times 
of often falling prices, it is unable to tackle the new 
market and competition conditions of the twenty-first 
century. 
Within the UN system, independent study groups 
have been established for four metals: the Inter-
national Lead and Zinc Study Group (ILZSG), the In-
ternational Copper Study Group (ICSG), and the Inter-
national Nickel Study Group (INSG). These are open to 
countries with significant involvement in production, 
consumption, or international trade, usually indus-
trial and emerging economies, as well as a few re-
source-rich developing countries. The ICSG has twenty-
four members, including Australia, China, the Euro-
pean Union, and the United States. The INSG has fif-
teen, including Brazil, Australia, Japan, and Russia 
(but not the United States or China). The ILZSG has 
thirty members, including China and the United 
States. The objective of these study groups is to create 
market transparency by providing data on production, 
consumption, trade, and prices, and national policy 
approaches such as environmental legislation. But 
these initiatives do not go far enough. Concentrating 
on a certain raw material makes sense, but the remit 
of the study groups is generally too narrow.7
The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, 
Metals, and Sustainable Development (IGF) is a forum 
for dialog and consultation to enhance the mining 
sector’s contribution to sustainable development. The 
IGF is a voluntary coalition of governments founded 
after the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in 2005. It is the only intergovernmental 
forum that permits mining ministries from all over 
the world to exchange views on the challenges facing 
mining and its potential contribution to sustainable 
development, regardless of whether the country pos-
sesses raw materials of global significance. The IGF 
also actively promotes its topics within the global 
development and sustainability agenda. Its Mining 
Policy Framework lays out comprehensive recommen-
dations on best practice and policy in the minerals 
sector.
 

The International Resource Panel (IRP) of the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) is a first step 
 More than half of its forty-three members are 
African countries. Others include significant resource-
producing developing and emerging economies in 
Asia (Kazakhstan, Mongolia), Oceania, Latin America 
(Brazil, Mexico), and the Caribbean, as well as Austra-
lia, Canada, and Russia. But important actors such as 
China, Japan, and the United States are not members, 
and from the European Union only the United King-
dom and Romania have joined. 
 
7  International Lead and Zinc Study Group, http:// 
www.ilzsg.org/static/home.aspx; International Copper 
Study Group, http://www.icsg.org; International Nickel Study 
Group, http://www.insg.org (accessed October 11, 2012). 
8  Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals 
and Sustainable Development, Mining and Sustainable Develop-
ment. Managing One to Advance the Other, 2010, http://www. 
globaldialogue.info/Mining%20Policy%20Framework%20 
final.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
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toward a comprehensive approach to global manage-
ment of natural resources. Its task is to disseminate 
scientific information on the sustainable use of natu-
ral resources and provide information on environmen-
tally compatible economic growth. Metals recycling is 
one important topic. As the IRP’s task is not to develop 
binding standards, its efficacy remains limited. 
WTO rules place limits on quantitative export 
restrictions. Quantitative restrictions in the form of 
quotas or bans are forbidden. But exceptions leave 
considerable leeway: export quotas are allowed in the 
case of internal supply crises, if they serve the pro-
tection of depletable natural resources, the environ-
ment, human health and animal protection, or 
national security. Unlike import tariffs, export tariffs 
are allowed. They have not been reduced systemati-
cally in the past, nor are they bound at the WTO. The 
latter means that countries may raise existing export 
tariffs without violating WTO rules. Only a few coun-
tries have so far agreed to abolish export tariffs in 
WTO accession agreements. China is one of them. 
The G20 has recognized the importance of improv-
ing raw materials governance and has started addres-
sing the issue, although the focus to date has been on 
energy and agricultural markets rather than minerals 
and metals. Transparency and price volatility occupied 
an important place on the G20 agenda during the 
French presidency in 2011. The 2011 Summit Declara-
tion emphasized that “appropriately regulated and 
transparent agricultural financial markets are a key 
for well-functioning physical markets and risk man-
agement,” and committed to “mitigate[ing] the 
adverse effects of excessive price volatility for the most 
vulnerable through the development of appropriate 
risk-management instruments.”9 Energy resources also 
featured prominently in the final declaration. With 
regard to international raw materials markets, the 
G20 called for “enhanced market transparency […] and 
[…] appropriate regulation and supervision.” With re-
spect to derivatives markets, “[m]arket regulators and 
authorities should be granted effective intervention 
powers to address disorderly markets and prevent 
market abuses.”10
 
9  G20 Cannes Summit Final DeclarationQ+&
$%+–51, from 
G20 Information Center, University of Toronto, http://www. 
g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration--
en.html (accessed February 25, 2013). 
 Under a Japanese chair, the G20 
Study Group on Commodities analyzed the drivers 
of price volatility, also consulting many other inter-
10  Ibid., section 32. 
national institutions, and published its report in 
November 2011.11
During its G20 presidency in 2012, Mexico again 
placed food security and price volatility on the 
agenda, but the euro crisis crowded out many other 
topics and hardly any progress was achieved on raw 
materials. In the end, the summit merely confirmed 
that food security was “one of the most important 
challenges that the world faces today” and, against the 
background of a growing world population, called for 
an increase in sustainable agriculture and an inten-
sification of efforts to increase market transparency 
(for example through the Platform for Agricultural 
Risk Management, the GEO Global Agriculture Moni-
toring, and the Agricultural Market Information Sys-
tem).
 
12 The 2012 Summit also emphasized the impor-
tance of transparency on energy markets, where price 
volatility can contribute significantly to economic in-
stability, and stressed the positive impact of the Joint 
Organizations Data Initiative (JODI).13 Minerals and 
metals were not mentioned specifically in the final 
declaration. The G20 Study Group on Commodities 
merged with the Study Group on Energy to become 
the Energy and Commodity Markets Working Group. 
A subgroup on raw materials (primarily agricultural 
and energy resources) headed by the United Kingdom 
and Brazil built on the 2011 results and addressed in 
particular the macroeconomic consequences of price 
volatility on economic growth, inflation, terms of 
trade, and state budgets.
&+	&='$<&$%&+&8	&	%
the G20, to address at least one aspect of the raw mate-
rials economy: the so-called resource curse (which is 
not exclusive to developing countries). In their Sum-
mit decla	$%$8Q&
$%	&++	&++&
the significance of the raw materials industry for the 
development and stability in many countries and the 
 
 
11  G20 Study Group on Commodities, Report of the G20 Study 
Group on Commodities, http://www.cmegroup.com/education/ 
files/G20Nakaso-November202011.pdf (accessed October 10, 
2012). 
12  G20 Leaders’ DeclarationQ\%&–19, 2012, from G20 
Information Center, University of Toronto, http://www.g20. 
utoronto.ca/summits/2012loscabos.html (accessed July 25, 
2012). 
13  Ibid. 
14  Energy and Commodity Markets Working Group, G20 
Commodity Markets Subgroup Summary Report on the Impacts of 
Excessive Commodity Price Volatility on Growth (n.p., June 2012), 
http://www.g20.org/images/stories/canalfinan/deliverables/ 
energy_markets/Policy_Report_to_Mitigate_Commodity_ 
Price_Volatility.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
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necessity to introduce transparency and certification 
initiatives to increase government revenues and limit 
the corruption, conflict, and violence that can be 
fueled by revenues from natural resources.15 At the 
Deauville summit in May 2011, they agreed to pro-
mote transparency by supporting EITI and committed 
“to setting in place transparency laws and regulations 
or to promoting voluntary standards that require or 
encourage oil, gas, and mining companies to disclose 
the payments they make to governments.” The aim is 
to promote economic growth and development in 
resource-rich developing countries through greater 
transparency and good governance.16
Barriers to Cooperation 
 
Although countries have become more aware that the 
challenges on the raw materials markets cannot be 
solved single-%&=Q+
++$%+%X$& and 
the G20 demonstrate how controversial the issue is. 
Some G20 states believe that the problems lie mainly 
in speculation and raw material cartels, whereas 
others blame government intervention in markets. 
The problem perceptions of the G20 members diverge 
widely, as do their concerns and interests. In light of 
rising prices and growing scarcities, strongly import-
dependent industrial countries like France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan, are concerned primarily with security 
of supply and industrial competitiveness. China, de-
spite its large domestic mining sector, fears supply 
shortages threatening its own development and indus-
trialization. Producer countries, such as Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Russia, and South Africa welcome the 
rising prices and see them as a chance for prosperity 
and development. 
Cooperation among the G20 is further impeded by 
differing ideas about regulation and by the diversity of 
mining traditions. Whereas governments and indus-
tries in Anglo-Saxon countries place more trust in the 
allocative function of free markets, their counterparts 
in continental Europe and East Asia fear a depletion 
of mineral reserves, mismanagement of markets and 
 
15  Q“Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future”: G8 Dec-
laration (n.p., 2009), http://www##"+
" 
&$"&
	$%8%Q#8. 
16  G8 Declaration: Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democ-
racyQ&<&QQ8	$'%8$	'$%*&%&	QY%-
versity of $	$%$Q^""##$	$%$#
"+''" 
2011deauville/2011-declaration-en.html (accessed May 2, 
2012). 
disruptions in supply chains. There is generally dis-
agreement about the role of the state in the market 
and about what instruments should be used to tackle 
problems associated with the raw materials sector. 
The German Government’s Raw Materials Strategy, for 
example, states that companies themselves are respon-
sible for safeguarding their supplies. Accordingly, the 
German government should merely create the right 
conditions and intervene only where markets fail to 
function correctly. National stockpiling or a state 
company for exploration and mining are rejected as 
options. In other countries, the government plays a 
much more proactive role. In Japan and South Korea, 
companies are supported by state-owned raw mate-
rial enterprises: JOGMEC (Japan Oil, Gas and Metals 
National Corp.) and KORES (Korea Resources Corp.). 
These are responsible for maintaining national stocks 
of oil, gas, and strategic metals, and also invest active-
ly in mining and processing abroad. China goes even 
further, specifically supporting its domestic manufac-
turing sector by regulating raw materials markets, for 
example in the area of rare earth elements. 
Major differences also exist with respect to the use 
of foreign (economic) policy instruments. Whereas the 
European Union, Japan, Mexico, and the United States 
regard export restrictions such as Chinese tariffs and 
quotas on minerals and metals as competition-distort-
ing, China and other emerging economies cite nation-
al sovereignty and the need to protect, among others, 
resources, the environment, human health, and ani-
mal welfare. The G20 members also disagree on the 
objectives and the adequate instruments of develop-
ment policy. Germany, for example, ties technical and 
financial aid to clear conditions of good governance, 
at least most of the time, in order to achieve better 
raw materials governance in partner countries. China, 
by contrast, forgoes such conditions. 
The lines of conflict follow similar patterns when 
it comes to transparency in revenue streams and due 
diligence in supply chains. With the U.S. Dodd-Frank 
Act (2010) and the EU Transparency Directive (2011), the 
United States and European Union took the lead – and 
met fierce opposition from other G20 countries such 
as China and Russia. 
Differences between G20 states concerning inter-
ests, ideas about regulation, objectives, and instru-
ments interfere with effective international raw mate-
rials governance. The necessary preconditions for 
overcoming these barriers are improving transparency 
on strategies and policies pursued by the G20 mem-
bers and strengthening communication between them 
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on raw materials. Only if governments and national 
institutions dealing with raw materials communicate 
with each other, and mutual trust is built, there will 
be a realistic chance for global raw materials govern-
ance that can effectively tackle the problems on the 
markets. Even then, this will likely be a long-term 
project. 
Presently, knowledge about the policies of the G20 
states on minerals and metals is inadequate. That is 
the starting point of this report, which sets out to 
explore the opportunities and challenges of intensify-
ing international cooperation by systematically 
examining the raw materials situations, strategies, 
and instruments of the G20 countries. 
The next chapter explains the focus on G20 coun-
tries and identifies commonalities and differences 
within their raw material economies and policies. The 
individual country profiles that follow first give an 
overview of minerals in the national economy before 
analyzing a country’s raw materials strategies and 
policies. All the G20 members are covered: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexi-
co, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Country Selection and Results 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Stormy-Annika Mildner 
 
Country Selection 
The G20 countries were selected on the basis of the 
following considerations: First of all, the G20 mem-
bers are of exceptional international importance. 
&	
&%$8$X4`Q&	
&%$8
global trade (2010), and 65 percent of world popula-
tion (2011), they represent not only the world’s most 
significant economies (see Annex 6, p. ) but include 
the global political heavyweights that can crucially 
influence international and regional policy-making.1

 
Secondly, the G20 states make up a critical proportion 
of international raw materials markets. This applies to 
production of mineral resources (see Figure 1, p. ) 
as well as consumption (see Figure 2, p. ) and world 
trade (see Annex 12, pp. 200ff.). According to the Ger-
man Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und 
Rohstoffe, BGR), the G20 were responsible for 72 per-

&%$8$X'%%	$
$%%&	
&%$8
global consumption of refined minerals in 2010.2
China has come to assume an especially prominent 
position. In the past decade, it has turned from an ex-
porting nation with relatively small demand for raw 
materials into the world’s largest consumer of alu-
'%'4#&	
&%$8$X
$%+'$%%`Q

$&	4#&	
&%`Q&4#&	
&%`Q%
&4#
&	
&%`Q%4#&	
&%`Q+&&4#&	
&%`Q%
%
4#&rcent).
 
3
 
1  G20, Statistics, http://www.g20.org/index.php/en/numeralia 
(accessed June 5, 2012). 
 This development can be attrib-
uted to the country’s ongoing industrialization, which 
is accompanied by a raw-material-intensive infrastruc-
2  Manfred Dalheimer, Entwicklungsfaktor Rohstoff, workshop 
“Ziele und Instrumente der deutschen Rohstoffpolitik: Die 
Versorgung der deutschen Wirtschaft mit Roh- und Werk-
stoffen für Hochtechnologie – Präzisierung und Weiter-
entwicklung der deutschen Rohstoffstrategie,” Büro für Tech-
nik-Abschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag und Fraunhofer-
Institut für System- und Innovationsforschung ISI (Berlin, 2011). 
3  BGR and DERA, Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010, 
DERA Rohstoffinformationen (Hannover, December 2011), 
pp. 116ff., http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/ 
Produkte/Downloads/DERA_Rohstoffinformationen/ 
rohstoffinformationen-07.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7 
(accessed October 15, 2012). 
ture boom. Other G20 countries with a particularly 
high share of global raw materials consumption are 
the United States, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and 
India. With respect to production, China’s position 
is a little less dominant than its position in global 
consumption. The largest producers of mineral and 
metals among the G20, aside from China, are Austra-
lia, Brazil, and Canada.
The list of globally active companies in this field 
is also dominated by the G20 (see table 1, p. 
 
19). Only 
nine of the hundred largest mining companies (by 
market value) are not headquartered in a G20 member 
state. Among the twenty largest, the Swiss Glencore 
and Xstrata are the only two not from a G20 state. 
The international mining sector is characterized by a 
high degree of concentration. The market values of 
the three largest mining companies – BHP Billiton 
(Australia/United Kingdom), Vale (Brazil), and Rio 
Tinto (Australia/United Kingdom) – represent one 
quarter of the global mining industry.5
Moreover, almost two-thirds of global spending on 
exploration for nonferrous and precious metals in 
2010 occurred in just eight countries: Canada (19 per-
cent), Australia (12 percent), United States 4&	
&%`Q
]&
$4&	
&%`Q*%4&	
&%`Q++4&	-
cent), and Brazil and Argentina (3 percent each).
 
6
 
4  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013); UNCTAD, Iron Ore Statistics (Geneva, 
November 2011). 
 
Canada and Australia exhibit the highest density of 
junior mining companies, whose unconventional 
approaches are crucial for initial exploration activi-
ties. The bulk of global raw materials trading takes 
place on commodity futures exchanges at Anglo-Saxon 
(London, New York, Toronto, Melbourne) and Chinese 
(Shanghai, Dalian, Zhengzhou) stock exchanges, or 
over the counter. 
5  Barry Sergeant, Top 100 Mining Companies: What a Difference 
a Year Makes, January 2010, http://www.mineweb.com/ 
mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page67?oid=95737&sn=Detail 
(accessed October 15, 2012). 
6  See BGR database 2012. 
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Figure 1 
Production of selected metals in 2010: Shares of top five producer countries (%) 
Source: All data (except iron ore) from Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World 
Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/WeltBergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf 
(accessed February 27, 2013); UNCTAD, Iron Ore Statistics, Geneva, November 2011. 
Figure 2 
Consumption of selected metals in 2010: Shares of top five consumer countries (%) 
Source: BGR and DERA, Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010, DERA Rohstoffinformationen (Hannover, December 2011), pp. 116ff. 
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Table 1 
G20 shares of the 100 largest mining companies 
 Global top-100  
mining companies 
G20 total   
China   22 
Canada  16 
South Africa  10 
United States  10 
India   
United Kingdom  7 
Australia  6 
Russia  6 
Other G20  9 
Other  12 
Thereof: Purely Non-G20   9 
Thereof: Companies with 
partial G20 ownership 
 3 
Companies may be counted twice where they are based in 
more than one country. 
Source: Barry Sergeant, Top 100 Mining Companies: What a Difference 
a Year Makes, January 2010, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/ 
view/mineweb/en/page67?oid=95737&sn=Detail (accessed March 
5, 2013). 
In light of these numbers, it is hardly surprising that 
the G20 countries also occupy a dominant position 
with regard to business mergers. Buyers from Austra-
lia (22 percent), the United States (17 percent), Canada 
4&	
&%`Q*%4&	
&%`Q%++4&	
&%`
accounted for the lion’s share of mergers in the min-
ing sector worldwide (measured in terms of value) in 
2011. The picture looks similar on the sellers’ side, 
where projects located in just three countries made 
up more than 51 percent of mergers in 2011: Canada 
(25 percent), the United States (15 percent), and 
Australia (11 percent). China accounted for 6 percent 
of projects and Russia for 3 percent.7
With the world’s largest consumer and producer 
countries among its members, the G20 offers a prom-
ising forum to set an agenda that could eventually 
improve international raw materials governance. 
However, the G20 nations do not only differ in their 
interests, they also exhibit significant differences in 
 
 
7  See PwC, On the Road Again? Global Mining 2011 Deals Review & 
2012 Outlook, March 2012, http://www.pwc.se/sv_SE/se/metal-
mining/assets/global-mining-2011-deals-review-and-2012-
outlook.pdf (accessed October 15, 2012). 
economic strength, political influence, stage of devel-
opment, and position on the raw materials markets. 
Minerals in the National Economies of the 
G20 Countries 
The objectives countries pursue through their re-
source policies depend on many factors, including 
their natural endowments with minerals and metals 
and the structure of their economies. Each of the fol-
lowing country profiles therefore starts by taking a 
closer look at national resource production and con-
sumption. In this regard, it should be mentioned that 
the appraisal was not always easy to prepare, given the 
inadequacies of country and resource data. National 
production and consumption figures and data on 
international trade and investment flows are not only 
of very mixed quality but often also incomplete or 
contradictory. And the resource situation of a coun-
try is only a temporary snap-shot: innovations, 
changes in demand, price changes, or the discovery 
of new reserves can change the picture quickly. 
 
The following results can be derived from the country studies 
(see also Annexes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, pp. 192ff.). 
While China, Australia, Brazil, and India are the 
world’s largest producers of raw materials, China is 
also characterized by very strong and growing domes-

&'%4%X'&+Q

$%+8$	$<&	&	-
cent of world consumption), which cannot be met 
solely by domestic production. Thus China is heavily 
dependent on imports. This also holds true, although 
to a much lesser degree, for India, which is among 
the country group with medium to high domestic 
consumption. Both Australia and Brazil are export-
oriented. In the case of Australia, the manufacturing 
sector remains weak, therefore domestic demand and 
consumption is comparatively low. 
The European Union, the United States, Russia, 
Canada, South Africa, Germany, and Mexico belong to 
the G20 countries with a moderate to strongly devel-
oped raw materials production. Due to their high 
levels of consumption, the European Union and the 
United States are nonetheless dependent on imports, 
as is Germany. Russia, Canada, and South Africa are 
 
8  The countries were categorized according to the produc-
$%<$'&4%%&, pp. 8#); categorizing them accord-
ing to production value would have resulted in a slightly dif-
ferent ranking (Annex 10, p. ). 
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significantly more export-oriented. Mexico has rela-
tively low domestic consumption and low exports. 
The G20 members characterized by comparatively 
low raw materials production are Turkey, Italy, 
France, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Japan, 
Argentina, South Korea, and Indonesia. Japan, Italy, 
and South Korea are also countries with a moderate 
level of national consumption. Thus, to meet domestic 
demand they depend on imports. France and Turkey 
fare similarly, although they are characterized by 
lower consumption rates. In Argentina, the United 
Kingdom, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia domestic 
demand is even lower. 
The Raw Materials Policies of the 
G20 Countries 
Which resource policies countries pursue is not only 
determined by their resource endowment, production, 
consumption, and industrial structure, however. How 
the problems are debated internally, which actors are 
involved, and which risks and prospects are perceived 
play an equally important role. 
 
The following results can be derived from the country studies 
(see Annexes 4–5, pp. 172ff.). 
Institutional Setting 
In all the G20 countries, commodity policy falls under 
the portfolio of one or more ministries or central 
authorities, with great variance in staffing, financial 
resources, and concentration of authority. In Argen-
tina, Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Indo-
nesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and to a lesser degree 
also the United States, one ministry takes the leading 
role on raw materials policy. In China, Canada, the 
European Union, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, raw mate-
rials policy is spread across several institutions in a 
more or less coordinated fashion. 
While in the centralized states of Brazil, France, 
Japan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South 
Korea, and Turkey, the central government and its in-
stitutions are primarily responsible for setting rules 
and regulations and supervising the mining and 
processing sector, powers (of regulation, supervision, 
environmental and labor protection, licensing, taxa-
tion, and royalties) are shared more evenly between 
the federal and state level in all other G20 members. 
States, provinces, and regions in Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, China, the European Union, Germany, Italy, 
and the United States possess legislative powers of 
their own for the mining sector. 
The raw material economies of China, India, Russia, 
and Saudi Arabia are characterized by a dominance 
of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. In most 
other G20 members, the companies active in mining 
and processing of minerals and metals are mostly pri-
vate. Nonetheless, government-owned mining com-
panies can also be found in Brazil, France (AREVA), 
Indonesia (PT Aneka Tambang), Mexico, and Turkey 
(EtiMGIM). The state-owned JOGMEC and KORES are 
key business stakeholders in the extractive industries 
of Japan and South Korea respectively, as well as 
instruments of state raw materials policy. 
Civil society groups with more or less political 
influence are found particularly in Europe (Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, European Union) and the 
United States. In many of the major producing coun-
tries, trade unions (in Australia, Canada, South Africa) 
or local communities (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico) demand 
greater participation in decision-making processes of 
national mining policy. 
Explicit Strategic Documents 
Australia, Italy, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey 
have no official policy documents identifying general 
objectives and strategies for the mining sector, while 
the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, South 
Korea, and the United Kingdom have published com-
prehensive strategies. Although the Chinese govern-
ment has also laid down an explicit strategy, the 
policy paper is outdated and limited in its application. 
Partial strategies emanating from individual minis-
tries or covering only parts of the mining sector can be 
found in Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and the 
United States. The topics covered by such strategies 
include: securing supply for domestic industries (and 
in some cases also for the agricultural sector), domes-
tic production, creating added value through proces-
sing, access to raw materials abroad, environmental, 
social, and development concerns, participation by 
local communities, and in some cases recycling, sub-
+$%Q%	&+$	
&&88
&%
=4+&&%%&, 
pp. 172ff.). 
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Identifying Critical Raw Materials 
Many resource-poor and import-dependent countries 
have compiled lists of critical raw materials, as have 
some resource-rich countries. The selection criteria 
for criticality vary widely. Brazil, the European Union, 
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States determine criticality 
according to domestic demand (by industry and in 
some cases agriculture) and vulnerability to disrup-
tion of supply. China implicitly selects critical mate-
rials within the framework of its national stockpiling. 
In general, however, producing countries are less 
interested in supply security. They view resources as 
lucrative export commodities and a source of foreign 
exchange, and define criticality accordingly. In this 
context, Brazil and China, and to a limited degree 
Russia have identified certain critical minerals and 
metals. For Canada, the criticality of a mineral lies 
not so much in its scarcity as in its socio-economic 
importance for Canadian regions. 
Promoting Domestic Production of Raw Materials 
(Including Domestic Processing and Value Added) 
In virtually all G20 countries, government institutions 
and/or private-sector actors are engaged in explora-
tion activities. Given their promising resource endow-
ments, Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, South Africa, and the United States 
plan to expand domestic production of minerals 
and metals. France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States are also 
engaged in marine mineral exploration and the tech-
nological development of deep-sea mining. 
While Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, and 
South Africa have been actively promoting foreign 
direct investment for quite some time, Russia is now 
planning to cautiously open the sector to foreign 
investors while India aims at making the sector more 
investment-friendly in general. 
Australia and Indonesia have lost some of their 
appeal: Australia by imposing a mining tax of 30 per-
cent on corporate profits from iron ore and coal, 
Indonesia by tightening export restrictions on min-
erals and metals. In the United States, legislative 
efforts are under way to expedite the complex and 
lengthy licensing process. 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia 
actively encourage domestic processing of locally 
extracted raw materials. China and Indonesia have 
created regional development plans based on domes-
tic resource endowments. China in particular uses its 
wealth of raw materials to advance national develop-
ment and industrialization through a variety of assis-
tance activities. Russia and South Africa are planning 
to increase domestic value added by expanding domes-
tic processing. 
National Stockpiling 
China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United 
States store critical raw materials. In Japan, the pri-
vate sector is required by law to hold reserves. China, 
Japan, and South Korea stockpile to protect the 
domestic economy against sudden supply disruptions 
or unexpected price hikes, while the United States is 
motivated solely by national defense considerations. 
While China and Japan do not reveal which minerals 
and metals are held in reserve, South Korean and U.S. 
reserves are quite transparent. France, Germany, and 
the European Union have discussed the option of 
stockpiling, but so far rejected it for both practical 
reasons and fundamental considerations, fearing that 
it would rather fuel than resolve market distortions. 
Recycling 
Several countries are expanding their recycling in-
dustries to open up new sources of raw materials 
supply. China, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States have estab-
lished legal frameworks for their recycling industries. 
In the European Union, Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, the search 
for new recycling technologies is backed by publicly 
funded research programs. In Russia, the recycling of 
mining spoil is under discussion. 
Promoting Innovation  
(Substitutes and Resource Efficiency) 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey 
place no strong focus on promoting innovation in 
the resources sector. The other G-20 countries conduct 
research and development with different priorities, 
different degrees of intensity, and different govern-
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ment incentives and support. Research programs in 
the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States place strong emphasis on re-
source efficiency and recycling. Japan is particularly 
engaged in long-term research programs seeking sub-
stitutes for rare earth elements and other rare metals. 
Protecting the Environment and Workers 
All G20 countries have labor protection and environ-
mental laws for the mining sector, but there are 
wide differences in their reach and implementation. 
Unsurprisingly, enforcement is much more difficult 
in developing countries and emerging economies. 
Informal artisanal and small-scale mining, often with 
inhumane working conditions and environmental 
degradation, is particularly prevalent in Brazil, China, 
India, and Indonesia. Australia, Canada, the European 
Union, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States have commit-
ted themselves politically, in some cases even legally, 
to encourage or compel their industries to comply 
with labor and environmental standards in their min-
ing activities abroad. 
Investing in Foreign Raw Materials Sectors 
While several G20 governments support domestic 
companies involved in foreign direct investment in 
mining, very different instruments are used, and the 
intensity of the measures varies greatly depending on 
the country and investment project. China, France, 
India, Japan, and South Korea all have state-owned or 
quasi-governmental raw materials companies that 
explore for natural resources abroad. The govern-
ments of China, Japan, and South Korea sometimes 
provide the necessary mining infrastructure (trans-
port, energy, local health care, training of skilled 
workers). Export credit agencies in China, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the United 
Kingdom offer advantageous financing and guaran-
tees for investments abroad. 
Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, and South Korea 
pursue various forms of raw materials diplomacy to 
assist their companies. Some conclude bilateral trade 
agreements featuring strict rules on export barriers, 
while others establish resource partnerships with 
resource-rich countries. 
Export Restrictions 
Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Russia impose ex-
port tariffs and/or quotas to restrict raw material 
exports. China in particular makes use of a wide range 
of measures, restricting exports or increasing their 
price through export tariffs, export quotas, mandatory 
export licenses, compulsory minimum prices, and 
the suspension of value-added tax refunds. Indonesia 
is prohibiting the export of numerous unprocessed 
'%&	+%'&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sional 
export restrictions are imposed by India (export tariff 
on iron ore) and South Africa (export license obliga-
tion). These countries justify export restrictions in 
terms of resource protection, environmental protec-
tion, promoting domestic added value, or simply the 
need for government revenues. The European Union 
(also as the representative of France, Germany, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom), Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and 
the United States, try to curtail the use of export 
restrictions through bilateral and multilateral trade 
policy measures. 
Development Policy 
The OECD member states among the G20 are increas-
ingly directing their development policy toward the 
raw materials sector, as is China and – to an as yet 
very limited extent – India. Donor countries aim at 
1) developing the mining sector in the partner coun-
try; and 2) promoting sustainable development. They 
do so by providing financial and technical assistance 
and, in some cases, by incentivizing foreign direct 
investment by their own mining and refining com-
panies. The objective of sustainability is strongest in 
the development policies of the European G20 coun-
tries (Germany, France, United Kingdom), and the 
United States. Australia’s and Canada’s development 
cooperation in the raw materials sector goes hand in 
hand with the exploration and production activities 
of their national mining industries in Africa, Latin 
America, and the Asia-Pacific region. 
The three East Asian countries – China, Japan, and 
South Korea – rely most strongly on the combination 
of export promotion, direct investment, and develop-
ment cooperation, in particular when it comes to 
developing physical infrastructure. The leading objec-
tive in this case is to initiate market-based develop-
ment processes in the partner country. 
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Global Governance 
Most G20 countries are members of at least one inter-
national governance institution active in the mining 
sector. So far, however, none of them has explicitly 
argued in favor of stronger institutionalization, con-
solidation, or strengthening of these institutions, let 
alone the establishment of a new multilateral organi-
zation. Emerging economies and developing countries 
are particularly critical of such ambitions, which they 
interpret as an attempt by industrialized countries to 
curtail the economic and social development of the 
Global South. Canada and Australia, as major pro-
ducers, see no need for a new governance structure 
as they believe the markets function adequately. It is 
unlikely that the G20 will take up the issue under the 
Russian presidency (2013), given Russia’s preference 
for export restrictions. Whether Australia, which takes 
$<&	&	&+&%
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Q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on the agenda remains to be seen, as it prefers the 
G20 to focus on macroeconomic issues. But the biggest 
opponent of discussing the issue within the G20 is 
China. 
Transparency Initiatives 
The United States has assumed the role of a global 
pioneer in creating binding transparency obligations 
for revenue flows in the raw materials sector and due 
diligence in supply chains of so-called conflict min-
erals. Within the European Union, the Council and 
the European Parliament are currently negotiating 
such reporting obligations. One of the strongest 
advocates is France, whereas Germany and the United 
Kingdom are critical. Since the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission published its guidelines for 
reporting payments in the raw materials sector, the 
topic has been gathering momentum in other coun-
tries, such as Canada. Whether other G20 countries 
will join this trend remains questionable. Australia 
has not signaled any such intention, nor are emerging 
economies and developing countries likely to join 
soon. EITI has somewhat better chances of success. The 
%&<&	&&&=+$	&%&	
summit declarations, and Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States are stakeholders, Indonesia is a can-
didate. The United Kingdom has placed the EITI high 
&&%$8+	&+&%
=%, proposing all 
members to join the initiative as full members.9
But the most significant mining countries remain 
rather cautious, limiting the scope of the develop-
ment. 
 
 
 
 
9  The EITI differentiates between compliance countries, 
candidate countries, and stakeholders (countries civil society, 
and companies). To become a candidate country certain re-
quirements have to be met; to earn the status of compliance 
country, a validation process has to be completed. 
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Argentina 
Claudia Zilla 
 
Argentina has always regarded itself primarily as an 
agricultural country without any pronounced mining 
tradition. Indeed, mining companies long ignored the 
mineral deposits of the Argentine cordilleras, which 
have yet to be properly explored. The development of 
Argentine deposits only became attractive for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the context of growing de-
mand for raw materials during the last two decades. 
Moreover, legislative reforms of the 1990s laid the 
foundation for today’s mining market and ownership 
structure and attracted foreign capital. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
While Argentina belongs to the G20 members with 
small shares of world raw materials production and 
consumption, its potential is largely unknown but 
expected to be significant. The area where reserves are 
suspected covers 75,000 square kilometers, of which 
only 25 percent have been explored. Metal ores are 
concentrated in three areas of the Andes, the north-
west, Cuyo, and Patagonia, while production of non-
metallic minerals predominates in the northeast and 
center.1 Rising production is observed in particular 
with respect to copper, gold (as a by-product of copper 
production), lithium, and borax.2
 
1  Instituto para el Desarrollo Social Argentino (IDESA), La 
minería y su aporte al desarrollo económico nacional (Buenos Aires, 
December 2011), p. 20, http://www.idesa.org/sites/default/ 
files/Publicaciones/Informe_Mineria_COMPLETO 
PE-2.pdf (accessed October 15, 2012); based on Susan Wacas-
ter, “Argentina [Advance Release],” in USGS, 2009 Minerals Year-
book, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, February 2011), 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2009/myb3-
2009-ar.pdf (accessed October 15, 2012). 
 In 2009, Argentina 
was the world’s second-largest producer of borax and 
2  Jürgen Vasters, Peter Buchholz, Dieter Huy, Martin 
Schmitz, Simone Röhling, and Sven Altfelder, Rohstoff-
wirtschaftliche Bewertung der Länder Afrikas, Asiens, der Gemein-
schaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS) mit Georgien und Südamerikas 
im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung für Deutschland (Hannover: Bun-
desanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, Deutsche 
Rohstoffagentur, September 2010), http://www.bgr.bund.de/ 
DE/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/Downloads/laenderbewertung. 
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 (accessed November 19, 
2012). 
the fourth-largest producer of strontium (from 
celestine).3 In 2010, it was the world’s third-largest 
producer of lithium. Argentina (Puno region), 
Chile (Atacama Desert), and Bolivia (Uyuni) form the 
“Lithium Triangle” that, according to official sources, 
holds 90 percent of known global lithium reserves. 
Argentina alone holds 22 percent of global reserves,5 
and in 2009 was the region’s second-largest producer 
after Chile, accounting for 11 percent of world pro-
duction (2,220 tonnes). A single company, Minera del 
Altiplano, accounts for the entire lithium production.6 
The process used here is particularly economical 
(vaporization of brine) and of great relevance for the 
automobile industry, motivating car manufacturers 
and suppliers to acquire shares in mining companies.7
In terms of value, gold mining is most important 
for Argentina, followed by copper and silver. Argen-
tina was the world’s fourteenth-largest producer of 
gold in 2010, +	&$8&	
&%4	$=
tonnes),
 
 and tenth-largest silver producer, with a 
share of 3 per
&%4	$%$%%&+`#9
The mining sector has grown modestly since the 
mid-+#+&+'&$
$%	X&#&	
&%$8
 Copper is 
comparatively insignificant with a global share of 1 
percent. 
 
3  Wacaster, “Argentina [Advance Release]” (see note 1), p. 2.1. 
4  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
5  Minsterio de Planificación Federal, Inversión Pública y 
Servicios, El gobierno nacional y su política mineraQ\=QQ
^""#'%%#$X#	"%$+"-el-gobierno-nacional-y-
su-poltica-minera (accessed August 26, 2012). While other 
sources mention smaller shares, they all agree on the great 
strategic significance of the “Lithium Triangle.” 
6  While sources such as IDESA (2011, see note 1) and Engi-
neering and Mining Journal (E&MJ), ed., Argentina Mining, 
October 2010, p. Q^""#X	&$	+#
$'"'%" 
reports/EMJ-Argentina2010.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012) 
estimate the lithium reserves in the tri-state area to make 
up &+&	
&%$8$$X	&+&	<&+Q& German-
	&%%&*'X&	$8*$''&	
&	&
$	+$%=&	
&%# 
7  For example, Toyota owns 25 percent of Sales Jujuy. 
8  BMWFJ, World Mining Data 2012 (see note ). 
9  Ibid. 
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Argentine GDP (2009, goods and services),10 and 3.1 
percent of exports. As an enclave sector detached from 
the domestic value chain but closely linked to global 
markets, mining was almost completely unaffected 
by Argentina’s economic crisis of 2001/02.11 The raw 
materials sector grew increasingly dynamically in 
2003–2010, fueled by major FDI inflows from twenty 
different countries. By 2010, the Ministry of Federal 
Planning, Public Investments, and Services (Ministerio 
de Planificación Federal, Inversiones Públicas y Ser-
vicios) had registered 570 mining projects (exploration 
and production).12
In 2010, gold, copper, and aluminum were Argen-
tina’s fifth-largest export category, after oil seeds 
and oleaginous fruits, vehicles, petrochemicals, and 
grain.
 The magnitude of exploration 
activity suggests further expansion of this economic 
sector. 
13 Aluminum, which is produced domestically 
from imported bauxite is the second most important 
export in this sector after gold. The value of mining 
exports increased by 753 percent between 1993 and 
2009,15 and because it creates a trade surplus the min-
ing sector represents an important source of foreign 
exchange. However, most mining products are ex-
ported unprocessed, leaving domestic manufacturing 
dependent on imports of processed and finished 
products. As rising world market prices stoked the 
global mining boom, numerous international cor-
porations expanded their activities into Argentina, 
with Canadian, Australian, and American firms lead-
ing the way. Of more than 1,100 registered mining 

$'%&+$%=&	&
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<&%#16
 
10  Wacaster, “Argentina [Advance Release]” (see note 
 Of 
	&+&	&
$'%&+Q&	
&%	&
		&%=X&%
1), 
p. 2.1; Vasters et al., Rohstoffwirtschaftliche Bewertung (see 
note 2), p. 37. 
11  Gaspar Tolón Estarelles, Situación actual de la minería en 
la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [FES] 
Argentina/Asociación de economía para el desarrollo de la 
argentina [AEDA], 2011), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ 
	&%%&%"#84

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
12  Data for 2003–2010 from Minsterio de Planificación 
Federal, Inversión Pública y Servicios, El gobierno nacional 
(see note 5). 
13  IDESA, La minería y su aporte al desarrollo económico nacional 
(see note 1), pp. 59f. 
14  Deutsch-Argentinische Industrie- und Handelskammer 
(AHK), Bergbau in Argentinien (Buenos Aires, 2011), http://www. 
ahkbrasil.com/pdf_public/CE_fm_Fact%20Sheet%20Bergbau_
#84

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
15  IDESA, La minería y su aporte al desarrollo económico nacional 
(see note 1), p. 22. 
16  Ibid., p. 91. 
established or conducting exploratory projects. Only 
&	
&%$8&
$'%&+re already operating. 
&	&'%%&	
&%	&
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%%
interest in exploration. Large-scale (metal) mining 
projects dominate (“mega mining”), largely as open-
cast operations. 
The Raw Materials Policy 
Institutional Setting 
The 
$%+$%	&8$	'$8<&&%$%
state and the provinces ownership of Argentina’s 
subsurface mineral resources.17
The mining sector is not very well positioned insti-
tutionally. A second-tier department, namely a secre-
tariat (Secretaría de Minería) within the Ministry of 
Federal Planning, Public Investments, and Services, is 
responsible for mining matters at the federal level.
 As a federal country, 
almost all Argentina’s non-maritime territory is 
divided into provinces, and provincial governments 
are almost entirely in charge of issuing exploration 
and mining licenses. 
 
The Mining Secretariat consists of two directorates, 
the National Directorate of Mining (Dirección Nacio-
nal de Minería) and the Directorate of Strategic Re-
gional Planning (Dirección Nacional de Planificación 
Estratégica Regional). The Geological and Mining Sur-
vey (Servicio Geológico Minero Argentino, SEGEMAR) 
as a technical/scientific agency is also part of the 
Mining Secretariat.19
 
17  *$%+
%!
$%QQ	#^*$		&+$%&+
provincias el dominio originario de los recursos naturales 
existentes en su territorio.” Previously, due to ambiguities 
in the old constitution, some mineral resources had been 
national property, others provincial property. 
 Two parliamentary committees 
deal with mining matters: the Chamber of Representa-
tives Committee on Mining and the Senate Committee 
18  The federal Division for the Environment and Sustainable 
Development also has the status of a secretariat, However, it 
is assigned to the presidential office (Secretaría de Ambiente y 
Desarrollo Sustentable, under Jefatura de Gabinete de Minis-
tros). 
19  Servicio Geológico Minero Argentino, http://www. 
segemar.gov.ar (accessed August 27, 2012). The Mining Sec-
retariat is also responsible for a coal company in the prov-
ince of Santa Cruz, the Yacimientos Carboníferos Rio Turbio 
(YCRT). This successor to Yacimientos Carboníferos Fisca-
les 4*>	<&%`+&%%&	8&&	
administration in 2010. 
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26 
on Mining, Energy, and Fuels.20 Agencies responsible 
for regulating mineral resources in the fifteen prov-
inces are represented in the Federal Mining Council 
(Consejo Federal de Minería, COFEMIN), which advises 
the secretariat for mining on sectoral policy.21
Private sector interests are organized in various 
associations, such as the Argentine Mining Chamber 
(Cámara de Empresarios Mineros, CAM) and the Group 
of Exploring Mining Companies of Argentina (Grupo 
de Empresas Mineras Exploradoras de la República 
Argentina, GEMERA). These prefer direct communica-
tion with the federal and provincial executive branch, 
which is usually more open to their concerns than 
Congress. The Argentine Union of Mineworkers (Aso-
ciación Obrera Minera Argentina, AOMA) represents 
workers in the sector.
 
22
In terms of key actors and institutions, the politi-
cal context is as follows: The governments of Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2011 and 2011–2015) 
have promoted the mining sector (through weak and 
thus investment-friendly national regulation) with the 
support of many provincial leaders who are politically 
close to the federal government. The Supreme Court 
of Argentina is considered “green,” giving ecological 
concerns better chances of success in court (for an 
example see “Evaluation and Outlook”, pp. 
 
f.). 
Concepts and Strategies 
Four national laws are relevant for the mining sector: 
the Mining Code (Código de Minería),23
 
20  Honorable Cámara de Diputados, Comisión de Minería, 
http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/comisiones/permanentes/cmineria/ 
index.html (accessed August 17, 2012); Senado de la Nación 
Argentina, Comisión de Minería, Energía y Combustibles, http:// 
www.senado.gov.ar/web/comisiones/cominfogral.php?nro_ 
c$'+$%4

&++&##`# 
 the Mining 
21  See also Instituto Correntino del Agua y del Ambiente 
4*`Q^""#
#$<#	"4

&++&+Q
2012). 
22  Asociación Obrera Minera Argentina (AOMA), http://www. 
aomaosam.org.ar (accessed August 27, 2012). 
23  The Mining Code was passed by the National Congress on 
!$<&'X&	QQ%+X&&%'&%&+&<&	'&+#
The last significant changes were made in 1995: Actualiza-
ción Minera (Ley No##`%	$&

%'X&%4&=
#`#&*$%+tution stipulates a single Mining Code 
providing the framework for the entire country. The prov-
inces are responsible for regulation. Secretaría de Minería 
de la Nación, Código de Minería – Legislación Minera y Tributaria, 
http://www.mineria.gov.ar/codigominero.htm (accessed 
August 13, 2012). 
Investment Law (Ley de Inversiones Mineras No. 24.196, 
1993), the General Law on the Environment (Ley General del 
Ambiente No. 25.675, 2003), and the Glacier Protection Law 
(Ley de Presupuestos Mínimos para la Preservación de los 
Glaciares y del Ambiente Periglacial No. 26.639, 2010). 
The first (and thus far only) National Mining Plan 
was ++&%	%&	&+&%
=$8!+$	
Kirchner. More declarative than strategically detailed, 
it puts forward the objectives of giving mining policy 
a longer-term national status, establishing a stable 
environment to promote investment, developing a 
national production model, and advancing regional 
integration, international cooperation, and public 
transparency. The plan does not list strategic or 
critical minerals.25
The regulatory framework for mining dates back to 
the neoliberal 1990s, and is therefore aligned with the 
strongly market-led “Washington Consensus.”
 
26
The state (generally at province level) issues explo-
ration and production licenses, whose recipients are 
entitled to treat their mines as private property. Min-
ing licenses are granted on a first come, first served 
basis, where the person who discovers a deposit is 
given permission to mine. The concessions are exclu-
sive and indefinite, and can be sold by contract. They 
are granted free of charge, with a regular fee (canon) 
and minimum investment within a certain timeframe 
required to keep the concession.
 The 
objective at the time was to create legal security and 
fiscal and trade incentives to attract FDI and to pro-
mote exports. Although Cristina Fernández de Kirch-
ner has taken interventionist measures in many sec-
tors, she is regarded as supportive of the mining 
industry, which has so far been spared from stronger 
regulation. 
27
 
24  Minsterio de Planificación Federal, Inversión Pública 
y Servicios, El gobierno nacional (see note 
 
5). 
25  Only uranium is defined as a strategic material on 
grounds of security and is subject to a number of special 
rules. 
26  One objective of the “Washington Consensus” was the dis-
posal (sale, privatization, etc.) of national property (including 
non-renewable natural resources) as a strategy to improve 
public finances. 
27  

$	%$!$##$%&$	&%'&%$'%&-
ro,” there are three levels of fee according to the type of min-
%^QQ%	&%%&&+$+&	=&	#+
$<&	&	+
of deposits are exempt for three years. The area assigned for 
exploration purposes may not exceed 10,000 hectares and 
one person may not own more than twenty concessions 
(200,000 hectares) in any one province. There is a one-off fee 
$8	&%%&&+$+&	&
	&+&
	&	&
Minería de la Nación, Código de Minería (see note 23). 
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The provinces also set and collect royalties (regalías), 
with the Mining Investment Law defining a ceiling 
of 3 percent of value “at the pit head” (boca de mina). 
Mining investments are not subject to any special 
conditions or authorization requirements. Before 
exploration or production starts, an environmental 
impact assessment (“Informe de Impacto Ambiental”) 
must be submitted to the respective provincial author-
ity, which rules on environmental compatibility (“Dec-
laración de Impacto Ambiental”). The environmental 
impact assessment must be renewed every two years. 
The General Law on the Environment sets minimum 
national standards for environmental protection, but 
the provinces may implement their own more restric-
tive rules ranging from banning surface mining or 
the use of cyanide to the complete prohibition of all 
mining activities. The provinces are also responsible 
for establishing agencies to implement and monitor 
mining legislation and for fiscal and environmental 
matters concerning mining. 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
National Level 
The Argentine mining sector is privately owned and 
dominated by international companies. The govern-
ment is not authorized to conduct production activi-
ties itself, so mining must operate through conces-
sions. Domestic and foreign investments must be 
treated equally. Foreign investors (natural persons and 
corporate entities) are allowed to transfer their net 
profits abroad without restrictions. Except for nuclear 
materials, all minerals may be traded freely at home 
and abroad. The mining sector enjoys numerous fis-
cal benefits, for instance applying to the import of 
machines and machine parts. Moreover, a stable tax 
burden is guaranteed for a thirty-year period, and the 
value added tax regime (Régimen de Financiamiento y 
Devolución del IVA, Ley No. 24.402Q`8<$	+	
+&+
of capital goods for mining. 
Several national initiatives in 2012 sought to har-
monize provincial mining policies by involving the 
federal government, in particular dealing with in-
creasing protests against mining and granting the 
provincial governments greater economic participa-
tion in mining activities. In the context of increasing 
resistance to mining projects in different regions, ten 
governors of mining provinces founded the Federal 
Organization of Mining States (Organización Federal 
de Estados Mineros, OFEMI) in February 2012. A month 
later they signed the Federal Agreement on Mining 
Development (Acuerdo Federal para el Desarrollo Minero), 
demanding, in accordance with the position of the 
federal government, the creation of state-owned pro-
vincial enterprises (that engage in exploration and 
production and share in the respective profits) and the 
institution of local infrastructure funds.
International Level 
 
International coordination in the mining sector is 
weak. Existing institutions possess few governance 
functions and are more discussion forums than con-
vergence mechanisms. Argentina is one of the seven-
teen members of the Latin American Mining Organi-
zation (Organismo Latinoamericano de Minería, 
]`Q8$%&%#29 The OLAMI secretariat is 
headquartered in the province of Buenos Aires,30
Argentina and Chile jointly run the world’s first 
cross-border mining scheme, launched with two 
specific projects in the Andean border region (Argen-
tine province San Juan and Chilean Atacama region). 
The production of copper and molybdenum in El 
Pachón and gold and silver in Pascua-Lama led the 
two governments in 1997 and 1999 to sign a treaty 
on mining integration and complementation, which 
entered into force in 2000.
 with 
sectoral actors (labor unions, companies, government 
agencies, universities, etc.) represented in its national 
coordination units. Within the Southern Common 
Market (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR), the 
Mining and Geology Working Subgroup (Subgrupo 
de Trabajo No. 15) of the Mercosur Council (Consejo 
Mercado Común) deals with raw materials production. 
31
 
28  The document was signed by the governors of the prov-
inces Jujuy, Salta, La Rioja, San Juan, Mendoza, Neuquén, 
Rio Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, and Catamarca. 
 International initiatives 
29  The member states of OLAMI are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
30  OLAMI, http://www.olami.org.ar (accessed August 17, 
2012). 
31  The “Tratado de integración y complemantación minera 
entre Argentina y Chile” relaxed a number of regulations. It 
ensures free movement of persons and goods between Argen-
tina and Chile, exempting them from customs laws, but both 
countries may continue to apply their own environmental, 
labor, health, and other legislation. Workers only pay taxes in 
the country in which they are employed. Investors may use 
all available natural resources (such as water) needed to con-
duct mining activities. A binational administrative disputes 
committee was established. Estarelles, Situación actual de la 
minería en la Argentina (see note 11), pp. 13f. 
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such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Ini-
tiative (EITI) are largely ignored in Argentina.32
Evaluation and Outlook 
 The 
Kirchner government is skeptical of such “regimes 
from the North,” and participation in EITI is often 
rejected on the grounds that the country has nothing 
to hide. Argentine subsidiaries of international cor-
porations (such as Xstrata Pachon S.A. and supplier 
Eco Minera S.A.) participate in the Global Compact, 
as does the San Juan province chamber of mining 
(Cámara Minera de San Juan). The Argentine Chamber 
of Mining Companies (CAEN) is a member of the Inter-
national Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) and 
Argentina is also a member of the Common Fund for 
Commodities (CFC) and the Intergovernmental Forum 
on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Devel-
opment. 
Argentina is a relatively recent mining country and 
has to date explored only a fraction of its potential. 
In the new millennium the mining sector has seen 
extremely dynamic developments, with exponential 
growth in the number of exploration projects in-
dicating further expansion to come. While the fed-
eral government and many provincial governments 
strongly promote mining and increasingly seek to 
acquire a share of the returns, organized civil society 
groups and parts of the population in mining regions 
express strong reservations over social and environ-
mental issues. Several anti-mining mobilizations have 
been successful. The mining debate in Argentina is 
still at a nascent stage, with four key aspects dominat-
ing the discussion. 
First, in the context of a strongly ideology-driven 
discussion, there is a lack of technical institutions 
with the necessary capacity, competence, and legiti-
macy to conduct independent, reliable evaluations 
on behalf of various actors and parties. The relevant 
departments and agencies are regarded as poorly 
equipped and biased (pro-mining), and therefore 
the public does not see them as reliable sources of 
information, responsible regulators, or neutral 
mediators. Existing legislation limits the regulatory 
 
32  In Latin America, Peru is a member of EITI and Guatemala 
a candidate. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), http://eiti.org/countries (accessed August 25, 2012). 
role of government.33
The second key aspect is environmental protection. 
Most Argentine mines are in the Andes, the source of 
numerous rivers that represent an important water 
supply for the population and for several branches of 
agriculture.
 For example, companies may 
hire any consultancy they wish (without any registra-
tion procedure) to conduct the environmental impact 
assessment. The assessment is then evaluated by a 
provincial body (usually as a desk review) following 
bureaucratic and political rather than scientific prin-
ciples. Environment departments have virtually no 
influence on mining policy, and ecological factors are 
therefore mostly neglected. 
 The case of glacier protection is para-
digmatic for the ecological dimension of the mining 
debate. The law regulating mining activities in glacial 
%&	
$%&++8%=++&%%
second, revised version (Ley 26.639), two years after 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner vetoed the 
first (Decree 1837/08) as too restrictive for the mining 
industry. In a case brought by Canadian mining com-
pany Barrik Gold (with support from employers’ asso-
ciations and trade unions) in the mining province San 
Juan, a federal judge struck down key provisions on 
the basis that the law was insufficiently precise and 
created legal uncertainty that violated the company’s 
rights.35 However, in July 2012 the Supreme Court 
revoked the injunction, declared the Law for the Preser-
vation of the Glaciers valid in its entirety, and demanded 
a glacier inventory as the basis for its implementation. 
In 2003 a mobilization against the expansion of a sur-
face gold and silver mine owned by Meridian Gold 
(Canada) in Esquel (Chubut province) led to a referen-
dum that stopped the mining activities. And in Anda-
lagá (Catamarca province) groups campaigned against 
the Agua Rica project (gold, copper, and molybdenum 
production) of BHP Minerals (Australia).36
Thirdly, the debate is loaded with issues of extrac-
tivism and enclave economies. In Argentina, pro-
duction of raw materials (especially metals) by inter-
 
 
33  For example, Ley No. #4`'&%%&]%%
Code, http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/cmineria/ley_ 
#'4

&++&+Q`# 
34  IDESA, La minería y su aporte al desarrollo económico nacional 
(see note 1), pp. 92f. 
35  Adrian Ventura, “La Corte respaldó la plena vigencia de la 
ley de glaciares,” La NaciónQ\=QQ^""#%
$%# 

$'#	"-la-corte-respaldo-la-plena-vigencia-de-la-ley-de-
glaciares (accessed August 27, 2012). 
36  IDESA, La minería y su aporte al desarrollo económico nacional 
(see note 1), pp. 113f. 
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national mining companies is mainly for export, 
whereas most of the minerals needed on the domestic 
market must be reimported after processing abroad. 
In this situation of “threefold external dependence” 
(on foreign capital, raw material exports, and pro-
cessed mineral imports), the arguments of extrac-
tivism37 and enclave economies have been at the 
forefront of criticism of mining in Argentina.39
The fourth point concerns local development, 
where it is widely observed that those local communi-
ties that are worst affected by the environmental 
damage of mining also profit least in economic terms. 
Of all taxes and duties paid by export-oriented mining 
companies, the federal government collects around 90 
percent, with the provinces – which own the resources 
– receiving less than 10 percent. The share received by 
the departments (the tier below the province), where 
mining projects are located is often less than 3 per-
cent.
 

Generally, national and mining-region govern-
ments rely one-sidedly on promoting FDI in the min-
 Argentina lacks significant positive experience 
in the establishment of trust funds, revenue sharing, 
participatory development plans, and other mecha-
nisms for the redistribution of resource rents. It is 
questionable whether recent initiatives by the federal 
and provincial governments to create state-owned 
enterprises that participate in the production process 
and receive a share of profits will transfer the benefits 
of the resource rents to the citizens of mining regions. 
 
37  Extractivism is a development strategy that aims at maxi-
mum exploitation of raw materials (and agricultural land), 
to export resources with little or no processing in order to 
secure foreign currency. 
38  Enclave economies are based on the transfer of resources 
to extraterritorial actors without the establishment of signifi-
cant endogenous production. Classifying the mining sector 
as an enclave economy refers to a situation where sectoral 
production logic becomes detached from the local produc-
tion cycle. 
39  For a fundamental critique, see Maristella Svampa and 
Mariana Antonelli, eds., Minería transnacional, narrativas del 
desarrollo y resistencias sociales (Buenos Aires, 2009). 
40  While estimates of the actual distribution of mining 
revenues vary, all agree on the basic weighting (central state 
 provinces  departments). Daniel Gonzalo Jerez and Hugo 
Nielson, Análisis de la situación actual y aspectos a considerer en la 
discusión de las cuestiones tributarias de la minería en la Argentina, 
May 2012, http://www.olami.org.ar/archivos/publicaciones/ 
CUESTIONES%20TRIBUTARIAS%20DE%20LA%20MINER%C3% 
!!!.pdf (accessed August 20, 2012); 
“Reclaman una mejor distribución delos impuestos a la 
minería,” El Inversor Energético & MineroQ&
&'X&	QQ
^""#&	$%&+#%&"%$
#&&
& 
&8	4

&++&+Q`# 
ing sector, and more recently also on receiving a 
larger share of the mining rent. 
The possibilities for citizens to obtain information 
or participate in mining issues are generally ex-
tremely weak, with mistrust and confrontation 
dominating the process. The potential for conflict is 
growing because legal, political, and social aspects are 
disregarded, civil society actors are not duly involved, 
and institutional measures that could balance inter-
ests and settle disputes are not implemented. This 
situation is thus the opposite of the stable environ-
ment and legal certainty that the federal government 
and many provincial governments want to offer 
foreign investors. 
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Australia 
Gitta Lauster 
 
Australia is very well-endowed with a wide range 
of raw materials and has benefited greatly from the 
sharp rise in resource prices. Its economy has recorded 
constant growth rates for more than twenty years. 
With a relatively small domestic manufacturing sector 
and extensive resource production, Australia produces 
resources primarily for export, especially to Asian 
countries, with processing largely done abroad. The 
Australian government is therefore seeking to sup-
port domestic resource processing in order to increase 
national added value and reduce vulnerability to 
world market developments. It has no formalized and 
comprehensive resource strategy, but has committed 
itself to developing measures to diminish the risk of 
“resource curse” in an imbalanced economy. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Australia stands out globally as the second-largest 
mining nation and one of the most important raw 
materials exporters. Always having been a major 
exporter, the country’s significance for international 
markets has grown still further in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Currently, Australia is experiencing its biggest 
mining boom in over 150 years.1
Australia possesses extensive and profitable mineral 
and metal resources, which make up an important 
share of its exports. According to Geoscience Australia 
(whose data is also used by the USGS), Australia has 
<&	=+%8
%'$%+$8	&4#&	
&%$8
%$%$X	&+&	<&+`Q	
$%'4#&	
&%`Q%-
'4#&	
&%`Q&4#&	
&%`Q%
&4#
percent), zinc (25.1 percent), industrial diamonds 
(23.5 percent), bauxit&4#&	
&%`Q	$%$	&4#
per
&%`Q
$X4#&	
&%`Q%$4#&	-
cent).
 
2
 
1  Robert G. Gregory, Then and Now: Reflections on Two Australian 
Mining Booms, IZA Discussion Paper 5969, September 2011, 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5969.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
 #&	
&%$8$X	$
$%$8%$%-
energy raw materials (by weight), Australia numbers 
among the main G20 producers of minerals and 
2  Geoscience Australia, Australia‘s Identified Mineral Resources 
2011, April 3, 2012, p. 6, https://www.ga.gov.au/image_cache/ 
GA20563.pdf (accessed April 29, 2012). 
metals. It is one of the leading producers and 
exporters of iron and ferro-alloy metals, most non-
ferrous metals, and precious metals as well as many 
industrial minerals. Beside their quantity, the quality 
of Australian resources must be noted. For instance, 
Australian iron ore has a particularly high iron con-
tent (more than 60 percent), comparable to ores from 
Brazil, South Africa, and India.3 Australia is also the 
leading producer of bauxite (36.5 percent of global 
	$
$%`Q%'4#&	
&%`Q%	
$%'
4#percent), and ranks second in production of lead 
4#&	
&%`Q	$%$	&4#&	
&%`Q$4#&	-

&%`Q'4#&	
&%`Q%'%%&+&4#
percent). While the Australian recycling industry is 
mostly directed towards waste management, indus-
trial recycling of metals and minerals takes place in 
various states and territories.5
Strong global demand for raw materials has stimu-
lated exploration and led to the discovery of signifi-
cant reserves of iron ore, cobalt, gold, copper, nickel, 
and rare earth elements.
 
6
 
3  Richard O’Brien, Australia’s Iron Ore Product Quality, Geo-
science Australia, 2009, http://www.australianminesatlas. 
gov.au/mapping/files/australianironorequality.pdf (accessed 
September 7, 2012). 
 Besides increased produc-
tion of the important high-grade iron ore, extraction 
of rare earth elements may bring economic gains. 
Lynas has discovered the world’s second-largest depo-
sit of rare earth elements at Mount Weld (the largest 
deposit is in Chinese Inner Mongolia). A concentration 
plant has already begun operations at Mount Weld, 
4  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
5  Planet Ark, “History of Australian Recycling,” http:// 
recyclingweek.planetark.org/recycling-info/history.cfm 
(accessed September 25, 2012). 
6  Australian Government, Bureau of Resources and Energy 
Economics, Mining Industry: Major Projects, April 2012, p. 1, 
http://bree.gov.au/documents/publications/resources/Mining-
Industry-Major-Projects.pdf (accessed May 27, 2012); Minerals 
Council of Australia, Quarterly Economic Brief, autumn 2012, 
p. 5, http://www.minerals.org.au/file_upload/files/ 
publications/MCA_Quarterly_Economic_Brief_Autumn_ 
2012.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
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and Lynas planned to locate processing in Malaysia.7 
While massive opposition by environmental activists 
and local communities repeatedly postponed the 
opening of the Malaysian plant, Lynas obtained a 
temporary two-year license in September 2012,9 
and the local court rejected all further objections 
in November 2012.10
With a strong extractive sector, Australia can 
generally satisfy its domestic industrial demand 
and export up to 95 percent of its mining products. 
Processing mainly takes place abroad, with only about 
30 percent of Australian-produced energy and metals 
consumed at home.
 
11 ]%&	&$	+
$%	X&#
percent of Australia’s GDP in 2010,12 representing 
60 percent of all exports of goods and services in 2010/ 
2011, with a rising trend.13 The largest share of ex-
ports goes to Asian markets: 30 percent to China, 
25 percent to Japan, and about 10 percent to South 
Korea.
Australian mining companies are all private-sector. 
Alongside mining giants like the British-Australian 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, these are often subsidiaries 
of European or North American firms, like Swiss-based 
 
 
7  Lynas Corporation Ltd., Concentration Plant, http://www. 
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April 29, 2012); “Australien könnte Markt für Seltene Erden 
beleben,” GTAI, Nove'X&	QQ^""##&"" 
!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'4
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April 29, 2012). 
8  Graeme Irvine, “Lynas on Hold for a Week,” Pro Edge Wire, 
September 25, 2012, http://proedgewire.com/rare-earth-intel/ 
lynas-on-hold-for-a-week/ (accessed September 26, 2012). 
9  Petaling Jaya, “Lynas Gets Temporaty Operating Licence,” 
The Star, September 5, 2012, http://thestar.com.my/news/ 
+$	=#+8&""""%$%"+&
%$%
(accessed November 7, 2012). 
10  Esther Tanquintic-Misa, “Lynas Prevails: Malaysia Kuan-
tan Court Junks Legal Action for 2nd Time,” Commodities and 
Futures, November 15, 2012, http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/ 
""'=+-australia-lynas-rare-earths-
court.htm#.UKts3tcvPDa (accessed November 20, 2012). 
11  For minerals alone, the figure is even smaller; Michael 
Sauermost, “Rohstoffe bleiben Australiens ‘Lebensversiche-
rung,’” GTAI, April 13, 2012, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/ 
!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'4

&++&
October 10, 2012). 
12  Pui-Kwan Tse, “Australia [Advance Release],” in USGS, 
2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International 
(Reston, December 2011), p. 3.1, http://minerals.usgs.gov/ 
minerals/pubs/country/2010/myb3-2010-as.pdf (accessed 
April 22, 2012). 
13  Minerals Council of Australia, Quarterly Economic Brief 
(see note 6), p. 1. 
14  Sauermost, “Rohstoffe bleiben Australiens ‘Lebens-
versicherung’” (see note 11). 
Xstrata’s Xstrata Nickel Australia Pty Ltd. Joint ven-
tures are common, for instance the aluminum smelter 
run by Australia’s Bauxite Resources Ltd. and the Chi-
nese Yankuang Group Corp.15 Many smaller mining 
companies are also headquartered in Australia, which 
is very popular among foreign investors. This applies 
in particu	$&+&	%+	Q$'&$+$'&
percent of Australian production,16 which is reputed 
to have a very attractive investment environment and 
ranks twelfth (out of 93 countries and regions) in the 
Fraser Institute’s Policy Potential Index.17
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
Australia’s mineral rights are owned by the Crown 
but administered by the six states (New South Wales, 
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, 
and Western Australia) and two territories (Northern 
Territory und Australian Capital Territory). The fed-
eral state may intervene in cases of “national interest,” 
but may not discriminate against any state or terri-
tory.19
Nationally, the Department of Resources, Energy 
and Tourism (RET) is largely responsible for resource 
policy. In July 2011, the Bureau of Resources and 
Energy Economics (BREE) was created within the RET 
to conduct independent research and policy advice.
 
20
 
15  Tse, “Australia [Advance Release]” (see note 
 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is 
responsible for international cooperation, including 
summit forums like the G20. The Council of Austra-
lian Governments (COAG) is another important actor 
in the raw materials sector, coordinating political 
reforms that involve national interests. Its member-
12), p. 3.3. 
16  Michael Sauermost, “Bergbausektor bleibt Australiens 
Wachstumsmotor,” GTAI, April 21, 2011, http://www.gtai.de/ 
GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/maerkte,did=79160.html (accessed 
May 27, 2012). 
17  Fred McMahon and Miguel Cervantes, Survey of Mining 
Companies 2011/2012, Fraser Institute, February 2012, p. 11, 
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/ 
Content/research-news/research/publications/mining- 
survey-2011-2012.pdf (accessed May 26, 2012). 
18  At some points “states” is used to refer to both states 
and territories. 
19  Tse, “Australia [Advance Release]” (see note 12), p. 3.2. 
20  Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE), 
“About,” http://www.bree.gov.au/about/about.html (accessed 
September 7, 2012). 
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ship consists of the Prime Minister, the leaders of 
the states and territories, and the president of the 
Australian Local Government Association (ALGA).21 
The Australian trade commission, Austrade, supports 
the international activities of Australian companies 
and works to attract foreign direct investment and 
promote international educational exchanges.22 The 
Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID) is responsible for international cooperation 
and is known for its Mining for Development program 
that seeks to develop mining industries in developing 
countries.23
The geological survey, Geoscience Australia, is run 
by RET and responsible for resource exploration and 
providing research and data for businesses. Geo-
science Australia provides information regardless of 
the nationality of the corporation seeking advice.
 
 
Scientific advice for Australian firms, communities, 
and state and federal governments is also supplied by 
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation.25 Regional employers’ associations 
like the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western 
Australia also provide Australian politicians and busi-
nesses with helpful information.26
Australia has a powerful mining lobby operating at 
the local and national level. It is exceptionally well-
funded, including as it does several mining giants and 
individual mining magnates that are all strongly 
committed to the industry’s interests.
 
27
 
21  Council of Australian Governments (COAG), “About 
COAG,” http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag (accessed Sep-
tember 25, 2012). 
 The Minerals 
Council of Australia, for instance, was reported to 
have played an important role in the failure of the 
national government’s first attempt to implement 
a new resource tax, the Resource Super Profits Tax 
22  Austrade, “About Us,” http://www.austrade.gov.au/ 
About-Austrade/default.aspx (accessed September 25, 2012). 
23  AusAID, “Mine Action,” http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ 
aidissues/mineaction/Pages/home.aspx (accessed September 
25, 2012). 
24  Interview at Geoscience Australia, July 2012. 
25  Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Orga-
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^""#
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26  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, 
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27  Perry Williams and Jonathan Barrett, “You Know I’m 
Right: Rinehart,” Financial ReviewQ&&'X&	QQ^"" 
afr.com/p/business/resources/fighting_taxes_isn_self_ 
interest_wNnln6DX8AtaYGEAEIWJN (accessed September 
7, 2012); Forbes, “Georgina Rinehart,” March 2012, http:// 
www.forbes.com/profile/georgina-rinehart/ (accessed 
September 7, 2012). 
(RSPT). The Council was the initiator of a massive 
media campaign in 2010.
Concepts and Strategies 
 
Australian raw materials policy has been strongly 
determined by the country’s long history as a net 
exporter, and is thus slanted towards distinctly dif-
ferent goals than those of resource-dependent coun-
tries with strong industrial sectors. Although there 
is no single comprehensive document identifying 
critical materials or providing a long-term strategy, 
various documents and studies, including COAG 
papers,29 provide sectoral recommendations, for 
instance on the rights of the central state vis-à-vis the 
states and territories. However, these are less compre-
hensive than the strategic documents and criticality 
analyses prepared in the United States, the European 
Union, and Germany.30 The relevant ministries regard 
the national resource strategy as including measures 
to attract investment in competition with other 
regions, supplying the necessary skilled labor, main-
taining productivity, and ensuring the continuing 
profitability of exports. The central state will only 
intervene in the markets if the national interest is 
endangered. This was the case, for instance, when the 
state-owned China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining (Group) 
Co. sought to purchase a controlling 51.6 percent 
share in Lynas Corp., which was opposed by the 
Australian Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB).31
The national government also intervenes to avoid 
production bottlenecks and maintain efficiency in the 
 
 
28  Ben Hills, “Captain Hooke,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 30, 
2012, http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewDocument.ac; 
jsessionid=* >> >** 6BB71?page=1&sy= 
afr&kw=director&pb=none&dt=selectRange&dr=1month&so=
relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=150&rm=200&sp=nrm& 
clsPage=1&docID=]¡*  (accessed Septem-
ber 7, 2012); ABC Local, “Mitch Hooke, CEO of the Minerals 
Council of Australia,” March 2, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/ 
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2012). 
29  Interviews with representatives of RET, July 2012. 
30  “Australia Lacks Resources Strategy, Liveris,” Neos-
kosmos.com, May 11, 2011, http://neoskosmos.com/news/en/ 
australia-lacks-resources-strategy-liveris (accessed August 
26, 2012). 
31  Rebecca Keenan, “Australia Blocked Rare Earth Deal on 
Supply Concerns,” Bloomberg, February 15, 2011, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-"+	ia-blocked-china-rare-
earth-takeover-on-concern-of-threat-to-supply.html (accessed 
September 7, 2012). 
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extractive sector, and has in the past undertaken great 
efforts, for instance to expand port capacity in New 
South Wales, Queensland, and Western Australia.32 
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in the broader resources sector (including oil and gas), 
this also benefits employment.33 However, the num-
bers employed in the mining business itself are con-
siderably smaller, accentuating the problem of eco-
nomic imbalances. Large amounts of capital and labor 
are required to build a new mine, but only a small 
workforce is eventually needed to operate most mines. 
A sectoral lack of skilled labor is another challenge. 
Critics of Australia’s raw materials policy fear that the 
country may be moving toward deindustrialization or 
suffering the “Dutch disease” (although the latter’s 
applicability to Australia is disputed). Australia is 
often discussed as a “two-speed” or “patchwork” econ-
omy, where mining grows faster than other sectors.35 
While the mining sector is forecast to grow at an 
annual rate of 9 percent over the next few years, 
other sectors are only expected to register 2 percent 
growth.36
Measures and Instruments 
 No solution is in sight to the effect of high 
wages and the steeply rising Australian dollar on the 
productivity of manufacturing and tourism. 
Legislation 
Section 91 of the Australian Constitution allows the 
states and territories to collect royalties for the extrac-
tion and purchase of natural resources and use them 
for the benefit of their citizens.37 Mining legislation is 
quite similar across the states and territories.
 
32  Interviews with representatives of RET, July 2012. 
 
33  Minerals Council of Australia, Quarterly Economic Brief, 
autumn 2012, p. 6. 
34  Interviews with representatives of the Treasury, July 2012. 
35  Gary Banks, Australia’s Mining Boom: What’s the Problem? 
Address to the Melbourne Institute and the Australian Eco-
nomic and Social Outlook Conference, June 30, 2011, p. 2, 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pd88&""" 
mining-boom-what-problem.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
36  Neil Hume, “Two-Speed Australian Economy Creates 
Unease,” Financial Times, May 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/ 
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37  Parliament of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia Con-
stitution Act, section 91, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_ 
Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/ 
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38  Invest Australia et al., Mineral and Petroleum Exploration 
and Development in Australia: A Guide for Investors (Canberra, 
Western Australia, the state with the largest mining 
industry, regulates the purchase of land use licenses: 
the 1978 Mining Act for exploration and mining li-
censes; the 1986 Environment Protection Act for extrac-
tion; and the 1997 Land Administration Act for ownership 
and management of state-owned land. The Native Title 
Act regulates the purchase of land rights from tra-
ditional Aborigine groups. Any company that wishes 
to acquire an exploration license has to complete a 
multi-stage application process that includes the 
obligation to inform the relevant agencies, ministries, 
affected landowners, and communities, and complete 
environmental assessments. Extraction licenses are 
issued out on a first come, first served basis, with 
holders of exploration licenses given preference. The 
application process includes a definition of the area 
involved, an application for the use of the land and 
the payment of royalties as well as the obligation to 
inform landowners and the community as well as the 
public.39 The process applies equally to Australian and 
foreign firms; the latter are under no obligation to 
involve Australian firms. In the case of “substantial” 
projects, however, investments must be approved by 
the government.
The political framework for foreign direct invest-
ment is provided by the 1975 Foreign Acquisitions and 
Takeovers Act (FATA) and the 1989 Foreign Acquisitions 
and Takeovers Regulations (FATR). The latter set thresh-
olds below which the FATA does not apply, with 
special arrangements for investments from the United 
States.
 
 These two laws give the Treasurer thirty days 
(extendable to ninety) to scrutinize FDI proposals, 
decide whether they conflict with national interest, 
and approve or reject them. In making these deci-
sions, the Treasurer is advised by the four-member 
Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB).
 
2005), chapter 9, http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/ 
Documents/Minerals%20and%20Petroleum%20Exploration/ 
Guide_for_%20Investors_9OnshoreLegislation.pdf (accessed 
September 7, 2012). 
 The govern-
ment seeks industrial and sectoral balance and diver-
sity, examines the impact of FDI on competition, and 
works to avoid monopolies. The FIRB always reviews 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Australian Government, The Treasury, Australia’s Foreign 
Investment Policy, September 2009. 
42  Austrade, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Australia, 
March 2011. 
43  Foreign Investment Review Board, Who Are We? http:// 
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investments by state-owned foreign entities, no mat-
ter what size the project is. This is often the case 
with Chinese initiatives, which are often backed by 
the state or state-owned enterprises. The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) also 
reviews the impact of proposals on competition, and 
the government examines the effect of foreign invest-
ments on Australian taxation and the environment.
Aboriginal Rights 
 
The land rights of the Aboriginal population in tradi-
tional areas are protected at the state and territory 
level, with the national government wielding powers 
of last resort under the 1984 Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage Protection Act. Mining firms pay royal-
ties to traditional landowners under the 1993 Native 
Titles Act, with the National Native Title Tribunal 
(established under the same act) intervening to help 
settle conflicts. Recently discussion has arisen over 
the lack of Aboriginal participation in the windfall 
profits from the current mining boom.
Taxation of the Mining Sector 
 
Royalties for mineral extraction are defined and col-
lected by the state and territory governments. Royal-
ties for resources in Australian territorial waters are 
shared by national government and the respective 
state.
Taxes on resource production have always been 
relatively low in Australia and have not risen signifi-
cantly during the mining boom. Stronger taxation of 
the mining sector would allow the whole population 
of Australia to benefit more strongly from their natu-
 
 
44  Austrade, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Australia 
(see note ). 
45  Australian Government, The Treasurer, Australia’s Foreign 
Investment Policy, January 2012, http://www.firb.gov.au/ 
content/_downloads/AFIP_Aug2012.pdf (accessed September 
25, 2012). 
46  Sandy Wood, Aboriginal Land Rights in Australia, http:// 
www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v6i3/aboriginal.htm (accessed 
&&'X&	Q`# 
47  Norimitsu Onishi, “Rich in Land, Aborigines Split on 
How to Use It,” New York Times, February 12, 2011, http:// 
www. nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/asia/13australia.html? 
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48  Pietro Guj, Mineral Royalties and Other Mining Specific Taxes, 
Q^""'
#$	"-content/uploads/2012/01/UWA_ 
&	-01_-Mineral-royalties-other-mining-specific-
taxes1.pdf (ac
&++&+Q`# 
49  RET, Resources Taxation, http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/ 
enhancing/taxation/pages/resourcestaxation.aspx (accessed 
&&'X&	Q`# 
ral resources, and not only the mining companies. To 
what extent the population actually benefited would 
of course depend on the actual use of the taxes and 
fees collected. In 2007, the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics recommended 
taxing mining profits,50 and in May 2010 then Labour 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd attempted to implement 
the advice by introducing a &	
&%	$8
(Resource Super Profits Tax, RSPT). His failure, espe-
cially in the face of massive opposition by the power-
ful mining lobby, was one factor that led to his 
replacement as prime minister by his colleague and 
deputy Julia Gillard in June 2010. After the August 
2010 elections, Gillard’s new government again pro-
posed a mining tax with the same goal: profit-based 
taxation in addition to the existing fees and royalties. 
Taxation of profits can be more efficient than raising 
fees, as the latter can discourage investment. In boom 
times, profits and thus taxes are higher; in recession 
both decrease. On the other hand, price cycles make 
it hard for the government to plan tax revenues. The 
new Mineral Resources Rent Tax (MRRT) that Gillard 
introduced in July 2012 imposes a 30 percent tax on 
profits, but for iron ore and coal only.51 Miners with 
annual profits less than $AUS50 million are exempt,52 
and royalties and fees can be deducted.53 The industry 
accepted the new MRRT, as its provisions are a good 
deal less strict than those initially proposed.
 
50  OECD, Economic Survey Australia 2008, p. 39. 
 But the 
question of the powers of central and state govern-
ments in the legislation is disputed and the Australian 
Fortescue Metals Group is planning to challenge it 
before the High Court. Three months after the new tax 
came into force, it is not even certain whether and to 
what extent the government will be collecting it at all. 
Mining giants BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Xstrata are 
all currently exempt, and the strength of the Austra-
lian Dollar, falling commodity prices, and shrinking 
mining profits mean that the government’s revenues 
51  “Bergbaukonzerne spüren die Abkühlung in China,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 21, 2012, p. 17. 
52  Blake Dawson, Mining in Australia: An Introduction for 
Investors, 2011 ed., http://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_ 
Resource=6121 (accessed October 10, 2012). 
53  “MRRT Not That Complex: Henry,” Sydney Morning Herald, 
November 22, 2010, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-
national/mrrt-not-that-complexhenry-20101122-&X#'
(accessed August 5, 2012). 
54  Interviews with representatives of the Minerals Council 
of Australia, July 2012. 
The Raw Materials Policy 
SWP Berlin / BGR Hannover 
A Comparative Analysis of the  
Raw Materials Strategies of the G20 
March 2013 
 
 
35 
will be much less than originally expected.55 And as a 
profit-based tax, revenues will always vary.56
While the government and the mining industry 
expected the resource boom to continue, a note of 
caution has become apparent.
 
57 Wages rose strongly 
during the boom and represent a challenge to com-
panies in less profitable times, as do rising energy and 
transport costs in combination with the strength of 
the Australian dollar. Furthermore, the Mineral 
Resources Rent Tax and new legislation on CO2 emis-
sions leave some companies fearing that their profits 
will decline further. This situation is further aggra-
vated by currently falling Chinese demand for many 
materials such as iron ore, where prices fell dramati-
cally in the third quarter of 2012 (in August and 
September 2012 the price of iron ore fell as low as 
US$90/tonne, from US$150/tonne only a few months 
earlier in April).59
Resource Wealth Fund 
 
Proceeds from the new MRRT were initially intended 
to support Australian companies, especially smaller 
businesses, but are now instead to be diverted to the 
pensions system.60
 
55  Andrew Bolt, “Government’s Mining Tax Fails to Raise 
a Cent; Budget Smashed,” Herald Sun, October 25, 2012, 
http://blogs.news.com.au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/index.php/ 
heraldsun/comments/governments_mining_tax_fails_to_ 
raise_a_cent_budget_smashed/ (accessed November 20, 2012). 
 The idea of channeling revenues 
into a sovereign wealth fund, as practiced by other 
resource-rich countries, has been discussed repeatedly 
56  Vicky Validakis, “Mining Tax Massive Fail,” Australian 
Mining, October 25, 2012, http://www.miningaustralia.com.au/ 
news/mining-tax-massive-fail (accessed November 20, 2012). 
57  Christoph Hein, “Die großen Rohstoffkonzerne rudern 
zurück,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 21, 2012, p. 12. 
58  Werner Kemper, “Mehrere australische Bergbauprojekte 
auf unbestimmt verschoben,” GTAIQ+QQ^"" 
www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/maerkte,did= 
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October 10, 2012). 
59  Yoreeh Koh, “Iron Ore Volatility to Remain, Says Rio 
Boss Albanese,” Couriermail, November 20, 2012, http://www. 
couriermail.com.au/news/iron-ore-volatility-to-remain-says-
rio-boss-albanese/story-e6freon6-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60  David Dittman, “Australia’s Mineral Resource Rent Tax: 
It’s the Investment, Stupid,” InvestingDailyQ!$<&'X&	Q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ber 20, 2012). 
(again in spring 2012 because of the high exchange 
rate) but rejected.61 The Australian government thus 
has no fund like Norway’s to compensate for future 
periods of lower prices. However, this model is cur-
rently being addressed at the state level, with Western 
Australia planning to create a wealth fund with reve-
nues from its large mining sector.62
International Trade 
 
Australia is an open and transparent market econ-
omy and rigorously follows free-market principles. 
It ranks third in the 2012 Index of Economic Free-
dom, after only Hong Kong and Singapore.63 In recent 
decades, Australia has lowered trade barriers and 
reduced tariffs. The highest tariffs have historically 
been in the textile, clothing, and the car industries; 
these too were substantially reduced in 2010.65 In the 
raw materials sector, the government tries to support 
the domestic sector through tax breaks, for instance 
on fuel.66 While the government currently supports 
aluminum smelting through energy subsidies,67
 
61  Interviews with representatives of the relevant ministries, 
July 2012; see also Phil Garton and David Gruen, The Role of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds in Managing Resource Booms: A Comparison 
of Australia and Norway, February 23, 2012, http://www. 
treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Speeches/2012/The-
role-of-sovereign-wealth-funds-in-managing-resource-booms 
(accessed September 25, 2012). 
 some 
smelters have had to close due to strong competition, 
especially from China, and the future of others is un-
62  Enda Curran, “Western Australia Goes Sovereign,” 
Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
dealjournalaustralia/2012/05/17/western-australia-goes-
sovereign/ (accessed September 7, 2012). 
63  Heritage Foundation, 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, 
Australia, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/australia 
(accessed September 25, 2012). 
64  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Australia-Japan Trade 
and Economic Framework (Joint Study), http://www.mofa.go.jp/ 
region/asia-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65  Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Austra-
lian Customs Notice No. 2009/49. Tariff, Duty Rate and Statistical 
Code Changes for 1 January 2010, http://www.customs.gov.au/ 
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66  Rebecca Lawson, “Miners Spared from Cuts to Diesel Fuel 
Rebate,” PerthNowQ]=Q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Q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67  Bernard Keane, “Aluminium Smelting: The Best Bang 
for Your Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Buck,” Crikey, March 10, 2011, 
http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/03/10/aluminium-smelting-
the-best-bang-for-your-fossil-fuel-subsidy-buck/ (accessed 
September 25, 2012). 
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certain.
In the WTO Australia supports reducing import 
tariffs and other trade barriers, including in the agri-
cultural sector, with the intention of opening up mar-
kets for Australian agricultural and industrial prod-
ucts.
 High costs in Australia have moved BHP Billi-
ton to start relocating some of its smelting operations 
(using Australian bauxite) to Africa (Mozal in Mozam-
bique and Hillside and Bayside in South Africa). 
69 Australia has signed free trade agreements with 
ASEAN, New Zealand, Thailand, Singapore, the United 
States, and Chile; negotiations with Malaysia were 
concluded in May 2012, and the launch of the free 
trade agreement is planned for early 2013. Further 
agreements are currently in the pipeline, including 
with Australia’s number one trading partner China, 
as well as India, Japan, and South Korea. Australia has 
always been an advocate of multilateralism and free 
and non-discriminatory trade.70
International Cooperation 
 
Australia is a founding member of the resource study 
groups for lead and zinc, and for nickel, and joined 
the group for copper in 2011.71 The RET holds regular 
bilateral minerals and energy cooperations meetings 
with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
the United States to exchange information on the 
minerals and energy sector and discuss new legis-
lation, trade and investments, renewable energy, 
market trends, and technological innovations.72
 
68  Sid Maher and Joe Kelly, “Threat to Smelters Sparks 
Power Alarm,” The Australian, May 25, 2012, http://www. 
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/climate/threat-to-
smelters-sparks-power-alarm/story-e6frg6xf-1226366237935 
(accessed September 25, 2012). 
 A 
memorandum of understanding on deeper energy 
and raw materials cooperation was signed with 
69  DFAT, Trade at a Glance 2011, http://www.dfat.gov.au/ 
publications/trade/trade-at-a-glance-2011.html#sect19 
(accessed September 25, 2012). 
70  Australian Government, Gillard Government Trade Policy 
Statement: Trading our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity, April 
2011, http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-
way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.html (accessed September 
25, 2012). 
71  RET, International Metal Study Groups, http://www.ret.gov.au/ 
resources/mining/australian_mineral_commodities/ 
study-group/Pages/international_metal_study_groups.aspx 
(accessed September 7, 2012). 
72  RET, Bilateral Minerals and Energy Cooperation, http://www. 
ret.gov.au/resources/enhancing/bmec/Pages/default.aspx 
(accessed September 25, 2012). 
Germany in June 2011.73 Australia closely follows 
other countries’ raw materials strategies and dis-
courses, for instance the sections in the U.S. Dodd-Frank 
Act on trade of so-called conflict minerals and revenue 
transparency and the EU’s similar transparency direc-
tive. Australia adheres closely to its open-market 
principles and further legislation is considered un-
necessary as transparency is already obligatory in the 
Australian resource sector.75 Legal developments in 
other countries are followed with particular regard 
to their impact on Australian trade and investment. 
Negotiation processes over FDI with the United States 
and the EU are criticized as often being too slow, com-
pared to other investors, for instance those from Asian 
countries.76
Broadening the G20 agenda on raw materials is not 
a priority for Australia, which would prefer the G20 to 
remain focused on macroeconomic issues. The Austra-
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tinue the trend set by the French presidency in 2011, 
when the agenda was extended towards resource 
trade.
 
77
An EITI pilot was launched in July 2012. The Austra-
lian mining industry’s compliance with EITI prin-
ciples is monitored by the central government, states 
and territories, businesses and non-governmental 
organizations.
 
 Australia also supports EITI finan-
cially.79
The Global Compact Network Australia was initi-
ated in May 2009 and is to be formalized and devel-
oped through working groups, conferences, and 
logical frameworks.
 

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74  See also in this volume “European Union,” pp. 59ff., and 
“United States of America,” pp. 150ff. 
75  Interview with a representative of AusAID, July 2012. 
76  Interviews with representatives of the relevant ministries 
and associations, July 2012. 
77  Interviews with representatives of the relevant ministries, 
July 2012. 
78  Kevin Rudd, “Australia Encourages Transparency in Oil, 
Gas and Mining,” press release, October 27, 2011, http://www. 
foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2011/kr_mr_111027.html 
(accessed September 20, 2012). 
79  Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Australia Helps 
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media release, August 10, 2012, http://foreignminister.gov.au/ 
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Development Cooperation 
Australian mining companies are very active abroad, 
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projects located in Africa. Of these 650 African proj-
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main products are diamonds, iron ore, gold, coal, cop-
per, platinum, and uranium. Australian investment 
in African exploration and mining projects reached 
$20 billion in the 2010/2011 fiscal year, with a rising 
trend. Supporting the activities of Australian firms 
abroad is an important aspect of Australian develop-
ment cooperation.
The Mining for Development program run by AusAID 
seeks to support the mining sector in developing coun-
tries by transferring knowledge, especially to Africa, 
Asia, and Pacific regions. In 2011, Australia supplied 
development cooperation to thirty-three African coun-
tries. In October 2011, Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
showed her appreciation for these efforts by announc-
ing the establishment of an International Mining for 
Development Center to provide scientific advice and 
information.
 
 It is one of six pillars of a new develop-
ment initiative in the mining business, the others 
being support for NGOs, technical assistance, trans-
parency, framework-building partnerships, and edu-
cation partnerships.
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
There is no coherent and comprehensive Australian 
raw materials strategy. The measures in place today 
concern government support for maintaining produc-
tivity, for instance in the form of infrastructure im-
provements. Internationally, Australia opposes an 
interference in the markets and is unlikely to support 
any broadening of the agendas of forums like the G20. 
To date, the government has not managed to channel 
 
world_doc/communication/network_reports/2010/AU_2010. 
pdf (accessed August 30, 2012). 
81  Dieter Grau, “Australische Bergbauunternehmen expan-
dieren in Südafrika,” GTAIQ&&'X&	QQ^""# 
#&""!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'
(accessed May 27, 2012). 
82  AusAID, Mining for Development in Africa, http://www.aa-
partnerships.org/downloads/Mining_for_Development_in_ 
Africa_ENG.pdf (accessed September 7, 2012). 
83  AusAID, Australia’s Mining for Development Initiative (Can-
berra, October 2011), http://www.ausaid.gov.au/aidissues/ 
Documents/mining-for-development.pdf (accessed September 
7, 2012). 
mining profits to the benefit of the population. The 
impact of the new mining tax is not yet clear. 
Australia considers itself an open and transparent 
market economy, currently facing challenges brought 
about by the mining boom. The government must 
juggle the demands of foreign markets and investors, 
while pursuing economic diversification in order to 
reduce the risks posed by price fluctuations. Efforts 
by Australian firms to tackle these threats by signing 
long-term supply agreements will only provide tem-
porary relief. Apart from falling demand, competition 
from other suppliers will also pose risks. This is espe-
cially true for materials that are not actually scarce, 
such as of iron ore. An end to the Chinese construc-
tion boom coinciding with competition from other 
iron ore suppliers will affect Australia dramatically. 
Australia will have to adapt to such changes quickly. 
The risks of current developments are summarized in 
a white paper on the “Asian Century” commissioned 
by the government in September 2011.
To avoid Australia remaining merely a giant min-
ing site for the world, Prime Minister Gillard ap-
pointed a Taskforce on Manufacturing.
 It identifies 
the challenges for Australia posed by the massive 
impact of Asia on its economy. Besides regional secu-
rity and stronger political and cultural relations, the 
development of the Australian economy in the Asian 
region is emphasized, along with support for edu-
cation, science, and innovation, taxation reforms, and 
macroeconomic and financial measures. According to 
the white paper, the creation of more added value in 
Australian manufacturing industry and services is 
decisive for the country’s future. 

 
 Its report 
published in August 2012 includes more than forty 
recommendations for increasing added value in the 
Australian economy and reducing dependence on 
extractive industries. But it remains to be seen how 
successfully these recommendations will be put into 
practice and to what extent the government will 
manage to diversify the Australian economy. 
 
84  Australian Government, Australia in the Asian Century 
White Paper (Canberra, October 2012), http://asiancentury. 
dpmc.gov.au/white-paper (accessed November 20, 2012). 
85  Australian Government, Prime Minister’s Taskforce on Manu-
facturing, Canberra, http://www.innovation.gov.au/Industry/ 
Manufacturing/Taskforce/Pages/default.aspx (accessed Novem-
ber 20, 2012). 
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Brazil 
Claudia Zilla 
 
For a long period of time, the production and pro-
cessing of agricultural raw materials was central 
to Brazil’s economy. Recently, the status of energy 
resources has been boosted by the discovery of oil 
reserves. Furthermore, the country has also always 
benefited from its major iron ore reserves. Mining 
has had a long tradition since the beginning of Por-
tuguese colonization, with gold and gemstones in 
particular playing an important role in developing 
the country’s more rural areas and contributing to 
the former colony’s wealth. Today, Brazil is one of the 
world’s largest mining producers,1
Minerals in the National Economy 
 with production 
and export volumes allowing it to consider itself a 
global player. The country attracts large amounts of 
foreign investment and hosts Vale as the world’s 
largest mining company. 
Brazil is a major producer of minerals, with an ex-
panding raw materials industry and a position as a 
significant global supplier. As the world’s fifth-largest 
country by area, it has significant deposits of bauxite, 
copper, iron, niobium, nickel, gold, phosphate, and 
graphite.2 Brazil produces seventy minerals, of which 
twenty-one are metals and forty-five industrial miner-
als.3 It was the top producer of niobium in 2010,
 
1  Engineering and Mining Journal (E&MJ), Brazil Mining, 
January/February 2011, p. 51, http://www.gbreports.com/ 
admin/reports/BrazilMining_2011.pdf (accessed October 10, 
2012). 
 and 
is among the leading producers of iron ore, bauxite, 
industrial minerals (asbestos and graphite), and gem-
2  Minsterio de Minas e Energia (MME) and Secretaria de 
Geologia, Mineração e Transformação Mineral (SGM), eds., 
Plano Nacional de Mineração 2030: Geologia, Mineração e Trans-
formação Mineral 4 	+Q`Q#Q^""#''&# 
gov.br/mme/galerias/arquivos/noticias/2011/PNM_2030.pdf 
(accessed August 20, 2012). 
3  E&MJ, Brazil Mining (see note 1), p. 51. 
4  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
stones. Moreover, Brazil exports nickel, magnesium, 
tin, vermiculite, chromium, and gold on a large scale. 
The country has gained a significant place in the 
global smelting business, especially for aluminum, but 
also nickel and its byproduct cobalt, copper, zinc, and 
tin.5
%Q'%%

$%&8$	#&	
&%$8Q
of which 1.1 percent derived from production and 3.1 
percent from processing.
 Brazil can meet its own demand for limestone, 
industrial diamonds, titanium, copper, tungsten, and 
talc. Imports supplement domestic production of 
phosphate, diatomite, and zinc. 
6 Over the past decade, the 
mining sector has grown at an annual average rate of 
10 percent. While metal ores for export grew by 6 per-
cent, production of non-metal minerals destined for 
the domestic market grew by a more modest 3 percent 
due to its structural linkage to domestic industrial 
	$4^#&	
&%`#%Q&'%%+&
$	
grew considerably more strongly than the Brazilian 
economy as a whole (3.1 percent vs. 0.6 percent),7 
reaching a record year-on-=&	$8&	
&%$
years later, in 2011. Overall, the value of mining out-
put increased by 550 percent, from US$7.7 billion to 
US$50 billion, between 2001 and 2011.
Mining is important for Brazil’s current account, 
accounting for about 12 percent of total exports (by 
value) in 2010.
 
9
 
5  Jürgen Vasters, Peter Buchholz, Dieter Huy, Martin 
Schmitz, Simone Röhling, and Sven Altfelder, Rohstoff-
wirtschaftliche Bewertung der Länder Afrikas, Asiens, der Gemein-
schaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS) mit Georgien und Südamerikas 
im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung für Deutschland (Hannover: Bundes-
anstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, Deutsche Roh-
stoffagentur, September 2010), p. 33, http://www.bgr.bund.de/ 
DE/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/Downloads/laenderbewertung.pdf?
__blob=publicationFile&v=3 (accessed November 19, 2012). 
 Iron ore still tops the list 4&	
&%
6  MME and SGM, eds., Plano Nacional de Mineração 2030 
(see note 2), p. 9. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Instituto Brasileiro de Mineração (IBRAM), Informações e 
análises de economía mineral brasileira, 6th ed., 2011, http://www. 
X	'#$	#X	"+&+"""#84

essed Novem-
ber 16, 2012). 
9  Vasters et al., Rohstoffwirtschaftliche Bewertung (see note 5), 
p. 33. 
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by value),10 8$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The mining sector itself provided 165,000 jobs in 
2011,
 Potassium 
chloride (29 percent), which is needed for fertilizer 
production, and copper (12.3 percent) are the biggest 
imports. 
12 but every job in mineral production creates 
an additional thirteen in upstream and downstream 
sectors and supply industries (multiplier effect 1:13).13 
Thus altogether 2.1 million workers were employed by 
the minerals sector in 2011. Many mining compa-
nies complain of a lack of skilled labor.15
The Brazilian mining sector is largely controlled by 
the private sector; there are only very few state-owned 
&%&		+&+#%Q'$+Q
$'%&+&	&
-
tive in extraction.
 
16 While there are numerous smaller 
exploration, production, and service companies, the 
raw materials sector is dominated by just fifteen do-
mestic and foreign firms.17 Investment in the mining 
sector comes primarily from Canada (19 percent), 
Australia (12 pe	
&%`&Y%&&+4&	
&%`Q
Mexico (6 percent), Peru and Chile (5 percent each), 
++%*%4&	
&%&
`Q%	&%%
and Brazil (3 percent each). Brazil ranks tenth in the 
world for private investment in mineral exploration 
(2009: US$321 million or 3 percent global share).19
Brazil’s raw materials economy is internationalized. 
Vale is the world’s biggest mining company in terms 
of production value, and second in market value.
 
20
 
10  IBRAM (ed.), Informações e análises de economía mineral brasi-
leira (see note 
 It 
+8$%&X=& 	%$<&	%'&%%+
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, and privatized in 1997. 
). 
11  Data for 2010. Ibid. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
15  MME and SGM, eds., Plano Nacional de Mineração 2030 
(see note 2), p. 66, referring to a study published in 2007 
by the Confederacção Nacional de Indústria (CNI). 
16  IBRAM, Informações e análises de economía mineral brasileira 
(see note ). 
17  E&MJ, Brazil Mining (see note 1), p. 52. 
18  IBRAM, Informações e análises de economía mineral brasileira 
(see note ). 
19  IBRAM, The Strength of Brazilian Mining (Brasília, 2012), 
^""#X	'#$	#X	"+&+"""#8
(accessed August 20, 2012), p. 11; based on 2009 data from 
the Metals Economic Group. 
20  “Top 100 Mining Companies: What a Difference a Year 
Makes,” Mineweb, January 12, 2010, http://www.mineweb.com/ 
mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page67?oid=95737&sn=Detail 
(accessed June 7, 2012). 
Today, the Brazilian state retains a 5.6 percent stake.21 
Vale has become one of the leading international 
mining enterprises and operates in thirty-six coun-
tries, especially in extraction and processing of iron 
$	&4&	&&	
&%$8 	%	$
$%+%
Vale’s hands),22 nickel, potash and phosphate, copper, 
bauxite, manganese, and coal. Among the fifty-two 
Brazilian companies with global reach, six operate 
in the raw materials sector: Gerdau, Grupo Camargo 
Corrêa, Grupo Votorantim, Magnesita, Tupy, and Vale. 
Comanhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) and MMX Mine-
ração are also growing dynamically.23
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
While Brazil is a federal state, its minerals and energy 
resources are owned by the federal government (the 
union or “Unão”). The federal states are responsible 
for environmental regulation. Their environment 
agencies award environmental licenses, but are not 
responsible for projects that transcend state borders. 
Minas Gerais, as its name suggests, is a historic mining 
state and maintains its relevance. The Amazon state 
Pará, where Vale operates the world’s largest iron ore 
complex at Carajás, has been growing in signifi-
cance.25
Numerous state and non-state actors and institu-
tions participate in formulating and shaping raw 
materials policy. The Ministry of Mines and Energy 
(Ministério de Minas e Energia, MME) is responsible for 
the mining industry, with specific powers exercised 
by the Secretariat for Geology, Mining, and Mineral 
Transformation (Secretaria de Geologia, Mineração 
e Transformação Mineral, SGM)
 
26
 
21  E&MJ, Brazil Mining (see note 
 and the National 
1`Q## 
22  Ibid., p. 52. 
23  MME and SGM, eds., Plano Nacional de Mineração 2030 
(see note 2`Q## 
24  On the Brazilian environmental licensing regime see 
MME, http://www.dnpm-pe.gov.br/Legisla/Guia/Guia_6.htm 
(accessed August 20, 2012). 
25  The states most heavily involved in minerals production 
	&^&	+4&	
&%`Q	¤4&	
&%`Q$¤+4&	
&%`Q
¥$$4&	
&%`Q 4#&	
&%`Q]$	$++$$
4#&	
&%`Q&	&4#&	
&%`#&$&	+&+$&&	


$%8$	#&	
&%#IBRAM, Informações e análises de econo-
mía mineral brasileira 4+&&%$&). 
26  MME and SGM, eds., Plano Nacional de Mineracao 2030 
(see note 2). 
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Department of Mining Production (Departamento 
Nacional de Produção Mineral, DNPM), founded in 
$+$	%'$%$	
<&+%&	
materials sector.27 The Brazilian Geological Survey 
(Serviço Geológico do Brasil, CPRM) is a public-private 
enterprise founded in 1969 and answerable to the 
ministry. Its remit is to organize and systematize 
Brazilian geological knowledge and develop the fed-
eral government’s Brazilian Geological Program. The 
Center for Mining Technology (Centro de Tecnologia 
]%&	Q*]`Q
	&&%Q+%+&	X&$
the Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation 
(Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, MCTI). It 
focuses on research, technological development, and 
professional training for raw materials processing and 
supports companies in the mineral/metallurgical and 
raw materials/chemicals sectors.29
The Brazilian Mining Institute (Instituto Brasileiro 
de Mineração, IBRAM)
 CETEM is funded 
mainly by the federal government and is headquar-
tered in Rio de Janeiro. In the House of Representa-
tives, the Mining and Energy Committee (Commissão 
de Minas e Energia, CME) is responsible for mining. 
30 is a private non-profit associ-
ation representing the interests of mining companies 
and organizations. IBRAM provides sector-specific 
information and communication through a vast 
range of statistical, legal, and policy publications. 
The Agency for Technological Development of the 
Mining Industry (Agência para o Desenvolvimento 
Tecnológico da Indústria Mineral Brasileira, ADIMB),31
 
27  For a description of the activities of the Departamento 
Nacional de Produção Mineral (DNPM), see http://www.dnpm. 
$<#X	"
$%&$#+&
$%4

&++&
August 20, 2012). 
 
established in 1996, promotes scientific and technical 
development in the mining industry and provides 
training for skilled workers in the fields of exploration 
and prospecting. Besides publications, workshops, 
and seminars, the agency also organizes expeditions. 
Today a private entity, ADIMB was originally set up 
by the science and mining ministries in 1993. ADIMB 
consists of four member institutions, MME, MCTI, 
IBRAM, and DNPM, as well as sixty-five associated 
28  CPRM stands for Companhia de Pesquisa de Recursos 
Mineirais, http://www.cprm.gov.br (accessed August 20, 2012). 
29  Centro de Teconologia Mineral (CETEM), http://www. 
cetem.gov.br/conheca.php (accessed August 20, 2012). 
30  IBRAM, http://www.ibram.org.br (accessed August 20, 
2012). 
31  Agência para o Desenvolvimento Tecnológico da Indústria 
Mineral Brasileira (ADIMB), http://www.adimb.com.br/site/ 
(accessed August 20, 2012). 
businesses. Some mining companies are also active 
in research, development, and education. Vale, for 
instance, founded its own technology institute (Insti-
tuto Tecnologico Vale, ITV) in 2009 to develop new 
technologies for a sustainable mining industry.32
Concepts and Strategies 
 
The Brazilian government sporadically publishes 
mining plans that take stock of the current situation 
and propose policies, thus serving the dual purpose 
of diagnosis and strategic conceptionalization.33 MME 
published the most recent in 2011: the National Mining 
Plan 2030 (Plano Nacional de Mineração, PNM).
PNM 2030 identifies “strategic minerals” that are 
“essential” or “critical” in one or more of the following 
categories: 1) importance to key industries and strong 
import-dependency, 2) growing significance in the 
coming decade, and 3) competitive advantage of the 
Brazilian mining sector.
 Its five 
chapters address 1) the environment in which the 
mining sector operates, 2) challenges in geology, min-
%Q%	$
&++%Q`8	&+
&%	$+Q`8$	&
++
for demand, investment, and human resources, and 5) 
strategic objectives and activities. 
35
 
32  Instituto Tecnológico Vale (ITV), http://www.vale.com/ 
pt-br/sustentabilidade/instituto-tecnologico-vale/paginas/ 
default.aspx (accessed August 20, 2012). 
 A mineral is thus consid-
ered “critical” if it is important to domestic key 
industries and must be imported to meet demand. 
Here, Brazil needs unrestricted market access and a 
diversified and competitive supply structure without 
cartels. One example of the first category would be 
minerals used in the production of the fertilizers 
required to ensure productivity in the agricultural 
sector. While the Brazilian government believes that 
the growing geopolitical importance of food security 
offers a chance to expand production and export of 
agricultural products and consolidate Brazil’s global 
leadership in this sector, the country still imports 
most of its fertilizer minerals: 90 percent of domesti-
cally-consumed potassium, 70 percent its nitrogen 
33  Cf. previous mining plans: I Plano Mestre Decenal para la 
Aviliação dos Recursos Minerais do Brasil (I PMD: 1965–`Q
%$&
&%	&]%&	¦¥$4]^–1990), and 
Plano Plurianual para o Desenvolvimento do Sector Mineral 
4]^`# 
34  MME and SGM, eds., Plano Nacional de Mineração 2030 
(see note 2). 
35  Ibid., pp. 63ff. 
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fertilizer, and 50 percent of its phosphorus. Given that 
&+&'$	+&	&$	Y[X$%%Q+
also has a negative effect on the trade balance. 
Secondly, minerals are also classified as strategic 
if their relevance is definitely expected to grow in 
coming decades because of their use in high-tech-
nology products. This makes cobalt, lithium, rare 
earth minerals, and tantalum “resources of future 
importance” where the government seeks to promote 
exploration and production, as well as initiating pub-
lic-private cooperation (especially in research, develop-
ment, and innovation) to accelerate the development 
of value-added chains.36
The third category of strategic minerals are those 
where Brazil has a competitive advantage in produc-
tion and export and whose export generates foreign 
exchange. Here, global demand and price trends play 
a crucial role. These strategic materials include iron 
ore (10 percent of all Brazilian exports) and niobium 
(where Brazil accounts for more than 90 percent of 
global reserves and production). 
 
Chapter five of PNM 2030 defines the strategic 
goals of mining policy until 2030. Its top priorities are: 
1) effective public governance; 2) expanding geological 
knowledge; and 3) management of strategic minerals. 
These concern fundamental structures of mining 
policy and fall largely under the powers of the MME. 
A second set of goals addresses the prerequisites for 
full development of the mining sector: 1) production 
in protected areas (“áreas com restriçao”), such as 
Amazonia; 2) formalizing and strengthening micro- 
and small enterprises; 3) research, development, and 
%%$<$%`&
$%%	%%%`%8	-
structure and logistics. These measures require con-
certed cooperation by government, the private sector, 
and civil society. The third set of goals includes: 1) 
sustainability of production; 2) value added chains 
and competitiveness; and 3) promotion of sustainable 
development in mining regions.37
 
36  Brazil is well aware of the location of its deposits of rare 
earth minerals, and was a pioneer of their exploration and 
production until the 1950s. But the sector stagnated follow-
ing the wave of nationalizations, and today Brazil lacks the 
necessary technological knowhow for profitable production. 
 Achieving this last 
set of goals will be contingent on the first two and 
requires cooperation between public, private, and civil 
society actors. 
37  MME and SGM, eds., Plano Nacional de Mineração 2030 (see 
note 2), p. 122. 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
National Level 
During the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
(2003–2010), a range of government initiatives in-
jected new impetus into the raw materials industry. 
Under President Dilma Rousseff (2011–`Q$
was herself previously Minister of Mining and Energy, 
reforms of the legislative framework are being dis-
cussed, to increase the government’s participation in 
resource revenues.39
Current legislative proposals from Congress and the 
executive include a spectrum of measures designed to 
promote the mining industry and increase the state’s 
control. They mention seven areas that require re-
form: 
 
(1) Unlike other Latin American countries, the dis-
tribution of resource rents is not a source of great 
disagreement amongst Brazilian local authorities. 
Taxation of mining companies varies depending on 
where mining takes place and which minerals are 
extracted. Corporate income tax is between 10 and 
15 percent,
 
38  For instance, mapping programs were revived. 
 while the licensing regime (the Com-
pensação Financeira pela Exploração de Recursos Minerais, 
CFEM) stipulates a royalty of 3 percent on net sales, of 
which the local community receives 65 percent, the 
state government 23 percent, and the federal govern-
ment 12 percent. As well as increasing license fees, the 
government plans to modify the redistribution prin-
ciple. Other reforms concern the scope, duration, sub-
ject, and management of concessions: (2) the govern-
ment intends to limit the size of plot covered by a con-
cession; (3) to uphold their rights, concession holders 
will X&	&§	&$'&'%''%<&+'&%+4`%
certain cases, the current procedure granting con-
cessions without expiry dates on a first come, first 
served basis will be replaced by a tendering process 
with licenses limited to a maximum of five years; 
(5) extraction concessions will no longer be issued 
to natural persons for unlimited periods, but only to 
legal persons, with a limit of forty years, extendable 
by another forty years. (6) Mining in protected areas 
urgently requires stronger regulation in relation to 
environmental protection and indigenous rights. 
Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution recognizes the 
rights of indigenous peoples to the natural resources 
39  On mining legislation see DNPM, http://www.dnpm.gov. 
br/conteudo.asp?IDSecao=67 (accessed August 20, 2012). 
40  E&MJ, Brazil Mining (see note 1), p. # 
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in their territories (about 15 percent of the country) 
but does not generally prohibit extraction there. 
Instead, Congress permits or rejects mining projects 
after a hearing with the affected indigenous commu-
nities. Outstanding regulatory loopholes in this are 
expected to be closed soon. Finally, (7) the government 
hopes that creating a National Mining Agency (Agên-
cia Nacional de Mineração, ANM) answerable to the 
MME will give the sector fresh impetus. This agency 
would replace the DNPM and would be autonomous 
in its actions, budget, and management. 
The government also wishes to increase value 
added in the mining sector by expanding pre-export 
processing. Central challenges facing the mining 
sector are inadequate infrastructure, energy costs, 
shortages of skilled labor, and problems accessing 
funding. In this context, the government is interested 
in technology transfer from abroad, but rejects raw 
material partnerships that would reduce Brazil to the 
role of supplier and prevent it from increasing added 
value at home. Instead, the government supports the 
creation of joint ventures with Brazilian participa-
tion.
As mentioned above, the agricultural sector is 
strongly dependent on imported phosphate and 
potash fertilizers. The government therefore seeks to 
support domestic phosphate and potash production 
and intends to establish a fertilizer industry to reduce 
import dependency. Even though some phosphate is 
produced in Brazil, the country still has to import 
large volumes to meet domestic demand. Brazil is the 
world’s second-largest importer of potash. 
 Projects that transfer technology to Brazil, 
allow domestic processing, and ensure exports to the 
technology-supplying country are regarded as attrac-
tive. The government is specifically seeking to de-
crease Brazil’s twin dependency in iron ore exports 
(iron as dominant export product, China as dominant 
purchaser): Diversifying mineral exports and markets 
is a trade priority. 
Informal mining is another controversial issue. 
About half a million people are directly involved in 
what is variously referred to as artisanal mining 
(“minería artesanal”), small-scale mining, or illegal 
mining (“minería ilegal”).
 
41  “Alemães propõem parceria com o Brasil na área de 
matérias-primas,” Valor Económico, March 7, 2012, http://www. 
inovasc.org.br/internacional/alemaes-propoem-parceria-com-
o-brasil-na-area-de-materias-	'+"4

&++&+Q
2012). 
 Informal extraction of 
42  The World Bank, Communities and Small Scale Mining 
(CASM), ASM Profile of Brazil, February 2009, https://www. 
gold (and gemstones and diamonds) leads to social, 
health, and environmental problems affecting the 
prospectors (“garimpeiros”) and their communities 
(and often harming indigenous groups). In particular, 
mercury used in gold extraction pollutes rivers on 
which neighboring communities depend for their 
livelihoods. “Garimpeiros” often live in settlements 
with poor sanitary conditions. However, small-scale 
mining is an important source of income for people 
in rural areas. The government therefore works to 
contain these problems by promoting cooperatives 
(“Cooperativa de Mineraãço dos Garimpeiros”). 
International Level 
The government’s mining policy is strongly focused 
on the domestic level, with less attention paid to inter-
national coordination. In Latin America, regional insti-
tutions in this field serve objectives of communication 
and exchange of ideas rather than searching for joint 
solutions for policy issues. Brazil is one of seventeen 
members of the Latin American Mining Organization 
(Organismo Latinoamericano de Minería, OLAMI).
Brazil is active in several international initiatives, 
but does not participate in the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). Brazil is a member of 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and 
two international raw materials study groups (nickel 
and zinc).
 
+X+&%Q]
$%+++$8%$%
$-
ordinating units composed of sectoral representatives 
(trade unions, businesses, state agencies, universities, 
etc.). Within the Southern Common Market (Mercado 
Común del Sur, MERCOSUR), the Mining and Geology 
Working Subgroup (Subgrupo de Trabajo No. 15) of 
the Mercosur Council (Consejo Mercado Común) deals 
with raw materials production. 

 
artisanalmining.org/casm/map?CO=BR (accessed November 
20, 2012). 
 The mining company Vale and the Mining 
Institute (IBRAM) are members of the International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM). Brazil partici-
pates in the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) and 
the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, 
Metals, and Sustainable Development. In the EU-Brazil 
43  Members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. OLAMI, http://www.olami.org.ar (accessed 
August 17, 2012). 
44  Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), Brazil, 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-process/ 
participant/brazil (accessed September 10, 2012). 
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Regulatory and Industrial Policy Dialogues initiated 
in 2009, a subgroup is working on “non-ferrous metals 
and minerals.”
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
The importance of the mining and mineral processing 
sectors for the Brazilian economy has risen steadily 
over recent decades. For government and business 
alike, promoting the mining sector also includes ex-
panding it geographically into so-called frontier areas. 
Amazonia is currently the limit of mining, but that 
could change. This region has hardly been explored 
but is likely to have significant mineral resources. At 
the same time, protecting Amazonia’s biodiversity and 
indigenous peoples is of great ecological and social 
relevance. So these diverging goals constitute a poten-
tial source of conflict. Numerous non-governmental 
organizations have criticized rights violations in the 
context of mining. In light of these challenges, the 
government should focus less on the geographical 
expansion of mining than on enhancing efficiency 
in an environmentally, socially, and economically 
sustainable manner through technological develop-
ment and infrastructure support. In both areas, 
investment rates in Brazil are far too low.
 
 Two other 
factors may become obstacles to dynamic develop-
ment in the sector. Firstly, the lengthy debate on 
reforming the legal framework (which has already 
been going on for two years) creates uncertainties. 
Secondly, environmental regulation is important 
in order to guarantee high ecological standards. In 
Brazil, it is often seen as a bureaucratic obstacle. 
 
 
45  European Commission, Directorate General Enterprise 
and Industry, ed., International Affairs EU-Brazil, http://ec. 
europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-
governments/brazil/index_en.htm (accessed August 20, 2012). 
46  Unlike other OECD countries, in Brazil the government 
(and not the private sector) is responsible for investment in 
technology, development, and innovation. 
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Canada 
Petra Dolata 
 
Canada is one of the world’s leading producers of 
raw materials, with rich and varied natural resources 
found across its territory. A large proportion of ex-
tracted resources are exported, mainly to the United 
States, and the Canadian mining sector attracts large 
flows of foreign direct investment. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Mineral and metal resources and mines can be found 
in all of Canada’s ten provinces and three territories. 
Geological formations like the Canadian Shield and 
the mountain ranges in the west hold particularly rich 
deposits. For 2009, Natural Resources Canada puts 
%$%	&+&	<&+Q$%%&+$8&Q$%%&+
of gold, 7.3 million tonnes of copper, 215,000 tonnes 
$8'$=X&%'Q#'$%$%%&+$8%
&QQ
$%%&+$8+<&	Q%#'$%$%%&+$8%
#1
In 2011, non-&%&	=	'&	+$	*![#
billion were produced,
 These 
reserves are not evenly distributed. Ontario and Que-
bec are the leading provinces for gold, the Northwest 
Territories head the list for diamonds. Uranium is 
exclusively mined in Saskatchewan, while iron ore 
is mainly extracted in Newfoundland and Quebec. 
Copper is mostly mined in Ontario and British Colum-
bia, nickel in Newfoundland and Ontario (but also in 
Quebec and Manitoba), indium and molybdenum are 
mostly extracted in British Columbia, and lead in New 
Brunswick. 
2 CDN$25.3 billion from metals 
%*![X$%8	$'%$%-metallic resources.3
 
1  Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), Canadian Reserves of 
Selected Major Metals, 2011, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/minerals-
metals/publications-reports/3975#T1 (accessed September 15, 
2012). 
 In 
2010, &'%%%	&8%%+&
$	

$%&8$	#
2  <&	&&
%&	&$8*%%$	+^#Y[8$	
Q#Y[8$	Q#Y[8$	# %$8*%-
da, Monthly and Annual Average Exchange Rates, 2012, http:// 
www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/exchange-rates-in-pdf/ 
(accessed September 15, 2012). 
3  NRCan, Canada’s MineraGFl Production Reaches a Record $50 
Billion, March 2012, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/minerals-metals/ 
publications-reports/3575 (accessed September 15, 2012). 
percent of GDP, with an upward trend. The sector 
&'$=+	$'&=Q&$&Q

$%%
for almost 2 percent of the country’s workforce. In 
Q	$
$%+&+&	&%$&	$%Q	$-
du
%'&+%%$%-metals. While the biggest 
numbers of metal-producing mines are found in Que-
X&
4`Q8$$&X=%	$4`Q% 	+*$'-
bia (12), when it comes to added value in the mining 
industry, Ontario leads ahead of Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia, and Quebec.5 The mining industry (exclud-
ing oil sands) paid around CDN$5.5 billion in taxes 
and royalties to Canadian provincial (which received 
#&	
&%`%8&&	$<&	%'&%+4#&	
&%`
in 2010.6 Canada is the world’s leading producer of 
potash, which is found almost exclusively in Sas-
katchewan, the global number two for uranium, and 
ranks third for aluminum and titanium ores.7 It is 
among the world’s five largest producers of chrysotile 
(asbestos), diamonds, graphite, cadmium, cobalt ores, 
molybdenum, nickel, platinum metals, sulfur, tellu-
rium, and titanium.9
 
4  NRCan, Capital Investment Rebounds in 2010 and Is Expected 
to Increase Further in 2011, June 2011, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/ 
minerals-metals/publications-reports/3167 (accessed Septem-
ber 15, 2012). 
 Canada also has great potential 
5  Mining Association of Canada (MAC), F&F 2011: Facts and 
Figures of the Canadian Mining Industry, 2011, http://www. 
mining.ca/www/media_lib/MAC_Documents/F&F2011-
%+#84

&++&&&'X&	Q`Q#Q–11. For 
a more detailed discussion covering specific minerals and 
metals see Philip M. Mobbs, “Canada [Advance Release],” in 
USGS, 2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International 
(Reston, November 2011), pp. 5.3–5.10, http://minerals.usgs. 
gov/minerals/pubs/country/2010/myb3-2010-ca.pdf (accessed 
September 15, 2012). 
6  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), pp. 9, 20, 26. 
7  X#Q%%&Q# 102–103; Philip M. Mobbs, “Canada 
[Advance Release]” (see note 5), p. 5.1. 
8  In September 2012 Canada declared it was ending asbestos 
mining; Stephen Chase and Les Perreaux, “Ottawa Does U-
Turn on Asbestos Mining, Globe and MailQ&&'X&	QQ
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-does-u-
turn-on-asbestos-'%%"	
&"4

&++&&&'X&	
15, 2012). 
9  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
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45 
when it comes to critical raw materials. Out of the 
fourteen identified by the EU, eight are found in 
Canada: antimony, fluorspar, germanium, graphite, 
niobium, rare earths, tantalum, and tungsten.10 
Significant reserves of various rare earths are also 
believed to lie in the ground in Canada.11 According 
to Statistics Canada, the value of metal ore and non-
metallic mineral exports was almost CDN$17.5 billion 
in 2011 and the value of metal and non-metallic min-
&		$
++'$	&%*![X$%Q12 more 
than half of which is exported to the United States. 
The European Union and China are further export 
destinations. Important as Canada may be as an ex-
porter, it also imports metals and ores worth almost 
*![X$%#+	&&8
$8 CDN$7.6 billion 
(2010) for iron and steel exposes a structural weak-
ness: Canada is competitive in production and enrich-
ment, but not so much in processing.13
After China, Canada is the country with the most 
mining companies among the global “top 100,” and 
mining is one of the few sectors where Canadian firms 
invest on a large scale internationally. Over one thou-
sand Canadian companies are active in over one 
hundred countries, and possess foreign mining stakes 
totaling about CDN$129 billion. Canada currently 


$%+8$	X$&	
&%$8$X+&%%$%
exploration, about 60 percent of which stays in the 
western hemisphere, especially in Chile, Mexico, the 
United States, and Argentina. The seven largest min-
 
 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
10  Linda-Maree Klimesch and Aarti Mona Sörensen, Möglich-
keiten deutscher Unternehmen für ein Engagement im kanadischen 
Rohstoffsektor, 2011, http://www.deutsche-rohstoffagetur.de/ 
DERA/DE/Downloads/Laenderstudie_Kanada_Dez2011.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=7 (accessed October 9, 2012), 13. 
A 
$&
$%$8
%X&8$%$%&%§-
tive analysis on pages 15 to 19. 
11  Rainer Jaensch, “Goldgräberstimmung in Kanadas 
Bergbau,” GTAI, March 31, 2011, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/ 
!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'4
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October 9, 2012); MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), p. *%%
Chamber of Commerce, Canada’s Rare Earth Deposits Can Offer 
a Substantial Competitive Advantage, April 2012, http://www. 

'X&	#
"'&+"$+"&$	+""	&	 
Elements.pdf (accessed September 15, 2012). 
12  Statistics Canada, Exports of Goods on a Balance-of-Payments 
Basis, by ProductQ*!]QX&-QQ^""# 
statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-+$'""
+"X&
-
eng.htm (accessed September 15, 2012). 
13  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), pp. –# 
ing companies possess half of all foreign assets.
The Canadian resource sector is very attractive for 
foreign investors because of its rich deposits and safe 
investment environment. Five Canadian provinces and 
territories are among the top ten regions in the Fraser 
Institute’s Policy Potential Index of the best places to 
mine: New Brunswick (1), Alberta (3), Québec (5), Sas-
katchewan (6), and Yukon (10).
 In 
Q*%%'%%
$'%&+%<&+&*![
billion abroad, representing almost 10 percent of all 
Canadian foreign direct investment. 
15 In 2012, Canada was 
the number one address for international investment 
in the area of non-8&		$+'&+Q%&	
&%$8
global spending on exploration went to Canada.16
Toronto is an international financial center for 
mining. About 1,500 mining companies are listed on 
&$	$%$$

%&Q$	X$&	
&%$8
the world’s listed mining companies. They primarily 
trade diamonds, iron ore, gold, potash, copper, nickel, 
silver, and uranium. The ten largest companies listed 
all possess assets estimated to exceed CDN$10 billion. 
&	
&%$8$X'%%++&+%&	
&%$8
all private financial activities in the mining sector are 
traded here, half of which relate to activities in Cana-
da. The TSX Venture Exchange in particular arranges 
private investment between CDN$1 and 5 million and 
is thus attractive for smaller companies.
 
17
Resource Policy 
 
Canadian resource policy is best understood by apply-
ing a multi-level system approach. The constitution 
assigns wide-ranging powers over natural resources to 
the provinces, which differ in their raw materials mix, 
with specific raw materials concentrated in specific 
regions. These constitutional and geological factors 
 
14  NRCan, Canada’s Mining Assets Abroad, January 2012, http:// 
www.nrcan.gc.ca/minerals-metals/publications-	&$	+"
(accessed September 15, 2012); MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), 
p. # 
15  Fred McMahon and Miguel Cervantes, Survey of Mining Com-
panies 2011/2012, February 2012, http://www.fraserinstitute. 
org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/ 
publications/mining-survey-2011-2012.pdf (accessed Septem-
ber 15, 2012). 
16  Metals Economics Group, World Exploration Trends 2012: 
A Special Report from Metals Economics Group for the PDAC Inter-
national Convention, http://www.metalseconomics.com/sites/ 
default/files/uploads/PDFs/wet2012english.pdf (accessed Sep-
tember 15, 2012). 
17  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), pp. 11, 13, 37–39. 
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make it difficult to establish a comprehensive federal 
resource policy. In addition, most producers in Cana-
da are private-sector non-state actors, so production 
and industrial location are determined only by invest-
ment and infrastructure policy. 
Institutional Setting 
Resource policy is mostly in the hands of the provinces 
(and to some extent the territories). The constitution 
gives the provinces vast powers over resource explo-
ration, development, and production, as well as the 
regulation of mining activities. The central govern-
ment is responsible only for certain territories, off-
shore areas, and uranium. Apart from the Nunavut 
Territory, which was established in 1999, all provinces 
and territories have their own mining legislation and 
their own ministry. Since the early twentieth century, 
exploration and production rights have not been auto-
matically transferred to investors, but remain with 
the provinces, which may grant leases to private indi-
viduals and companies. These register their claim to 
a piece of land and commit to explore for resources 
within a certain period. Today, about 90 percent of the 
land belongs to the state as “Crown Land.” This means 
that it is relatively easy to stake a claim.
The national government, especially Natural Re-
sources Canada, plays an important role in scientific 
research, research funding, and data collection and 
analysis. The Canada Centre for Mineral and Energy 
Technology (CANMET), the CANMET Mining and Min-
eral Sciences Laboratories (CANMET-MMSL), Geomatics 
Canada, and the geological survey register potential 
deposits. The federal government is responsible for 
developing environmental standards covering nation-
al and international mining activities, and also helps 
design and implement environmental regulations. 
The Green Mining Initiative of 2009 led by CANMET-
MMSL is responsible for footprint reduction, waste 
management, ecosystem risk management, and mine 
closure and rehabilitation.
 Nonetheless, 
only a small fraction of these claims ultimately lead to 
commercial production. 
19
 
18  Klimesch and Sörensen, Möglichkeiten deutscher Unternehmen 
für ein Engagement im kanadischen Rohstoffsektor (see note 
 The Environmental 
10), 
pp. 23–26. 
19  NRCan, Greening Initiative to Reduce Mining’s Environmental 
Footprint, 2010, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science/story/3573 
(accessed September 15, 2012); Canadian Mining Innovation 
Council, Green Mining Initiative, http://www.cmic-ccim.org/en/ 
Assessment Agency (part of the environment ministry, 
Environment Canada) is responsible for examining the 
environmental impact of all new mining projects.20 
Responsibility for environmental regulations is shared 
by several federal institutions: Environment Canada, 
Fisheries and Ocean Canada, and Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development. Where infrastructure is 
concerned, Transport Canada becomes involved, too, 
while matters involving international market access 
and social responsibility concerns of internationally 
operating Canadian companies bring Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade Canada and the Canadian 
Trade Commissioner Service into play.21 Coordination 
of the different provincial and federal ministries is 
achieved through an annual conference of mining 
ministers, the Energy and Mines Ministers’ Conference 
(EMMC).22
The most important industrial associations are 
the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and the Pros-
pectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC). 
Workers’ organizations also play an important role, 
partly because unions can assert their interests quite 
effectively in more rural areas where there is a limited 
labor pool. There have been a number of significant 
strikes in recent years.
 
23 Indigenous workers play an 
even more important role, with the mining sector 
employing twice as many indigenous workers as other 
sectors and thus being the largest private-sector em-
ployer for this group. More than one thousand indige-
nous communities live in close proximity to mining 
sites,
 
pancanadiannetwork/green_mining_initiative.asp (accessed 
September 15, 2012). 
 and with many new and promising projects 
located in regions further north, their number is 
tending to rise. This gives the sector an important 
socio-political role. Resource companies, especially 
the larger ones, often negotiate agreements contain-
20  Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Registry, 2012, http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/ 
050/index-eng.cfm (accessed September 15, 2012). 
21  Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Building 
the Canadian Advantage – A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector, March 
2009, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/ds/csr-strategy-rse-stategie.aspx? 
view=d (accessed September 15, 2012). 
22  NRCan, Canada’s Annual Energy and Mines Ministers’ Confer-
ence, 2012, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media-room/news-release/ 
2012/6507 (accessed September 15, 2012). 
23  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), p. 60, annex 10; Philip M. 
Mobbs, “Canada [Advance Release]” (see note 5), p. 5.5. 
24  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), pp. 59, 71–72. 
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ing provisions on education, employment, business 
development, and financial compensation with local 
and indigenous communities.25
Concepts and Strategies 
 
Canada has no comprehensive national resource strat-
egy. On the one hand, most of the relevant powers lie 
with the provinces, on the other, Canada is one of the 
most open and market-oriented countries regarding 
its resource policies.26 Canada also considers itself a 
resource producer rather than a consumer and priori-
tizes efforts to attract foreign investment. The last 
major policy paper27 dates from 1996 and was the 
outcome of an agreement between industry represen-
tatives, government, trade unions, indigenous groups, 
and environmental activists, concerning the necessity 
of social and environmental standards. Environ-
mental protection and sustainable development 
remain important features of the official Canadian 
government strategy today.29 At the same time, the 
1996 paper notes that resource production is a matter 
for the provinces and market forces, pointing out that 
the international competitiveness of the mining sector 
cannot be sustained by special treatment, and espe-
cially not by protectionism. Quite the contrary, it is 
for private industry to take risks and use its resources 
appropriately.30 In another section, the policy paper 
declares that Canada is “Open for Business,”31
 
25  Ibid., pp. 71–72. 
 with the 
federal government concentrating on its constitu-
tional powers: tax cuts, international trade and 
investment, science and technology, and sustainable 
development. Dialog with indigenous groups is an 
important aspect of Canadian resource politics, with 
26  Ibid.Q## 
27  NRCan, The Minerals and Metals Policy of the Government of 
Canada: Partnerships for Sustainable Development, 1996, http:// 
www.nrcan.gc.ca/minerals-metals/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca. 
minerals-metals/files/files/pdf/poli-poli/mmp-eng.pdf (accessed 
September 15, 2012), p. 5. 
28  NRCan, Whitehorse Mining Initiative, 199Q^""# 
nrcan.gc.ca/minerals-metals/policy/government-canada/ 
¢
4

&++&&&'X&	Q`# 
29  Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/ 
&8#+%%%-1 (accessed September 15, 
2012). 
30  NRCan, The Minerals and Metals Policy of the Government of 
Canada (see note 27), p. 6. 
31  X#Q## 
the hope that mining can increase economic 
and social cohesion, especially in more rural areas and 
communities.32
%Q!	&+$	
&+*%X+&
another report for the mining industry, entitled From 
Mineral Resources to Manufactured Products: Toward a Value-
Added Mineral and Metal Strategy for Canada. It primarily 
addresses the question of how to increase productivity 
and value added in the resource sector, identifying 
measures including the creation of partnerships 
between businesses and politics, enhancing foreign 
trade, investing in human capital, consideration of 
environmental aspects, funding innovation, science, 
and technology, and making Canada more attractive 
as an industrial location.
 
33
Although no comprehensive policy document for 
the metals and minerals sector has been published 
since, that does not mean that Canada has no resource 
strategy. The federal government is eager to support 
exploration, extraction, and refining of domestic min-
erals, to promote Canadian investment abroad, to 
attract foreign investment to Canada, and to create a 
fair global environment for trade and investment, for 
instance by promoting market transparency. Another 
important aspect for the federal government is to 
diversify the markets for Canadian resources in order 
to decrease dependency on the United States, as is 
sustainable development. 
 
The resource strategies of the provinces comprise 
the principles of open market access and a sound 
investment environment.
 
32  Ibid., p. 1. 
 They contain social and 
environmental dimensions. Although Quebec is the 
only province to pursue an active industrial policy, 
discussions about royalties are frequent and provoke 
controversy among industry representatives. 
33  Government of Canada, From Mineral Resources to Manu-
factured Products: Toward a Value-Added Mineral and Metal Strategy 
for Canada 4Q`Q^""#%	
%#
#
"+&+"# 
nrcan.gc.ca.minerals-metals/files/pdf/mms-smm/poli-poli/pdf/ 
val-eng.pdf (accessed September 15, 2012). 
34  Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mining, 
Ontario’s Mineral Development Strategy, 2006, http://www.ontla. 
$%#
"X		="	&$+$	="'$%""#84
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September 15, 2012); British Columbia Ministry of Energy 
and Mines, Mineral Exploration and Mining Strategy: Seizing 
Global Demand, 2012, http://www.empr.gov.bc.ca/Mining/ 
Documents/MiningStrategy2012.pdf (accessed September 
15, 2012); Québec Ministry of Natural Resources, Preparing 
the Future of Québec’s Mineral Sector, 2009, http://www.mrn.gouv. 
qc.ca/english/publications/mines/strategy/mineral_strategy. 
pdf (accessed September 15, 2012). 
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Policy Measures and Instruments 
Even if there is no comprehensive federal strategy, 
Ottawa engages in resource policy through a multi-
tude of measures, including initiatives for transpar-
ency and against corruption in resource-producing 
countries and initiatives for corporate social responsi-
bility and environmentally sustainable practices (for 
example, Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
and the Green Mining Initiative). 
Given that Canadian mining companies are global 
players, the international dimension is significant. 
Ottawa defends trade liberalization and open market 
access, especially in the contexts of the WTO, OECD, 
and NAFTA. In recent years, discussions among the 
G20 about a specific role for resources have gained 
momentum.35 In the 1990s, transparency and eco-
nomic cooperation were already at the center of the 
EU-Canada Working Group on Metals and Minerals. 
Recently, declarations of intent to deepen bilateral 
German-Canadian collaboration in the resource sec-
tor were published in advance of the visit by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in August 2012. In these 
documents, both partners propose closer cooperation 
in education and sustainability, also in relation to 
critical resources and rare earths.36 The Canadian 
mining sector hopes for successful completion of the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (CETA). Canada is also seeking agreements with 
Latin American states and special bilateral Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs).37 Outside 
Canada, the mining industry is supported by Cana-
dian diplomatic missions. Canada’s international 
cooperation with developing countries goes beyond 
industry support, emphasizing sustainability and 
transparency. The Canadian International Develop-
ment Agency (CIDA) focuses on promoting environ-
mentally friendly and socially acceptable resource 
management practices.
 
35  NRCan, The Minerals and Metals Policy of the Government of 
Canada (see note 
 
27), p. 22. 
36  Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 
“Heitzer: Marktpotenziale für deutsch-kanadische Zusam-
menarbeit im Rohstoffsektor nutzen,” press release, August 
QQ^""#X'#&""	&++&"	&++&'&%&%Q 
did=503530.html (accessed October 9, 2012). 
37  MAC, F&F 2011(see note 5`Q## 
38  Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
Natural Resources Management, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ 
acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/FRA--LK7 (accessed 
December 10, 2012). 
International Raw Materials Governance 
The Canadian government and mining industry are 
interested in maintaining a good reputation as inves-
tor. In the past, there have been reports of Canadian 
companies acting unethically, for instance when 
members of Latin American death squads were hired 
to guard mines. In 2009, the federal government 
implemented a strategy to improve the social respon-
sibility of Canadian firms abroad, including CSR 
consulting and binding obligations. These efforts, 
however, appear inadequate to some observers, who 
were disappointed that the Canadian House of Com-
mons rejected a more rigorous bill (C-300) in a close 
vote.39
Concerning international efforts to improve trans-
parency in the mining sector, Canada officially em-
braced EITI in 2007.
 
 Since the publication of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission rules for 
transparency of payments in the resources sector, 
this topic has also been discussed more intensely. At 
the beginning of September 2012, two NGOs – Publish 
What You Pay Canada (PWYP-Canada) and the Revenue 
Watch Institute – established a working group on 
transparency in revenue flows (the Resource Revenue 
Transparency Working Group) seeking to develop a 
framework for legally binding transparency obliga-
tions concerning payments to foreign governments 
in the resources sector. In the past, the Canadian 
government has been skeptical toward such initiatives 
arguing that they would adversely affect smaller Cana-
dian companies that are faced with extra costs to meet 
the disclosure requirements. Furthermore, it is feared 
that Canadian firms would find it difficult to compete 
with foreign rivals that do not have to adhere to such 
rules.
 
39  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 
 Canada has played an active role in promoting 
5`Q#%&	%$%	&
Canada, Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extrac-
tive Sector, March 2009, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/ds/csr-strategy-rse-stategie. 
aspx?view=d (accessed September 15, 2012). 
40  NRCan, Canada’s Role in the EITI: Government, 2011, http:// 
www.nrcan.gc.ca/extractive-%+	&+"$<&	%'&%"
(accessed May 22, 2012). 
41  See also “United States” in this volume, pp. 150ff. 
42  Claire Woodside (One International), New Canadian Initia-
tive to Improve Transparency in the Extractive Sector, September 
Q 2012, http://www.one.org/international/blog/pwyp-canada-
announces-new-initiative-to-improve-transparency-in-the-
canadian-extractive-sector/ (accessed October 9, 2012). 
43  Shawn McCarthy, “Miners Urge New Rules, More Trans-
parency,” Globe and Mail, September 6, 2012, http://www. 
theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/ 
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the international Kimberley Process. Since the dia-
mond certification agreement was concluded, Canada 
has passed extensive legislation on diamond trade.
Canada’s role within the G20 is more ambivalent. 
The prime minister likes to portray Canada as an 
emerging energy superpower. Recently, another pic-
ture has emerged – that of a resource giant. Internally, 
reports already exist that discuss the impact of this 
shift of emphasis. The Canadian government supports 
international rules on transparency, corruption, and 
market access and sees the G20 as a suitable institu-
tion for promoting that agenda. The discussion about 
critical resources is perceived more skeptically. Criti-
cality is defined with regard to the socio-economic 
dimension of certain resources for Canadian regions, 
not so much as meaning access to resources (scarcity 
through trade or scarcity through production). This 
is the perspective of a producer that possesses a range 
of natural resources. Expansion of the domestic raw 
materials sector is driven not by reducing import 
dependencies but improving domestic growth and 
welfare. This is why so much effort goes into attract-
ing foreign investors. And while Canada criticizes 
China there is also understanding for its resource 
policy position as long as core and strategic industries 
are not affected. 
 
Of course, Canadian diamond producers benefit from 
this, too. 
Evaluation and Outlook 
Canadian resource policy is affected by geographic 
location, constitutional and historic predispositions, 
and extensive deposits of a multitude of resources 
unevenly spread across the country. This has pre-
vented the emergence of a coherent and extensive 
federal resource policy. Currently, however, there is 
also no desire for such a strategy. With the exception 
of a few core industries, the country trusts the forces 
of the markets and relies on tax incentives to steer 
developments. 
The international financial crisis may have led 
to a reduction of demand for resources, but experts 
at Natural Resources Canada still expect demand to 
grow, and point out that Canadian resources will 
 
energy-and-resources/miners-urge-new-rules-more-
	%+	&%
="	
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44  NRCan, Canada: A Diamond-Producing Nation, 2011, http:// 
www.nrcan.gc.ca/minerals-metals/business-market/3630 
(accessed September 15, 2012). 
remain available in sufficient quantities for some 
time. New mines have opened since 2010, and global 
price rises mean that not only the volume but also 
the value of production increased. In 2010, about 
70 percent of mining capacity was in use, with further 
increases expected as China and India draw in more 
resources as a result of their predicted growth. 
Ontario and Quebec both intend to conduct substan-
tial projects exploring the mining potential of their 
northern regions. The “Ring of Fire” project in north-
ern Ontario promises the extraction of vast deposits of 
chromite, diamonds, copper, nickel, and platinum. 
The Quebec government’s twenty-five-year Plan Nord 
	$$+&+%<&+'&%+$	$<&	*![X$%%
the north of the province, where large deposits of 
iron ore, cobalt, nickel, platinum metals, and zinc are 
suspected. Ottawa’s Geo-mapping for Energy and Min-
erals 4]`	$	'	%8	$'–2013 with a 
budget of CDN$100 million, to explore for new re-
source deposits, especially offshore and in the Arctic.50
The low population density, however, has led to 
bottlenecks in skilled labor and adversely affects capi-
tal mobilization. A study by Ernst and Young expects 
&	
&%$8&
		&%$	8$	
&%&'%ing 
+&
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45  Philip M. Mobbs, “Canada [Advance Release]” (see note 
 And the vast distances to 
new mines require extensive infrastructure projects. 
Canada is thus looking abroad to attract capital and 
labor. Although its resource base is diverse, the coun-
try still faces major challenges such as its large carbon 
footprint and its vulnerability to international market 
fluctuations as a raw materials exporter. The govern-
ment considers scarcity of personnel and capital to be 
its main challenges. 
5), 
p. 5.2. 
46  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), pp. 10–Q# 
47  Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, 
Ring of Fire Secretariat, 2012, http://www.mndm.gov.on.ca/en/ 
ring-fire-secretariat (accessed September 15, 2012). 
48  Government of Quebec, Plan Nord: Building Northern Québec 
Together, 2012, http://plannord.gouv.qc.ca/english/index.asp 
(accessed September 15, 2012). 
49  NRCan, Mineral Production, March 2012, http://www.nrcan. 
gc.ca/minerals-metals/publications-reports/3575 (accessed Sep-
tember 15, 2012); Klimesch and Sörensen, Möglichkeiten deut-
scher Unternehmen für ein Engagement im kanadischen Rohstoffsektor 
(see note 10), pp. 32–3]*QF&F 2011 (see note 5), pp. 39–# 
50  Richard Walker, Geo-mapping for Energy and Minerals: New 
Geoscience Maps for Nunavut, 2011, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/ 
media-room/news-release/32b/2011-03/mineral/1577 (accessed 
September 15, 2012). 
51  MAC, F&F 2011 (see note 5), p. 59. 
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Another important factor to bear in mind is that 
the strength of the Canadian dollar (due to rising 
resource prices) makes exports more expensive. 
Domestically, the resource sector plays an important 
role in regional, social, and structural policies. The 
development of new projects in the provinces and 
territories functions as regional structural policy and 
development policy for indigenous communities. 
This also leads to conflicts with affected populations. 
Canada’s rich deposits of natural resources allow 
it to diversify its activities away from the United 
States. China and India are considered important 
future trading partners. Market access and corporate 
responsibility remain priorities of resource policy, 
especially regarding Canadian mining activities in 
Latin America. At the same time, the government has 
to address debates about strategic resources, even if 
Canada has distinct views as a major resource pro-
ducer. Geopolitical considerations and partnerships 
with the United States and Europe mean that Canada 
cannot neglect these discussions. While the G20 is 
seen as an important forum in this regard, the role of 
Canada is perceived more of that of a passive follower 
than an active player. From an economic standpoint, 
there are many links with countries like China. In the 
future two questions will be particularly significant: 
What will happen if Canada’s economic and security 
interests diverge? And will Canada’s foreign policy in-
creasingly be driven by its resource wealth? 
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China 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
 
Since the turn of the century, China’s spectacular eco-
nomic rise has shaped global resource markets. The 
dynamic growth of the country’s consumption of 
raw materials and the resulting increase in import 
demand are the principal forces behind the global 
mining and commodities boom. At the heart of 
China’s sophisticated raw materials policy lie con-
cerns about its own security of supply. The objective 
of underpinning economic growth, industrialization, 
and modernization with an adequate supply of raw 
materials takes priority over considerations of global 
governance. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Mineral raw materials are the tangible base of China’s 
dynamic economic expansion, with average growth 
rates of 10 percent over the past three decades. Infra-
structure development in the world’s third-largest 
country by area, urbanization of its most populous 
nation (of about 1.3 billion), advancement to become 
the largest industrial manufacturer, and satisfaction 
of the consumer demands of a growing middle class: 
none of these would have been possible without a 
reliable resource base. Thus it can be expected that 
China’s consumption of minerals and metals will 
continue to grow for quite some time in absolute 
terms, per capita, and per unit of GDP.1
Thus it comes as no surprise to which extent China 
dominates global production, consumption, trade, 
and pricing of raw materials. Currently, as the 2010 
global market shares demonstrate, production of bulk 
metals takes place primarily in China: aluminum 39.1 
&	
&%Q
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1  On the debate about the connection between economic 
growth and metal consumption, and for a forecast of Chinese 
metal consumption, see Huw McKay, Yu Sheng, and Ligang 
Song, “China’s Metal Intensity in Comparative Perspective,” 
in China the Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development, ed. Ross 
Garnaut, Jane Golley, and Ligang Song (Canberra: ANU E, 
2010), pp. 73–
$%+&	%&<&$'&%+%*%¨+%&-
bors (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and China’s particularities, 
maximum consumption of steel is projected to be 700 to 
 kg per capita per year. 
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energy raw materials (by weight) in 2010, China is the 
clear global leader.2 In 2010 it also maintained an 
extraordinarily strong position for production of most 
steel additives, precious and rare metals, and indus-
trial minerals.3 The country’s even larger shares of 
consumption in the same year indicate the extent to 
which developments are driven by demand: alumi-
%'#&	
&%Q
$&	#&	
&%Q&Q per-
cent, nickel 3#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&	
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#&	
&%#
China is in the fortunate position of being able to 
cover a large proportion of domestic demand from 
domestic sources, as it is endowed with ample mineral 
deposits. It possesses the world’s largest reserves of 
antimony, barite, bismuth, graphite, gypsum, indium, 
molybdenum, rare earth elements, silicon, strontium, 
tin, titanium, tungsten, and vanadium, and the sec-
ond-largest reserves of cadmium, diatomite, lead, 
lithium, magnesium, and zinc, as well as occupying 
a leading position on iron ore, fluorspar, gold, and 
mercury.
 
5
 
2  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
 
3  BMWFJ, World Mining Data 2012 (see note 2). No details for 
indium. 
4  BGR and DERA, eds., Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010, 
DERA Rohstoffinformationen (Hannover, December 2011), 
pp. 117–36, http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/ 
Produkte/Downloads/DERA_Rohstoffinformationen/ 
rohstoffinformationen-07.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7 
(accessed October 15, 2012). 
5  U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), ed., Mineral Commodity Sum-
maries 2012 (Reston, January 2012), http://minerals.usgs.gov/ 
minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/mcs-2012-raree.pdf 
(accessed October 15, 2012). The USGS data may be unreli-
able, as China employs its own methods for recording of data 
and grants the USGS only restricted access, see Pui-Kwan Tse, 
“The Mineral Industry of China” (China [Advance Release]), 
in USGS, 2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International 
(Reston, February 2012), p. 9.13, http://minerals.usgs.gov/ 
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In 2010 the mining sector employed 5.6 million 
&$&Q$	#&	
&%$8&$	%$$%#6
In 2010, China’s external trade in raw materials 
amounted to US$71#X$%Q$	&	
&%$8+
total external trade. China is the world’s leading 
exporter of antimony, barite, fluorspar, graphite, in-
dium, rare earth elements, and tungsten. But imports 
of raw materials far exceed exports, with bauxite, iron 
ore, copper, and nickel especially noteworthy in terms 
of value and volume. While China has large deposits 
of these minerals, domestic ores are of poor quality 
and correspondingly expensive to refine. The country 
is also highly dependent on imports of chromium, 
cobalt, potash, manganese, platinum, tantalum, and 
zirconium. In terms of value, China’s metal and min-
&	'$	+%'$%&$#&	
&%$8+
total imports, which is high in international compari-
son (see above). 
 
According to the national statistics office, mining 
accounted fo	#&	
&%$8%$%<&&
in 2009. The commodity sector has a dual structure: 
large state-owned enterprises with in some cases 
modern plants, high productivity, and a leading 
position in the world market – such as Chalco (alu-
minum), Baosteel and Hebei Iron & Steel (steel), Jin-
duicheng (molybdenum), Baotou Steel & Rare Earth 
(rare earth elements), Yunnan Tin (tin), Zijin Mining 
(gold, copper, zinc), and Minmetals (metal trading) – 
coexist with numerous smaller, privately or cooper-
atively owned companies with small output, low 
productivity, environmentally harmful methods, and 
sometimes hazardous working conditions. Informal 
mining, including criminal structures, is not a rarity. 
The utilization of secondary raw materials in in-
dustrial production is growing. A vibrant recycling 
industry is now developing, initiated by the Recycling 
Economy Promotion Law ++&%%'e-
mented in 2009, and the national recycling quota is 
growing fast. China has become a key importer of 
scrap metals from abroad, with its aluminum industry 
increasingly processing scrap, about half of which is 
imported.7
 
minerals/pubs/country/2010/myb3-2010-ch.pdf (accessed 
October 11, 2012). 
 
6  Tse, “The Mineral Industry of China” (see note 5), p. 9.1. 
7  Michael Komesaroff, “Waste Not, Want Not,” China Economic 
Quarterly 16, no. 1 (2012): 9. 
The Raw Materials Policy 
Since the reform process began under Deng Xiaoping, 
economic growth has been the main political objec-
tive of China’s state and party leaderships. Given that 
economic growth is central to modernization, creat-
ing prosperity, and preservating the power of the 
Communist Party (CCP), the great political value of a 
secure supply of raw materials (and energy) is obvious. 
In the Chinese understanding, the state has a crucial 
role to play in achieving this objective. Historically, 
China has always been a centralistic agrarian society, 
in which control over resources (land and water) con-
stitutes a source of political power. The legacy of 
Maoist paradigms for exploitation and mobilization 
of resources, preference for national independence 
and self-sufficiency, and governmental influence on 
industrial investment can still be felt.
Institutional Setting 
 
The relevant actors for China’s mining sector can be 
broadly divided into three groups: center, economy, 
and provinces. At the top level are the central insti-
tutions of the party and the state. The CCP Politburo, 
the National Congress (parliament), and the State 
Council (cabinet) are the most influential actors in 
China’s authoritative decision-making process. On 
raw materials policy they act only in exceptional cases 
and in a rather declaratory way. The most important 
executive organs further down are the Ministry of 
Land and Resources (MOLAR), the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MOEP), 
the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), and numerous central agencies such as the 
Chinese Geological Survey (CGS), the Chinese State 
Reserve Bureau (SRB), and the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of 
the State Council (SASAC). While MOLAR handles the 
administration of exploration and production of raw 
materials (as well as soil protection), the raw materials 
smelting and processing industries belong to the MIIT 
portfolio. MOFTEC regulates foreign trade and direct 
investments, but is bound by guidelines set by individ-
 
8  For China’s energy and resource policy paradigms see 
Philip Andrews-Speed, The Institutions of Energy Governance 
in China, Note de l’Ifri (Paris, January 2010), pp. –20. 
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ual ministries and central state commissions. MOEP is 
responsible for water protection and emission control, 
while NDRC holds a preeminent position as it shoul-
ders overall economic responsibility for macroeco-
nomic control and industrial policy planning, as well 
as sectoral competence for energy, chemicals, and 
large-scale construction projects. Sometimes labeled 
the “small state council,” the NDRC controls govern-
ment investment and is centrally in charge of the 
country’s economic policy. 
Secondly, numerous private and public enterprises 
are involved in mining, production, refining, and 
processing, with a wide range of size and productivity. 
The raw materials sector is organized in quasi-public 
professional associations, such as the Mining Asso-
ciation (CMA), the Iron and Steel Association (CISA), 
the Nonferrous Metals Industry Association (CNIA), 
and the Rare Earth Industry Association. Besides 
representing interests, these associations also fulfil 
statutory tasks. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
their directors occupy leading positions in the politi-
cal hierarchy. While their management decisions are 
profit-oriented, they have the power to influence 
decisions at the central level. 
The third and de facto most important group of 
actors consists of regional and local government 
and administrative institutions. They grant mining 
licenses, environmental permits, and explosion per-
mits, giving them the power to promote, permit, or 
prevent investments, or to actually enforce centrally 
directed capacity reductions. They monitor compli-
ance with environmental and health and safety legis-
lation, and possess legislative powers of their own. On 
the other hand, they impose corporate and resource 
taxes on local enterprises and bear political respon-
sibility for local growth and employment, and thus 
pursue a regionally focused industrial policy agenda. 
Within this institutional setting, raw materials 
regulation is both a “top-down” and a “bottom-up” 
process. While in principle the central ministries 
and authorities are responsible for formulating na-
tional laws and decrees, the consensus-based legis-
lative process means that SOEs and provinces are also 
involved. In the end the legislative outcome amounts 
to vague rules that more resemble political declara-
tions of intent than administrative regulations. While 
administrative implementation and oversight of cen-
trally enacted regulations lie with the provinces, dis-
tricts, and communities, Beijing’s monotoring tools to 
control them are inadequate. Whether or not national 
environmental and occupational safety laws, invest-
ment requirements, and restrictions are observed 
becomes a matter for local negotiations between SOE 
directors, private enterprises, and local cadres, who 
bargain over the distribution of the considerable 
profits of mining and raw materials production, with 
the central government playing only a supporting 
role. However, Beijing is not entirely powerless in this 
game: flagrant violations of environmental laws or 
cases where corruption becomes publicly known may 
provoke central intervention, and all decisive actors 
are subject to regular internal assessment as CPC 
members.9
The fragmented and chaotic system within which 
China’s mining and raw materials industries oper-
ate has in fact generated considerable production 
growth over the past decades and neutralized deeply 
entrenched fears of supply shortage. Nevertheless, 
success in production cannot obscure systemic short-
comings. Due to its weak position within the executive 
hierarchy, MOLAR is unable to fill its role as the deci-
sive instance on raw materials policy. Without con-
sistent leadership and decision-making powers, 
coherent regulation on the ground is impossible. An 
absence of regulatory transparency, the perpetuation 
of inefficient production, and great deficits in environ-
mental protection and occupational safety are the con-
sequences of these structures. 
 
Concept and Strategies 
The de facto priority of China’s raw materials policy 
is security of supply. Yet, there is no explicit strategy 
stating objectives, preferences, measures, and instru-
ments – neither for developing mining and produc-
tion nor for satisfying demand. At best, there are 
strategies for particular products such as rare earth 
elements. Only the NDRC’s five-year plans or state-
ments by the State Council, MIIT, and MOLAR hint at 
objectives currently pursued. The white paper China’s 
Policy on Mineral Resources published by the State 
Council in 2003 is thus far the only official report 
to include all relevant areas and aspects of Chinese 
resource policy.10
 
9  Similar institutional frameworks can be found China’s 
energy policy and energy economy, see Andrews-Speed, 
The Institutions of Energy Governance in China, pp. –30. 
 It remains valid, even though the 
postulated policy has been largely overtaken by events. 
10  Information Office of the State Council, China Policy 
on Mineral Resources, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-
""
$%&%#'4
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The white paper emphasizes the importance of min-
erals as the basis for modernization, providing an 
overview of the geological and economic situation of 
raw materials in China (chapter I) and the develop-
ment of the legal context (VI), defining objectives and 
priorities for raw materials policy (II), and outlining 
instruments and measures for the three most impor-
tant objectives: expansion of capacity and production 
(III), internationalization by means of investment and 
trade (IV), and environmental protection and sustain-
ability (V). 
As a concrete translation of the white paper, 
MOLAR’s National Plan on Mineral Resources 2008–2015 
provides quantitative production targets and iden-
tifies metals and minerals whose exploitation should 
be increased.11
The structure of the white paper for rare earth ele-
ments published by the State Council in June 2012 
follows that of the white paper of 2003. A detailed 
description of China’s rare earths industry including 
its various problems (I) is followed by chapters on 
principles and targets (II), resource protection and 
production (III), environmental protection (IV), 
modernization and processing (V), and the inter-
national level (VI). The publication describes China’s 
leading position in the sector, identifies goals of en-
vironmental protection, consolidation, and techno-
logical modernization, and justifies in detail the 
practice of export restrictions.
 
12
The Strategic Roadmap for Seeking Mining Breakthroughs 
(2011–2020), approved by the State Council on October 
19, 2011, states concrete objectives for intensifying 
exploitation, expanding production, and increasing 
the resource efficiency of eleven strategic minerals 
(including iron ore, potash, and copper), where China 
is more than 50 percent dependent on imports.
 
13
 
11  Pui-Kwan Tse, “The Mineral Industry of China,” in USGS, 
2008 Minerals Yearbook: China, vol. 3, Area Reports, International 
4&+$%Q+`Q##Q^""minerals.usgs.gov/ 
'%&	+"X+"
$%	=""'=X--ch.pdf (accessed 
October 11, 2012). 
 
12  Information Office of the State Council, Situation and 
Policy of China’s Rare Earth Industry, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english/business/2012-06/20/c_131665123.htm (accessed 
August 31, 2012). 
13  Guowuyuan Bangongting, Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi 
tongguo Zhao kuang tupo zhanlüe xingdong gangyao (2011–2020 
nian) [General Office of State Council, Plenum of the standing 
committee of the State Council passed the “action plan for 
the breakthrough strategy for the exploitation of natural 
resources”], Beijing, 2011, www.chinania.org.cn/html/ 
China’s national five-year plans that are drawn up 
by the NDRC include macroeconomic guidelines for 
investment and energy consumption as well as sector-
based targets, currently for 2011 to 2015. In order to 
enable the mining and raw materials sectors to ensure 
China’s raw materials supply, the plan calls for explo-
ration efforts to achieve a geological breakthrough 
within five years and lead to the exploitation of larger 
sources within the same period.
The annual investment lists identifying promoted, 
accepted and non-promoted sectors, which are pub-
lished by the NDRC, provide an important legal frame-
work. These lists are embedded in long-term industrial 
policy planning, such as the modernization of the 
ten largest industries, including steel and non-ferrous 
metals, or the objective of becoming an innovative 
economy by 2020 and the world’s leading economy by 
2050. In addition, the government’s decision to lower 
national energy consumption and CO2 emissions 
forced the closing of smaller and outdated smelters 
and the consolidation of the mining sector. 
 
On the basis of these plans and concepts, the offi-
cial objectives of China’s raw materials policy can be 
summarized in eight points: (1) expansion of domestic 
production; (2) technological modernization of pro-
duction and processing; (3) development and indus-
	$%$8&%&	$		$<%
&+4`
$%+$$%
of the raw materials industry; (5) increase energy 
and resource efficiency; (6) develop strategic reserves; 
(7) en<	$%'&%	$&
$%4`	&
%<&+'&%%
foreign sources. An integrated approach encompass-
ing mining, smelting, and processing through to 
downstream manufacturing can be observed. 
However, raw materials policies and plans designed 
in Beijing do not always harmonize with the rough 
reality of China’s mining regions. In fact, commitment 
to central concepts, strategies, and plans on the pro-
vincial, district, and municipal levels is very limited. 
Especially with regard to environmental protection 
and incoming foreign direct investment, the mineral 
policies white paper is more a diplomatic statement 
than a decisive blueprint. While foreign know-how is 
welcomed in the oil and gas sectors, the foreign pres-
ence in mining is limited to a few gold mines. Many 
investors have in fact had to pull out. In general, local 
 
zhengcefagui/falvfagui/2011""#'4
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October 26, 2012). 
14  Agnieszka Winnicka and Joao Santos, China Industrial 
Policy: Implementation of the 12th Five Year Development Plan  
(2011–2015), delegation of the EU to China, Beijing 2012, 
unpublished manuscript. 
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policy implementation is far more important than 
central planning. 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
Exploration, Production, and Processing 
Domestic exploration efforts are currently being 
stepped up to meet high domestic demand. Under 
Chinese market economy conditions, exploration is 
nowadays conducted by commercial actors rather 
than state agencies.15
Regional planning shapes the national develop-
ment of the mining and raw materials economy. 
Industrial zones for smelting, processing, and down-
stream manufacturing have been developed in close 
proximity to deposits of coal, oil, iron ore, copper, and 
rare earths to efficiently exploit resources and create 
industrial clusters. The sub-division into five economic 
regions in the latest five-year plan foresees developing 
mining and refinery centers in the energy- and re-
source-rich west of the country, where wages and elec-
tricity costs are considerably lower than in the east. 
By relocating to the west, aluminum smelters, for 
example, are able to lower their production costs by 
about one third.
 
16
With the objectives of modernizing the sector, 
enhancing production (for example by increasing 
yield rates), and improving resource efficiency, the 
central and regional levels intensely regulate the 
mining sector through diverse requirements on 
minimum production output, minimum capacity, 
environmental protection, occupational safety, 
and technology. 
 
Industrial Consolidation 
For many years, consolidation and restructuring to 
create a small number of large enterprises has been a 
stated objective for the raw material sector. Adminis-
trative efforts focus on both the mining sector itself 
and the subsequent primary industries. 
Consolidation seeks to improve energy and resource 
efficiency, environmental protection, mine and occu-
 
15  General Office of the State Council, Plenum of the standing 
committee of the State Council passed the action plan for the break-
through strategy for the exploitation of natural resources, Peking 
2011, http://www.chinania.org.cn/html/zhengcefagui/ 
falvfagui/2011/1"#'4

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
16  Tse, “The Mineral Industry of China” (see note 5),  
pp. 9.1–9.2; Michael Komesaroff, “Off to Desert Pastures,” 
China Economic Quarterly Q%$#4`^–10. 
pational safety, productivity, containment of crime 
and smuggling, and exercise of authority and control. 
With the realization of economies of scale and tech-
nological learning effects, the remaining large-scale 
SOEs are expected to achieve larger profit margins. 
Mandatory requirements and centrally administrated 
mergers are to accomplish the restructuring. The 
creation of efficient, large, internationally competitive 
units thriving as Chinese “national champions” on the 
world markets is the goal.17 However, the central level 
does not really succeed in enforcing its own rules, for 
example to restrict production capacity. For instance, 
in 2010, the illegal exploitation of rare earths could 
only be contained by deploying the People’s Liberation 
Army. Moreover, regulations on minimum produc-
tion capacity, application of technology, and environ-
mental protection have tended to stimulate invest-
ment in capacity expansion and modernization rather 
than reducing production capacity. Thus provincial 
consolidation efforts end up reducing the number of 
enterprises, but not their capacity, while consolida-
tion extending across provincial boundaries requires 
a great deal of political effort.19
Industrial Policy 
 
China’s capital- and resource-intensive industrializa-
tion is supported by a favorable macroeconomic 
framework. Although the state has not provided direct 
financial transfers for domestic enterprises since 2005, 
prices for land, environment, capital, and foreign 
exchange are still politically determined. Low-interest 
credit, partial subsidies for energy, political pricing in 
conjunction with allocation of industrial sites, and 
almost free use of the environment all function as sub-
sidies for primary producers and manufacturing. As a 
	&+Q&+&
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$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This reduction in price factors spurs corporate profits 
and is responsible for lopsided investment-driven eco-
 
17  Peter Thomas in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy 
Shaping International Trade and Investment Patterns – Evidence from 
the Iron and Steel Industry, Duisburger Arbeitspapiere Ostasien-
++&%+
8&%"4+X	Q`Q#–9; Michael 
Komesaroff, “Smelters Away,” China Economic Quarterly 12, 
no. 4`^–12 (10); Michael Komesaroff, “Metals: Good 
Golly Miss Moly(bdenum)!,” China Economic Quarterly 11, no. 2 
4`^–10. 
18  Patti Waldmeir, “Good Luck Beijing’s Rare Earth Police, 
You’ll Need It,” Financial Times, May 5, 2010. 
19  For aluminum: Komesaroff, “Smelters Away” (see note 17); 
for steel: in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy (see 
note 17), pp. 7–9. 
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nomic growth and the development of industrial over-
capacity.20
Promotion of industrialization and industry em-
bedded in a macroeconomic framework constitutes a 
powerful competitive advantage on the international 
resource markets. Chinese resource consumers are 
enabled to pay higher prices for raw materials than 
their foreign competitors. Strong Chinese purchasing 
power in connection with the enormous volume of 
demand vigorously pulls in imports, which are large-
ly handled by the Shanghai Metals Exchange (SME). 
Chinese market power limits the availability of 
numerous metals to foreign consumers that have to 
pay higher prices than their Chinese competitors or 
be content with lower quality.
 Large, financially sound, and well-capital-
ized state-owned enterprises are privileged. 
21
These framework conditions, which are favorable 
for industrial investment, also provide fertile ground 
for a raw-materials-based industrial policy. In order to 
maximize both domestic value added and domestic 
employment gains in downstream production stages, 
central and regional authorities exercise broad in-
fluence on investment, production, foreign trade, and 
technology transfer by means of low-interest loans, 
high-tech-driven industrial location policies, and 
industrial regulation favoring domestic enterprises.
 Accordingly, Chinese 
enterprises enjoy a supply advantage. 
22 
Due to its low production costs, virtually unlimited 
domestic demand, and intense domestic competition, 
the Chinese raw materials and primary industry sec-
tor quickly developed into a dominant power on the 
world markets and pushed foreign competitors aside 
through price pressure. These developments are well 
documented for the sectors of steel23, aluminum
 
20  For an analysis and quantitative assessment see Yiping 
Huang and Bijun Wang, “Rebalancing China’s Economic 
Structure,” in China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Devel-
opment, ed. Ross Garnaut, Jane Golley, and Ligang Song 
(Canberra: ANU E, 2010), pp. 302–10. 
 
21  For a report from the perspective of the affected enter-
prises see Rüdiger Kiani-Kreß, “Chinas Manipulative Roh-
stoffbörse,” Wirtschaftswoche, November 25, 2009, http:// 
www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/blei-chinas-manipulative-
rohstoffboerse/5596100.html (accessed September 20, 2012). 
22  Hanns Günther Hilpert, Chinas globale wirtschaftliche Heraus-
forderung: Für eine kohärente Außenwirtschaftspolitik Europas, 
SWP-Studien 29/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, December 2010), p. 23. 
23  in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy (see note 17). 
24  Komesaroff, “Smelters Away” (see note 17); Komesaroff, 
“Off to Desert Pastures” (see note 16). 
and rare earths.25
Export Restrictions 
 Less well known is China’s domi-
nant position in molybdenum, magnesium, fluorspar, 
graphite, and tungsten. 
China regulates its foreign trade in raw materials, 
refined, and semi-finished products to improve its 
security of supply and strengthen domestic value 
added, both in processing and in downstream manu-
facturing. Measures are imposed primarily on the 
export side, where duties, quotas, obligatory export 
licenses, mandatory minimum prices, prohibition of 
third-country refining, and suspension of value-added 
tax refunds restrict the volume or raise the price of 
exports. These measures are applied to both commod-
ity metals and to those metals and minerals where 
China is a dominant world market supplier due to 
its large domestic deposits (rare earth elements, anti-
mony, fluorspar, gold, graphite, indium, magnesium, 
molybdenum, silicon, silver, and tungsten).26
Taken together, these measures may result in a 
price difference of more than 30 percent between 
China and the world market.
 MOFTEC, 
MOEP, the General Administration of Customs (GAC), 
and the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals 
Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters 
(CCCMC) are responsible for implementing these 
measures. Confronted with foreign criticism and 
official complaints to the WTO by the European 
Union, the United States, and Japan, export restric-
tions are now officially justified in terms of environ-
mental and resource protection. 
27
 
25  Hanns Günther Hilpert and Antje Elisabeth Kröger, 
“Seltene Erden – Die Vitamine der Industrie,” in Konfliktrisiko 
Rohstoffe? Herausforderungen und Chancen im Umgang mit knappen 
Ressourcen, ed. Stormy-Annika Mildner, SWP-Studie 5/2011 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2011), 
pp. 163–67. 
 While they improve 
the market supply in China, foreign raw materials 
consumers suffer a competitive disadvantage in terms 
of prices and availability. While many countries em-
26  For an up-to-date overview see Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie e.V. (BDI), Übersicht über bestehende Handels- 
und Wettbewerbsverzerrungen auf den Rohstoffmärkten, unpub-
lished manuscript (Berlin, 2012), pp. 7–	$&%Y%$%
Delegation to China and Mongolia, Summary Note on Recent 
Developments on China’s Export Quotas on Raw Materials (Beijing, 
2012); for the example of coking coal see in der Heiden, 
Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy (see note 17), pp. 11–19. 
27  For the example of rare earths, see Jane Korinek and 
Jeonghoi Kim, Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw Materials and 
Their Impact on Trade, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper 95 
(Paris: OECD, March 29, 2010), p. 16. 
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ploy export restrictions on resources, it is China’s 
restrictions that are mostly responsible for broad 
market disturbances and distortion of competition. 
Such restrictions exert detrimental effects wherever 
the exporting country is large enough to be relevant 
for global supply. Since China holds considerable 
power on the international raw materials markets 
and demand is mostly price-inelastic, Chinese export 
restrictions result in significant price increases on 
the world market and provoke supply shortages.
Raw Materials Investment Overseas 
 
In order to guarantee supplies to its domestic indus-
tries, China’s raw materials sector follows the official 
line of “two markets – two resources” and invests mas-
sively in developing and exploiting foreign sources. 
According to the National Statistics Office, while Chi-
%&+&&%&		+&+%<&+&$%=Y[#X$%%%&	-
national mining until the end of 2009, the figure ex-
ploded to US$101 billion in 2010 and US$219 billion 
in 2011.29
In view of the strategic and financial dimensions, 
various central agencies (NDRC, SASAC, MOFTEC) sup-
port and monitor foreign mining investments finan-
cially, administratively, and politically.
 China’s raw materials economy is active 
worldwide, wherever there is an opportunity to 
exploit new sources or buy into established deposits 
and producers by means of acquisition or equity 
participation. So far, the regional focus has been 
on Australia, Canada, Asia (Afghanistan, Indonesia, 
Philippines), Latin America (Brazil, Peru, Venezuela), 
and Africa (DR Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Zambia). 
Beside the large SOEs, there are many smaller private 
investors that can operate mostly below the official 
radar in Asian and African markets. 
30 SOEs receive 
low-interest loans, for example from the China Devel-
opment Bank or the Export-Import Bank of China, 
have access to special capital funds,31
 
28  Hilpert, Chinas globale wirtschaftliche Herausforderung 
(see note 
 and can insure 
22), p. 22. 
29  Data from the mining association (CMA); see Commodity 
Discovery Fund, Chinese Mining Investments in Africa Increased by 
$140 Billion Last Year, www.cdfund.com/en/blog-eng/chinese-
mining-investments-in-africa-increased-by--billion-last-
=&	"4
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30  in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy (see note 17), 
pp. 20–2# 
31  The Fund for Mining Rights to Overseas Mineral Re-
sources, the Fund for Economic and Technical Cooperation 
Overseas, the Fund for Reducing Risk in Prospecting of 
Overseas Mineral Deposits, and the China Africa Develop-
themselves against political risk. There is little specific 
information on the degree of financial advantage, but 
experts believe that with grace periods extending up 
to thirty years the terms are exceptionally favorable. 
Chinese investments are of course also financially 
attractive for developing countries rich in raw mate-
rials. Recipients, especially in Africa, receive develop-
ment packages (ODA) for local infrastructure and/or 
loans with advantageous interest rates and terms. Due 
to their great experience with energy, railroad, high-
way, and seaports construction projects, and because 
wages are relatively still low in China, Chinese enter-
prises are highly competitive in the infrastructure 
market, especially in Africa. The volume of ODA cred-
its is considerable. With US$110 billion, China pro-
vided more development loans than the World Bank 
in 2010 and 2011.32 Moreover, China is a politically 
attractive partner, since it follows the principle of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of partners 
and has no reservations about cooperating with 
authoritarian regimes.33
Considering the enormous dimensions of the in-
vestment process, it should come as no surprise that 
there have been numerous resource conflicts and 
commercial failures. Firstly, as outsiders and new-
comers, Chinese SOEs have come into conflict with 
established Western enterprises and structures. In 
order to meet increasing domestic demand for raw 
materials, they have had to overbid foreign competi-
tors, buy up established resource companies, interfere 
in established business relations, or move to politi-
cally sensitive locations (Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, 
Zimbabwe). Secondly, illegal mining organized by 
Chinese traders results in destruction of the environ-
ment, loss of licensing and tax revenues for local 
authorities, and weakening of the local state due to 
the development of criminal structures.
 

 
ment Fund are important; see in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral 
Industrial Policy (see note 
 Thirdly, 
numerous mining operations are in difficulties: the 
development costs for an iron ore mine in Western 
17), p. 21. 
32  Geoff Dyer, Jamil Anderlini, and Henry Sender, “China’s 
Lending Hits New Heights,” Financial Times, January 17, 2011. 
33  For details of economic cooperation between China and 
Africa see Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story 
of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Helmut Asche and Margot Schüller, Chinas Engagement in Afri-
ka – Chancen und Risiken für Entwicklung 4+
X$	%^«Q`# 
34  On illegal mining by Chinese enterprises in Indonesia 
and the Philippines see John McBeth, “Mineral Depletion in 
Philippines and Indonesia: Plundering Ways of Chinese Min-
ing Firms,” Straits Times, September 26, 2012. 
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Australia have increased from US$1.9 to US$7.1 bil-
lion; local workers and a Chinese manager have been 
killed in labor disputes at the Chambishi copper mine 
in Zambia; Chinese investors are involved in numer-
ous labor, environmental, and land ownership con-
flicts with local communities in Papua New Guinea 
and Peru. These examples demonstrate that Chinese 
enterprises yet have to learn how to deal with legal 
regulation, with a critical public, and with indepen-
dent unions, or how to compensate local communi-
ties.35
Reserves and Stockpiling 
 
As laid out in the white paper of 2003, developing 
reserves and stockpiling are inherent to national 
security of supply. Central responsibility resides with 
the State Reserve Bureau (SRB), which is answerable 
to the NDRC. Physical stockpiling is the responsibility 
of the provinces. Reserves of commodity metals (such 
as aluminum, copper, iron, tin), a number of rare 
metals (such as chromium, lithium, manganese, 
molybdenum, rare earth elements, selenium, tanta-
lum, tungsten, vanadium, zirconium), and potash are 
held, but there is no official list of strategic metals and 
minerals. Instead, the SRB reserves the right to prag-
matically decide which raw materials should be 
stockpiled in what quantities on an ad hoc basis in 
relation to forecast demand. Transparency of volumes 
and flows are avoided to prevent market speculation. 
The underlying objective of reserves and stockpiling 
is to avoid price fluctuations and critical shortages. 
Evaluation and Outlook 
China’s modernization and industrialization will not 
fail due to lack or uncertainty of supply of metals or 
minerals. Despite deficits in cohesion and transpar-
ency, its raw materials policy is effective and success-
ful. A number of factors contributed to privileged 
access to raw materials for Chinese industrial 
enterprises: large domestic deposits, the enormous 
pull on imports by Chinese demand, priority for 
domestic consumers through export restrictions, and 
extensive exploitation of foreign sources. China’s raw 
materials policy has certainly made an important 
contribution to its rapid industrialization and the 
associated strong growth rates. China does not gen-
 
35  Michael Komesaroff, “Screwing up in Foreign Climes,” 
China Economic Quartely 15, no. 2 (2012): 9–11. 
erate its resource rent by maximizing profits from the 
sale of national raw materials, but by creating added 
value and employment domestically. Nevertheless, its 
raw materials policy rather resembles the sorcerer’s 
apprentice who is no longer able to control the spirits 
he called. In view of growing overcapacity, pervasive 
environmental problems, and raging corruption and 
criminality at the province and district levels, develop-
ments in China’s mining and raw materials sector 
seem almost unmanageable. The activities of Chinese 
enterprises abroad are even less controllable. 
The chances of integrating China into international 
raw materials governance seem poor. If it cannot en-
force coherent and transparent regulation within its 
own borders, efforts on an international level must be 
viewed with even greater skepticism. While China’s 
main objective is access to existing and new sources of 
raw materials, Western governance initiatives are fear-
fully regarded as a further supply risk. Nationalist 
currents even view Western regulatory proposals as 
hidden attempts to obstruct China’s rightful economic 
rise. Instead of transparency, China would rather 
make arrangements for a global competition policy to 
prevent oligopolistic price manipulation by multina-
tional resource companies, for example by restraining 
supply and production. In its pursuit of national 
autonomy in raw materials, China will rely on its own 
strength – the domestic demand power of its markets 
and the financial power of state-owned enterprises – 
rather than on untested international agreements. 
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European Union 
Stormy-Annika Mildner and Julia Howald 
 
The EU produces numerous metals and many indus-
trial minerals and rocks. With respect to high-tech 
metals, however, it is strongly dependent on imports 
from often highly concentrated supply sources. In 
early 2011, the European Commission issued a com-
prehensive strategy paper aiming to secure European 
industry’s supply of critical materials. Because raw 
materials policy is a field where competences are 
shared between the EU and its member states, the suc-
cess of the strategy will depend strongly on the mem-
ber states’ willingness to follow the Commission’s 
sometimes very ambitious proposals. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
With 6.5 percent of global production of non-energy 
raw materials (by weight, 2010), the EU is one of the 
G20 members with strong raw materials production. 
Its twenty-seven member states produce a variety of 
raw materials. Their share of global production is 
especially high with respect to industrial minerals. In 
terms of their significance in world production, the 
following five stand out (figures for 2010): feldspar 
4'$+&	
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percent), kaolin (36.6 percent), diatomite (27.7 per-
cent), and salt (21.0 percent).1
Germany is the top raw materials producer in the 
EU, responsible for 25.1 percent of total EU production 
in 2010, followed by Sweden (11.5 percent), France 
(11.0 &	
&%`Q%4#&	
&%`Q=4#&	
&%`Q
%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-
gium, and Luxemburg produced no non-energy 
mineral raw materials in 2010. 
 EU member states also 
posess metal resources including copper, iron, silver, 
and tin, which satisfy part of domestic demand. 
Some EU members are among the world’s leading 
producers of secondary raw materials, although 
recycling rates differ strongly between materials and 
countries. Germany ranked first among EU members 
 
1  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
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Bulgaria came last with no recycling at all.2
While the EU can satisfy domestic demand for 
many industrial minerals through its own production, 
it is highly dependent on imports of high-tech metals.
 
3 
Its entire consumption of antimony, cobalt, molyb-
denum, niobium, platinum, rare earth elements, tan-
talum, titanium, and vanadium must be imported.
A European Commission working group compris-
ing members of the Raw Materials Supply Group 
(RMSG) considered which raw materials could become 
critical for the European economy in the next ten 
years.
 
Many major European industries, such as car-making, 
aerospace, engineering, and chemicals, depend heavi-
ly on reasonably priced supplies of raw materials. 
5 The RMSG brings together stakeholders from 
the Commission, industry, NGOs, trade unions, mem-
ber states, and EU candidate countries.6
 
2  Eurostat, “Environment in the EU27: Landfill Still Account-
&8$	!&	=$8]%
+&	&&%&Y%
2010,” press release, March 27, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_STAT-12-&%#'4

&++&]=Q`# 
 According to 
the group, raw materials are “critical” if they are sub-
ject to heightened risk of supply shortages that would 
have a severe impact on the European economy. Of 
forty-one non-energy minerals and metals examined, 
fourteen were identified as critical: antimony, beryl-
lium, cobalt, fluorspar, gallium, germanium, graphite, 
indium, magnesium, niobium, platinum group 
metals, rare earth elements, tantalum, and tungsten. 
These are mainly imported from China, Russia, the DR 
3  European Commission, The Raw Materials Initiative — Meeting 
Our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in EuropeQ*]4`
8%"Q!$<&'X&	QQ&]=QQ# 3, http:// 
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM^^ 
0699:FIN:en:PDF (accessed May 6, 2012). 
4  European Commission, The Raw Material Initiative – Meeting 
Our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in Europe – AnnexQ*4`
Q#Q^""&
#&	$#&"&%&		+&"+&
$	+"'&+-
'%&	+"8&+"+&
&%#84

&++&]=Q`# 
5  European Commission, Ad-hoc Working Group on Defining 
Critical Raw Materials, Critical Raw Materials for the EU, July 30, 
2010, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/ 
files/docs/report-b_en.pdf (accessed May 6, 2012). 
6  European Federation of Geologists (EFG), Panels of Experts, 
http://www.eurogeologists.de/index.php?page=251 (accessed 
November 23, 2012). 
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Congo, and Brazil,7 and are very difficult to substitute 
or recycle with current technologies. The list of criti-
cal materials is currently being revised, with publi-
cation of an updated version due by the end of 2013, 
perhaps taking a more sector-specific approach.
Against the background of the EU’s ambitious cli-
mate targets, the European Commission’s Joint Re-
search Center (JRC) has identified those metals that 
will be particularly needed in coming decades for six 
low-carbon technologies (nuclear, solar, wind, bio-
energy, carbon capture and storage, and power grids).
 
9 
These are cadmium, dysprosium, gallium, hafnium, 
indium, molybdenum, neodymium, nickel, niobium, 
selenium, silver, tellurium, tin, and vanadium.10
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
The JRC expects European companies to experience 
shortages of dysprosium, gallium, indium, neodym-
ium, and tellurium in the next five to ten years. 
Institutional Setting 
The EU and its member states share responsibility for 
raw materials policy-making. To what degree each can 
exert influence varies according to the specific policy 
field and the extent of Europeanization. Trade policy, 
for example, falls under the exclusive competence of 
the EU Commission. Thus, only the EU can legislate 
on trade matters, and not individual member states. 
Member states can, however, make their voices heard 
via the Trade Policy Committee of the Council of the 
European Union.11
 
7  DG Enterprise and Industry, Critical Raw Materials for the EU 
(Brussels, June 2010), pp. 5f., http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/raw-materials/files/docs/report-b_en.pdf (accessed 
\%&Q`# 
 Shared competence applies to en-
vironmental, energy, and internal market policies. 
Thus, while both the EU and member states can adopt 
8  +
++$%	&	&+&%<&+$8	&Q
$X&	Q# 
9  European Commission Joint Research Center, Critical 
Metals in Strategic Energy Technologies, http://setis.ec.europa.eu/ 
newsroom-items-folder/jrc-report-on-criticalmetals-in-
strategic-energy-technologies/at_download/Document 
4

&++&\%&Q`# 
10  Unlike Critical Raw Materials for the EU, this lists rare earth 
elements individually and selectively. 
11  The Trade Policy Committee is also called the 133 Com-
mittee, because it was established by Article 133 of the EEC 
Treaty (now Art. 207 TFEU). Council of the European Union, 
Foreign Affairs, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/ 
council-configurations/foreign-affairs?lang=en (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
binding acts, member states may exercise their powers 
only in so far as the EU has not yet done so itself.12 The 
legislative powers of the EU and its member states 
thus compete in these policy fields. Development 
policy and research and development are special cases. 
Although they fall under shared competence accord-
%$	
&+%$8&	&=$%&>%
$%-
ing of the European Union, the legislative powers do 
not actually compete. In the areas of research, tech-
nological development, and space, the EU has the 
power to carry out activities, in particular to define 
and implement programs. However, its actions must 
not prevent member states from pursuing their own 
policies. Likewise with regard to development cooper-
ation and humanitarian aid, the EU has the compe-
tence to conduct a common policy insofar as its exer-
cise of this right does not result in member states 
being prevented from exercising theirs.13
The formulation of a raw materials strategy for the 
EU falls first and foremost under the responsibility of 
the European Commission. The Directorate General 
for Trade (DG Trade) is in charge of implementing the 
EU’s common trade policy, and in this capacity also 
deals with trade in raw materials. DG Enterprise and 
Industry handles international aspects of the mining 
sector (where responsibilities overlap with DG Trade), 
sustainable supply, recycling, and resource efficiency, 
the Innovation Partnership (involving member states, 
companies, NGOs, and researchers), and critical raw 
materials. DG Environment is responsible for environ-
mental protection and thus deals with recycling and 
resource efficiency. Two executive agencies, the Execu-
tive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI) 
and the Research Executive Agency (REA), are con-
cerned with raw materials, among other things.
 

 
12  European Union, Division of Competences within the European 
Union, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_ 
affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0020_en.htm (accessed Feb-
ruary 27, 2013). 
 At 
the European Parliament, the committees on inter-
national trade; on environment, public health, and 
food safety; and on industry, research, and energy are 
mainly responsible for raw-materials-related topics. 
The European Parliament’s European Raw Materials 
Group (ERMG), inaugurated in February 2011, is also 
concerned with raw materials. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Executive agencies under the European Commission 
are set up for a limited time to administer EU-wide programs. 
They are tied to the EU financial framework, currently  
2007–2013. 
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European institutions obtain expert advice on raw 
materials from the European Federation of Geologists 
(EFG) and from EuroGeoSurveys (EGS). The EFG con-
sists of geological associations from twenty-one EU 
member states,15
The Commission conducts public consultations for 
many of its initiatives to take into account the posi-
tions and interests of both industry and civil society. 
At the European level, industry is represented by Busi-
nesseurope, an umbrella organization of forty-one 
European industrial associations from thirty-five coun-
tries.
 while EGS is an umbrella organiza-
tion for thirty-three European geological surveys, in-
cluding the German Federal Institute for Geosciences 
and Natural Resources (BGR). As an independent, non-
profit organization, EGS advises European institutions 
developing and drafting laws, regulations, and pro-
grams. 
16
Concepts and Strategies 
 The European mining industry is represented 
by Euromines. Because the European industrial asso-
ciations are often unable to agree on common posi-
tions, many national organizations also maintain 
their own offices in Brussels. Numerous NGOs also 
work on individual aspects of the EU’s raw materials 
policy, including the British NGO Publish What You 
Pay, which is especially vocal in promoting trans-
parency in the mining sector. 
The Commission first took up the issue of raw 
materials security in 2006, in its trade strategy Global 
Europe: Competing in the World. This document expresses 
growing concern about the EU’s import dependency, 
as well as about other countries’ raw materials export 
barriers and their impact on the competitiveness of 
European companies.17
%Q&*$''++$%X+&8	++	&=
paper on securing access to raw materials, titled 
The Raw Materials Initiative – Meeting Our Critical Needs for 
Growth and Jobs in Europe (in short: The Raw Materials 
 
 
15  European Federation of Geologists (EFG), Activities, http:// 
www.eurogeologists.de/index.php?page=161 (accessed June 
Q 2012). 
16  Businesseurope, Mission and Priorities, http://www. 
X+%&++&	$&#&"
$%&%"&8#+&
(accessed June 27, 2012). 
17  European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the 
World (Brussels, 2006), 7, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ 
docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (accessed May 23, 2012). 
Initiative).
In late 2010, DG Trade issued a strategy document 
outlining the EU’s trade policy. With respect to raw 
materials, the document stresses that a “sustainable 
and undistorted supply of raw materials […] is of stra-
tegic importance for the competitiveness of the EU 
economy,” and proposes a two-fold strategy: to estab-
lish a monitoring mechanism for export barriers and 
to use bilateral and multilateral negotiations to estab-
lish stricter rules on export restrictions.
 Apart from lamenting high raw material 
prices, the document mainly criticizes the increasing 
use of export restrictions and other competition-
distorting measures by resource-rich emerging econ-
omies (especially China and Russia) to create unfair 
advantages for their processing industries. It also 
points out that emerging countries such as China and 
India have significantly increased their foreign com-
mercial activities in recent years, especially in Africa. 
Starting from these observations, the Commission 
identifies three general objectives: improving access to 
raw materials for European companies, increasing the 
use of domestic raw materials, and reducing raw mate-
rials consumption. 
19
In February 2011, the Commission published 
Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw 
Materials, a new EU raw materials strategy building on 
the Raw Materials Initiative $8#
 
20 Apart from non-
energy mineral resources, the strategy also covers mar-
kets for energy resources, agriculture, as well as food 
security. In the context of the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis, the Commission included price volatility, 
financial market regulation, and integrity and trans-
parency of markets as central elements of a European 
raw materials strategy.21
With respect to minerals and metals, the strategy 
upholds the three general goals of the Raw Materials 
 
 
18  European Commission, The Raw Materials Initiative – Meeting 
Our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in EuropeQQ^""&	-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM^^^ 
FIN:en:PDF (accessed May 23, 2012). 
19  DG Trade, Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy as a 
Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, 2010, p. Q^""	&# 
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/nove'X&	"	$
#8
(accessed June 29, 2012). 
20  The document is part of the overarching strategy outlined 
in the Commission’s communication Europe 2020: A Strategy for 
Smart, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth (March 2010). 
21  European Commission, Tackling the Challenges in Commodity 
Markets and on Raw Materials (Brussels, February 2, 2011), 
pp. 88#Q^""&
#&	$#&"&%&		+&"$
&+"	-materials/ 
files/docs/communication_en.pdf (accessed July 5, 2012). 
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Initiative. Like the German government,22
With regard to development policy, the document 
proposes partnerships with resource-rich countries, 
especially in Africa. Through cooperation with these 
countries, the Commission seeks to improve their 
governance, transparency in resource production and 
trade, as well as the trade and investment climate. 
Diplomacy is also the keyword in foreign trade policy. 
Through bilateral and multilateral negotiations,
 the Commis-
sion assigns principal responsibility for security of 
supply to the business sector, while tasking itself with 
creating the appropriate regulatory framework. 
23
To foster domestic production, the Commission 
recommends that member states take greater account 
of extraction in their land-use policies and increase 
transparency in licensing procedures for exploration 
and mining. Finally, the Commission highlights the 
need to expand the geological knowledge base across 
and beyond national borders to cover all of Europe. 
 the 
Commission hopes to raise other countries’ awareness 
of the problems in global raw materials trade. The 
Commission looks to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system and the EU’s competition policy to create a 
level playing field. 
The Commission’s Roadmap to a Resource Efficient 
Europe outlines measures to improve resource effi-
ciency and promote recycling, including revising the 
Commission’s Strategy on the Prevention and Recycling 
of Waste in 2012,
The EU’s new raw materials strategy reflects the dif-
ferent interests and concerns of its member states. The 
sections on mineral resources clearly bear the hall-
marks of the German government, describing goals 
and means similar to the German raw materials strat-
egy.
 supporting resource efficiency 
research, and introducing economic incentives for 
recycling and deposit systems. The Commission also 
proposed reassessing the effectiveness of existing 
waste management regulations and revising the Action 
Plan for Sustainable Consumption and Production $8#
To prevent illicit waste dumping, the Commission 
proposed strengthening EU-wide inspection standards 
for waste shipments. 
25 However, the inclusion of agriculture and food 
security can clearly be ascribed to French influence.26
 
22  See also “Germany” in this volume, pp. 
 
73ff. 
23  Meaning dialogs, for example in the G20, UNCTAD, WTO, 
and OECD. 
24  An updated Strategy has not yet been published (as of Feb-
ruary 2013). 
25  See also “Germany” in this volume, pp. 73ff. 
26  See also “France” in this volume, pp. 67ff. 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
Research, Material and Resource Efficiency, Recycling 
The EU supports numerous research projects on re-
source efficiency, recycling, and substitutes, which are 
administered by the Executive Agency for Competitive-
ness and Innovation (EACI) and the Research Executive 
Agency (REA). In May 2012, the Competitiveness and Inno-
vation Framework Programme (CIP), which is adminis-
tered by the EACI and runs until 2013, was granted an 
additional €35 million to promote private-sector eco-
innovation projects.27 Because the EU financial frame-
$	8$	–2020 is still being negotiated, it is not 
yet clear what programs the REA and EACI will be run-
ning in the future. There are plenty of ideas as to how 
the European raw materials economy can be pro-
moted. One idea is to set up an innovation center on 
sustainability in the raw materials economy, as part of 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology.
%&
&'X&	Q&Waste Framework Directive 
2008/98/EC entered into force to protect the environ-
ment and human health by preventing the harmful 
effects of waste generation and waste management. 
Member states were given two years to implement 
the directive, which requires them to implement the 
waste treatment hierarchy (prevention, preparing 
for reuse, recycling, other recovery, notably energy 
recovery, and disposal) and to adopt waste manage-
ment plans and waste prevention programs. The 
directive also introduces the “polluter pays principle” 
and “extended producer responsibility” and sets new 
recycling and recovery targets.
 
29 In many countries, 
however, implementation is lagging behind. Accord-
ing to the European Parliament, only six countries 
have so far implemented the directive.30
 
27  	$&%*$''++$%Q%<	$%'&%^®#]$%%
New Funding to Bring Environmental Solutions to Market,” 
	&++	&&+&Q]=QQ^""&	$#&"	"	&++-
release_IP-12-&%#'4

&++&\=Q`# 
 
28  European Commission, “European Institute of Innovation 
and Technology (EIT) to Create More Innovation Hubs,” press 
release, November 30, 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-&%#'4

&++&\%&Q`# 
29  	$&%*$''++$%Q	&
<&""*$8&	$-
pean Parliam&%%$8&*$%
$8!$<&'X&	$%
Waste and Repealing Certain Directives Text with EEA Rele-
vance, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
\^^^^^^&%^¡]4

&++&\%&Q`# 
30  European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution 
of 2 February 2012 on the Issues Raised by Petitioners in Rela-
tion to the Application of the Waste Management Directive, 
and Related Directives, in the Member States of the Euro-
pean Y%$%4"4!``Q>&X		=QQ^""w. 
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The Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equip-
ment (2012/19/EU, WEEE Directive) came into force on 
August 13, 2012. It places new and stricter regulations 
on the disposal of electrical and electronic appliances, 
+&%	&
=
%%	&
$<&	=	&+$8&	
&%$8
waste appliances (or 65 percent of new electrical and 
electronic equipment sold) to be achieved by 2019. The 
Commission also wishes to curb illegal exports of elec-
tronic waste, which are often labeled as used equip-
ment to evade EU waste regulations. In the future, the 
exporter of such shipments will have to test and docu-
ment the functionality of the appliances. By establish-
ing such strict export controls, the EU seeks to protect 
workers and the environment in third countries from 
the risks of electronic scrap processing. Member states 
<&%>&X		=$'&'&%&	&
<&
in national law.31
In September 2011, DG Environment published its 
Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe.
 
32
The Action Plan for Sustainable Consumption and Produc-
tion (SCP) is currently being revised, and is due to be 
replaced by a strategy for a new “green single market 
for green growth.”
 The roadmap, 
among other things, recommends gearing all levels of 
government and as many policy fields as possible to 
the objective of increasing resource efficiency. Exact 
aims and indicators are to be developed by 2013. On 
]=QQ&	$&%	'&%++&	&+$-
lution that is in some respects even more ambitious 
than the Commission’s proposal. It requests the Com-
'++$%$	&+&%X=&&%$8&+<&
proposal to abolish landfill waste disposal, and second 
to revise the recycling targets for 2020. The European 
Resource Efficiency Platform (EREP) was launched in June 
2012, as part of the Europe 2020 strategy. Its mandate 
initially runs until mid-# 
33
On February 29, 2012, DG Environment presented 
a proposal for a European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on 
 
 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2012-0026+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed October 2, 2012). 
31  European Commission, “Environment: New Rules on E-
waste to Boost Resource Efficiency,” press release, August 13, 
2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-&%#'
(accessed September 10, 2012). 
32  European Commission (Representation in Germany), Fahr-
plan Ressourceneffizienz, http://ec.europa.eu/deutschland/press/ 
pr_releases/10191_de.htm (accessed June 29, 2012). 
33  European Commission, 17th IPP/SCP Regular Meeting, Wednes-
day, the 20th of June 2012 (10:00–16:30), Draft Agenda, https:// 
circabc.europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/ce3f7af3--
&8-&-&&
"&	]&&% 
20Agenda%2020.06.2012.pdf (accessed July 5, 2012). 
raw materials, which is now in its early stages. The EIP 
brings together member states, companies, NGOs, and 
researchers to pool capital, know-how, and human 
resources with the objective of encouraging explora-
tion, mining, and processing of raw materials, devel-
opment of substitutes, and improvement of recycling 
within the EU.
Stockpiling 
 A strategic implementation plan is to 
be adopted in early 2013. 
The EU does not stockpile raw materials, but the idea 
has been discussed occasionally.35 In response to Chi-
nese export restrictions, the EU Industry Commis-
sioner announced in September 2011 that the EU was 
considering establishing a stock of rare earths.36 DG 
Enterprise and Industry commissioned the British 
consultancy Risk and Policy Analysts (RPA) to analyze 
the benefits and feasibility of stockpiling from an eco-
nomic perspective by comparing the stockpiling pro-
grams of China, Japan, South Korea, and the United 
States. The results, published in March 2012, were 
inconclusive. RPA noted that each of the fourteen raw 
materials identified as critical might require a differ-
ent approach.37 The member states discussed the 
RPA report during the meeting of the Raw Materials 
Supply Group on November 12, 2012. Given that 
most EU members, including Germany, oppose stock-
piling, it is unlikely that the idea will make further 
progress any time soon.39
Trade Policy 
 
DG Trade has put trade barriers onto the agenda of 
both multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations. In 
2006, the EU and Japan proposed revising the multi-
lateral regime on export restrictions in the course of 
 
34  European Commission, “Innovation Partnerships: New 
Proposals on Raw Materials, Agriculture and Healthy Ageing 
to Boost European Competitiveness,” press release, February 
29, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-196_en.htm 
(accessed July 6, 2012). 
35  “EU will sich mit Lagerhaltung gegen Rohstoff-Knapp-
heit wappnen,” Agrarheute.de, January 27, 2011, http://www. 
agrarheute.com/lagerhaltung (accessed May 31, 2012). 
36  “EU legt Lager für Seltene Erden an,” Tagesschau, Sep-
tember 6, 2011, http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/ 
selteneerden106.html (accessed May 31, 2012). 
37  DG Enterprise and Industry, Stockpiling of Non-energy 
Raw Materials, March 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/raw-materials/files/docs/stockpiling-report_en.pdf 
(accessed October 2, 2012). 
38  Written interview with representatives of DG Enterprise 
and Industry on October 16, 2012. 
39  See also “Germany” in this volume, pp. 73ff. 
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the WTO Doha Round. However, due to opposition 
from developing countries and emerging economies, 
these efforts have remained unsuccessful to date – 
although the EU did succeed in committing Russia to 
reducing many of its export tariffs and forgoing the 
imposition of new export tariffs on a broad range of 
raw materials in the scope of its WTO accession agree-
ment.
The EU currently relies mainly on bilateral negotia-
tions to reduce export barriers on raw materials. The 
free trade agreement with South Korea, for example, 
includes a ban on export restrictions that – in contrast 
to the WTO rulebook – covers not only quantitative 
restrictions, but also tariffs.
 

Finally, raw materials also play a central role in 
the talks between the European Union and the United 
States within the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(TEC). At the last two meetings in 2010 and 2011, the 
parties agreed to cooperate more closely on the en-
 Allowing for isolated 
exceptions and limited transitional periods, export 
tariffs have also been banned in free trade agreements 
with Colombia, Peru, and the Ukraine and in the asso-
ciation agreement with Central America. The EU is 
also pushing for the inclusion of such provisions in 
ongoing negotiations with Canada, India, Malaysia, 
MERCOSUR, and Singapore. Negotiations on economic 
partnership agreements with African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) countries, however, constitute an excep-
tion. Most of these merely prohibit the imposition 
of new export duties or increases in existing tariffs, 
while leaving ample room for exceptions. Export tariffs 
are, for example, allowed in the interests of national 
economic development. Only the economic partner-
ship agreement between the EU and the CARIFORUM 
countries completely prohibits new export duties and 
requires that existing duties be abolished within three 
=&	+$8&+%%$8&	&&'&%%# 
 
40  Martin Kohr, “EU, Japan Propose New WTO Treaties to 
Prevent Export Taxes, Restrictions,” TWN Info Service on WTO 
and Trade Issues (Apr06/17), April 26, 2006, http://www.twnside. 
org.sg/title2/twninfo396.htm (accessed October 2, 2012). 
41  See also “Russia” in this volume, pp. 111ff. 
42  European Union, “Free Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and 
the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part,” Official Journal of the 
European UnionQQ<$#4]=Q`Q&	&^*&	
Two: National Treatment and Market Access for Goods, Sec-
tion A: Common Provisions, article 2.9 and 2.11, p. 10, http:// 
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011: 
127:FULL:EN:PDF (accessed October 2, 2012). 
forcement of international trade rules and research 
and development in the raw materials sector.
The EU also makes vigorous use of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. In December 2009, the EU, Mexico, 
and the United States filed a complaint against Chi-
nese export restrictions (quotas and tariffs) on bauxite, 
coke, fluorspar, manganese, magnesium, yellow phos-
phorous, silicon metal, silicon carbide, and zinc.
 
 The 
WTO dispute settlement body ruled in favor of the 
complainants in summer 2011, and the WTO’s appel-
late body upheld the ruling in January 2012. Spurred 
by this success, the EU, Japan, and the United States 
filed another complaint with the WTO, this time con-
cerning Chinese export restrictions on rare earth 
elements.
The EU itself imposes very low import tariffs on 
minerals and metals, or none at all. At a conference in 
May/June 2012, European steel producers called on the 
Commission to prohibit scrap exports in order to im-
prove the EU’s raw materials supply, but the Commis-
sion has yet to take any official steps in this direc-
tion.
 

Raw Material Cooperation Agreements 
 Scrap exports are regulated under the WEEE 
Directive, as described above. 
The EU Commission signed a letter of intent with Green-
land on June 13, 2012, which it hopes will secure Euro-
pean companies expedited access to Greenland’s raw 
materials. While the EU has yet to sign any raw mate-
rial cooperation agreements along the lines of the Ger-
man raw materials partnerships, EU Industry Com-
missioner Tajani has signed similar letters of intent 
with Chile and Uruguay. These two agreements, how-
ever, also include cooperation in other areas. Similar 
agreements are planned with Morocco and Tunisia.
 
43  DG Enterprise and Industry, EU–USA – Transatlantic 
Economic Council, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/ 
international/cooperating-governments/usa/transatlantic-
economic-council/#h2-5 (accessed June 27, 2012). See also 
“United States” in this volume, pp. 
 
150ff. 
44  See also “China” in this volume, pp. 51ff. 
45  WTO, DS395: China – Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds395_e.htm (accessed June 27, 2012). 
46  WTO, DS432: China – Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, http://wto.org/english/ 
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47  Silvia Antonioli, “Corrected – Steelmakers Lobby EU 
Commission for Scrap Export Ban,” Reuters, June 1, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/01/steel-export-ban-
idUSL5EH11N920120601 (accessed September 10, 2012). 
48  Written interview with representatives of DG Enterprise 
and Industry on October 16, 2012. 
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The envisioned cooperation with Greenland in-
cludes infrastructure and investment projects and 
capacity-building in the country’s mining sector. 
Greenland is rich in many materials the EU has 
identified as “critical” (niobium, platinum, rare earth 
elements, and tantalum). The Greenlandic govern-
ment was granted responsibility for administering its 
own raw materials in 2009. Gold, lead, silver, and zinc 
are currently mined, but mining rare earths is proving 
more difficult. One of the world’s largest single depos-
its of rare earths is at Kvanefjeld, which also holds 
large amounts of uranium.50 Uranium may currently 
be explored as an accompanying mineral, but not 
mined. Environmental organizations, local politicians, 
and research institutes warn against the potential 
consequences of uranium mining because Greenland 
currently has no effective regulatory system for ura-
nium trading.51
Development Policy 
 It thus remains to be seen which 
projects will actually emerge from the cooperation. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) finances mining 
projects in the context of cooperation between the EU 
and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) has been supporting mining projects and re-
lated infrastructure projects – mainly in the resource-
rich countries of Eastern Europe – since 1993. The 
new EBRD strategy for the mining sector also covers 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, which officially 
requested to become countries of operation of the 
EBRD in February 2012.52
Following the third EU-Africa Summit in November 
2010, the EU and the African Union agreed on a Joint 
Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011–2013, whose imple-
mentation was discussed in Brussels in January 2012.
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49  European Commission, “European Commission Signs 
Today Agreement of Cooperation with Greenland on Raw 
Materials,” press release, June 13, 2012, http://europa.eu/ 
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50  DERA, Das mineralische Rohstoffpotenzial Grönlands (Hanno-
ver, December 2010), http://www.deutsche-rohstoffagentur. 
de/DE/Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/DERA_ 
Rohstoffinformationen/rohstoffinformationen-01.pdf?__ 
blob=publicationFile&v=7 (accessed July 25, 2012). 
51  Reinhard Wolff, “Grönlands strahlende Aussichten,” Taz, 
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52  EBRD, Draft Mining Strategy (London, 2012), http://www. 
ebrd.com/downloads/policies/sector/draft-mining-strategy.pdf 
(accessed September 10, 2012). 
53  DG Enterprise and Industry, Africa-EU Cooperation on Raw 
Materials, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/magazine/articles/ 
This cooperation covers governance, investment and 
infrastructure, geological knowledge, and capacity-
building in the raw materials sector. The EU supports 
transparency and governance projects through the 
European Development Fund (EDF), while geological 
explorations are funded through the EU-Africa Infra-
structure Trust Fund.
Transparency 
 
The EU Commission followed the U.S. example in 
October 2011 by presenting two draft directives on 
transparency of revenue flows in the raw materials 
sector: one amending transparency directive 2004/109/ 
EC for companies whose securities are admitted to 
	%$%	&&'	&4*]±²`Q55 and 
one concerning the accounting directives 78/660/EEC 
(requirements for the annual financial statements 
of certain companies) and 83/349/EEC (consolidated 


$%+`4*]±²`#56 In contrast to the U.S. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010,57 the Commission’s proposals do not cover 
transparency in supply chains. Instead, “[t]o increase 
transparency to the payments made by the extractive 
and logging industries to governments all over the 
world, the Commission has proposed to introduce a 
system of Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR).”
 
industrial-policy/article_11029_en.htm (accessed November 
13, 2012). 
 The 
EU wants to enable citizens of resource-rich countries 
54  DG Enterprise and Industry, Joint Africa EU Strategy Action 
Plan 2011–2013, http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/ 
default/files/doc_jaes_action_plan_2011_13_en.pdf (accessed 
July 6, 2012). 
55  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 
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56  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Annual 
Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements, and 
Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Brussels, 25 
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(accessed May 23, 2012). 
57  See also “United States” in this volume, pp. 150ff. 
58  European Commission, “More Responsible Businesses Can 
Foster More Growth in Europe,” press release, October 25, 
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to retrieve information on government revenues, and 
to ensure that revenues are used to a greater extent 
for the benefit of the people. Payments to national, 
regional, and local governments are to be reported by 
project as well as by country (“project-by-project” and 
“country-by-country”). 
After the proposal was adopted by the Commission, 
it was referred to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on October 26, 2011, which jointly decide on its 
implementation in an ordinary legislative procedure. 
The two bodies have yet to reach agreement. Some 
member states, including Germany and the United 
Kingdom, believe that the Commission’s proposal goes 
too far according to economic considerations, espe-
cially concerning project-by-project reporting, and 
push for a higher disclosure threshold (€500,000).59 In 
contrast, the European Parliament argues for stricter 
reporting requirements. The Committee on Legal 
Affairs of the European Parliament voted in Septem-
X&	8$		&+$$8®Q8$		$³&
-by-
project reporting and simplified rules for small and 
medium enterprises to lower the burden on them. The 
rules are to apply to the oil, gas, minerals, and forestry 
sectors. The European Parliament must still pass the 
draft in plenary session before it can be referred to the 
Council. Industry, in turn, criticizes the administra-
tive costs that the EP’s proposal would entail and fears 
competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis foreign rivals not 
subject to the same reporting requirements, including 
Chinese or Russian companies. Businesseurope argues 
for a voluntary system of country-by-country reporting 
similar to EITI, where companies would have to dis-
close only payments to central governments, and not 
to lower tiers. Businesseurope is strictly opposed to 
project-by-project reporting.60
Global Raw Materials Governance 
 
Intensifying the international dialog on raw mate-
rials is a matter of special concern for the EU. In its 
response to the Commission’s raw materials strategy 
 
59  Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Annual Financial 
Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports 
of Certain Types of Undertakings – General Approach, p. 20, http:// 
	&+&	#
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'#&	$#&"8"&%""+"+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#8
(accessed February 27, 2013). 
60  Businesseurope, Accounting Directive, Transparency Directive, 
Position Paper, May 22, 2012, http://www.nho.no/getfile. 
php/filer%20og%20vedlegg/BUSINESSEUROPE%20posisjons 
dokument%20om%20direktivet%20om%20regnskapsf% 
F	%$$'³&%%$'+&Q###8
(accessed February 27, 2013). 
Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw 
Materials, the Council stresses the importance of dialog 
within the G20: “[T]he G-20 has an important role to 
play alongside the World Trade Organization and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in addressing the 
concerns over global supply security and the smooth 
functioning of markets.”61 So far, however, the EU 
has not been very successful in putting this idea into 
action, due to the opposition of many emerging econ-
omies. The Commission currently considers it un-
realistic to expect the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) to agree to concerted action 
by the G20 against export restrictions. The EU is now 
seeking progress through the OECD and UNCTAD. The 
EU lauds the OECD list of worldwide export restric-
tions and numerous research papers. The Commission 
hopes that these will help to spread awareness of the 
problem of export barriers, also among emerging 
economies and developing countries. The Commission 
is also approaching developing countries that are 
negatively affected by export barriers to win them 
over in the campaign against export restrictions.62
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
The EU takes the issue of securing access to raw mate-
rials very seriously, but lags behind its own aspira-
tions. This is not surprising, since the EU lacks the 
necessary powers in many policy fields, and the imple-
mentation of its strategies often lies in the hands of 
the member states. The record thus shows a mixed 
picture in areas such as resource efficiency and waste 
management. With respect to transparency of revenue 
flows, the EU could take a leading role, together with 
the United States, but the outcome of negotiations 
between the European Parliament and Council is still 
open due to the opposition of many member states. 
The member states’ diverging interests prevent the EU 
from taking a more proactive international role. 
 
 
61  Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on 
Tackling the Challenges on Raw Materials and in Commodity Markets, 
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France 
Florian Wassenberg 
 
Since around 2010, France has placed mineral 
resources prominently on its political agenda, and 
the government has assumed an active role in raw 
materials policy. Dialog between government and 
industry is producing its first results, although a 
coherent and comprehensive strategy has yet to be 
developed. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Once a fairly significant producer (as the world’s third-
largest producer of iron ore until 1970), France has 
become a net importer of metal raw materials over the 
past four decades. Today, the only significant regions 
where mining still takes place on an industrial scale 
are the overseas department of French Guiana (gold) 
and autonomous New Caledonia (nickel). In European 
France the last significant metal mines closed in the 
mid-2000s, largely for lack of profitability.1
Crude iron, crude steel, aluminum, and cobalt, 
among others, are still produced in France, but from 
processed ores exclusively imported from abroad. The 
total value of imported metal ores and scrap exceeded 
®X$%%#
 
2 Very few French companies are 
active in mining abroad. The well-known exceptions 
are the state-owned Areva Group, which operates 
uranium mines all over the world as well as a number 
of gold mines, and the Eramet Group, which produces 
the steel stabilizers manganese and nickel. Recycling 
of scrap metal has grown steadily to a point where 
X&&&%%&	
&%$8+
	 iron, aluminum, 
and zinc are now recycled.3
Industrial minerals, on the other hand, are still 
widely produced in France, which is among the 
world’s ten largest producers of diatomite, feldspar, 
 
 
1  University of Leoben, Minerals Planning Policies and Supply 
Practices in Europe, Commissioned by the European Commission 
Enterprise Directorate GeneralQ!$<&'X&	Q# # 
2  By comparison the value of oil and gas imports amounted 
to €60 billion and €17 billion, respectively, in 2011; Eurostat, 
Comext Database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/ 
(accessed September 5, 2012). 
3  Waldemar Duscha, “Recycling- und Entsorgungswirtschaft 
Frankreich,” GTAI (Branche kompakt), 2011. 
gypsum, silica, and talc (with a share of 3 to 5 percent 
of world production in each case).
The French industrial sector has contracted steadily 
over the past decades to a share of less than 13 percent 
of GDP.
 French policy for 
non-energy mineral resources thus concentrates only 
on metals that are indispensable for French industry 
and vulnerable to supply risks. By and large, the 
French risk assessment concurs with those of the Euro-
pean Commission and other industrial countries. 
5 Nevertheless, there are still sectors that de-
pend heavily on metal raw materials and are affected 
by price fluctuations and supply bottlenecks. As in 
other industrial economies, these include the auto-
motive industry, chemicals, defense, and aerospace. 
Also, the new French government has committed itself 
to the re-industrialization of France. This is one of the 
main tasks of the Ministry for Industrial Recovery, as 
the Ministry of Industry was tellingly renamed. Pre-
viously part of the Ministry of the Economy, Finance, 
and Industry, the Ministry of Industry became a sepa-
rate department under the new government in 2012. 
According to Industry Minister Arnaud Montebourg, 
the issue of securing access to strategic metals is about 
nothing less than the “sovereignty and competitive-
ness of French companies.”6
Special attention is also given in France to rare 
earth elements due to their importance for numerous 
high-tech products. The French chemical company 
Rhodia is one of very few companies outside China 
 
 
4  Alberto Alexander Perez, “France [Advance Release],” in 
USGS, 2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International 
(Reston, July 2012), http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/ 
pubs/country/2010/myb3-2010-fr.pdf (accessed September 
12, 2012). 
5  See the report on France’s competitiveness by former 
EADS boss Louis Gallois, commissioned by the French govern-
ment and published in November 2012, according to which 
French %+	=¨++	&8&8	$'&	
&%%$#
percent in 2011. The report is available from http://www. 
gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers_joints/rapport_ 
de_louis_gallois_sur_la_competitivite_0.pdf (accessed 
January 16, 2013). 
6  Arnaud Montebourg, Ministre du Redressement Produc-
tif, Communiqué de presse N° 156, Paris, October 16, 2012, 
http://proxy-pubminefi.diffusion.finances.gouv.fr/pub/ 
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that is technologically capable of separating and 
refining the whole spectrum of rare earths.7
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
Within government, mineral resources are first and 
foremost the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry. 
The Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Edu-
cation and Research, Ministry of Defense, and Foreign 
Ministry all also deal with specific aspects. The supply 
of certain metals emerged as a problem – identified 
first by companies, then also by political leaders – 
in the course of the tremendous price rises of recent 
years. The French white paper of June 	%+Q
for example, of future global tensions due to rising 
demand for raw materials in emerging economies. 
But the government only became active in April 2010, 
when then Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo 
presented a communiqué on “strategic metals” to the 
Council of Ministers, arguing that these metals were 
indispensable for the competitiveness of French 
industry.9
The heart of the French raw materials policy is 
the newly established Committee for Strategic Metals 
(Comité pour les Métaux Stratégiques, COMES) of the 
Ministry of Industry, established in January 2011 by 
the French government as a central platform for state/ 
industry cooperation on supply security. Incorporat-
ing all relevant government and business actors, the 
new committee is to prepare a “grande stratégie” for 
metallic raw materials.
 
10
 
7  Rhodia is the world’s leading producer of specialty chemi-
cals and was acquired by the Belgian Solvay Group in 2011. 
 COMES is an advisory body 
without any legislative authority that brings together 
three groups of actors that are crucial for raw mate-
rials policy: (1) ministries dealing with raw materials; 
(2) relevant technical government agencies; and (3) the 
8  Odile Jacob, La documentation Française, Le Livre blanc 
sur la défense et la sécurité nationale, p. 25, http://www. 
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/ 
"#84
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9  Communiqué du Conseil des ministres du 27 avril 2010. 
10  Press release from Minister of Industry Eric Besson, 
Installation du Comité pour les Métaux Stratégiques, March 30, 
2011, http://www.minefe.gouv.fr/actus/11/110330comes.html 
(accessed October 5, 2012). 
industrial sectors represented by their trade associa-
tions, as well as certain major companies.11
The technical agencies represented are the Geo-
logical Survey (Bureau de Recherches Géologiques 
et Minières, BRGM), the Environment and Energy 
Management Agency (Agence de l’Environnement 
et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie, ADEME), the French 
Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea (Institut 
Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation de la Mer, 
IFREMER), and the French Development Agency 
(
 
Agence Française de Développement, AFD). The in-
dustrial associations represent the metal processing 
industry, the automobile industry, the chemical in-
dustry, and the recycling industry, among others. 
Companies operating in the mining sector, such as 
Areva and Eramet, as well as major users of metals, 
such as Rhodia and the car producer Renault, are also 
represented in COMES. The Minister of Industry chairs 
the Committee; since the 2012 election this has been 
Arnaud Montebourg. The committee has its own gen-
eral secretariat headed by a mining specialist, who is 
appointed for a term of three years. 
Both chambers of parliament have also discussed 
the issue of raw materials in detail during recent 
months. In March 2011, the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defense published a report on 
supply risks emanating from the defense industry’s 
import dependency concerning metals,12 calling for 
a renaissance of industrial policy, for example in 
the form of public investment in new mining and 
recycling technologies.13 The Secretariat-General for 
Defense and National Security (Secrétariat Général 
de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale, SGDSN) is 
currently conducting a study on strategic metals. 
And in March 2011, an interparliamentary body of the 
Senate and the National Assembly held a public con-
sultation focusing on rare earths, in which leading 
representatives of government and industry partici-
pated.15
 
11  Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 
“Décret no. 2011–³%<&	$	% création du 
comité pour les métaux stratégiques (COMES),” Journal Officiel 
de la République Française, January 26, 2011. 
 
12  Sénat, Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commis-
sion des affaires étrangères, de la defense et des forces armées 
sur la sécurité des approvisionnements stratégiques de la 
France par M. Jacques Blanc, Senateur, March 10, 2011. 
13  Ibid., p. 33. 
14  Ibid., p. 36. 
15  Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques 
et technologiques, Rapport sur les enjeux des metaux strategiques: 
le cas des terres rares, August 23, 2011. 
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Concepts and Strategies 
Drafting of a French strategy for non-energy resources 
is currently in process, so no comprehensive refer-
ence document exists yet.16 The action plan adopted 
in April 2010 does, however, represent a preliminary 
package of measures. The first central element is to 
compile a list of metals to be classified as strategic. 
The plan proposes the following additional measures: 
expansion of geological knowledge through explora-
tion, development of a recycling policy for strategic 
metals, and encouragement of government activities 
by establishing an ongoing supply security dialog 
between state and industry.17
However, an elaborate strategy for mineral re-
sources and development cooperation already exists, 
adopted by the Interministerial Committee for Inter-
national Cooperation and Development (
 This last point was put 
into practice by establishing COMES, which is now 
entrusted with the refining and implementing of a 
strategy for strategic metals. 
Comité 
Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et 
du DéveloppementQ**`%]=#&$<&	
objective of this strategy is to enhance the contribu-
tion of mineral extraction to the economic and social 
development of producer countries, identifying the 
following crucial steps: (1) provision of relevant data 
for exploration and mining; (2) improving governance 
and transparency; and (3) transition to an economy 
based on broad growth rather than raw material 
revenues alone.
CICID mentions thirteen central, west and southern 
African countries on which French development co-
operation in the mining sector should concentrate.
 
19
Policy Measures and Instruments 
 
At its first meetings, COMES identified four essential 
fields of action to be addressed by working groups: 
 
16  According to a senior government official, there are cur-
rently no plans for such a document. 
17  Communiqué en Conseil des ministres du 27 avril 2010, http:// 
#X	'#8	"
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&++&September 12, 
2012). 
18  Comité interministériel de la coopération internationale 
et du développement, Ressources minérales et développement en 
Afrique. Documentation d’orientation stratégique, ]=Q# 15. 
19  Chosen from the more than fifty countries receiving 
French development aid as part of the French Zone de solidarité 
prioritaire, most of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
(1) identification of supply risks; (2) identification of 
France’s own raw materials potential; (3) recycling, 
&88
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=Q%+X+$%%4`international 
cooperation.20
Identification of Supply Risks 
 
Basic measures such as information gathering are 
currently the priority of French raw materials policy. 
First of all, demand and associated industrial vulner-
ability are to be identified more systematically, and 
small and medium-sized enterprises especially sen-
sitized to potential risks in the first place. Every com-
pany should be able to independently assess the global 
market situation for the metals it needs.21
So far the needs and risk assessments of well-
organized larger companies and sectors are best 
known. The chemicals industry, for example, needs 
large quantities of non-ferrous metals to produce 
special steel (tantalum, titanium, zirconium) and as 
catalyzers (molybdenum, rhenium, rhodium). The 
Mechanical Engineering Federation points out the 
key role of chromium in the superalloys used in jet 
engines, gas turbines, and the nuclear industry. The 
defense and aerospace companies Dassault Aviation 
and EADS have reported price surges and scarcities 
of titanium, carbon fibers, and aluminum, but argue 
that these bottlenecks are caused not by production 
shortages but by a lack of ore-processing capacity. 
Both groups also see supply risks with respect to rare 
earths, which they say are indispensable in the pro-
duction of aircraft and various defense products.
 
22
In order to improve its ability to estimate the needs 
of smaller companies, the government is currently 
conducting an electronic survey of all potentially 
affected businesses. Simultaneously, the Geological 
Survey (BRGM) is cooperating with industry to develop 
profiles for certain metal resources, brief summaries 
of the most salient facts, including uses in industry, 
global production, consumption, and recycling data, 
main industrial actors, and price trends. Each profile 
concludes with an assessment of the supply risk. 
BRGM has so far examined more than ten metals.
 
23
The COMES working group has put together a list of 
strategic metals, similar to those prepared by the Euro-
 
 
20  Besson, Installation du Comité pour les Métaux Stratégiques 
(see note 10). 
21  Discussion with a representative of the Ministry of Indus-
try, June 26, 2012, Paris. 
22  Sénat, Rapport d’information (see note 12), pp. 17–# 
23  Documents at http://www.mineralinfo.org/Substance/ 
substance.htm (accessed October 5, 2012). 
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pean Union or the United States. This list will prob-
ably remain confidential, but is unlikely to differ 
much from others. In 2002–Q ]	&=&%-
tified short- and medium-term supply risks for sixteen 
metals, nine of which can also be found in the Euro-
pean Commission list (no surprise given that the work 
of the BRGM was one of the sources the Commission 
relied upon).
Reassessing Domestic Geological Potential 
 
The second COMES working group is responsible for 
reviewing the country’s geological potential. The last 
time BRGM undertook a comprehensive survey was in 
&+%+QX'&&$	$%$%=
extended to a depth of 100 meters.25
Industry Minister Arnaud Montebourg has explic-
itly called on French companies to reengage in mining 
projects on French soil. While the extraction rights 
for industrial minerals are held by the landowner, the 
rights to explore and mine metal ores are held by the 
state and are awarded by the Ministry of Industry in 
consultation with the State Council (Conseil d’Etat) 
and the General Council for the Economy, Industry, 
Energy, and Technology (Conseil Général de l’Écono-
mie, l’Industrie, de l’Énergie et des Technologies).
 That inventory is 
now to be updated, also with an eye to the question 
of strategic metals. Besides searching on the French 
mainland, the government is also investing in marine 
exploration, where the exclusive economic zones of 
certain overseas territories are believed to hold signifi-
cant deposits on and under the seabed. A focus of the 
marine research agenda is on manganese nodules 
around the tiny Clarion Clipperton atoll, situated in 
the Pacific ocean between Hawaii and the west coast 
of Mexico. French experts believe that these nodule 
&$++$$'$%$%%&+$8%
&%
275 million tonnes of copper, as well as other min-
erals. Although mining is not yet profitable, IFREMER 
and the German Federal Institute for Geosciences 
and Natural Resources (Bundesanstalt für Geowissen-
schaften und Rohstoffe, BGR) have already examined 
the impact it would have on the ecosystem (in Feb-
ruary 2012). 
26
 
24  Antimony, cobalt, gallium, germanium, indium, magne-
sium, platinum group metals, rare earths, tungsten. Euro-
pean Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompa-
nying the Raw Materials Initiative – Meeting Our Critical Needs for 
Growth and Jobs in EuropeQ 	++&+Q!$<&'X&	QQ# 17. 
 
25  University of Leoben, Minerals Planning Policies (see note 1), 
p. 106. 
26  Ibid., p. # 
The Code Minier, which is the legal basis for mineral 
extraction, provides for rather lengthy licensing 
procedures with comprehensive participation of local 
population.27 This is probably one reason why so far 
there are hardly any companies exploring new metal 
ore deposits in France.
Minister Montebourg wishes to amend the Code 
Minier to ease exploration and mining license appli-
cation procedures. He also intends to set up a pilot 
mine to demonstrate responsible mining.
 Apart from residual questions 
concerning profitability, social acceptance is likely to 
constitute an obstacle to larger mining projects. The 
exploration of shale gas, for example, was suspended 
by the National Assembly in 2011 after massive public 
protests. 
29
Recycling, Efficiency, and Substitution 
 However, 
it remains to be seen whether new French mines can 
operate profitably (which in the recent past they 
could not). 
Recycling, the topic of the third working group, is 
also accorded great significance by COMES members. 
In July 2010, ADEME, which holds the deputy chair-
manship of the recycling working group, published 
a widely noted report on the recycling potential of 
several rare and/or precious metals used in high-tech 
products. According to the report, only a proportion of 
scrapped products are collected, from which only part 
of the precious metal content is then recycled. It also 
notes that France is not yet able to recycle rare earths 
profitably.30 In the meantime, this has changed. 
Rhodia, as a large consumer of rare earths, is increas-
ingly successful in developing new recycling methods 
for “heavy” rare earths, which are especially critical as 
there are currently no alternative sources.31
 
27  Code Minier, consolidated version as of March 1, 2011, 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte= 
LEGITEXT&&&4

&++&
September 11, 2012). 
 In the 
28  One exception is Variscan Mines, established in 2010. 
29  Ministre du Redressement Productif, Communiqué de 
presse N° 156 (see note 6). 
30  ADEME, Etude du potentiel de recyclage de certains métaux rares 
(Angers, July 2011), http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q= 
ademe%20recycling%20metaux&source=web&cd=2&sqi=2& 
ved=0CCQQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww2.ademe.fr%2 
Fservlet%2FgetBin%3Fname%3DDA7E2019CCA756F2F7EE
ED2D199F12#8&LfdJUKCNKsLatACgCg 
&usg=AFQjCNEPV1mYE%<-H0SCVA&cad=rja 
(accessed September 7, 2012). 
31  The well-known Australian deposits and the recently re-
opened Mountain Pass Mine in the United States mainly yield 
light rare earths. For heavy rare earths there will be no alter-
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case of “light” rare earths, Rhodia seeks to diversify 
imports.32
Stockpiling 
 
Strategic stockpiling has a long tradition in France, 
but of the mineral reserves only oil and uranium 
remain; the stockpiling of a number of metals 
X&&&%%++
$%%&8$		&+$%+
of cost and lack of demand.33 Although this develop-
ment is now deemed a mistake in some quarters, it 
is currently unlikely that stockpiling will be reinsti-
tuted. Industry shows little willingness to bear the 
costs and is skeptical about state-administered 
schemes.
International Cooperation 
 
The fourth working group, headed by the Foreign 
Ministry, deals with international cooperation. The 
most important topic this group currently addresses is 
the establishment of bilateral partnerships with alter-
native suppliers. Diversification of imports is con-
sidered necessary in France, especially with respect 
to rare earths. The search for alternatives to Chinese 
producers has so far centered on Australia and Ka-
zakhstan. In September 2011, the French and Kazakh 
governments signed a strategic partnership between 
the French Geological Survey (BRGM) and Kazakh-
stan’s state-owned Kazatomprom.35
 
native sources of supply before 2015/2016. For more infor-
mation on the distinction and on the supply situation see 
Harald Elsner, Kritische Versorgungslage mit schweren Seltenen 
Erden – Entwicklung “Grüner Technologien” gefährdet? Commodity 
Top News 36/2011 (BGR, 2011), http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/ 
Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/Commodity_Top_News/ 
Rohstoffwirtschaft/36_kritische-versorgungslage.pdf?__ 
X$XX
$%>&<4

&++&
$X&	Q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 Meanwhile, 
32  Defra, A Review of National Resource Strategies, March 2012, 
p. 20, http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/pb13722-
national-resource-strategies-review.pdf (accessed September 
2012); for information on import diversificatin, also see 
section “International Cooperation”. 
33  “Décret du 26 décembre 1996 portant dissolution de l’éta-
blissement public Caisse francaise des matières premières,” 
Journal Officiel de la République Francaise, no. 303, December 29, 
1996, p. # 
34  Fedem, Mise en oeuvre de l’Initiative matières premières de 
l’Union européenne (RMI): Réponse à la consultation de la Commission 
européenne (Paris, September 19, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enterprise/policies/raw-materials/files/pc-contributions/ 
org-061-fedem_en.pdf (accessed September 12, 2012). 
35  Kazatomprom wants to begin mining rare earths, starting 
with 1,500 tonnes in 2012. Franco-Kazakh cooperation is well 
established: Areva and Kazatomprom are partners, as are the 
French oil giant Total and the Kazakh Kazmunaigas. 
Rhodia has concluded cooperation and supply con-
tracts for rare earth elements with several French 
and foreign companies, such as Areva, the Australian 
mining company Lynas, and the German Tantalus 
Group.36
Among countries that import metal raw materials, 
Germany is a key partner. At the Franco-German Coun-
cil of Ministers in February 2012, the two countries 
agreed to cooperate closely on non-energy mineral 
resources, including marine raw materials research 
and the joint development of new exploration tech-
nologies.
 
37 Generally, there has been an active ex-
change between German and French decision-makers 
regarding raw materials – both bilaterally and in the 
context of the international study groups for copper, 
lead and zinc, and nickel, in which both participate 
along with several other EU member states.
Raw materials are of growing importance in devel-
opment cooperation. To date, discussion has focused 
on how certain developing countries could benefit 
more from their vast raw material reserves. The BRGM, 
for example, conducted a study on behalf of the For-
eign Ministry on the nine raw materials that are most 
common in Africa, in order to improve the data avail-
able to governments. The study is intended provide 
guidance to resource-rich developing countries and 
strengthen their negotiating position vis-à-vis multi-
national mining companies. The French government 
also runs cooperation projects with Guinea (consulta-
tion and training), Mauretania (financial support to 
expand a gold mine and for a training center for the 
state-owned mining company), and Afghanistan (tech-
nical assistance). Members of COMES agree that the 
cooperation with developing countries could con-
tribute significantly to France’s future security of 
supply. 
 
France is open to multilateral cooperation in the 
field of raw materials, for example supporting the 
Kimberley Process and the Extractive Industries Trans-
 
36  Areva and Rhodia intend to cooperate in mining deposits 
holding uranium and rare earths. Lynas Corporation owns 
the largest known deposit of (light) rare earths, which is 
located in Western Australia, and has built a processing and 
separation plant in Malaysia that is set to begin production. 
See also “Australia” in this volume, pp. 30ff. 
37  BMBF and Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et 
de la Recherche, Maßnahmenplan für den Deutsch-Französischen 
Ministerrat am 6. Februar 2012, http://www.bmbf.de/pubRD/ 
'++%'&%%&+
8	%$&++
&	'%+&		 
schavan_wauquiez.pdf (accessed October 2, 2012). 
38  Discussion with a representative of the Ministry of 
Industry, June 26, 2012, Paris. 
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parency Initiative (EITI). Within the EU, France is one 
of the strongest supporters of two draft directives 
seeking to impose far-reaching reporting obligations 
on multinational mining companies.39 President 
Sarkozy apparently considered putting metallic raw 
materials on the agenda of the French G20 presidency 
in 2011, but the idea was abandoned in favor of agri-
cultural resources to avoid a dispute with China.
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
At least since 2010, the topic of security of supply of 
non-energy mineral resources has reached the highest 
echelons of French politics. Risk assessment and strat-
egies of the crucial government and private actors do 
not differ significantly from those in other industrial 
countries. The change of government in summer 2012 
has done nothing to change that. As in other coun-
tries, the debate focuses on specific metals that, ac-
cording to current trends, play a key role for cutting-
edge technologies. By appointing a state-led commit-
tee to develop a strategy for these “strategic” metals, 
the French state has assumed an active role. At the 
same time, public instances are calling upon compa-
nies to assume responsibility. This concerted action 
seems to function well and, by all accounts, enjoys 
popularity among all involved. This is, for example, 
reflected in the numerous partnerships that have 
emerged between companies represented in COMES, 
and between companies and government agencies. 
The French government supports multilateral ini-
tiatives for a stricter regulation of raw materials 
trading. At the same time, government and industry 
alike rely foremost on bilateral partnerships with 
resource-rich countries and recycling to secure sup-
plies of rare earths in particular. 
 
 
 
 
39  Stormy-Annika Mildner and Florian Wassenberg, Rohstoff-
reichtum darf nicht länger arm machen, SWP-&" 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2012). 
40  Discussion with a representative of the Ministry of Indus-
try, June 26, 2012, Paris. 
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Germany 
Stormy-Annika Mildner and Julia Howald 
 
While Germany can satisfy its demand for many in-
dustrial minerals and rocks from domestic reserves, it 
has scarcely any primary metal deposits and is largely 
dependent on imports to satisfy its industry’s large 
demand for these. The German government regards 
securing the supply of raw materials as first and fore-
most the responsibility of companies. But since 
markets are often distorted and price mechanisms do 
not always function correctly it does act to provide an 
appropriate framework. Although the government’s 
raw materials strategy is coherent and transparent, 
there is debate – also within government – over cer-
tain details, such as the exact shape of Germany’s 
bilateral resource partnerships, the degree to which 
export duties should be abolished, and the ambitious-
ness of transparency initiatives. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Germany possesses large raw material reserves.1 With 
1.6 percent of global production of non-energy raw 
materials (by weight), it is one of the G20 members 
with moderate production. In 2010, Germany ranked 
first in global production of fluorspar (with a share 
of #&	
&%`Q+&
$%8$	$%4#&	
&%`Q%
third for salt (7.2 percent).2
The situation differs for metals. Germany has 
almost no reserves and is unable to satisfy its large 
domestic demand through domestic production, 
despite having some of the highest recycling rates 
for many metals.
 Demand for industrial 
minerals and rocks can be satisfied domestically. 
3
 
1  BGR and DERA, Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010, DERA 
Rohstoffinformationen (Hannover, December 2011), p. 17. 
 In 2010, the value of metal imports 
amounted to about €22 billion, according to the 
2  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
3  For example, in 2009, 69 percent of lead, 60 percent of 
'%'Q&	
&%$8
	&+&&Q%&	
&%$8
$-
per were produced from recycled material. BGR and DERA, 
Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010 (see note 1), p. # 
German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und 
Rohstoffe, BGR). Germany is one of the world’s largest 
consumers of metals. In 2010, it was the third-largest 

$%+'&	$8
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&	
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tion) and the fourth-	&+$8'%'4#&	
&%`Q
&4#&	
&%`Q%
&4#&	
&%`Q%%4#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cent). Import dependency is high for high-tech metals 
such as rare earth elements, for many of which supply 
sources are also highly concentrated.5 In 2010, for 
example, about half of all imports of rare earth ele-
ments came from China.6
In 2011, the KfW Group published a study identify-
ing several raw materials as critical for German in-
dustry in the short and medium term. The following 
factors were taken into account to determine “critical-
ity”: import and consumption in Germany, strategic 
relevance (vulnerability of the supply chain, surge in 
demand created by new technologies, substitutability), 
supply risks for the German economy (concentration 
of global reserves by country), market risks (business 
concentration of global production), and structural 
risks (such as recyclability). The three metals found to 
be most critical for Germany are (in descending order 
of criticality): germanium, rhenium, and antimony. 
Tungsten, rare earth elements, gallium, palladium, 
silver, tin, indium, niobium, chromium, and bismuth 
are also critical.
 
7
 
4  Ibid., pp. Q–# 
 
5  The only domestic reserves that have been explored more 
closely are near Delitzsch in Saxony, where mining is not 
yet profitable. Ad-hoc-AG Rohstoffe, Seltene Erden in Deutsch-
landQ!$<&'X&	QQ#–6, http://www.infogeo.de/ 
dokumente/download_pool/Seltene_Erden_Rohstoffe_ 
Deutschland_November_2010.pdf (accessed April 21, 2012). 
6  BGR and DERA, Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010 
(see note 1). 
7  Lorenz Erdmann, Siegfried Behrend, and Moira Feil, Kri-
tische Rohstoffe für Deutschland. Identifikation aus Sicht 
deutscher Unternehmen wirtschaftlich bedeutsamer mine-
ralischer Rohstoffe, deren Versorgungslage sich mittel- bis 
langfristig als kritisch erweisen könnte (Frankfurt am Main: 
KfW Bankengruppe, September 30, 2011), http://www. 
kfw.de/kfw/de/I/II/Download_Center/Fachthemen/Research/ 
PDF-Dokumente_Sonderpublikationen/Rohstoffkritikalitaet_ 
>#84
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The raw materials sector accounts for only a small 
share of GDP. In 2009, 3 percent came from metal 
processing and 0.5 percent from mineral extraction. 
According to the Trade Association Steel and Metal 
Processing (Wirtschaftsverband Stahl- und Metall-
<&		X&%Q]`Q%	$'&=Q
people were employed in about 5,000 steel and metal 
processing companies, which generated around €70 
billion in revenues.9 The government envisions the 
mining sector growing in coming years – at least this 
is an objective of its raw materials policy. German 
companies currently active in the mining sector are 
mostly medium-sized – and mainly operate domes-
tically. According to the Association for Mineral 
Resources and Mining (Vereinigung Rohstoffe und 
Bergbau, VRB), the German extractive sector currently 
comprises around 5,000 companies employing approx-
imately 200,000 people.10 Their activities are mostly 
aimed at regional markets rather than the German 
market.11 Partly because of low prices during the 
1990s, most German companies left the mining busi-
ness as it was cheaper to purchase raw materials from 
abroad. Reopening operations now is proving to be 
quite difficult. Especially for small and medium-sized 
companies, mining abroad is often too risky. Whether 
the Raw Materials Alliance (Rohstoffallianz), which 
was founded in April 2012 by ten of Germany’s largest 
companies,12 can encourage its members to reengage 
in the mining business remains to be seen.13
 
8  Steve T. Anderson, “Germany [Advance Release],” in USGS, 
2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
July 2012), http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/ 
2010/myb3-2010-gm.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012), 
p. ##The mineral extraction sector includes coal, oil, 
and natural gas. 
 The Raw 
9  Wirtschaftsverband Stahl- und Metallverarbeitung e.V., 
WSM-Industrie, http://www.wsm-net.de/WSM-Industrie.2.0.html 
(accessed November 22, 2012). 
10  Vereinigung Rohstoffe und Bergbau e.V., Rohstoffversorgung 
in Deutschland, http://www.v-r-X#&"
	&+"#³
(accessed November 22, 2012). 
11  Vereinigung Rohstoffe und Bergbau e.V., Zur Lage der deut-
schen Rohstoff gewinnenden Industrie (Rede des Vorstands zur Jahres-
tagung 2012), http://www.v-r-X#&"
	&+"#³
(accessed November 22, 2012). 
12  The ten founding members are Aurubis, BASF, Bayer, 
Bosch, Rockwood Lithium, Evonik Industries, Georgsmarien-
hütte Holding, Stahl-Holding-Saar, ThyssenKrupp, and 
Wacker Chemie. 
13  BDI, “Aufbau der Allianz zur Rohstoffsicherung 
beginnt,” press release, January 30, 2012, http://www.bdi.eu/ 
Pressemitteilungen_Pressemitteilung_Allianz_zur_ 
Rohstoffsicherung_30_01_2012.htm (accessed May 10, 2012). 
Materials Alliance is not a buyer cartel, nor does it 
intend to operate its own mines. Instead it provides 
its members with market analyses and investigates 
potential involvement in projects. It also intends to 
develop, monitor, and financially support mining 
projects. Both government and industry rejected the 
idea of creating a (fully or partly state-owned) German 
mining company.15
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
Responsibility for raw materials policy lies first and 
foremost with the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie, BMWi), which was also in charge of de-
veloping The German Government’s Raw Materials Strategy 
(October 2010). Within the ministry, a department for 
raw materials policy was created in February 2011, to 
deal with domestic raw materials supply, recycling, 
and access to raw materials from abroad. It was espe-
cially entrusted with developing bilateral resource 
partnerships.16
Several other institutional changes have also been 
made to support and implement the raw materials 
strategy. The German Mineral Resources Agency 
(Deutsche Rohstoffagentur, DERA) was created in 
October 2010 as part of the Federal Institute for Geo-
sciences and Natural Resources (BGR), to serve as a 
contact and information platform for industry and 
politics. One of its main tasks is to observe the inter-
national mineral and fossil fuel markets.
 
17
 
14  Statement made by Dierk Paskert, managing director of 
the Raw Materials Alliance, at the conference “Tiefseebau – 
Technologische und rohstoffpolitische Potenziale für die 
deutsche Wirtschaft” on June 19, 2012, at the BMWi. 
 As the 
central geoscientific agency, the BGR advises govern-
ment and industry on geoscience and raw materials 
issues. It is also involved in implementing develop-
ment cooperation. 
15  Discussion with representatives of the BMWi, May 30, 
2012. 
16  BMWi, “Brüderle: ‘Weiter Tempo machen zur Rohstoff-
sicherung,’” press release, February 2, 2011, http://www. 
bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did= 
#'<&	&%&		%4

&++&]=Q`# 
17  DERA, Über uns, http://www.deutsche-rohstoffagentur.de/ 
DERA/DE/Ueber-Uns/ueber-uns_node.html (accessed May 3, 
2012). 
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The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium 
für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, BMU) 
is responsible for resource efficiency. In February 
2012, the federal government adopted the German 
Resource Efficiency Program (ProgRess), which was pre-
pared by the BMU.
In order to avoid conflicts of interest and power 
struggles between the different actors, and to establish 
a common approach in the field, an interagency com-
mittee (Interministerieller Ausschuss, IMA) was estab-
lished in 2007. Headed by the BMWi, its members are 
the Chancellery, the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, 
AA), the BMZ, the BMU, the Ministry of Finance (Bun-
desministerium der Finanzen, BMF), the Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (Bundes-
ministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und 
Verbraucherschutz, BMELV), the Ministry of Education 
and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung, BMBF), the Ministry of Transport, Building 
and Urban Development (Bundesministerium für 
Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung, BMVBS), and 
the Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des 
Innern, BMI). Apart from the ministries, several fed-
eral agencies and institutions such as the BGR and the 
German Central Bank participate in the meetings of 
the IMA. Last but not least, the Federation of German 
Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, 
BDI) and other associations represent the industry 
within the IMA.
 The Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministe-
rium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung, BMZ) is responsible for those areas of 
raw materials policy that touch on development 
policy. 
19
Apart from the BDI, which has repeatedly hosted 
major raw materials conferences attracting great 
attention (in 2005, 2007 and 2010),
 
20
 
18  BMU, Überblick zum Deutschen Ressourceneffizienzprogramm 
(ProgRess), http://www.bmu.de/wirtschaft_und_umwelt/ 
ressourceneffizienz/ressourceneffizienzprogramm/doc/ 
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 other organiza-
19  BMWi, Zwischenbilanz der Rohstoffaktivitäten der Bundesregie-
rung (Schwerpunkt nichtenergetische Rohstoffe)Q\=Q# 3, 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/XYZ/zwischenbilanz-
der-rohstoffaktivitaeten-der-bundesregierung,property=pdf, 
bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf (accessed May 3, 
2012). 
20  BDI, “BDI Rohstoffkongress: Rohstoffmangel gefährdet 
Industrieland Deutschland,” press release, October 26, 2010, 
http://www.bdi.eu/Pressemitteilungen_BDI_Rohstoffkongress_ 
26_10_2010.htm (accessed May 3, 2012). 
tions such as the German Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammer-
tag, DIHK) and the Association for Mineral Resources 
and Mining have also devoted great attention to the 
topic of supply security. The DIHK, for example, made 
“Energy and Raw Materials for Tomorrow” its central 
theme for 2012. 
While German industry is closely involved in for-
mulating raw materials policy, many civil society 
organizations, such as the NGO Global Policy Forum, 
complain that their positions are not sufficiently 
taken into account, especially on critical issues such 
as transparency and resource partnerships. Their main 
concern, in contrast to industry associations, is not 
security of supply but improving environmental and 
social conditions in resource-rich countries. 
Concepts and Strategies 
In October 2010, the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology published The German Government’s 
Raw Materials Strategy, creating a general framework 
to align the objectives, strategies and instruments of 
the different policy fields dealing with raw materials. 
Strategy papers prepared by the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (2010) and 
the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Con-
+&	<$%Q%!
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related to development policy and resource efficiency, 
respectively. 
The German Government’s Raw Materials Strategy: 
Ensuring of Supply Security 
Like earlier strategies, the central goal of The German 
Government’s Raw Materials Strategy is to secure an ade-
quate supply of raw materials for the domestic econ-
omy.21
 
21  BMWi, The German Government’s Raw Materials Strategy 
(Berlin, 2010), http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/ 
Pdf/raw-materials-strategy,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi, 
sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf (accessed February 25, 2013). 
 Primary responsibility lies with the private 
sector, while the federal government sees its task as 
merely creating the necessary political framework. 
The federal government views the main challenges 
not in absolute, physical scarcity, but insufficient 
capacities to explore, produce, and process, as well 
as transport infrastructure deficiencies in producing 
countries. The strong regional concentration of 
reserves and production of many raw materials (often 
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in politically instable countries) and trade policy inter-
ventions (such as export barriers) are also identified as 
creating supply risks. 
The German raw materials strategy rests on four 
pillars: (1) diversification of supply sources; (2) improv-
ing material efficiency, developing substitutes, and 
advancing recycling; (3) improving information and 
vocational training, together with a viable political 
8	'&$	8$	&	'%X+%&++
<&+%4`8$+-
tering good governance and transparency and pro-
moting a sustainable raw materials economy in devel-
oping countries and emerging economies. 
In its strategy paper, the federal government points 
to several instruments designed to encourage German 
mining companies to invest abroad: guarantees for 
untied financial loans insure the financing of raw 
materials projects abroad against political and com-
mercial risks; investment guarantees support direct 
investment by offering protection against political 
risks due to state intervention; and export credit 
guarantees help German manufacturers of mining 
equipment to develop new or difficult markets by 
insuring the companies’ export transactions against 
non-payment by foreign clients. 
Bilateral resource partnerships are proposed as a 
way to diversify the sources of supply, while the Euro-
pean Union’s common trade policy is expected to 
foster fair competition in global markets by pressing 
for the abolition of export restrictions through the 
WTO and in bilateral free trade negotiations. 
Within its Raw Materials Strategy, the government 
announced its intention to step up support for re-
search and development in order to improve resource 
efficiency. With respect to recycling, it advocates 
revising the Closed Substance Cycle and Waste Management 
Act (Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetz). The government 
also intends to promote research on substitutes for 
critical raw materials. Last but not least, an important 
objective of the government’s strategy is expanding 
domestic mining. It also regards preserving the capac-
ity to process raw materials within Germany an im-
portant component of the competitiveness of German 
industry. 
The BMZ Strategy: Mineral and Energy Resources as a 
Factor in Development 
Complementing The German Government’s Raw Materials 
Strategy, the Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (BMZ) formulated the relevant 
principles of development policy in its own strategy 
document,22
In early 2012 the BMZ launched the Global Develop-
ment Policy Raw Materials Initiative (GeRI) as a joint 
undertaking of BGR and GIZ, aiming to bring together 
existing and future development policy projects under 
a single roof and make their implementation more 
 which was also published in 2010. The 
strategy paper is based on the observation that many 
resource-rich developing countries are unable to per-
form their government functions in planning, moni-
toring, and regulating the mining sector due to a lack 
of human resources, funding, and institutional capac-
ity. German development policy promotes the socially, 
ecologically, and economically sustainable use of 
raw materials in developing countries. German devel-
opment cooperation therefore supports partners in 
fostering good governance in the mining sector and in 
harnessing the economic dynamism generated by the 
mining sector to promote broader growth. The activi-
ties involved include financing (German Investment 
and Development Corporation, DEG) and technical 
support (BGR and German Agency for International 
Cooperation, GIZ) for mining projects, the develop-
ment of infrastructure and of supply and processing 
industries, and the establishment of sustainable tech-
nologies in the respective partner country, including 
training and education. Improving mining regulation 
in developing countries also benefits German industry 
by improving investment conditions and opening up 
new markets for mining machinery, equipment, and 
consulting services. Germany also advises countries on 
monetary and fiscal transparency in the mining sector 
(for example Ghana). Apart from the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the BMZ also sup-
ports schemes to certify the origin of raw materials 
that do not come from conflict zones, such as the Kim-
berley Process Certification Scheme, and to involve the 
extractive industry in regional peace processes (such 
as the DR Congo and the International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region). Advisory projects in the raw 
materials sector are implemented by the BGR and GIZ, 
whose activities include advising governments in coun-
tries such as Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, and Nami-
bia on sustainable organization of their raw materials 
sectors. West and Central Africa and Central Asia are 
also priorities for German development policy. 
 
22  BMZ, Mineral and Energy Resources as a Factor in Development, 
http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/strat
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efficient and flexible by using the comparative 
advantages of both institutions. 
The BMU Strategy: Sustainable Raw Materials Use 
%]=Q&>&&	]%+	=8$	&%<	$%'&%
published a strategy document on resource efficiency. 
The document starts from the premise that simply 
securing access to raw materials will not suffice in the 
long term.23 Instead, politics, industry, and science 
must work together to enhance energy and material 
efficiency in industrial production processes, while 
society must contribute its share by modifying life-
styles and consumption habits. These changes are 
necessary because demand for energy and raw mate-
rials in many emerging economies will increase in 
coming years and decades, while the ecosystem is 
already overburdened today. Thus, if future global 
distribution conflicts are to be avoided, the search for 
an environmentally sustainable global growth and 
development model must start today.
The document goes on to call for non-renewable 
raw materials to be gradually replaced as far as pos-
sible by renewable raw materials. Materials for which 
no substitutes have yet been developed should be used 
as efficiently as possible. This shift is seen as an eco-
nomic opportunity as well as a challenge. The paper 
points out that more efficient use of raw materials 
does more than just reduce production costs. If Ger-
many took a leading role in developing resource tech-
nologies, its companies could profit from increased 
competitiveness and sales to other countries.
 
25
Conflicting Goals and Controversies 
 
At a first glance, these three strategies seem to fit well 
together. The BMWi’s document focuses on expanding 
the raw materials supply to fully satisfy German de-
mand. The goal of the BMZ’s strategy is to reduce 
negative effects in resource-rich developing countries 
and make their raw materials sectors more sustain-
able and more oriented toward economic develop-
ment. The BMU’s strategy prioritizes reducing 
domestic demand and using raw materials more 
efficiently.26
 
23  BMU, Strategie Ressourceneffizienz, http://www.bmu.de/files/ 
pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ressourceneffizienz.pdf 
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 A closer look, however, reveals several 
24  BMU, Strategie Ressourceneffizienz, http://www.bmu.de/ 
files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ressourceneffizienz.pdf 
(accessed ]=Q`Q# 6. 
25  Ibid., pp. 10–12. 
26  Stefan Werland, Debattenanalyse Rohstoffknappheit, PolRess 
conflicting goals that are the subject of considerable 
debate in politics and society. 
One conflicting goal concerns the resource partner-
ships. In the case of Kazakhstan, numerous NGOs 
criticized the neglect of transparency and good gover-
nance in favor of economic interests. Questions also 
arise around the issue of technology transfers. While 
these can contribute significantly to economic devel-
opment, they are not always in the immediate interest 
of German companies. Nor is the establishment of 
processing industries abroad. Another controversy lies 
in the degree of ambition relating to financial trans-
parency. While transparency is without doubt in-
dispensable for fighting corruption, industry critics 
warn of high implementation costs and competitive 
disadvantages where such rules apply only to single 
jurisdictions. Banning export quotas and tariffs, 
which the BMWi calls for, is also controversial, as 
these are not always levied in order to create a com-
petitive advantage for domestic producers. Especially 
for the least developed countries that depend heavily 
on raw material exports and lack a properly function-
ing taxation system, export tariffs are one way to tax 
and regulate the raw materials sector at least at the 
national borders. The BMZ therefore advocates a case-
by-case approach rather than a general prohibition.27
Policy Measures and Instruments 
 
Domestic Raw Materials Production 
The federal legal basis for mining in Germany is the 
Federal Regional Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz), the 
Federal Building Code (Baugesetzbuch), the Federal Mining 
Act (Bundesberggesetz), and the Mineral Deposits Act (Lager-
stättengesetz). At state level the regional planning laws 
(“Landesplanungsgesetze”) are also important.
 
Arbeitspapier AS 5.1, Berlin, July 19, 2012, http://www. 
ressourcenpolitik.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/AS-5-1_ 
Rohstoffkanppheit.pdf (accessed November 27, 2012). 
 Laws 
governing economic activities, including mining and 
land-use planning, are subject to concurrent legis-
$%%&		
&4`of the Basic Law, which 
means that legislative power lies with the states, un-
27  Discussion with representatives of the BMZ on September 
19, 2012. 
28  Staatliche Geologische Dienste der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Rohstoffsicherung in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land – Zustandsbericht, http://www.infogeo.de/dokumente/ 
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78 
less and until the federal government passes legis-
lation.29
The Federal Mining Act lays down the rules for explo-
ration, mining, and processing. It is based on a distinc-
tion between what is an integral part of the ground 
(“grundeigene Bodenschätze”) and what is not (“berg-
freie Bodenschätze”). Resources that are an integral 
part of the ground, including some industrial min-
erals and rocks, belong to the landowner.
 However, in the field of land-use legislation 
the federal states also have the option of deviating 
from federal law under Article 72 (3) of the Basic Law. 
30 But most 
minerals and metals (along with energy raw materials 
and geothermal energy) are categorized as not being 
an integral part of the land (“bergfrei”), and therefore 
as not bound to the ownership of the land.31 Explora-
tion for such resources requires a permit issued by the 
federal government. Mining requires ownership of the 
mine or a license. Before a company may start mining, 
its operating plan must be approved to ensure work-
place safety and post-closure land restoration, among 
other things.32 State-level agencies are responsible for 
issuing licenses – in compliance with all relevant laws 
and environmental regulations.33
Because decisions about land use are made by the 
states, where competition between mining and other 
land uses such as housing, infrastructure, and 
 
 
29  Deutscher Bundestag, Konkurrierende Gesetzgebung, http:// 
www.bundestag.de/service/glossar/K/konk_ges.html (accessed 
&&'X&	Q`# 
30  Minerals that are an integral part of the land (“grund-
eigen”) include basalt, bauxite, bentonite, clay, diatomite, 
feldspar, kaolin, roof slate, steatite, talc, and trass. 
31  Minerals that are not an integral part of the land (“berg-
frei”) include actinium and actinides, aluminum, antimony, 
arsenic, beryllium, bismuth, boron, cadmium, cesium, chro-
mium, cobalt, copper, francium, gallium, germanium, gold, 
hafnium, indium, iridium, iron, lanthanum and lanthanides, 
lead, lithium, manganese, mercury, molybdenum, nickel, 
niobium, osmium, palladium, phosphate, platinum, polo-
nium, radium, rhenium, rhodium, rubidium, ruthenium, 
scandium, sulfur, selenium, silver, strontium, tantalum, tel-
lurium, thallium, tin, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, yttri-
um, zinc, zirconium – pure and in the form of ores, except 
in alum and vitriol ores; hydrocarbons; bituminous coal and 
lignite; graphite; brine, halite, potash, magnesium com-
pounds, and borates; barite and fluorspar. 
32  Bundesministerium der Justiz, Juris, Bundesberggesetz 
(BbergG), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/ 
XX&	"&+'#84
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33  Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruk-
tur, Verkehr und Technologie, Genehmigungsrecht, http:// 
www.stmwivt.bayern.de/fileadmin/Web-Dateien/Dokumente/ 
energie-und-rohstoffe/Genehmigungen.pdf (accessed Septem-
X&	Q`Q# 1–3. 
environmental protection is fierce, it remains to 
be seen to what extent the objective of expanding 
domestic raw materials production can actually be 
reached. 
The Federal/State Committee of Soil Research (Bund-
Länder-Ausschuss Bodenforschung) therefore calls for 
a specialized national law on securing raw materials 
to regulate the raw materials supply and protect val-
uable near-surface deposits from other forms of land 
use. The Committee’s recommendations include, 
among others, better identification and prioritization 
of raw materials deposits in land-use plans, legal clas-
sification of areas where raw materials are protected 
(“Rohstoffschutzgebiet”), a more consistent approach 
across the states, and greater involvement of federal 
geological agencies in all planning phases from explo-
ration to licensing. The 2012 federal budget sets aside 
€1.5 million to support exploration.35
Deep-Sea Mining 
 
Another component of the German strategy for secur-
ing raw materials is research on seabed minerals. In 
August 2011, the government published a National 
Masterplan on Marine Technologies (Nationaler Masterplan 
Maritime Technologien, NMMT) to promote the expan-
sion of German marine technologies.36 The BGR has 
been exploring the possibilities of deep-sea mining on 
behalf of the government since 2006, and has been 
assigned two areas in the Central Pacific by the Inter-
national Seabed Authority (ISA). The total size of 
this area, in which the BGR is exploring manganese 
nodules and crusts, amounts to 75,000 km2. Germany 
is one of the few countries (currently fourteen)37 that 
own exploration licenses and are already exploring 
the opportunities of deep-sea mining.
 
34  Staatliche Geologische Dienste der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Rohstoffsicherung in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land – Zustandsbericht (see note 
 
). 
35  BMF, Bundeshaushalt 2012: Ausgaben für Investitionen, http:// 
www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/bundeshaushalt2012/html/ 
ep09/ep09kp03nra10.html (accessed November 23, 2012). 
36  BMWi, “Umsetzung des Nationalen Masterplans Maritime 
Technologien (NMMT) kommt gut voran,” press release, 
March 26, 2012, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/ 
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22, 2012). 
37  ISA, Contractors, http://www.isa.org.jm/en/scientific/ 
exploration/contractors (accessed June 22, 2012). 
38  Nationaler Masterplan Maritime Technologien, Marine 
minerale Rohstoffe: Beschreibung, http://www.nmmt.de/bal_ims_ 
controler.php?menu=Yms2OX3ZjplZD01aQ%3D%3D=& 
field=J&reset=search&letter=&window_close=all (accessed 
June 22, 2012). 
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Resource Efficiency, Recycling, and Substitutes 
The Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF) promotes research and development work 
on resource and material efficiency, energy saving, 
and sustainability through numerous programs and 
measures. One example is the founding of the Helm-
holtz Institute Freiberg for Resource Technology (HIF) 
in August 2011, as proposed in The German Government’s 
Raw Materials Strategy. Several of the government’s pro-
posals were also realized by the creation of the VDI 
Centre for Resource Efficiency and Climate Protection 
(VDI ZER) in June 2009, a collaborative project of the 
Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) and the 
Association of German Engineers (Verein Deutscher 
Ingenieure, VDI). One project the center runs is an 
innovation radar that allows companies to search for 
creative ideas and resource-efficient technologies.39
The Recycling and Waste Legislation Reform Act (Gesetz 
zur Neuordnung des Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallrechts) 
came into force on June 1, 2012, implementing the 
EU Waste Framework Directive in German law.
 

Stockpiling 
 It intro-
duces a five-level waste hierarchy, tightens the rules 
for waste separation, and sets targets for significant 
improvements in recycling rates by 2020. 
Both government and industry are skeptical toward 
the idea of storing certain raw materials, as currently 
discussed on the European level,
 
39  VDI ZER, Innovationsradar, http://www.vdi-zre.de/home/ 
wie-funktioniert-ressourceneffizienz/innovationsradar-
ressourceneffizienz/ (accessed May 11, 2012). 
 on the grounds of a 
costs-benefit analysis. Technological advances such as 
the development of substitutes or the discovery of new 
deposits could quickly prove the choice of a certain 
metal wrong. Storing metals is also a costly endeavor. 
But the idea of stockpiling is also rejected from an 
economic policy perspective, as it constitutes a politi-
cal intervention in the markets. In the worst case such 
interventions could even amplify market distortions. 
Lastly, it is argued, the interests within Europe are too 
diverse to realize such a project on the European level. 
The idea of stockpiling raises numerous as yet un-
answered questions: who would administer the stock-
pile, who would pay for it, who would decide what 
40  BMU, Eckpunkte des neuen Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetz, 
http://www.bmu.de/abfallwirtschaft/abfallpolitik/ 
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41  “EU will sich mit Lagerhaltung gegen Rohstoff-Knappheit 
wappnen,” Agrarheute.de, January 27, 2011, http://www. 
agrarheute.com/lagerhaltung (accessed May 31, 2012). 
and when to buy and sell, and how would the dis-
tribution of stocks among the EU member states 
function?
Resource Partnerships 
 
Negotiating bilateral resource partnerships is a central 
element of The German Government’s Raw Materials Strat-
egy. While the Federal Ministry of Economics and Tech-
nology (BMWi) bears the main responsibility, the For-
eign Office, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Ministry 
for the Environment (BMU) also participate in devel-
oping partnerships. The interests of the industry in 
selecting and negotiating the partnerships are repre-
sented by the BDI. These partnership agreements do 
not grant German companies exclusive access to part-
ners’ raw materials sectors. The partner country com-
mits itself to provide transparency, legal security, and 
non-discrimination. In return, the German govern-
ment offers support for modernizing the mining sec-
tor (including developing processing industries, train-
ing and education, and exploiting new deposits), pro-
moting transparency in financial flows and supply 
chains, and help in establishing a functioning finan-
cial and fiscal policy.
The first partnership agreement was signed in 
October 2011 with Mongolia,
 
 which has significant 
reserves of copper, fluorspar, gold, molybdenum, rare 
earth elements, and tungsten. Another agreement was 
+%&$%>&X		=QQ¬+%Q$+&
copper, gallium, indium, molybdenum, niobium, 
rhenium, rare earth elements, and tungsten make it 
an attractive partner for German companies.
 
42  Discussions with representatives of the BMWi and the 
BDI. For more information, see also “European Union” in this 
volume, pp. 
 The 
Integrated Mineral Resources Initiative (IMRI) in 
59ff. 
43  BMWi, The German Government’s Raw Materials Strategy (Ber-
lin, 2010), http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/raw-
materials strategy,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en, 
rwb=true.pdf (accessed February 25, 2013)Q## 
44  BMWi, Agreement between the Government of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the Government of Mongolia on Cooperation in 
the Fields of Raw Materials, Industry and Technology, http://www. 
bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/agreement-between-germany-
and-mongolia-cooperation-raw-materials-industry-technology, 
property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf 
(accessed February 26, 2013). 
45  Mark Brinistool, “Kasakhstan [Advance Release],” in USGS, 
2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
June 2012), http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ 
country/2010/myb3-2010-kz.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012),  
pp. #–## 
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Mongolia, in which German development agencies 
work together with the local private sector, is exem-
plary for the implementation of resource partner-
ships. 
The second German resource partnership, signed 
with Kazakhstan in February 2012, was strongly 
criticized by civil society, with numerous NGOs accus-
ing the government of ignoring human rights and the 
need for democratization for the sake of securing 
lucrative contracts for German companies.
Both BMWi and BDI are against a rapid negotiation 
of new resource partnerships. Instead, they argue that 
existing partnerships should first be given time to 
develop, and for the moment new agreements should 
take the form of raw material dialogues, for example 
to encourage cooperation between the geological 
agencies of partner countries. Countries like Peru and 
South Africa would be obvious partners.
 Indeed, 
its clauses on transparency are weaker than those 
found in the agreement with Mongolia. 
 A first agree-
ment of this kind was concluded with Chile on Jan-
uary 26, 2013, in the form of a declaration of intent 
regarding cooperation on mining and mineral raw 
materials.
The Australian-German Joint Declaration on Re-
sources and Energy Cooperation signed in June 2011 
attracted less public attention than the agreements 
with Mongolia and Kazakhstan. Australia and Ger-
many declared their intention to promote free inter-
national markets and examine possibilities for co-
operation in the areas of research and development, 
trade and investment opportunities, recycling, sub-
stitution, resource-efficient production, and the 
impact of mining activities on the environment.
 
50
 
46  BMWi, Agreement between the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in the Fields of Raw Materials, 
Industry and Technology, http://www.bmwi.de/English/ 
Redaktion/Pdf/agreement-kazakhstan-germany,property= 
pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf (accessed 
February 26, 2013). 
 
47  “Rohstoffpartnerschaft mit Kasachstan beschlossen,” 
dradio.deQ>&X		=QQ^""#	$#&"&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48  “Rohstoffpartner gesucht,” German-Foreign-Policy.com, 
May 29, 2012, http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/ 
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49  BMWi, “Agreement on German-Chilean Raw Materials 
Partnership,” press release, January 26, 2013, http://www. 
bmwi.de/English/Navigation/Press/press-releases,did= 
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`# 
50  Australian-German Joint Declaration on Resources and Energy 
Cooperation, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/ 
Transparency in the Mining Sector 
Germany is a strong promoter of the EITI initiative. 
	%+presidency in 2007, it placed strengthen-
ing the initiative high on its agenda. Germany backs 
the initiative financially and supports implementa-
tion through its bilateral development projects.51
The German government is rather critical of the 
Commission’s proposal for a new EU transparency 
directive.
 The 
participation of German companies in the initiative, 
however, has largely failed to materialize so far. RWE 
AG joined EITI in April 2010 and remains the only Ger-
man company among stakeholders. The KfW Group is 
another German stakeholder. 
52 With the backing of the private sector, the 
government warns against high bureaucratic costs 
and competition disadvantages compared to compa-
nies subject to less rigorous reporting requirements. 
Under the Commission’s proposal, companies would 
have to disclose payments in the raw materials sector 
on a project-by-project as well as country-by-country 
basis. In the Council of the European Union, Berlin 
argued that the project-by-project disclosure require-
ment should be removed from the new directive and 
that the minimum threshold for disclosure should 
be raised. It particularly rejected the European Par-
liament’s proposal to extend reporting requirements 
beyond the raw materials sector.53
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ErklaerungRohstoffdialog.pdf (accessed November 26, 2012). 
 
51  BMZ, Transparenzinitiative im Rohstoffsektor: EITI, http:// 
www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/goodgovernance/ 
transparenz/eiti/index.html (accessed May 11, 2012). 
52  Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung 
auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Viola von Cramon-
Taubadel, Volker Beck (Köln), Uwe Kekeritz, weiterer Abgeord-
neter und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Drucksache 
"Q^""X#X%&+#&""X""" 
#84
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%&""	¡	'$%+erung 
der Transparenzanforderungen in Bezug auf Informationen 
über Emittenten, deren Wertpapiere zum Handel auf einem 
geregelten Markt zugelassen sind, sowie der Richtlinie 2007/ 
"&	¬$''++$%Q¬]4`&%µQ&
&'X&	
6, 2011, http://www.bdi.eu/images_content/Konjunktur 
StandortUndWettbewerb/BMF-Tran.pdf (accessed June 1, 
2012). See also “European Union” in this volume, pp. 59ff. 
53  Misereor, “Bundesregierung blockiert EU-Pläne für mehr 
	%+	&%'$+$88+&$	Q·]	
QQ^""# 
misereor.de/presse/pressemeldungen/pressemeldungen-
detais/article/bundesregierung-blockiert-eu-plaene-fuer-mehr-
transparenz-im-rohstoffsektor.html (accessed June 7, 2012). 
For more information on developments concerning the trans-
parency directive (as of November 2012), see “European 
Union” in this volume, pp. 59ff. 
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The German government and private sector are 
also hostile toward the idea of introducing reporting 
requirements for the use of so-called conflict minerals 
(from the DR Congo and neighboring countries), 
which the United States has now established. Berlin 
believes that an obligation to report the origin and 
utilization of these materials (all the way from mine 
to final consumer) would entail disproportionately 
high bureaucratic costs, while positive effects in the 
producing countries are anything but certain.55
European and Global Raw Materials Governance 
 Ulti-
mately, the government and private sector prefer to 
support voluntary initiatives over introducing strict 
and legally binding rules for single jurisdictions. 
Germany supports strengthening international raw 
materials governance. On the EU level this has already 
been achieved. The European strategy for raw mate-
rials of early 2011, Tackling the Challenegs in Commodity 
Markets and on Raw Materials, clearly bears German hall-
marks – at least with respect to minerals and metals. 
German interests are also mirrored in resource-spe-
cific aspects of EU trade policy, namely in efforts to 
reduce export barriers affecting raw materials. 
Germany is a member of the international metal 
study groups on lead and zinc, copper, and nickel, and 
of the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC).56 Ger-
many is also an observer at the meetings of the Inter-
governmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and 
Sustainable Development (IGF), which is a discussion 
platform for mining and mineral resources. The Ger-
man government participated in the development 
of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas.57 The BMZ supports the United Nations Global 
Compact financially and by functioning as the co-
ordination center for the German Global Compact 
network.
 
54  See also “United States” in this volume, pp. 
 Finally, the federal government favors 
150ff. 
55  BDI, Fokus Sicherheit und Rohstoffe, Ed. 1, 2012. 
56  Common Fund for Commodities, CFC Project Financing, 
http://www.common-fund.org/projects/projects-funded-by-cfc/ 
(accessed June 6, 2012). 
57  OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, 
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58  BMZ, Global Compact, http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_ 
machen/themen/wirtschaft/privatwirtschaft/unternehmensve
rantwortung/global_compact/index.html 4
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2012). 
entrenching the topic more strongly within the G20, 
although thus far without success. 
Evaluation and Outlook 
Resource security has become an important issue for 
the German government. Germany has taken an inter-
national lead in resource and material efficiency, 
waste management, and recycling. Raising industry 
and public awareness of the risks threatening inter-
national raw material markets can also be considered 
a government success. Institutional reforms such as 
setting up the German Mineral Resources Agency 
(DERA) and the Helmholtz Institute Freiberg for Re-
source Technology, and launching the Global Develop-
ment Policy Raw Materials (GeRI) and various research 
programs must also count as successes. 
Other aspects of German raw materials strategy, 
however, are not without contradictions. While Berlin 
advocates a common EU raw materials policy, it pur-
sues its own individual approach on resource partner-
ships. Incongruities can also be found in the economic 
and development components of the strategy. Where-
as cooperation with resource-rich countries is sup-
posed to contribute to economic and social develop-
ment, the agreement with Kazakhstan largely ignores 
human rights. Nor is the German government fully 
consistent with respect to transparency. It supports 
the EITI, but on behalf of its own industries works to 
weaken further-reaching EU initiatives. Implementa-
tion of the strategy is, however, still in its early stages, 
and these ambiguities could yet turn out to be merely 
growing pains. 
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India 
Jannic Horne and Christian Wagner 
 
The Indian raw materials sector represents the mate-
rial base for industrialization. Demand can largely be 
satisfied by domestic production. With the economy 
	$%X=X$$&	
&%%%=+%
&&
mid-1990s, the raw materials sector has been able to 
expand too. But with a share of 2.3 percent of GDP 
(2010), it remains relatively insignificant and the gov-
ernment sees great potential for further growth.1
Minerals in the National Economy 
 
India possesses large reserves of barite, bauxite, 
chromium, iron ore, limestone, and manganese. Its 
iron ore reserves are estimated at 25 million tonnes 
(fifth in the world) and rare earth reserves at three 
million tonnes (fourth).2 Eighty-seven different min-
erals were produced in 2010.3 According to World 
Mining Data, India accounted for large shares of global 
	$
$%$8X	&4&	
&%`Q
4&	
&%`Q
chromium (13 percent), manganese (10 percent), 
graphite (9 percent), and iron (11 percent).
 
1  Ministry of Mines (MoM), Unlocking the Potential of the Indian 
Minerals Sector: Strategy Paper for the Ministry of Mines (New Delhi, 
!$<&'X&	`Q#QQ^""'%&+#%
#%"	&	& 
**$%&%%+*&&X&X&&&8X# 
pdf (accessed October 10, 2012); Peter E. J. Pitfield, Teresa J. 
Brown, and Naomi E. Idoine, Mineral Information and Statistics 
for the BRIC Countries 1999–2008 (Nottingham, Edinburgh, and 
London, 2010), p. Qhttps://www.bgs.ac.uk/downloads/start. 
cfm?id=1637 (accessed October 9, 2012). 
 The quar-
2  Daniel J. Cordier, “Rare Earths,” in USGS, Mineral Commodity 
Summaries 2012 (Reston, January 2012), p. 129, http://minerals. 
usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/mcs-2012-
raree.pdf (accessed October 15, 2012). 
3  Chin S. Kuo, “India [Advance Release],” in USGS, 2010 Miner-
als Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, February 
2012), p. 11.1, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ 
country/2010/myb3-2010-%#84
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“Indiens Wirtschaftswachstum heizt Rohstoffnachfrage an,” 
GTAI, April 11, 2012, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/ 
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2012); Boris Alex, “Indien steigt wieder in das Geschäft mit 
Seltenen Erden ein,” GTAI, March 17, 2011, http://www.gtai.de/ 
"!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'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October 10, 2012). 
4  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
rying of rough diamonds, which has been practiced 
for centuries, is one of the few extractive sectors in 
&
%&^X&&&%8+
=&	+"%" 
2009, production shrank by 99 percent. By contrast, 
the diamond-cutting industry retains its significance, 
with India accounting for 55 percent of global pro-
cessing.5
As well as supplying domestic industries, mining 
is also a relevant export sector. In 2010, the most im-
portant exported mineral was cut diamonds, which 
made up 66.2 percent of iron and mineral exports 
(by value), while uncut diamonds were the most im-
portant non-energy non-metal mineral import, with 
a +	&$8#&	
&%$8$	&%'%&	'$	+#
Other significant exports are iron ore (22.2 percent), 
granite (3.9 percent), precious and semiprecious 
+$%&+4#&	
&%`Q'%4#&	
&%`Q
	$''Q
and lead. In the area of metals and alloys, the most 
important exports are iron and steel (as a single prod-
uct group), aluminum, and copper.
 
6
India remains self-sufficient in many metal miner-
als, such as bauxite, chromite, limonite, iron ore, 
manganese ore, and rutile, as well as the industrial 
minerals barite, dolomite, feldspar, limestone, quartz 
and quartzite, sillimanite, and talc,
 
7 but is heavily 
dependent on imported energy. Oil imports, mainly 
from the Middle East, represented roughly 70 percent 
of ore and mineral imports in fiscal year 2009/2010.
 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
 
Other significant imported primary products are cop-
per (3.6 percent), phosphate (0.6 percent), and – last 
but not least – gold. For cultural reasons, India is the 
5  Pitfield, Brown, and Idoine, Mineral Information and Statistics 
(see note 1), p. 62. 
6  MoM, Annual Report 2010–11 (New Delhi, August 2011), 
pp. 53, 161ff., http://mines.nic.in/index.aspx?level=1&lid= 
%4
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`# 
7  Kuo, “India [Advance Release]” (see note 3), p. 11.2. 
8  “Indiens Wirtschaftswachstum heizt Rohstoffnachfrage an” 
(see note 3); MoM, Annual Report 2010–11 (see note 6), pp. 53, 
165ff. 
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world’s biggest consumer of gold, with more than 
700,000 kg annually.9
The Indian mining industry is characterized by a 
multitude of small mines. %Q&	&&	&QQ
$8
	$
&'&+%Q%+	
minerals. Apart from the Vedanta Group, which is 
listed in London and emerged largely from the Indian 
Sterlite Group and Hindustan Zinc, the country’s 
mining sector is mainly dominated by mining com-
panies owned by individual states. In 2010, state 
&%&		+&+

$%&8$	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+
	$
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total of 500,000 jobs.
 
10 The iron ore sector is an excep-
tion. It is dominated by large private-sector companies 
like Tata Steel and Arcelor Mittal. Although the state-
owned National Mineral Development Corporation is 
the single largest producer, 70 percent of production 
is in private hands.11
Foreign direct investment in India’s mining sector 
is small, but increasing steadily. While FDI amounted 
$$%=Y['$%	%8+
=&	"Q
had jumped to US$591 million by 2010/2011.
 Apart from the state-owned 
enterprises, whose role is declining, two companies – 
Vedanta and Arcelor Mittal – play a crucial role. 
12 Indian 
companies are increasingly active abroad, for example 
in Australia, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Iran, Congo, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Singapore, South Africa, Thai-
land, the United States, and Zambia.13
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
The Indian raw materials debate concentrates on fossil 
fuels – coal, oil, and gas – with metals and minerals 
playing only a minor part. Corruption and illegal min-
ing are important issues, together with the associated 
financial, social, and political repercussions.
 
9  MoM, Annual Report 2010–11 (see note 
 Indus-
6), pp. 53, 165ff; 
Pitfield, Brown, and Idoine, Mineral Information and Statistics 
(see note 1), p. # 
10  Kuo, “India [Advance Release]” (see note 3), p. 11.1. 
11  “Indiens Wirtschaftswachstum heizt Rohstoffnachfrage 
an” (see note 3). 
12  Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report – Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Flows to India: Country-wise and Industry-wise, August 25, 
2011, http://rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications. 
aspx?Id=1029 (accessed October 10, 2012). 
13  MoM, Annual Report 2010–11 (see note 6), pp. 171ff. 
14  *$
'^¡$%$++##*	$	&+Q·India 
Today, n.d., http://indiatoday.intoday.in/gallery/coal-scam-how-
india-lost-rs-#-lakh-crores/1/7610.html (accessed October 
10, 2012). 
try and government recognize the great need to 
reform an inadequate regulatory regime.15
Institutional Setting 
 
At both federal and state level a multitude of govern-
ment actors deal with raw materials, with the con-
sequence that responsibilities are not always clear-cut. 
The main actor is the Ministry of Mines (MoM), which 
is responsible for both the Indian Bureau of Mines 
(IBM) as the controlling, advising, and evaluating 
agency, and the Geological Survey of India (GSI).16 A 
number of other ministries, such as those for steel, 
coal, and petroleum and natural gas, also deal with 
raw materials issues, as does the Department of 
Atomic Energy. Environmental regulations (environ-
mental impact assessments) are the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). Below 
the federal level, each state has several ministries and 
agencies involved in extraction. While the multitude 
of federal and state-level actors often causes coordina-
tion problems and regulatory overlap, there is broad 
clarity over mineral rights: deposits within a state’s 
territory belong to the state, offshore resources belong 
to central government.17
Apart from the few major corporations already 
mentioned, the private sector is fragmented and 
poorly developed due to a general preference for 
state-owned enterprises, poor security of investment, 
unclear and overlapping regulations, insufficient 
exploration by the Geological Survey (GSI), and inter-
minable licensing procedures. It is therefore not sur-
prising that international companies have to date 
mainly become involved in trading. Exploration activi-
ties are mostly undertaken by large Indian companies 
such as Tata, Essar, and O. P. Jindal.
 The national parliament and 
the state assemblies are generally weak and possess 
only minor powers with regard to supervision. 

 
15  Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd., Exploring India: Mining the Oppor-
tunities (n.p., 2011), p. 29, http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/EY_Exploring_India_Mining_the_opportunities/ 
$FILE/EY_Exploring_India_Mining_the_opportunities.pdf 
(accessed October 10, 2012). 
 
16  MoM, Annual Report 2011–12 (New Delhi, 2012), p. 13, http:// 
mines.gov.in/annual-report/ann2011-12.pdf (accessed October 
10, 2012). 
17  Ibid., p. 69. 
18  Ministry of Steel, Annual Report 2011–12 (New Delhi, 2012), 
#88#Q^""+&&#$<#%"%%&$	-
"%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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$	-12%29.pdf 
(accessed October 10, 2012); Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd., Exploring 
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Illegal mining is a major problem. In 2010 alone, 
Q%
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means that there are thirty illegal mining actitivies 
for each legal activity.19 However, the total number of 
illegal mines is declining and the problem is largely 
concentrated in eleven rather underdeveloped states.20 
Given the sector’s history of environmental harm, 
population displacement, corruption, and patronage, 
mining companies often find themselves confronted 
with local opposition. When, as is often the case, dis-
sent is ignored by companies and government agen-
cies, actual protest movements emerge and revolu-
tionary movements such as the Maoist Naxalites may 
gain strength.21
Concepts and Strategies 
 
The Ministry of Mines recognizes several challenges 
for India.22
The Ministry of Mines plans action in several areas 
to achieve sustainable development of the Indian raw 
 Manufacturing is confronted with rising 
production costs due to growing demand for miner-
als and increasing world market prices, while falling 
productivity at domestic mines demands intensified 
exploration. Despite these challenges, the Ministry of 
Mines is upbeat about the prospects for the Indian raw 
materials sector, given the country’s large reserves and 
initiated and upcoming regulatory reforms. A scenario 
for 2025 expects that the mining sector will contrib-
ute US$250 billion to GDP, adding 2.5 million addi-
tional jobs in the sector itself and another 13 million 
indirectly. 
 
India (see note 15), p. 7; Keith Campbell, “India Seeks Natural 
Resources in Africa but Recognises Continent’s Development 
Needs,” Mining Weekly, March 25, 2011, 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/india-seeks-natural-
resources-in-africa-but-recognises-the-continents-development-
needs-2011-03-25 (accessed October 10, 2012). 
19  Human Rights Watch, Out of Control. Mining, Regulatory 
Failure, and Human Rights in India, 2012, p. 1, http://www.hrw. 
org/sites/default/files/reports/india0612ForUpload_0.pdf 
(accessed October 10, 2012). 
20  Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd., Exploring India (see note 15), p. 7; 
MoM, Annual Report 2011–12 (see note 16), p. 21; MoM, Unlock-
ing the Potential (see note 1), p. 12. 
21  Human Rights Watch, Out of Control (see note 19); “Stop 
Mining in Naxal-hit Areas: V Kishore Chandra Deo,” The Eco-
nomic Times, June 1, 2012, http://articles.economictimes. 
indiatimes.com/2012-06-01/news/31959103_1_mining-lease-
naxal-hit-areas-district-mineral-foundation (accessed October 
10, 2012). 
22  MoM, Unlocking the Potential (see note 1). 
materials sector. Firstly, the national raw materials 
base is to be expanded and access to foreign sources 
of rare minerals improved. At home, the GSI will col-
laborate with the private sector to collect geophysical 
and geochemical data for up to 30 percent of the coun-
try’s territory over the next five years. To date, only 
X$&	
&%+X&&%&$	&#88+$	&'%%
strategies will be developed together with the Ministry 
of Earth Sciences. GSI’s electronic data systems are 
to be improved significantly, for example to point 
the private sector to investment opportunities. Private-
sector activities will be supported by accelerating 
licensing procedures, improving legal certainty, sim-
plifying license transfer, and creating financial incen-
tives. 
The government will support mining projects of 
Indian companies for raw materials that are scarce in 
India and which therefore have to be acquired from 
abroad. This will involve, for example, cobalt, nickel, 
phosphate, coking coal, and potash. The Ministry of 
Mines is planning to conduct a demand analysis for 
the coming twenty-five years as a basis for selecting 
especially suitable foreign mining sites for these min-
erals. It also proposes establishing a central resource 
planning agency and intends to support the inter-
national activities of private companies through infor-
mation, networks, and easing bureaucracy. Such 
activities are also to be embedded in Indian develop-
ment cooperation. 
Secondly, the Ministry of Mines intends to improve 
interagency cooperation, for example with the Minis-
try of Environment and Forests in the environmental 
approval process, and proposes to enhance the ex-
change of information between federal and state agen-
cies by creating a shared interdisciplinary database. 
These measure should reduce the current five- to 
eight-year processing time to less than two and give 
investors greater planning security. A number of im-
provements have already been introduced in the new 
Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation) Bill 
(MMDR). 
Thirdly, to ease the actual work of extraction on 
the ground, the Indian strategy aims to improve infra-
structure, train skilled workers, and simplify access 
to modern technologies. In order to realize major 
infrastructure mining projects, the Ministry of Mines 
intends to improve communication with the minis-
tries responsible for railroads, shipping, and roads. In 
addition to that, important ports are to be expanded, 
central waterways to be developed and the socio-
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economic conditions of the local population in min-
ing areas to be improved through development funds. 
Concrete steps are planned to overcome the short-
age of skilled labor. The Ministry for Human Resource 
Development is to triple the numbers of mining engi-
neers trained at India’s technical universities in the 
coming ten years, state vocational colleges will offer 
more courses on mining, and training activities in the 
private sector will be promoted. The short-term strat-
egy for promoting modern technologies is to facilitate 
imports, the longer-term one is to develop internation-
al research projects via the Geological Survey (GSI) and 
the Bureau of Mines (IBM). 
Fourthly, the report suggests additional measures 
to secure sustainability and development, for example 
calling for improvements in the IBM’s monitoring 
processes. Companies are to bear a larger share of the 
follow-on costs of mining, and the private sector will 
be encouraged through research funding to develop 
more sustainable mining and processing methods. 
Fifthly, the Ministry of Mines is planning to develop 
an information, communication, and education strat-
egy to address the key actors: industry, NGOs, local 
populations, different levels of government, and the 
international community. The relevance of the mining 
sector for economic growth, employment, and indus-
trial development will be emphasized, while also 
underlining that extraction need not conflict with 
sustainability. 
In light of the scale of planned reforms, a new im-
plementing agency is considered necessary to docu-
ment progress, harmonize regulations, and provide 
the necessary knowhow. 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
National Regulation 
Efforts to liberalize, and modernize the Indian raw 
materials sector started in the 1990s. The National 
Mineral Policy of 1993 provided the basis for these 
reforms and for the first time allowed foreign direct 
investment in exploration and mining. A process of 
decentralization was also initiated. But conditions 
barely improved, and the sector remained inefficient 
and opaque. In 2005, the Planning Commission set up 
the Hoda Committee to draft new reforms. The com-
mittee’s proposals fed into the current reform efforts, 
which were launched with the new National Mineral 
Policy %#23
Consultation began in 2011 on the Mines and Mineral 
(Development and Regulation) Bill,
 
 which seeks to elimi-
nate competitive disadvantages, create an independ-
ent regulatory agency, make the licensing process 
more transparent,25 make the extractive sector more 
sustainable, and give local communities a larger share 
of the proceeds, for example through local develop-
ment funds funded by mining companies.26 Critics 
argue that the changes would increase production 
costs and expand the powers of central government.27 
The proposal was approved by the Cabinet in January 
2012 and subsequently debated by the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Coal and Steel.
Another new development that evolved from the 
Hoda Committee’s proposals is the Sustainable Develop-
ment Framework for Indian Mining (SDF). Following pro-
posals from the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM) and of the International Union for Con-
servation of Nature (IUCN), the SDF recommends intro-
ducing clear guidelines, best-practice standards, and 
reporting rules.
 A decision 
had not been made by the summer of 2012. 
29 Initially serving as guidance for pol-
icymakers and industry, in the long run SDF should 
become a general benchmark ideally controlled by a 
specialized agency at the Ministry of Mines.30
Several measures have been taken to tackle illegal 
mining by improving administrative oversight of the 
 
 
23  MoM, Annual Report 2010–11 (see note 6), p. –*'p-
bell, “India Seeks Natural Resources in Africa” (see note ); 
Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd., Exploring India (see note 15), p. # 
24  MoM, Annual Report 2011–12 (see note 16), p. 1. 
25  “Indiens Wirtschaftswachstum” (see note 3). 
26  “Mines Bill Seeks Holistic Reforms in the Sector: UPA 
Report,” Economic Times, May 22, 2012, http://articles. 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-"%&+" 
1_mining-sector-mines-bill-mining-projects (accessed October 
10, 2012). 
27  Confederation of Indian Industry, Industry Concerned on 
Compensation in MMDR Act, September 30, 2011, http://cii.in/ 
PressreleasesDetail.aspx?enc=yIfQZV%VBUDuYprGl6jl
9OpEqRPH2icTa5DUuMxYvJdqAXToxF5iv0VV$RiMyAZ§ 
r9dkN2+p+Sg== (accessed October 10, 2012); “Naveen Patnaik 
Asks PM to Modify MMDR Bill, 2011,” Indian Express, May 19, 
2012, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/naveen-patnaik-
asks-pm-to-modify-mmdr-bill-2011/951390 (accessed October 
10, 2012). 
28  MoM, Annual Report 2011–12 (see note 16), 1. 
29  MoM and ERM, Sustainable Development Framework (SDF) for 
Indian Mining Sector (New Delhi, November 30, 2011), 6, http:// 
mines.nic.in/writereaddata/filelinks/2155afeb_FINAL%20 
REPORT%20SDF%2029Nov11.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
30  Ibid., pp. 88# 
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sector. For example, expanding the scope of regulation 
to increase transparency of the raw materials proces-
sing chain.31 Coordination between actors such as 
the Ministry of Shipping, the Ministry of Railways, 
the regulatory agencies, the states, and the Bureau 
of Mines has been improved and control mechanisms 
have been reinforced. Federal and state-level commit-
tees supervise implementation of the reforms.32
Up to 50 percent of iron ore is exported (mainly 
to China), and export tariffs have been raised several 
times to secure supplies for Indian demand.
 
33 This 
measure highlights a trend toward resource national-
ism, which has no negative connotations in India. 
India levies a 5 percent import tariff on zinc ores, a 20 
percent export tax on iron ore fines, and a 15 percent 
export tax on iron ore lumps. In July 2011, all mining 
operations in the Bellary region in the state of Karna-
taka were suspended. An import tariff of 3 percent is 
levied on refined copper.35
International Activities 
 
Large and medium-sized Indian raw materials enter-
prises are increasingly active abroad. To date they have 
mainly invested in African countries with large coal 
and copper deposits, although other minerals are also 
coming to the fore.36 But Indian business activities 
are not limited to developing countries, as shown by 
Tata’s acquisition of the Dutch-British steel company 
Corus Group or the purchase of Anglo American’s zinc 
business by the British-Indian Vedanta Resources.37
State-owned enterprises have also begun operating 
abroad, with three principal objectives: initiating tech-
nology transfer, drawing investment to India, and 
acquiring rights to develop foreign deposits.
 

 
31  MoM, Annual Report 2010–11 (see note 
 Memo-
randa of understanding, which the Ministry of Mines 
has concluded with Afghanistan, Colombia, Mali, and 
the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Sas-
6`Q## 
32  MoM, Annual Report 2011–12 (see note 16`Q#88#Q88# 
33  “Indiens Wirtschaftswachstum” (see note 3). 
34  Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd., Exploring India (see note 15), p. 
“Indiens Wirtschaftswachstum” (see note 3). 
35  Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. (BDI), Über-
sicht über bestehende Handels- und Wettbewerbsverzerrungen auf den 
Rohstoffmärkten, unpublished document (Berlin, 2012), p. # 
36  Campbell, “India Seeks Natural Resources in Africa” 
(see note ). 
37  *$	+

&+¸#X%88&	Q·BBC News, October 20, 
2006; Eric Onstad, “Vedanta B=+%$«%
++&+8$	[#
Billion,” Reuters, May 10, 2010; Campbell, “India Seeks Natural 
Resources in Africa” (see note ). 
38  MoM, Annual Report 2011–12 (see note 16), pp. 79ff. 
katchewan, are one central instrument. Another are 
joint working groups, which currently exist with 
Australia, Malawi, Mozambique, Uzbekistan, and the 
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Saskatchewan.39 
There are also bilateral agreements, such as one con-
cluded with Japan in 2012 on the joint development 
of rare earths in India.
In recent years, India has been seeking to present 
itself as a major mining nation on the global stage, for 
example at international conferences.
 

India’s international development record on min-
ing is mixed. On the one hand, it appears more coop-
erative than China and seeks long-term partnerships 
that serve both its own national resource interests and 
the partner’s development efforts. The developmental 
aspect can be seen, for example, in the plan to estab-
lish an India-Africa Diamond Institute in Botswana, 
which dates back to the first India-Africa Summit in 
#
 The goal is to 
keep pace in the competition for exploration projects 
and to attract investors to develop deposits in India. 
 On the other hand, Indian companies are in-
creasingly also criticized for using bribery and corrup-
tion.
The Indian government opposes international 
initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI) on the grounds that they fall 
behind India’s Mines and Mineral (Development and Regu-
lation) Bill. A spokesperson for the Ministry for Oil and 
Gas also said that the initiative was driven by Western 
oil giants that find it difficult to operate in countries 
with poor governance.
 

Evaluation and Outlook 
 
India will be able to provide its industries with a 
multitude of domestic raw materials for the foresee-
 
39  Ibid. 
40  Cecilia Jamasmie, “Japan and India Sign Rare Earth Deal 
to Reduce Dependency on China,” mining.com, May 1, 2012. 
41  MoM, Annual Report 2011–12 (see note 16`Q#8# 
42  Campbell, “India Seeks Natural Resources in Africa” 
(see note ); “India to Set up India-Africa Diamond Institute 
in Botswana,” Indian Express, June 12, 2012, http://www. 
indianexpress.com/news/india-to-set-up-indiaafrica-diamond-
institute-in-botswana/960925 (accessed October 10, 2012). 
43  Naren Karunakaran, “Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative May Help Curb Illegal Mining; India Reluctant to 
Sign Up,” Economic TimesQ>&X		=QQ^""	
&+# 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-02-"%&+" 
1_sashi-mukundan-mining-bp (accessed October 10, 2012). 
44  Ibid. 
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able future. Production of bauxite, alumina, and crude 
steel can be expected to increase as planned projects 
come on stream. India is thus likely to maintain its 
position as an important exporter of raw materials. 
Given the steady growth of the diamond processing 
industry, uncut diamond imports will also continue 
to grow. Because of its enormous potential India will 
continue to be a country that primarily produces and 
processes raw materials.
In light of the importance of state-owned enter-
prises, confusion over responsibilities, and widespread 
corruption,
  
 the Indian government is aiming to 
create a coherent and transparent regulatory system 
to ease the licensing process and attract private invest-
ment. Licensing procedures are to be made more 
transparent, simpler, and faster, FDI are to be facil-
itated, and central agencies such as the Geological 
Survey (GSI) and Bureau of Mines (IBM) need to be 
modernized. But to date almost no private company 
is involved in exploration, which is still mainly con-
ducted by the government-run GSI. The GSI, however, 
is not able to collect comprehensive data giving a clear 
overview of potential and undeveloped deposits. An-
other symptom of inadequate regulation is local 
opposition to mining companies whose projects are 
often connected with clientelism, environmental pol-
lution, and resettlement. Future planning of mining 
projects will therefore take greater account of sustain-
ability, as already seen in the recent Sustainable Develop-
ment Framework for Indian Mining (SDF). This strategic 
report, published in late 2011, draws a fairly compre-
hensive picture of intended reforms.
Indian raw materials policy faces several chal-
lenges. At home, exploration must be improved to 
allow domestic and foreign companies to increase 
production, the often unclear and overlapping respon-
sibilities of central and state governments must be 
harmonized, and local communities must benefit 
more from sectoral development. Internationally, the 
government must support private and state-owned 
 
 
45  Kuo, “India [Advance Release]” (see note 3), p. 11.5. 
46  MoM, Unlocking the Potential (see note 1), p. 11; Vaishnavi 
Naik, “India Presents a Huge Market for Mining Industry,” 
MetaworldQ	QQ^""#'&$	#
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&&	"	"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<&#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2012). 
47  “Stop Mining in Naxal-hit Areas” (see note 21); Kannan 
Kasturi, “Draft Mining Regulation, Mining vs. Communities,” 
indiatogether.org, October 5, 2010, http://www.indiatogether. 
org/2010/oct/law-mining.htm (accessed October 10, 2012). 
48  MoM, Unlocking the Potential (see note 1). 
Indian companies investing abroad in order to secure 
access to rare raw materials in an increasingly con-
tested international market. In both cases, steering 
capacities have to date proven to be rather poor, and 
need to be improved. Reforms will therefore remain 
incremental rather than comprehensive. 
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Indonesia 
Franziska Killiches 
 
Indonesia is endowed with large mineral deposits and 
plays an important role in regional and international 
markets. Its raw materials policy has undergone sig-
nificant changes since the fall of Suharto in #&
biggest challenges for the Indonesian mining industry 
currently ensue from the decentralization process and 
from restrictive measures imposed by the new Law on 
Mineral and Coal Mining (No. 4/2009). The Indonesian gov-
ernment strives to utilize the domestic raw materials 
sector as an engine for economic growth and develop-
ment. At the local level, some mining projects entail 
negative impacts such as pollution, corruption, and 
social tensions. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Indonesia is rich in minerals and metals. In 2010, it 


$%&8$	#&	
&%$8$X%
&	$
$%
4	%`Q#&	
&%$8%	$
$%4	%`Q#
percent $8
$&		$
$%4	%`Q%#&	
&%
of gold production (rank 7).1 The Indonesian raw mate-
rials economy is shaped mainly by the country’s size 
and its geographical nature as an archipelago. Many 
deposits are located in remote areas far from the capi-
tal, Jakarta, making transport and logistics costly and 
giving local authorities great importance for the en-
tire sector. Indonesia currently exploits only part of 
its raw materials reserves. An overall assessment of its 
national mineral resources is still in progress. Explo-
ration of rare earth elements, for example, began only 
recently.2
The entire extractive sector contributes 11.2 per-
cent of GDP (2010).
 
3
 
1  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
 Of that, the energy sector (mainly 
2  Meeting with representatives of GAI, August 9, 2012. 
3  Chin Kuo, “Indonesia [Advance Release],” in USGS, 2010 
Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
February 2012), pp. 12.1–#Q^""'%&	+#++#$<" 
minerals/pubs/country/2010/myb3-2010-id.pdf (accessed 
August 30, 2012). 
coal and natural gas) makes up the largest part, while 
the '%&	%+	=

$%+8$	$%=&	
&%$8
GDP. At the regional and local level, however, the im-
portance of the mineral sector can be far greater. In 
West Papua, for instance, minerals and metals mining 
contributes about 63 percent of regional GDP.5
Non-energy mining products contributed approxi-
mately 16.9 percent of Indonesian exports in 2011,
 Often 
extractive industry is the only source of revenue for 
regional and local governments. 
6 
principally to China, Japan, and the United States, 
which together accounted for 70 percent thereof.7 In 
Q&	'%='$	&%
&4#&	
&%$8$
X=<&`Q%4&	
&%`Q8&		$-%
&4#&	
&%`Q
%
$&	4#&	
&%`8	$'%$%&+# The coun-
try’s geography makes it difficult to properly control 
exports, with nickel exports to China offering a promi-
nent example of the widespread nature of commodity 
smuggling.9
Traditionally, the Indonesian raw materials sector 
has been dominated by large domestic and foreign 
companies, with the latter attracted to invest in the 
underdeveloped resource sector by favorable invest-
'&%
$%$%+%&		$4$`#&
most important foreign companies include Freeport-
McMoRan (gold and copper), Newmont Mining Cor-
poration (gold and copper), and Vale (nickel), which 
have been operating in Indonesia through subsidiaries 
since the mid-1960s. Freeport-McMoRan and Rio Tinto 
operate the world’s second-largest copper and gold 
mine at Grasberg in West Papua. Major domestic com-
 
 
4  Meeting with representatives from IMA, ICEL, and ESDM, 
+"Q# 
5  Cut Dian Augustina, Ehtisham Ahmad, Dhanie Nugroho, 
and Herbert Siagiam, Political Economy of Natural Resource 
Revenue Sharing in Indonesia, Asia Research Center Working 
Paper 55 (London: Asia Research Center, 2012), http://www2. 
lse.ac.uk/asiaResearchCentre/_files/ARCWP55-Agustina 
Ahmad NugrohoSiagian.pdf (accessed August 30, 2012). 
6  Kuo, “Indonesia [Advance Release]” (see note 3). 
7  “Implementation of New Export Rule a Mess: Kadin,” 
Jakarta Post, June 11, 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/ 
news/2012/06/11/implementation-new-mineral-export-rule-a-
mess-kadin.html (accessed August 30, 2012). 
8  BGR Database 2012. 
9  Meetings in Jakarta, August 7–10, 2012. 
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panies include both state-owned and private firms. 
The principal state-owned enterprises are PT Aneka 
Tambang (gold, silver, copper, and nickel), PT Timah 
Tbk (tin), and Krakatau Steel (steel). 
Since the 2000s, the Indonesian raw materials sec-
tor has undergone significant change. Over the past 
decade, domestic and foreign (especially Indian and 
Chinese) small- and medium-size companies have 
increasingly entered the market. This “new” group 
of investors represents a major challenge for the Indo-
nesian authorities, as their business activities are 
often opaque and difficult to regulate. In the course of 
this development, illegal mining by small companies 
and local populations has proliferated.10
The Raw Materials Policy 
 Parts of the 
rural population see small-scale mining as an attrac-
tive way to earn a living. 
Institutional Setting 
The Indonesian mining sector is regulated at the 
national, regional, and local levels. At the national 
level, in 2009 the new Law on Mineral and Coal Mining 
No. 4 of 2009 replaced the old Mining Law (11/1967) of 
1967. Since then, as the parliament has passed no new 
legislation for the raw materials sector, it has been the 
responsibility of the executive to implement the new 
law with government, presidential, and ministerial 
decrees (regulations). Within the executive, the Minis-
try of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), specifi-
cally its Directorate General of Mineral and Coal, is 
in charge of the mining sector. In technical geo-scien-
tific matters, the ESDM is assisted by its subordinate 
authority, the Indonesian Mining Agency (GAI). 
Other relevant national institutions include the 
Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Forestry, 
and the Ministry of Public Works, which all adopt 
policies affecting the raw materials sector. Their in-
fluence is limited, however, as they fail to coordinate 
their policies properly and there is no national strat-
egy to guide their actions.11
 
10  Meeting with representatives of the regional mining 
authority in West Java, August 9, 2012. 
 The Indonesian Invest-
ment Agency (BKPM) regulates incoming FDI and is 
responsible for granting investment permits. At least 
11  Terry OCallaghan, “Patience is a Virtue: Problems of 
Regulatory Governance in the Indonesian Mining Sector,” 
Resources Policy 4`^–25. 
officially, there is no discrimination between foreign 
and domestic companies in the mining sector. 
There are thirty-four regions in Indonesia, subdi-
vided into several hundred districts and 95 cities. All – 
regions, districts, and cities – can adopt their own 
regulations and laws within the scope of their powers, 
although the extent to which they exercise this right 
is not fully known. Regional mining authorities sub-
ordinate to the ESDM advise the regional executives 
and parliaments. In theory, the regions strive to co-
ordinate the mining activities in the districts and 
cities, but in practice their limited resources and lack 
of instruments to sanction lower levels leaves them 
with little influence or control. 
Decentralization Law No. 22 of 1999 expanded the 
political, administrative, and financial autonomy 
of regional and local authorities, and in 2009 they 
acquired important additionally responsibilities in 
the raw materials sector. This shift of responsibilities, 
however, was not accompanied by a strengthening 
of administrative capacities in particular at the local 
level. As a result, few districts and cities have ade-
quately resourced mining authorities, and some have 
none at all. Instead, in the districts and cities the exe-
cutive, especially the regent or mayor, often decides 
unilaterally on resource-related issues and uses its 
power on behalf of special private interests. Typically, 
local resource politics are opaque and accompanied 
by rampant corruption. 
While there is no mandatory consultation process 
for national, regional, and local legislation, various 
interest groups seek to exert influence, in particular 
on the national level. The private sector is represented 
by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try (KADIN), specific mining interests by the Indone-
+%]%%++$
$%4]`Q
+	&	
and 75 associated members.12
 
12  ]&&%	&	&+&%<&+$8]Q+Q# 
 Many mining compa-
nies also have close relations with the Indonesian gov-
ernment and parliament, and patronage and cronyism 
are widespread. Civil society groups and NGOs such as 
the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL), 
the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of 
Violence (KontraS), and the Mining Advocacy Network 
(JATAM) also work on resource-related issues. They 
mostly seek to raise public awareness of environ-
mental and social problems through documentation 
and education, but exert little influence on national 
mining legislation. 
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As a result of the Law No. 4/2009 the raw materials 
sector has gained prominence in the public debate 
in Indonesia and abroad. The public discourse on the 
national level differs from that on the local one. At 
the local level, mining projects often lead to serious 
conflicts (strikes, protests, and violent clashes) 
between the local populations and investors, security 
firms, and mining companies, but also between dif-
ferent population groups.13 However, these local devel-
opments attract only limited national public attention 
and press coverage.
Concepts and Strategies 
 Jakarta sees the mining industry 
primarily as a lucrative economic sector: Companies 
hope to participate in the resource boom, while the 
government wants to use the sector as an engine for 
economic growth and development. 
While there is no official governmental strategy docu-
ment for the raw materials sector, Law No. 4/2009 can 
be read as a national strategy, as it determines long-
term goals without laying down detailed regulations. 
Three overall objectives are identified: (1) implement-
ing Decentralization Law No. 22/1999 in the mining sector; 
(2) promoting economic development by strengthen-
ing and protecting the domestic raw materials sector; 
and (3) maximizing state revenues from the mining 
sector on all administrative levels.  
The economic importance of the raw materials sec-
tor is also acknowledged in the national Masterplan for 
the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Devel-
opment (Masterplan MP3EI) of 2011, which seeks to ex-
pand the economy and accelerate growth by support-
ing investment in twenty-two key industries in six 
economic corridors.15
 
13  In 2011 alone, KontraS documented around two hun-
dred violent conflicts related to mining, palm oil, and 
forestry projects in Indonesia. Meeting with representatives 
$8¬$%	Q+Q# 
 Of the twenty-two sectors, four 
are directly related to mineral mining (bauxite, cop-
per, nickel, steel). The Masterplan acknowledges the 
14  Prominent cases include the Lapindo mudflow disaster 
of 2006 and the death of two protesters at the port of Sape in 
December 2012. In particular the human rights abuses and 
environmental destruction caused by mining in West Papua 
have gained international media coverage. 
15  Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, Masterplan: 
Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 
2011–2025 (Jakarta, 2011), http://www.ekon.go.id/media/ 
filemanager/2011/05/27/p/d/pdf_mp3ei.pdf (accessed August 
30, 2012). 
economic corridors of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, 
and West Papua/Moluccas as particularly important 
for mineral and metal production. Infrastructure 
projects planned under MP3EI will improve the con-
nection of some of the more remote mining areas to 
the domestic economy.16 The largest single project is 
the expansion of an underground mining project by 
PT Freeport Indonesia in the West Papua/Moluccas 
economic corridor.17
Policy Measures and Instruments 
 
Most of the policy measures and instruments affecting 
the mining industry are comparatively new, intro-
duced only after the adoption of Law No. 4/2009. A final 
assessment will only be possible in several years time. 
The biggest challenges for the Indonesian mining 
industry currently result from the implementation 
of the decentralization process and from restrictive 
measures imposed by Law No. 4/2009. 
Decentralization 
Two laws – 22/1999 and 25/1999 – initiated the process 
of decentralizing power in Indonesia, while Law 
No. 4/2009 applied the process to the mining sector. 
Through this legislation, the government sought to 
break with the centralist tradition of the Suharto 
regime and strengthen the political, administrative, 
and financial authority of the regions, districts, and 
cities.
 
16  Necip Bagoglu, “Indonesien treibt Industrie- und Infra-
strukturprojekte voran,” GTAI, April 27, 2012, http://www. 
#&""!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'
channel=premium_channel_gtai_1 (accessed August 30, 
2012). 
 To this day, however, decentralization has 
produced many negative developments, mainly at 
the local level (districts and cities), that pose great 
challenges to all involved in mining. For example, 
it opened the door to corruption, abuse of power, 
and patronage in the awarding of mining conces-
sions. Whereas previously, mining concessions were 
17  ¡%+<'X$$%Q$<&	%'&%$%

Projects Worth Rp 536 Trillion This Year,” Jakarta Post, March 
QQ^""#&³	$+#
$'"%&+"""" 
govt-launch--projects-worth-rp-536-trillion-year.html 
(accessed August 30, 2012). 
18  Marco Bünte, “Dezentralisierung in Indonesien: Teil 1: 
Initiation und Inhalt,” Südostasien aktuell, November 2003, 
pp. 565–79, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/openaccess/ 
suedostasienaktuell/2003_6/giga_soa_2003_6_buente.pdf 
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awarded in the form of contracts between central 
government and the mining company (mining 
authorization, MA, or contract of work, CoW), now 
mining licenses (mostly mining business licenses, 
IUDs) can be awarded by all levels of government, 
following the subsidiarity principle. 
Due to weakness of local institutions and the 
powerful position of executives in the districts and 
cities, this transformation has led to a de facto com-
mercialization of authority at the local level, with 
local elites using the licensing process to finance their 
“kingdom of personal interests.”19 This resulted in a 
virtual sellout of locally available mining licenses in 
the 2000s. While 152 mining contracts (CoWs) were 
concluded during the Suharto era, the regions, dis-
tricts, and cities have already issued more than 10,000 
mining licenses (IUDs) in the last decade. Many of 
these licenses overlap or even duplicate, generating 
legal uncertainty across the entire mining sector.20 
Decentralization also causes problems in environ-
mental and social protection. Under the subsidiarity 
principle, the regions, districts, and cities are 
responsible for mining oversight, but in reality – 
particularly at the local level (districts and cities) – are 
not capable. As a consequence, many small and 
medium-sized mining projects lack any kind of 
government oversight.21
The Law on Mineral and Coal Mining No. 
 
Law No. 4/2009 fundamentally changed the legal frame-
work of the Indonesian raw materials sector.
4/2009 
22
 
19  Political elites wish to refinance their expenses for local 
election campaigns by awarding mining licenses in their 
territory. Sometimes political elites are themselves involved 
in mining or security businesses and interested foremost in 
maximizing their own profits. Interviews with representa-
<&+$8\]%¬$%	Q+"Q# 
 The 
law and its regulations feature two particularly note-
worthy aspects for the Indonesian mining industry. 
First, the new mining law limits foreign ownership in 
'%&+$'''$8&	
&%8&	&&%
year of production. Second, the law bans the export of 
unrefined metals (such as bauxite, copper, gold, iron, 
%
&Q%%`8	$'Q	&§	%'%%
$'a-
20  Günter Tiess and Sugeng Mujiyanto, Mineral Resources 
Policies and Governance in Indonesia, http://www.minpol.com/ 
Aachen_MP-Indonesia.pdf (accessed August 30, 2012). 
21  Discussions with representatives of ICEL, August 7, 2012. 
22  Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 4 of 2009 Concerning 
Mineral and Coal Mining (Jakarta, 2009), http://news. 
mitraismining.com/Link/UU--2009-Minerba-Englishversion. 
pdf (accessed August 30, 2012). 
nies to process minerals before export. The Indonesian 
government hopes this measure will increase the local 
value added and strengthen the domestic processing 
industry. As the construction of smelters and refin-
eries is associated with large capital investments and 
long-term planning, the Ministry of Energy and Min-
eral Resources (ESDM) has adopted an interim solution 
to allow exports of unprocessed raw materials after 
#&clean and clear” status will allow a com-
pany to continue exporting unprocessed minerals if 
it can demonstrate that there is no overlap of its 
licenses, that it fulfils all its tax obligations, and that 
it has concrete plans to build smelters and refineries 
%%$%&+#&]%+	=	&$	+Q$8&
10,250 IUP holders have achieved “clean and clear” 
status.23 To prevent excessive exporting of unproc-
&++&	'&	+X&8$	&&&%&Q&
government imposed export quotas on the most 
important Indonesian mineral products in summer 
2012.
While some observers interpret the Law No. 4/2009 
as a sign of rising resource nationalism,
 
25 this judg-
ment should not be passed too hastily. On the one 
hand many of the measures represent more personal 
interests of the elites rather than nationalistic 
tendencies,26 and on the other the government has 
repeatedly shown that it is willing to be flexible about 
the strict regulations and work with the mining indus-
try to find pragmatic solutions. There are no indica-
tions of this changing. Increasingly nationalist rheto-
ric on raw materials can be attributed largely to the 
upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in 
#27
 
23  Rabby Pramudatama, “Jakarta Should Guide Governors 
on Mining: IMA,” Jakarta Post, August 21, 2012, http://www. 
&³	$+#
$'"%&+""""³	-should-guide-
governors-mining-ima.html (accessed August 30, 2012). 
 Overall, the current mining legislation should 
24  “Editorial: Revisiting the Mining Law,” Jakarta Post, August 
QQ^""#&³	$+#
$'"%&+"""" 
editorial-revisiting-mining-law.html (accessed August 30, 
2012). 
25  Michael Buehler, “Resource Nationalism Clouds Indone-
sia’s Economic Prospects,” thediplomat.com, September 7, 2012, 
http://thediplomat.com/asean-beat/2012/09/07/resource-
nationalism-clouds-indonesias-economic-prospects/ (accessed 
September 10, 2012). 
26  Rizal Ramli, “Insight: It’s All about Rent Seeking, Not 
Nationalism,” Jakarta Post, July 6, 2012, http://www. 
thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/06/insight-it-s-all-about-
rent-seeking-not-nationalism.html (accessed August 20, 2012). 
27   	
&&Q&&
$%88&
$%%$%&+¨+
Mining Law,” Jakarta Globe, September 11, 2012, http://www. 
thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/the--election-effect-on-
Indonesia 
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be interpreted not as resource nationalism but as an 
expression of the growing national confidence of 
an expanding regional and international economic 
power. 
Fiscal Policy 
The most important duties to be paid in the mining 
sector are royalties, dead rents, and corporate taxes. 
Revenues are shared between central government 
(20 percent), the regions (16 percent), and local author-
&+4&	
&%`#29 In 1999 regional and local govern-
ments gained the right to levy their own taxes and 
fees. In summer 2012 the government imposed an 
export tax of 20 percent on 65 minerals and metals, 
including antimony, bauxite, chromium, copper, gold, 
iron ore, iron sand, lead, manganese, molybdenum, 
nickel, platinum, silver, and tin.30
Stockpiling, Research Funding, and Recycling 
 
The Indonesian government neither stockpiles critical 
raw materials nor supports Indonesian companies in 
mining projects at home or abroad. There is no explic-
it strategy document dealing specifically with sectoral 
research and development or recycling. For several 
years, however, the number of university courses on 
geology and mining engineering has been increas-
ing.31
Environmental and Social Regulation 
 
There is no strategy or overarching vision for envi-
ronmental and social protection specifically geared 
toward the mining sector. Important general legis-
lation includes the Environmental Law 32/2009 and the 
Company Law 40/2007. According to the latter, all com-
panies operating in Indonesia are required to comply 
with the principles of corporate social responsibility.32
 
indonesias-mining-"4

&++&&&'X&	Q`# 
 
In practice, however, vague wording and lack of detail 
28  Dezi Kirana and Robert Reid, “Indonesia,” in Mining 2011, 
ed. Michael Bourassa and John Turner (London, 2011),  
#–# 
29  Augustina, Ahmad, Nugroho, and Siagiam, Political Econ-
omy (see note 5), 5. 
30  Necip Bagoglu, “Indonesien besteuert Export von Metall-
erzen,” GTAIQ]=QQ^""##&"" 
!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'4

&++&
August 30, 2012). 
31  Interviews with representatives of GAI, August 10, 2012. 
32  PwC, Mining in Indonesia: Investment and Taxation Guide 
(Jakarta, 2012), http://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/ 
assets/Mining-Investment-and-Taxation-Guide-2012.pdf 
(accessed August 30, 2012). 
combined with poor implementation regulations 
render them toothless. Economic interests often pre-
vail over social and environmental concerns, resulting 
in frequent mining accidents and excessive pollution. 
Indonesia became an official candidate for EITI mem-
bership in 2010, with civil society groups in particular 
supporting the transparency initiative.33 The Ministry 
of Economics is responsible for EITI obligations. But 
to date the transparency efforts seem not to have had 
any noticeable effect on the mining sector, and most 
Indonesian mining companies have failed to comply 
with their obligations for the EITI initial implementa-
tion phase. Moreover, EITI is largely unknown in 
many state institutions.35
Trade Policy 
 
As a leading member of ASEAN, Indonesia’s trade 
policy is aligned on enhancing regional economic 
integration. In the framework of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), Indonesia has free trade agreements 
with Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and 
South Korea.36 Especially China and Japan hope to 
improve their access to the raw materials and markets 
of ASEAN members by concluding free trade agree-
ments to dismantle tariffs and facilitate foreign direct 
investment. Although Indonesia’s overall trade bal-
ance remains positive, in particular the free trade 
agreement with China has been severely criticized.37
 
33  Publish What You Pay, a network of forty Indonesian 
NGOs, is of particular relevance. 
 
As Indonesia has been flooded with cheap Chinese 
goods as a result of the free trade agreement, large 
parts of the Indonesian population are skeptical 
about further liberalization of foreign trade. 
34  “NGOs Question Indonesia’s Commitment to Extractive 
Industries’ Transparency,” Jakarta Globe, April 19, 2012, http:// 
www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/ngos-question-indonesias-
commitment-to-extractive-industries-	%+	&%
="
(accessed August 30, 2012). 
35  %&	<&+	&	&+&%<&+$8]%Q"
August 2012. 
36  Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO, Indonesien (Bern, 
2012), http://www.seco-cooperation.admin.ch/laender/ 
05""%&#'%&$%$NHzLpZeg7t, 
lnp6I0NTUZ%
=Z%Z2qZpnO2Yuq2Z6gpJCDd3x, 
hGym162epYbg2c_JjKbNoKSn6A (accessed August 30, 2012). 
37  Meeting with the delegation of the European Union in 
Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN, +Q# 
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Evaluation and Outlook 
The Indonesian raw materials industry is currently 
undergoing the greatest change in its history. Law 
No. 4/2009 sets ambitious goals for future develop-
ments. Its positive aspects include updating the legal 
framework, formulating strategic goals for raw mate-
rials policy, and raising public awareness. But poor 
implementation of the legal framework and weak 
institutions especially at the local level produce in-
consistency and opacity, whose negative consequences 
(insecure investment climate, weak law enforcement, 
increasing social tensions, and heavy environmental 
pollution) prevent the raw materials sector from 
becoming an engine for economic and social develop-
ment in Indonesia. 
Given its good economic performance and rich 
resources, Indonesia is likely to continue to play an 
important role in regional and global raw materials 
markets.
Given the domestic challenges, it is likely that 
Indonesia will remain a cautious player on the inter-
national stage.
 But if the mining sector is to drive sustain-
able development, important political problems need 
to be overcome. These include rampant corruption, 
cronyism, weak local institutions, and lack of legal 
certainty and policy transparency at all political levels. 
It remains to be seen whether these challenges will be 
mastered. 
39
 
 The government will concentrate on 
implementing the new mining laws and regulations, 
but has little appetite for opening markets and liber-
alizing trade after its experience with the free trade 
agreement with China. Internationally, Indonesia is 
primarily interested in investment and technology 
transfer, specifically processing and environmental 
technologies. 
 
 
38  Vikram Nehru, “Indonesian Manufacturing and the 
Middle-income Trap,” eastasiaforum.org, August 7, 2012, 
^""#&++8$	'#$	""""%$%&+%-
manufacturing-and-the-middle-income-trap/ (accessed 
August 30, 2012). 
39  Howard Loewen and Hanns Günther Hilpert, Indonesien 
als Partner deutscher Außenpolitik, SWP-Studie 6/2012 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2012), http:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/ 
2012_S06_lwn_hlp.pdf (accessed August 30, 2012). 
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Italy 
Malte Paolo Benjamins and Hanns Günther Hilpert 
 
Apart from certain industrial rocks and minerals, 
Italy is poor in natural resources, and relies mainly 
on imports to meet its industrial demand for metals. 
While there is as yet no official resources strategy, 
institutional changes in recent years demonstrate that 
the subject of metals and minerals is gaining in im-
portance. One noteworthy measure is the commodity 
partnership with Afghanistan. Despite these advances, 
Italy has not made any extra effort in multilateral 
forums to promote international cooperation in secur-
ing raw materials supplies. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Italy is a relatively resource-poor country, with the 
exception of certain industrial minerals. Although 
extraction of metal ores ceased with the closure of 
the last mines in Tuscany in the 1990s, Italy is a major 
producer of minerals such as feldspar, marble, clay, 
lime, gypsum, pumice, sand, and gravel.1 Feldspar has 
the greatest international importance, with a share of 
21.5 percent of world production.2
Italy has the second-largest industrial manufactur-
ing sector in Europe (after Germany) and is Europe’s 
second-largest producer and consumer of steel. The 
leading Italian industries of iron and steel, aluminum, 
metal processing, mechanical engineering, vehicle 
manufacturing, and chemicals depend heavily on im-
ports of energy and non-energy raw materials.
 
3
 
1  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
 The 
domestic availability of industrial minerals is a signifi-
cant advantage for the ceramics industry, but to pro-
duce tiles, sanitary wares and porcelain Italy needs 
2  “Feldspar,” in USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2011 
4&+$%Q`Q#Q^""'%&	+#++#$<"'%&	+"X+" 
commodity/feldspar/mcs-2011-felds.pdf (accessed May 22, 
2012). 
3  Alberto Alexander Perez, “Italy [Advance Release],” in USGS, 
2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
July 2012), p. 23.1, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ 
country/2010/myb3-2010-it.pdf (accessed September 20, 2012). 
imported clay, barite, fluorite, kaolin, talc, and 
wollastonite.
In 2010 Italian raw materials production from im-
$	&$	&+%	&
=
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lion tonnes of aluminum, 1Q$%%&+$8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crude steel, and 100,000 tonnes of zinc.
 
5
Italy’s primary production sector is medium-sized. 
In addition to the major players – Alcoa Italia (alu-
mina and aluminum), KME (copper), Riva (steel), and 
Italcementi and Buzzi (cement) –, there are many 
small and medium-sized enterprises focusing on spe-
cific market segments in primary production, proces-
sing, and trade. Some of these are highly competitive 
in world markets. At the same time, foreign compa-
nies such as Alcoa, Glencore, Rio Tinto, and Solvay 
have invested in Italy. 
 
Institutional Setting 
Institutions on three levels – national, regional, and 
business – influence Italy’s mining policies and law. 
The most important actor at the national level is the 
Ministry of Economic Development (Ministero dello 
Sviluppo Economico, MSE). As the highest state 
authority on mining issues, it takes charge of bilateral 
talks, develops strategies for securing Italy’s supply of 
energy and non-energy raw materials, and exerts oper-
ational influence on the mining sector through its 
directorates and offices. 
Administrative responsibility within the Ministry 
rests with the General Directorate of Mineral and 
Energy Resources (Direzione Generale per le risorse 
minerarie ed energetiche, DGRME), a division of the 
Department of Energy (Dipartimento per l’energia). 
The activities of the DGRME include: (1) preparing 
strategic priorities and development plans; (2) plan-
ning, authorizing, executing, and monitoring explo-
 
4  Ian Wilson, Minerals of Italy: Built to Last, August 2007, 
http://www.venetamineraria.com/data/recensioni/ITALY%20 
INDUSTRIAL%20%20IAN%20WILSON.pdf (accessed September 
15, 2010). 
5  Perez, “Italy [Advance Release]” (see note 3), p. ## 
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ration and production operations; (3) developing safe-
ty standards and technical guidelines for production, 
	%+$	Q%+$	&%4`&%+	%&
$'i-
bility of all legislative measures.6
Within the DGRME, the National Mining Office for 
Hydrocarbons and Georesources (Ufficio Nazionale 
per gli minerario Idrocarburi e le georisorse, UNMIG) 
is responsible for operational matters. UNMIG was 
'&	&%$&]%%%$
$%+++$8
five units: the center, three regional offices (Bologna, 
Rome, Naples), and a research laboratory. Most of the 
day-to-day work is done in the regional offices. UNMIG 
carries out investigations prior to awarding mining 
licenses, monitors technical and administrative 
aspects of exploration and production after a license 
has been awarded, collects and publishes data relevant 
to the mining sector, conducts studies, evaluations, 
and surveys on safety, monitors compliance with pol-
icies and legislation, and conducts an extensive pro-
gram of research.
 In addition, the 
Directorate supports the regions in carrying out their 
statutory duties and offers technical assistance. 
7
To provide a platform for those interested in explo-
ration and production and to promote research in the 
resources sector, MSE joined with other government 
agencies, research institutions, companies, and indus-
try associations to found the Raw Material Laboratory 
(Laboratorio Materie Prime, LAB-MP).
 

The laboratory is responsible for: (1) research on 
technologies for the recycling and conservation of 
mineral resources; (2) support for national raw mate-
rials supply planning; (3) support for regional policies 

$%
&	%%	&+$	
&&	
$%4`	$'$%	$-
grams to reduce wastage of raw materials; (5) reclaim-
ing abandoned mines for tourism, cultural, and other 
purposes; (6) identifying nationally strategic minerals 
in line with EU policy; and (7) promoting mine safety. 
 LAB-MP is a 
critical tool of mineral policy, in particular helping 
to expand knowledge in the resources sector. 
 
6  Ministero Dello Sviluppo Economico (MSE), Direzione 
generale per le risorse minerarie ed energetiche, http://unmig. 
sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/dgrme/direzione/struttura/ 
struttura.htm (accessed September 26, 2012). 
7  MSE, Ufficio nazionale minerario per gli idrocarburi e le 
georisorse, http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/dgrme/ 
direzione/unmig.asp (accessed September 26, 2012). 
8  LAB MP, Chi Siamo, http://www.lab-mp.criet.unimib.it/ 
default.asp?idPagine=732&funzione=&lingua=ING (accessed 
September 26, 2012); MSE, Minerali solidi: Laboratiro materie 
prime, http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/ 
miniere/laboratorio.asp (accessed September 26, 2012). 
Italy’s mining industry is represented by the Italian 
Petroleum and Mining Industrial Association (Asso-
mineraria), which is a member of the employers’ 
organization Confindustria. The eighteen companies 
that produce or prospect industrial minerals form 
Settore Minerario, the smallest section within Asso-
mineraria. Assomineraria’s remit is to represent min-
ing interests to politics and the public, for example 
seeking to promote its members’ interests by analyz-
ing, monitoring, and proposing legislative initiatives 
on the regional, national, and EU levels. Assominer-
aria also provides support to members entering new 
markets. Its activities take the form of working 
groups, conferences and seminars, monthly news-
letters, and an in-house information system called 
Sesamo.9
The mining industry falls under the scope of con-
current legislation. The Italian mining industry was 
first regulated in 1927 under Royal Decree 1443, which 
stipulated that mineral resources on Italian territory 
were owned by the government. Presidential Decree 
No. 616 $8\=QQ<&&&%=	&$%+-
ministrative powers for the first time. Legislative Decree 
112 $8]	
QQ	&&+&<+$%$8 powers 
between Rome and the regions.
 
10
Concepts and Strategies 
 Under the latter, 
the national government is empowered only to pass 
framework-setting legislation to: (1) establish a nation-
al resources strategy (including associated programs); 
(2) set maximum ceilings for royalties and fees and 
minimum standards for environmental protection, 
operational safety, and occupational health and safe-
ty; and (3) regulate the offshore sector. The regions 
have the right to pass mining laws and regulations 
within this framework and are ultimately responsible 
for regulating mining companies operating in Italy’s 
regions, provinces, and municipalities. 
Neither for energy nor the minerals sector does Italy 
possess an official strategy, a deficiency viewed as a 
structural weakness in both Rome and Brussels.11
 
9  Assomineraria, Chi Siamo, http://www.assomineraria.org/ 
chisiamo/index.php (accessed September 26, 2012). 
 The 
10  MSE, Leggi e decreti legislativi: Decreto Legislativo 31 marzo 1998, 
n. 112, http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/norme/ 
#'4

&+sed September 26, 2012). 
11  European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, 
Member States Competitiveness Performance and Policies: Reinforcing 
Competitiveness (Brussels, 2011), pp. –10, http://ec.europa. 
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Ministry of Economic Development (MSE) has repeat-
edly promised to publish a resource strategy – again 
in 2012 – but has, so far, failed to deliver. 
The establishment of the resource laboratory LAB-
MP can be regarded as a pragmatic substitute for an 
official strategy. In particular, the lack of systematic 
data on domestic production was cited as a reason to 
establish LAB-MP. Incompatibilities between standards 
used by local units responsible for data collection 
and analysis result in problems with aggregation and 
harmonization. LAB-MP highlights a gap between the 
local and the central level and identifies eliminating 
bureaucratic bottlenecks as an important goal. So it is 
not surprising that compiling reliable data on domes-
tic production is an important short-term goal. Other 
projects planned by LAB-MP include: (1) analyzing 
domestic production of minerals; (2) identifying stra-
tegic and critical raw materials; (3) simplifying the 
administrative processes for the approval of mining 

<&+4`%=zing the security of supply of min-
eral resources; (5) ensuring the health and safety of 
mining workers; (6) initiating and implementing a 
commodity partnership with Afghanistan; and (7) im-
proving efficiency in the use of raw materials. An eco-
nomic analysis of the Italian mining sector has already 
been concluded.12
Measures and Instruments 
 
Resource Partnership with Afghanistan 
On April 12, 2011, the Italian Ministry of Economic 
Development and the Afghan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs finalized a cooperation agreement for miner-
als and hydrocarbons.13
 
eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/industrial-
policy/files/ms_comp_report_2011_en.pdf (accessed Septem-
ber 26, 2012). 
 One of the goals is to foster 
Italian private-sector investment in the Afghan mining 
sector. Italy also hopes to support exploration, in par-
ticular for marble, by creating incentives for Italian 
12  LAB MP, La produzione nazionale di minerali di prima e seconda 
categoria, http://www.lab-mp.criet.unimib.it/default.asp? 
%&8%$%&<$
&
$4

&++&eptember 
26, 2012). 
13  MSE, Memorandum of Understanding on the Promotion 
of Economic Cooperation Between the Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Italian Republic and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April 12, 
2011, http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/ 
internazionale/afghanistan/accordo.afghanistan.pdf (accessed 
September 26, 2012). 
companies, and to strengthen the Afghan mining 
sector by training geologists and mining engineers 
and setting up a geoinformation system. Afghanistan 
is responsible for providing an acceptable investment 
climate and ensuring security for Italian companies 
on the ground. Bilateral cooperation will be imple-
mented through contracts between private companies 
and government institutions. 
One particular concern of the agreement is to sup-
port the marble industry in the western province of 
Herat. With the help of the Italian Development Minis-
try and private actors, a service center offering train-
ing, education programs, and technical assistance is 
to be created there. Precious and semi-precious stones 
and cement are also mentioned in the agreement. 
Initially, preparatory studies of the possibilities for 
encouraging investment in the Afghan cement 
industry and sectoral cooperation between the two 
countries are to be conducted. 
The agreement with Afghanistan could become a 
model for further agreements. On September 20, 2011, 
the Italian Foreign Ministry finalized a framework 
agreement with Mongolia, identifying mining as one 
of three particularly important sectors. Italy will pro-
vide technology, technical expertise, and equipment 
in return for access to the country’s mining sector, in 
particular its rare earths. 
Government-Financed Research Programs 
Non-energy resource research is conducted by two 
Italian institutions. The first, LAB-MP, has already been 
mentioned. The Associazione Nazionale Ingegneri 
Minerari (ANIM), which is part of LAB-MP, concerns 
itself with the environmental aspects of mining and 
problems that can occur in production and processing 
of minerals.15 The second, CRIET (Centro di Ricerca 
Interuniversitario in Economia del Territorio), is a con-
sortium of ten universities that examines both energy 
and mineral resources and is often commissioned by 
public institutions to do research.16
 
14  MSE, Minerali solidi: Laboratiro materie prime, http:// 
unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/miniere/ 
laboratorio.asp (accessed September 26, 2012). 
 
15  Associazione Nazionale Ingegneri Minerari (ANIM), 
Materie prime, http://www.anim-minerari.it/?cat=30 (accessed 
September 26, 2012); ANIM, Chi Siamo, http://www.anim-
minerari.it/?page_id=3 (accessed September 26, 2012). 
16  Centro di Ricerca Interuniversitario in Economia del Terri-
torio (CRIET), SOSE – Rapporti di Monitoraggio Settoriali, http:// 
#
	&#%'X#"&8#+%&8%$%& 
voce&cod=36 (accessed October 5, 2012); CRIET, Chi Siamo, 
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Stockpiling 
Unlike natural gas, Italy does not stockpile mineral 
resources.17
Government Guarantees and Insurance 
 
The public insurer SACE supports Italian companies 
operating abroad, insuring economic and political 
risks of export and foreign direct investment, and 
providing credit guarantees for major infrastructure 
and industrial projects. Mining and metallurgy are 
not, however, the focus of SACE’s business activities.
International Cooperation and Resources Governance 
 
Italy is a stakeholder in EITI,19 which it supports politi-
cally, financially, and through the dissemination of 
technical information,20 and supports the efforts of 
&o tackle corruption in the commodity mar-
kets. In the International Copper Study Group (ICSG), 
the International Nickel Study Group (INSG), and the 
International Lead and Zinc Study Group (ILZSG), Italy 
is represented by the DGRME.21
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
Although no official resource strategy has yet been 
published, it is evident that the issue of security of 
supply is growing in prominence. The establishment 
of LAB-MP was designed to initiate activities similar 
to those already implemented in many other G20 
 
http://www.criet.unimib.it/Default.asp?idPagine=679& 
funzione=&cod=36 (accessed October 5, 2012). 
17  For information on natural gas, see Ministero Dello 
Sviluppo Economico, Stoccaggio di gas naturale: Elenco 
dei pozzi per lo stoccaggio di gas naturale, http://unmig. 
sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/stoccaggio/pozzi/ 
pozzi.asp (accessed September 20, 2012). 
18  SACE, Solutions to Insure Your Business, http://www.sace.it/ 
GruppoSACE/content/en/consumer/products/products_guide/ 
index.html (accessed October 5, 2012). 
19  EITI, Stakeholders, http://eiti.org/supporters/countries 
(accessed September 26, 2012). 
20  MSE, Attività internazionali della direzione generale RME:  
EITI – Extractive Industries Trasparency Initiative, http:// 
unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/internazionale/ 
eiti.asp (accessed September 26, 2012). 
21  MSE, Area internazionale: Attività internazionali della 
direzione generale RME, http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico. 
gov.it/unmig/internazionale/gruppidistudio.asp (accessed 
September 26, 2012); MSE, Attività internazionali della 
direzione generale RME: Gruppi di Studio sui Metalli non Ferrosi, 
http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/internazionale/ 
nonferrosi.asp (accessed September 26, 2012). 
countries, including strengthening the domestic 
mining sector, improving international cooperation, 
and identifying critical or strategic resources. While 
Italy has signed a resource partnership with Afghani-
stan, it remains to be seen what specific projects this 
will actually produce. Other fields such as resource 
efficiency and recycling are not particularly developed 
in Italy. Nor does Italy participate actively in interna-
tional resource governance, relying instead largely on 
the work of the EU. 
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Japan 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
 
As the world’s third-largest industrial nation, Japan 
possesses a large and sophisticated mineral processing 
sector. Metal and mineral deposits are scarce in Japan, 
leaving it strongly dependent on reliable imports and 
encouraging an active policy of security of supply. 
The strengths of Japanese policy are its conceptually 
guiding and coordinating Ministry for Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI), the strong presence of Japanese 
companies in international markets, and the large 
number of activities supporting the sector. In inter-
national raw materials governance Japan has been 
focusing on functioning markets and is open to polit-
ical initiatives. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
Japan has a poor raw materials base with considerable 
reserves of industrial minerals like bentonite, dolo-
mite, feldspar, iodine, limestone, and silica glass, but 
hardly any metals in quantities worth extracting. Its 
deposits of non-ferrous metals like lead, silver, and 
zinc are too small, although one small gold mine oper-
ates on the southern island of Kyushu.1 Japan has a 
significant share of global production of only a few 
	$
+^&	'4#&	
&%`Q
''4#&	-
cent), gallium (7.1 percent), sulfur (6.1 percent), talc 
4#&	
&%`QX+'4#&	
&%`QX&%$%&4#&	-
cent), feldspar (3.0 percent), and gold (0.3 percent). 
With 0.2 percent of global production of non-energy 
raw materials (2010, by volume), Japan can be con-
sidered one of the resource-poor countries of the G20.2
The mining sector is correspondingly insignificant 
in the Japanese economy. According to the Japan Min-
ing Report 2011, the sector will contribute less than 0.1 
 
 
1  John C. Wu, “The Mineral Industry of Japan,” in USGS, 
2004 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
`Q# 12.1; 12.23, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/ 
X+"
$%	=""³'=X#84

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
2  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
percent of GDP through 2015 (including coal).3 On 
the other hand, processing and refining is a distinct-
ly relevant economic factor. Globally, Japan is the 
second-largest producer and exporter of steel after 
China. With high shares in the consumption of alu-
'%'4#&	
&%`Q
$&	4#&	
&%`Q&4#
percent), nickel (10.2 percent), steel (5.0 percent), tin 
(9.6 percent), %%
4#&	
&%`Q\%s also one 
of the leading consumers of industrial materials after 
China and the United States.
The Japanese economy has a broad-based and 
highly diversified industrial structure and distinctive 
competitive strengths in steel, non-ferrous metals, 
automotive manufacturing, electrical engineering, 
electronics, information and telecommunications 
technologies, plastics, and chemicals. The recent shift 
towards information and environmental technologies 
has also significantly modified the demand for metals. 
While the demand for industrial and platinum group 
metals has fallen, the need for rare metals, in particu-
lar lithium, and rare earth elements has risen sharply. 
 
Given its great demand for industrial raw materials 
and lack of a domestic resource base, Japan has always 
been dependent on reliable imports. Only in the case 
of sulfur is it self-sufficient. With certain metals, de-
pendency is particularly high and concentrated on a 
single source, as in the case of rare earths and tung-
sten from China. 
The Japanese steel industry has sophisticated inte-
grated steelworks, and eight large private-sector enter-
prises have successfully specialized in smelting and 
processing non-ferrous metals. Mitsubishi Materials, 
Mitsui Mining and Smelting, Sumitomo Metal Mining, 
JX Nippon Mining and Metals, Nittetsu Mining, Dowa 
Mining, Furukawa, and Toho Zinc are capable of 
supplying the demanding Japanese industries with 
 
3  Business Monitor International, Japan Mining Report 2011 
(abstract), May 5, 2011, http://www.marketresearch.com/ 
Business-Monitor-International-<"\%-Mining-"
(accessed October 10, 2012). 
4  BGR and DERA, Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010, 
DERA Rohstoffinformationen (Hannover, December 2011), 
pp. 117–36, http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/ 
Produkte/Downloads/DERA_Rohstoffinformationen/ 
rohstoffinformationen-07.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
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the high-quality products they require. These com-
panies are global leaders in metal processing, export a 
large part of their production to Asian neighbors and 
operate production facilities around the globe. 
Japan’s raw materials trade and overseas resource 
development have been formed by a genuinely Japa-
nese phenomenon: the General Trading House (Sôgô 
Shôsha).5 Since the beginning of industrialization at 
the end of the nineteenth century, the Sôgô Shôsha 
have enabled domestic industry to gain access to for-
eign export markets, foreign resource supplies, and 
modern technology. The Sôgô Shôsha have always 
been much more than simply traders acting on behalf 
of their domestic and foreign clients, also offering 
complementary services like finance, insurance, trans-
port, logistics, market research, and marketing. Since 
the 1970s, the Sôgô Shôsha have developed raw mate-
rials deposits internationally and established com-
petitive strength in financing, project coordination, 
and project development. For foreign raw materials 
companies and resource-rich countries alike, the Sôgô 
Shôsha are an attractive partner because of their 
financial strength, their project development know-
how, and their “neutrality”. They neither pursue any 
hidden political agenda nor strive for oligopolistic 
market power. The six leading Sôgô Shôsha active in 
the resource business are Mitsubishi Shôji, Mitsui 
Bussan, Itôchu, Marubeni, Sumitomo Shôji, and Sojitz, 
which have investments in around fifty mining pro-
jects and companies, mainly in North America, Latin 
America, Australia, Southeast Asia, and southern 
Africa.6
In a 2009 strategy paper, METI identified rare 
and critical metals on the basis of criteria including 
market conditions, market trends, concentration of 
deposits, production, trade, potential for recycling, 
substitution, and reduction, and technology trends. 
The list comprises the seventeen rare earth elements 
plus thirty other metals: antimony, barium, beryl-
lium, bismuth, boron, cesium, chromium, cobalt, gal-
lium, germanium, hafnium, indium, lithium, manga-
 
 
5  For an overview see Harald Dolles and Hanns Günther 
Hilpert, “Sôgô Shôsha im Zeitalter der Restrukturierung der 
japanischen Wirtschaft,” in Joachim Zentes et al., B2B-Handel: 
Perspektiven des Groß- und Außenhandels (Frankfurt am Main: 
Deutscher Fachverlag, 2002), pp. 177–# 
6  Yuji Nishikawa, “Road to Recovery: A Search for Secure 
and Stable Supplies of Raw Materials,” Mining Journal, June 15, 
2012, p. Q^""#'%%-journal.com/reports/japan-
road-to-recovery?SQ_DESIGN_NAME=print_friendly (accessed 
October 10, 2012). 
nese, molybdenum, nickel, niobium, palladium, 
platinum, rhenium, rubidium, selenium, strontium, 
tantalum, tellurium, thallium, titanium, tungsten, 
vanadium, and zirconium.7
Recycling of durable consumption goods has been 
increasing continuously since a national recycling 
law took effect in April 2001, with the recycling quota 
reach%&	
&%%#&
<$'&$8
recycled metals is unknown, however, since private 
companies that collect junk may use it for very dif-
ferent purposes such as manufacturing input, smelter 
scrap, or resale.
 

The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Since Japan is a major consumer of raw materials but 
lacks domestic deposits, there is no question about 
the legitimacy and necessity of government action. 
Maintaining security of supply is regarded as a central 
concern of foreign and economic policy. However, 
China’s import surge, emerging countries’ sometimes 
nationalistic resource policies, concentration ten-
dencies in the global resource industry, and growing 
bilateral tensions with China jeopardize the supply 
of raw materials. Moreover, mineral and metal proces-
sing and refining is considered to be of supreme im-
portance for the quality, flexibility, and competitive-
ness of Japan’s manufacturing industry. Without a 
secure supply, manufacturing, employment, and com-
petitiveness will suffer, it is feared. Japan’s identity 
as an industrial nation could even be called into 
question.9
At the latest when China stopped shipping rare 
earth elements to Japan in an unexplained move in 
summer 2010, the subject has also attracted wide pub-
lic attention and become a top foreign policy priority. 
 
 
7  Keizai Sangyôshô, Raa Metaru Kakuhô Senryaku (Tokyo, 2009), 
p. Q^""#'&#$#³"	&++""-
3.pdf (accessed October 1, 2012). 
8  Ho-sung Jung et al., “Assessing the Potential Value of Rare 
Metals in Urban Mines: A Comparative Look at Korea and 
Japan,” Monthly Focus, %$#4`^# 
9  For the perspectives of METI and Japan’s mining indus-
try see Shuhei Kojima, Stable Supply of Mineral Resources 
(Tokyo, 2002), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/projects/koubutsu/ 
pp01r001-r0712e.pdf (accessed October 1, 2012); Yuji Nishi-
kawa, “A Changing Mining Industry: The Global Mineral 
Resources Industry Is Becoming Increasingly Polarised,” 
Mining JournalQ+QQ# 22–25. 
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Institutional Setting 
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 
as Japan’s traditional industrial advocate, is respon-
sible for designing and coordinating the country’s raw 
materials policy. Administrative responsibility lies 
with the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. 
Certain issues are handled by other METI departments, 
such as the Trade Policy Bureau, the Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation Bureau, and the Manufacturing 
Industry Bureau (with separate departments for steel 
and non-ferrous metals). Various organizations that 
are independent but answerable to METI deal more or 
less extensively with raw materials issues: the Japan 
Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), 
the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science 
and Technology (AIST), the New Energy and Industrial 
Technology Development Organization (NEDO), and 
the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). 
Raw materials policy is also an issue for the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (resource diplomacy), the 
Ministry of the Environment (ME) (recycling), and the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT) (basic research). Especially METI 
and MFA civil servants hold regular discussions. The 
bicameral parliament influences raw materials policy 
through its legislative and budgetary approval powers. 
JOGMEC was established on February 26, 2006, 
through legislation merging the two state-run com-
panies, the Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) and 
the Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ). JOGMEC’s 
mission is to supply capital and equipment for the 
exploration, development, mining, and production of 
energy and mineral resources overseas and in Japan’s 
territorial waters, to stockpile energy and mineral 
resources, and to secure, manage, and rehabilite aban-
doned mines in Japan.10
While AIST and NEDO are umbrella organizations 
for applied, interdisciplinary industrial research, the 
MEXT research institutes focus on basic research, for 
example the Japan Science and Technology Agency 
(JST), the National Institute for Materials Science 
 At the end of fiscal year 2010/ 
\]*&'$=&&+%$++&+$8
US$13.5 billion. JOGMEG supplies investment, loans, 
and professional services on a worldwide scale and 
maintains thirteen offices overseas. 
 
10  Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), 
Annual Report Year ended March 31, 2011 (Tokyo, 2012), pp. –
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation Law, Law No. 
of July 26, 2002, http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/aboutus/ 
docs/jogmec_law_2010.pdf (accessed October 1, 2012). 
(NIMS), the Japan Agency for Marine Earth Science 
and Technology (JAMSTEC), and the National Research 
Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention 
(NIED). Other government agencies support overseas 
activities of Japanese mining and processing compa-
nies, like the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 
and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI). 
The Japanese mining industry, the processing and 
refining sector, and the resource trade are organized 
in associations and institutions. Keidanren is the over-
all Japanese business association, wielding great 
influence on legislation and policy. The Japan Mining 
Industry Association (JMIA) and the Japan Iron and 
Steel Federation (JISF) are members of Keidanren. Two 
Keidanren committees deal with raw materials issues, 
the Committee on Energy and Resources and the Com-
mittee on Oceanic Resources. Apart from Keidanren, 
there are also sectoral organizations such as the Metal 
Economics Research Institute (MERI), the Mining and 
Materials Processing Institute of Japan (MMIJ), the Iron 
and Steel Institute of Japan (ISIJ), and the Japan Min-
ing Engineering Center for International Cooperation 
(JMEC). These address technical issues as well as eco-
nomic, political, and social topics of common interest. 
Despite the great number of ministries, independ-
ent organizations, corporations, and associations, the 
Japanese system is well-organized, coherent, and trans-
parent – at least from the industry’s insider perspec-
tive. Building on its traditionally strong position at 
the center of all relevant information flows and deci-
sion-making, METI can implement long-term indus-
trial strategies and ensure coherent implementation. 
Concepts and Strategies 
METI has published or initiated four resource supply 
strategies. While they cover different topics, involve 
different political objectives, and have different legal 
implications, they are all complementary. 
(1) The Guidelines for Securing Natural Resources of 
]	
QQ&	&$&X=
X%&&
+$%%
are thus legally and politically binding for the whole 
government and its subordinate authorities and insti-
tutions.11
 
11  Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Guide-
lines for Securing Natural Resources (provisional translation), 
 Their stated objective is to increase Japanese 
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participation in key resource acquisition projects. To 
secure the national supply of oil, coal, gas, uranium, 
rare metals, and other mineral resources, Japanese 
enterprises should acquire rights for exploration and 
development abroad or conclude long-term supply 
agreements. For this purpose, Japan should develop 
a supporting (bilateral and multilateral) resource 
diplomacy and take action in areas such as conducting 
resource exploration, commissioning development 
studies, offering financial subsidies to resource inves-
tors, and supporting them diplomatically. Japanese 
development aid should play a complementary role 
in this endeavor. 
(2) The METI Strategy for Ensuring Stable Supply of Rare 
Metals +%%$%
&$%\=QQ8&	$%&-
pert consultations and public hearings.12
Pillar One recommends policy measures to support 
Japanese resource investments abroad, pointing out 
how Japanese mining investment can contribute posi-
tively to the social and economic development of the 
producer country, for instance by introducing modern 
technology, by mining in an environmentally friendly 
manner, by taking social responsibility seriously, and 
by developing a supportive infrastructure around the 
investment location. Japanese resource diplomacy and 
expanded overseas development aid should go hand in 
hand. The role of JOGMEC should be strengthened 
and Japanese mining investors should be eligible for 
attractive financing and insurance. Exploration activi-
ties in Japanese territorial waters should also be ex-
panded and deep-sea mining developed. Pillar Two 
covers the recycling of rare metals. The existing recy-
cling system should be improved and expanded and 
new recycling technologies developed. In the long run, 
an Asian recycling economy should be established. 
Pillar Three calls for the development and utilization 
of alternative materials, while Pillar Four identifies 
stockpiling as another measure to secure supply. 
 The strategy 
prioritizes a secure and stable supply of metals for 
the survival and the competitiveness of the Japanese 
manufacturing industry. To maintain security of 
supply, political priorities need to be set. A four-pillar 
strategy and a resource-specific infrastructure are 
proposed. 
In the domains of capital formation, technology 
development, and public administration, a supportive 
infrastructure for the mining industry is to be estab-
 
4$=$Q`Q^""#'&#$#³"&%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12  Sangyôshô, Raa Metaru Kakuhô Senryaku (see note 7). 
lished. First, a pool of domestic and foreign skilled 
labor is to be developed through university education, 
vocational training, and by compiling a new inter-
national network of personal contacts. Second, tech-
nological breakthroughs in the raw materials industry 
are sought to open up new markets and business 
opportunities. Prominent examples include satellite 
remote sensing technology, refining processes for rare 
metal ores, and BioReach technology. Third, inte-
grated efforts by government agencies and organiza-
tions are to support the overseas mining activities of 
Japanese companies, which should also collaborate 
with one another. 
(3) The METI Priority Measures to Ensure Stable Supply of 
Natural Resources and Fuel, announced on December 20, 
2011, were designed to cope with the Great East Japan 
Earthquake of March 11, 2011, and mostly contain 
energy policy measures.13
4`&\%&+&
X%&¨+Strategy to Secure Resource 
Supply $8\=QQ
%+$X&%&	+$$+
modification of energy and raw materials policy after 
the devastating earthquake of March 11, 2011.
 However, the earthquake 
destroyed two large refineries and again revealed 
Japan’s vulnerability in the raw materials sector. More-
over, reconstruction has dramatically increased raw 
materials consumption and import dependency. Ac-
cordingly, the priority measures take up some of the 
points already mentioned in the strategy paper of July 
QQ%	&&	&&		&%
=#&$
'&%
calls for government and business to cooperate even 
more closely to identify the types and quantities 
of minerals resources required. Adequate financing 
should be supplied by JOGMEC or other public 
sources. And Japan should strengthen efforts to train 
mining engineers and cooperate with producer coun-
tries in the areas of infrastructure development, voca-
tional training, health services, and technology co-
operation. 

 
13  METI, Priority Measures to Ensure Stable Supply of Natural 
Resources and Fuel (Tokyo, 2011) http://www.meti.go.jp/english/ 
press/2011/pdf/1220_02b.pdf (accessed October 1, 2012). 
 The 
strategy, published by the Prime Minister’s Office, 
amends and expands the Guidelines for Securing Natural 
Resources $8]	
Q, with respect to oil, natural 
gas, coal, and minerals. Henceforth, Japan’s foreign 
policy should focus particularly on resource-rich coun-
14  Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Shigen Kakuhô 
Senryaku. Dai jûgokai pakkeejigatainfura Kaigai Tenkai Kankei 
Daijin Kaigô Hôkoku Shiryô, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/info/ 

$''&&"$%'$%""+%$-2.pdf (accessed 
October 9, 2012). 
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tries, support Japanese private investment in raw 
materials production and processing, offer invest-
ment packages, participate in the bidding for mining 
licenses abroad, and utilize bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic channels, such as comprehensive trade 
agreements, the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD), and the WTO. 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
Marine Resource Development 
Adding up territorial waters, exclusive economic 
zones, and continental shelf, Japan possesses the 
sixth-largest waters of any country. Besides energy 
resources, rich deposits of minerals have also been 
found in Japanese waters, for instance cobalt-rich 
ferromanganese crusts, gold, silver, and rare earth 
elements. If deep-sea mining proves economically 
viable, resource-poor Japan might be able to meet 
part of its raw materials needs from domestic sources. 
In 2001, the Japanese Deep Ocean Resources Develop-
ment Company (DORD) acquired a license to prospect 
for polymetallic nodules from the International Sea-
bed Authority (ISA). Japan’s Basic Plan on Oceanic Policy 
$&X=&
X%&$%]	
QQ&%<+&+
commercial deep-+&'%%X=#15 To establish 
a legal framework for the exploration and mining of 
deep-sea resources, the Mining Act was amended on 
January 21, 2012.16 For the time being, only JOGMEC 
is actively exploring Japan’s oceanic waters, using its 
new research vessel Hakurei. JOMEC is also developing 
deep-sea mining robots in cooperation with two 
Japanese companies.17
Raw Materials Investment Overseas 
 
The exploration, development, and operation of metal 
ore mines overseas is meant to secure Japan’s supply 
 
15  “Marine Resource Plan OK’d: Govt Hopes to Exploit 
Oceanic Riches, Block Unauthorized Research,” Daily Yomiuri, 
]	
Q# 
16  Davis LLP, The Mining Act of Japan Amended for the First Time 
in 61 Years, June 15, 2012, http://www.davis.ca/en/publication/ 
the-mining-act-amended-for-the-first-time-in-61-years/ (acces-
sed October 1, 2012). 
17  JOGMEC, Annual Report Year Ended March 31, 2011 (see note 
10), p. 15; Hiroshi Kawamoto, “Japan’s Policies to Be Adopted 
on Rare Metal Resources,” Science and Technology Trends, Quar-
terly Review Q%$#4`^–73; “Govt to Lead Development 
of Robotic Deep-sea Mining,” Daily Yomiuri 4\%	=Q`Q
^""#=$'	#
$#³"="X+%&++"#'
(accessed October 10, 2012). 
of metals and minerals on a long-term basis. As for oil 
and natural gas, Japan has also set itself self-suffi-

&%
=	&+8$	
$''$='&+4percent) and 
rare metals (60 percent). JOGMEC promotes Japanese 
mining investments overseas in various ways. First, 
JOGMEC itself invests in exploration activities over-
seas, often subsequently is selling its shares on to par-
ticipating (Japanese) companies. For instance, JOGMEC 
has invested in rare earth mining projects in Australia 
and in Vietnam. Second, JOGMEC supports the explo-
ration and mining investments of Japanese companies 
with equity capital, loans, and guarantees. Third, 
JOGMEC produces, processes, and disseminates infor-
mation relevant for the raw materials sector. Fourth, 
JOGMEC staff teach at mining institutes and universi-
ties. Fifth, JOGMEC identifyies technology trends, sup-
ports technology implementation efforts, and runs its 
own technology development activities.
Apart from JOGMEC, there are also specialized gov-
ernment financial institutions providing investment 
finance, guarantees, and insurance to Japanese com-
panies investing overseas. JBIC, which is a 100 percent 
state-owned bank, can offer first-class financing con-
ditions at very low rates. NEXI insures the Japanese 
mining industry against political and business risks. 
 
Resource diplomacy and development cooperation 
actively support the acquisition efforts of the Japanese 
raw materials industry. Japan has concluded memo-
randa of understanding for joint raw materials explo-
ration with numerous countries in Central and South-
east Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry have installed a “one-stop system” for Japa-
nese companies planning exploration and resource 
development overseas. 
In producer countries, further support is provided 
by Japanese embassies, the local offices of JETRO, 
and JOGMEC. Additionally, JOGMEC invites decision-
makers from producer countries to “Metal Saloons” 
in Tokyo to initiate business contacts and prepare 
agreements and contracts. In 2005 JICA has published 
guidelines for the mining sector stating Japan’s devel-
opment objectives. These include creating a mining-
investment-friendly climate and introducting modern 
and ecologically compatible mining technology into 
producer countries.19
 
18  JOGMEC, Annual Report Year Ended March 31, 2011 
(see note 
 In practical terms, Japanese 
10), pp. 13–17. 
19  Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), JICA 
Thematic Guidelines on Mining (Tokyo, 2005), http://gwweb.jica. 
$#³"'">X³&
#%+8"&&
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development cooperation concentrates on explo-
ration, development and feasibility studies, local 
skill-formation, and environmental projects. 
Recycling 
Recycling is to be expanded and exploited more 
intensively as a source of raw materials. In January 
%%<&+$%X=!]&+'&\%¨+
metal reserves hidden in “urban mines” were com-
parable in size to the metal deposits of leading pro-
ducers.20 METI and ME have agreed to prioritize 
developing the recycling of cobalt, dysprosium, neo-
dymium, tantalum, and tungsten. The Law on Rare 
Earth Recycling, passed on August 3, 2012, creates 
incentives for recycling mobile phones and other 
small electronic devices. Rare earth recycling will 
become profitable in the medium term. Both private 
and government research institutes are working on 
new recycling technologies. JOGMEC is developing 
technologies to recycle cobalt and tungsten from hard 
metal tools and rare earths from used glass polish and 
fluorescent materials,21 while Mitsubishi Materials is 
developing cost-efficient technologies for recycling 
dysprosium and neodymium from washing machines 
and air conditioners.22
Substitution 
 
Industrial consumption of metals can be reduced 
effectively by substituting rare metals and miniaturiz-
ing components and products. Several institutions 
and programs are working on this question. METI is 
promoting collaborative research, where private 
profit-oriented research facilities are joining forces 
with public research institutes. Research into sub-
stitution focuses primarily on cerium, dysprosium, 
europium, indium, platinum, terbium, and tung-
sten.23
 
"88&X
"[FILE/JICA%20 
Thematic%20Guidelines%20on%20Mining.pdf (accessed 
October 1, 2012). 
 >	$'$Q!	%	&+&	

20  National Institute for Material Sciences (NIMS), Japan’s 
‘Urban Mines’ Are Comparable to the World’s Leading Resource 
NationsQ^""#%'+#$#³"&%"%&+"	&++""" 
#'4

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
21  JOGMEC, Annual Report Year Ended March 31, 2011 
(see note 10), p. 17. 
22  Cindy Hurst, “Japan’s Approach to China’s Control of 
Rare Earth Elements,” China Brief 11, no. 7 (2011), http://www. 
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news% 
4

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
23  Sangyôshô, Rare Metaru Kakuhô Senryaku (see note 7), 
pp. 20–22. 
project on the topic of rare metal substitution, specifi-
cally indium (in transparent electrodes), dysprosium, 
(in magnets), and tungsten (in hard metal tools). AIST 
and Toyota are developing an energy-saving, dyspro-
sium-free high-efficiency electric motor. The Element 
Strategy Project, a basic research project run by MEXI, 
analyzed the qualities of critical elements and mate-
rials between 2007 and 2011. As a result, MEXI an-
nounced in June 2012 that research into substitution 
of rare metals and hazardous materials would be con-
tinued in certain promising fields.25 METI will provide 
research funding for industrial applications out of its 
own budget.26
Reserves and Stockpiling 
 
Reserves and stockpiling of energy and mineral 
resources are statutory tasks of JOGMEC. The private 
raw materials sector is also obliged to hold its own 
reserves. Governmental reserve are released to the 
market in response to supply or demand disruptions. 
$&]+	&=$8\=QQ'&n-
tioned chromium, cobalt, gallium, indium, manga-
nese, molybdenum, nickel, niobium, platinum, rare 
earths, strontium, tantalum, tungsten, and vanadium, 
neither METI nor JOGMEC will reveal which are stored 
or in what quantities to avoid market speculation. 
However, official planning targets indicate that re-
serve stocks would amount to 60 days in total, with 
\]*$%+$
+8$	=+Q&	<&+&
$	
8$	=+#27
Global Governance 
 Reserve stocks are said to have increased 
recently, especially for the critical rare earth metals. 
When it comes to global governance, Japan generally 
trusts the functioning of international raw materials 
markets. In the light of the numerous problems, how-
ever, it is open-minded about multilateral cooperation 
 
24  Kawamoto, “Japan’s Policies to Be Adopted on Rare Metal 
Resources” (see note 17), p. Kishô Kinzoku Daitai Zairyô 
Kaihatsu Purojekuto, ed. New Energy and Industrial Technology 
Development Organization (NEDO), http://www.nedo.go.jp/ 
activities/EF_00123.html (accessed October 1, 2012). 
25  Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Tech-
nology (MEXT), Kinshô Genso wo Mochiinai Kakushinteki na Daitai 
Zairyô no Sôsei wo Okonau “Genso Senryaku Purojekuto” no Saitaku 
Kyoten Kettei, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdo""" 
1323106.htm (accessed October 1, 2012). 
26  Keizai Sangyôshô, 2012 Nendô Mono Zukuri Hakushô, p. 223, 
http://www.meti.go.jp/report/whitepaper/mono/2012/pdf/ 
honbun_2.pdf (accessed October 1, 2012). 
27  JOGMEC, Annual Report Year Ended March 31, 2011 
(see note 10), p. 19. 
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initiatives. Japan supports the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a stakeholder, partici-
pates in the Kimberley process, and is a member of 
the study groups for copper, lead and zinc, and nickel. 
Together with the United States and the European 
Union, Japan participates in the trilateral raw mate-
rials dialog. When developing raw materials sources 
overseas, Japan’s private sector and public institutions 
sometimes cooperate with their South Korean coun-
terparts. 
Evaluation and Outlook 
For Japan, security of supply of raw materials is an 
issue of great political relevance. A sophisticated sys-
tem of government support for overseas exploration 
and development is in place. Moreover, Japan has 
numerous large and competitive companies capable of 
actively realizing these policy aims. Government and 
business are becoming increasingly ambitious and 
no longer satisfied with developing and exploiting 
overseas ore mines as minority shareholders. With 
clear, transparent information channels and decision-
making structures, raw materials policy is coherent 
and functional. If there is a weakness, it would be 
budgetary control. Given the strong international 
competition for metals and minerals, however, it is 
still unlikely that Japan can overcome its dependence 
on insecure, instable markets. From the producer per-
spective, the only potential obstacles to cooperation 
would be the saturation of Japan’s raw materials con-
sumption, the sporadic appearance of resource con-
flicts with local communities (Philippines, Peru, Boli-
via),29
 
 and the lack of contours in Japanese foreign 
policy. 
 
 
28  Nishikawa, “Road to Recovery: A Search for Secure and 
Stable Supplies of Raw Materials” (see note 6), pp. –25. 
29  Detlev Rehn, “Japan will bei ‘strategischen’ Metallen von 
China unabhängiger werden,” GTAIQ]	
QQ^"" 
www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/maerkte,did= 
#'4
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Mexico 
Claudia Zilla 
 
Mexico has a long mining tradition, stretching back 
to the colonial era when silver extraction played a 
central role. Mining has always been regarded as an 
important sector of the economy, and indeed the 
country’s first business association was the Chamber 
of Mines founded in 1906. Mexico is experiencing a 
mining boom that began in 2003. In 2011 it was 
the top Latin American destination for spending on 
exploration, and fourth in the world.1
Minerals in the National Economy 
 
Production and exports broke value records in 2010, 
especially as gold and silver prices rose.2 That year 
Mexico ranked among the world’s major producers 
of 8$	&4#&	
&%$8$X	$
$%`Qsilver 
4# percent), bismuth (10.6 percent), molybdenum 
4#&	
&%`Q%
4#&	
&%`Q&4#&	
&%`Q
gold 4#&	
&%`Q
$&	4#&	
&%`Q'%%&+&
(1.1 percent), and iron (0.6 percent).3
 
1  Metals Economic Group (MEG), March 2012, quoted in: 
Gobierno Federal, ed., Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012; 
Quinto Informe de Ejecución 2011, p. Q^""%#
&	$%# 
presidencia.gob.mx/quinto-informe-de-ejecuci-n.html 
(accessed August 20, 2012). 
 It is also a 
leading producer of non-ferrous and precious metals. 
The most important active minerals projects involve 
the metals gold, silver with gold, copper with gold, 
copper, and also zinc in combination with copper 
and/or silver with lead. Notable non-metallic produc-
tion includes barite, diatomite, fluorite, graphite, 
gypsum, kaolin, limestone, phosphates, rock salt, and 
strontium minerals. Mexico possesses important 
2  Especially for gold, silver, lead, zinc, molybdenum, iron, 
manganese, fluorite, dolomite, kaolin, phosphorite, and 
sodium sulfate. Cámara Minera de México (CAMIMEX), ed., 
Informe Anual 2011, http://www.camimex.org.mx/admin/ 
'&+X

$%&+"%8$	'&#84

&++&+
20, 2012). 
3  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). CAMIMEX, ed., Informe Anual 2011 (see 
note 2), p. 6. 
reserves of copper (third in the world after Chile and 
Peru), bismuth, and silver (in both cases fourth). It also 
possesses major deposits of cadmium, lead, manga-
nese, molybdenum, and zinc, although these 
represent smaller shares. 
8&Q	&+&	&'%%
$'%&+%Q
X$&	
&%&	&8=$		=8$	&%-owned. 
Mexican mining is a favorite destination for FDI. The 
firms that invest in Mexico originate primarily from 
Canada (71.5 percent of firms), including Mexico’s 
biggest gold producer Goldcorp Inc. Other countries 
of origin are the United States (16.0 percent of firms), 
*%4#&	
&%`Q%+	4#&	
ent).5
Genuinely Mexican mining companies also play a 
central role in the sector, with four listed on the Mexi-
can stock exchange (Grupo México, Minera Autlan, 
Industrias Peñoles, Minera Frisco),
 
6
Total private-sector investment in the sector 
	&
&	&
$	[#X$%%Q	&	&+&%%
%%	$$8#&	
&%#*'<&%<&+-
ment in 2007–+[#X$%Q&	
&%
increase over 2001–2006.
 and two (Grupo 
México and Industrias Peñoles) standing out on the 
world scale. Grupo México is in fact the world’s sixth-
	&+
$&	'%&	Q+#&	
&%+	&$	%%
from mines and smelters in Mexico, the United States, 
and Peru. With lead, zinc, and silver mines and smelt-
ers in Mexico, Industrias Peñoles is also a global leader 
for those metals. 
7
%&	&&	&'%%%<&+'&%	$³&
+Q
of which 79.2 percent were in the exploration phase 
 Exploration spending in 
2010 concentrated particularly on the search for gold 
deposits. 
 
4  Gobierno Federal, ed., Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012 
(see note 1), p. 290. 
5  Secretaría de Economía and Coordinación General de 
Minería, eds., Anuario Estadístico de la Minería Mexicana, Am-
pliada 2011, Version 2012, p. 535, http://www.economia.gob. 
mx/files/comunidad_negocios/informacion_sectorial/mineria/
anuario_estadistico_mineria_ampliada_2011.pdf (accessed 
August 20, 2012). 
6  The Mexican company Fresnillo has been listed on the 
$%$%$

%&+%
&# 
7  Gobierno Federal, ed., Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012 
(see note 1). 
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and 9.6 percent in production. The projects involved 
gold and silver in 62.3 percent of cases, copper in 12.3 
&	
&%Q%$='&
$	&+%#&	
&%#9 In 
December 2011 there were 27,022 valid concessions, 
3.9 percent more than a year previously.10
The most important market for Mexican raw mate-
rials, especially copper, silver, and zinc, is the United 
States, with which Mexico has a customs union under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
NAFTA has done a great deal to facilitate U.S. and 
Canadian FDI into the Mexican mining sector. How-
ever, many ores and concentrates are subject to im-
port tariffs.
 
11
According to government figures, mining con-
	X&+#&	
&%$8]&
$¨+#
 
12 In 2011 25,922 
new jobs were created in the mining and metals sec-
tor, bringing the total to 309,700 (year-on-year growth 
9.1 percent).13 percent of these jobs are located in 
the extraction of metal ores.
Mining is the fourth most important sector for 
8$	&%
		&%
=	&
&+4^[#X$%`Q after 
automotives, oil, and remittances.
 
15 The mining and 
metals sector recorded a trade surplus of $9.6 billion 
in 2011, with year-on-=&		$$8#&	
&%#
the same time, its broad manufacturing base (espe-
cially vehicle manufacturing) makes Mexico depen-
dent on imports of industrial metals such as alumi-
num, copper, and iron and steel. In 2010 imports of 
industrial metals, non-metallic minerals, and precious 
metals together amounted to $7,6 billion.16
 
8  Secretaría de Economía and Coordinación General de Mine-
ría, eds., Anuario Estadístico de la Minería Mexicana (see note 
 
5), 
p. 536. 
9  Ibid., p. 537. 
10  Gobierno Federal, ed., Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012 
(see note 1). 
11  Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Expor-
tación, http://leyco.org/mex/fed/ligie.html#s5c26 (accessed 
&
&'X&	Q`# 
12  Gobierno Federal and Secretaría de Economía, eds., Reporte 
de Coyuntura de la Minería NacionalQ4\%	=Q`Q
http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/comunidad_negocios/ 
industria_comercio/informacionSectorial/minero/Reporte 
Coyuntura_Enero2012.pdf (accessed October 11, 2012) How-
ever, according to the Mexican Chamber of Mines, mining 
contributes only 1.6 percent of GDP. 
13  Gobierno Federal, ed., Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012 
(see note 1), p. 291. 
14  Gobierno Federal and Secretaría de Economía, eds., 
Reporte de Coyuntura de la Minería Nacional (see note 12). 
15  CAMIMEX, ed., Informe Anual 2011 (see note 2), p. 5. 
16  Secretaría de Economía, Employment, http://www. 
economia.gob.mx/files/comunidad_negocios/industria_ 
The Raw Materials Policy 
Institutional Setting 
Under Article 27 of the Constitution of the United Mexican 
States all minerals located within its national borders 
are property of the nation, making the federal govern-
ment responsible for mining policy, including grant-
ing licenses. Together with the Constitution, the Mining 
Law of 1992 (Ley Minera, as amended in 1996 and 2005) 
and other regulations form the legal framework for 
the sector. 
Nationally, the General Coordination of Mines (Co-
ordinación General de Minería, CGMinería) is situated 
on the third tier of the Ministry of Economy (Secreta-
ría de Economía, SE), under the auspices of the Under-
secretary of Industry and Commerce (Subsecretaría 
de Industria y Comercio). CGMinería in turn consists 
of two departments: the Directorate General of Mines 
(Dirección General de Minas, DGM) is primarily re-
sponsible for questions of regulation,17
The sector also includes two further institutions 
coordinated by the Ministry of Economy and CGMin-
ería. The remit of the Mexican Geological Service (Ser-
vicio Geológico Mexicano, SGM) is to identify and to 
develop mining projects, thus deepening and expand-
ing knowledge about geology and resources. It main-
tains offices in eight Mexican states with a budget 
funded 25 percent from the public purse and 75 per-
cent from its own resources. The Mining Development 
Trust Fund (Fideicomiso de Fomento Minero, FIFOMI) 
provides technical support and training to optimize 
mining and the value added chain.
 while the 
Directorate General of Mining Promotion (Dirección 
General de Promoción Minera, DGPM) largely deals 
with matters of investment. 

Other ministries and agencies involved in granting 
mining permits and licenses are: the Labor Ministry 
(working conditions in mines), the Environment 
 This para-state 
entity was established seventy-eight years ago and 
answers to the Finance Ministry (Secretaría de Hacien-
da y Crédito Público, SHCP). It has been self-funding 
+%
&%8%
ions as a sectoral development 
bank with fourteen branches across the country’s 
regions. 
 
comercio/informacionSectorial/minero/ReporteCoyuntura_ 
%&	$#84

&++&&
&'X&	Q`# 
17  Dirección General de Minas, http://www.economia-dgm. 
gob.mx (accessed August 20, 2012). 
18  Fideicomiso de Fomento de la Minería, http://www.fifomi. 
gob.mx/web/index.php (accessed August 20, 2012). 
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Ministry (environmental licenses), the National Water 
Commission (water management), the Defense Minis-
try (explosives), and the Ministry of Agricultural Re-
form (access to private and communal land “ejidos”). 
There are no specialized committees at the parliamen-
tary level. 
Mexican mining engineers, metallurgists, and geol-
ogists are organized in two professional bodies, an 
association, and a chamber (Asociación de Ingenieros 
de Minas, Metalurgistas y Geólogos de México and 
Colegio de Ingenieros de Minas, Metalurgistas y Geó-
logos de México).19 The Chamber of Mines (Cámara 
Minera de México, CAMIMEX) represents the interests 
of businesses in the industry and is organized in 
&<&+&
$%+#+Q'&'X&	+Q*]]¹
represents 93 percent of the country’s mining output. 
Mining labor is represented by a sectoral trade union 
8$%&%Q&%
$!
$%&	X³-
dores Mineros, Metalúrgicos, Siderúrgicos y Similares 
de la República Mexicana (SNTMMSRM).20
Concepts and Strategies 
 
The National Development Plan for 2007–2012 (Plan Nacio-
nal de Desarrollo, PND), introduced by President Felipe 
Calderón Hinojosa of the Partido Acción Nacional 
(PAN), formed the strategy concept for his term of 
office (which ended in December 2012), but while this 
official declaration of intent covers agriculture, energy 
and fossil fuels, and tourism, it contains no chapter 
explicitly dedicated to mining. Instead it is the govern-
ment’s annual progress reports that deal with mineral 
resource extraction (under the heading “Productivity 
and Competitiveness” in the section on “A Competi-
tive and Employment-generating Economy”). Two min-
ing-specific “strategies” are defined here: increasing 
FDI in the mining sector and expanding financial 
resources for small and medium-sized mining enter-
prises. That reflects the narrow focus of Mexican min-
ing policy, which is primarily about maintaining the 
country’s attractiveness for investment and promoting 
SMEs. 
 
19  Asociación de Ingenieros de Minas, Metalurgistas y 
Geólogos de México, http://www.geomin.com.mx (accessed 
August 20, 2012); Colegio de Ingenieros de Minas, Metalur-
gistas y Geólogos de México, http://cimmgm.org/index.html 
(accessed August 20, 2012). 
20  Sindicato National de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos, 
Siderúrgicos y Similares de la República Mexicana, http:// 
www.sindicatominero.org.mx (accessed September 3, 2012). 
This tallies with the investor-friendly legal frame-
work that governs mining. Mexico ranks 35th (of 79) 
in the Fraser Institute’s Policy Potential Index, which 
measures mining companies’ perceptions of overall 
policy attractiveness of countries and regions.21
Concessions are granted to Mexican and foreign 
natural and legal persons on a “first come, first 
served” basis. They are valid for fifty years (for both 
exploration and production) with the possibility to 
extend for a further fifty.
 Only 
Chile scores better in the Latin American context. But 
Mexico dropped seven places in a year because of wide-
spread security problems. 
22
Mining concessions must satisfy a series of require-
ments under environmental law (Ley General del Equi-
librio Ecológico y Protección al Ambiente, LGEEPA), includ-
ing an environmental impact assessment (Manifesta-
ción de Impacto Ambiental, MIA) approved by the 
Environment Ministry. But institutional capacities 
are inadequate for conducting thorough inspections, 
and on average the Dirección General de Minas awards 
concessions within just 17.3 working days.
 Exploration and produc-
tion rights cover all non-radioactive minerals and may 
be freely traded. There is no size restriction on con-
cessions, nor is a Mexican stake required. Domestic 
and foreign investors are treated equally; foreign com-
panies must be registered under Mexican law and may 
transfer profits abroad. Mexico collects land value and 
corporate taxes, but not royalties. A fee is payable 
where the state has invested in exploration, discovery 
(“prima por descubrimiento”), or similar measures. To 
address the problem of illegal mining, and curb the 
associated phenomena of tax evasion, social conflicts, 
and environmental harm, the Ministry of Economy 
attempts to restrict exports of illicitly extracted 
minerals. 
23
 
21  Fred McMahon and Miguel Cervantes, Survey of Mining 
Companies 2011/2012, Fraser Institute, February 2012, http:// 
www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/ 
research-news/research/publications/mining-survey-2011-
2012.pdf (accessed 26.5.2012), quoted in CAMIMEX, ed., 
Informe Anual 2011 (see note 
 
2), p. 7. 
22  Until the 2005 reforms there were different types of con-
cession for exploration and for extraction. Today concessions 
grant prospecting and mining rights together. Engineering 
and Mining Journal (E&MJ), ed., Mexican Mining, October 2011, 
p. 55, http://www.gbreports.com/admin/reports/EMJ-Mexico. 
pdf (accessed October 11, 2012). 
23  Gobierno Federal, ed., Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012 
(see note 1), p. 291. 
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Policy Measures and Instruments 
National Level 
Until the wave of privatizations in the mid-+&
mining sector was dominated by state-owned com-
panies. During the subsequent two decades low global 
commodity prices caused a decline in public funding. 
Now the government’s interest in supporting the 
sector is growing again, and bringing with it issues 
of institutional regime and business law. 
Unusually for Latin America, Mexico has a sec-
toral development bank, the Mining Development 
Trust Fund (FIFOMI), whose responsibilities include 
strengthening the competitiveness of Mexican SMEs. 
It operates with government authorization in the in-
ternational financial markets. It manages only 10 
percent of its portfolio directly, with the rest granted 
through financial intermediaries. FIFOMI’s financial 
support, which in 2011 was granted to 720 businesses, 
applies to extraction and subsequent phases of the 
production chain such as processing and marketing, 
but not to exploration projects. FIFOMI also supplies 
training and advisory services for mining companies. 
A redevelopment program (Programa de Reactivación 
de Distritos Mineros) also provides support to districts 
where mining operations have ceased.
The Mexican Geological Service runs a geological/ 
mining mapping program (Programa de Cartografía 
Geológica-Minera) to advance cartography and enlarge 
the scale at which data is available. It is also respon-
sible for the advancement of Mexican mapping and 
for a digital database on mining geology (Banco Digi-
tal de Datos Geológico-Mineros). 
 
The government regards participation in inter-
national conferences and holding national events as 
a way to encourage dynamic development. The first 
Mexico Mining Day was held at the 2011 conference of 
the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada 
(PDAC) in Toronto; in the same year Acapulco hosted 
the 29th Convención Internacional de Minería.25
Key government, business, and NGO actors discuss 
a series of challenges for the Mexican mining sector: 
 
The state is considering introducing mining royal-
ties. This is part of a sectoral tax reform that has been 
under discussion for some years, leaving business 
representatives complaining about fiscal insecurity. 
Labor conflicts and strikes regularly force mining 
operations to cease for indefinite periods. The Cana-
 
24  Ibid., p. 295. 
25  Ibid., p. 290. 
dian company Gammon Gold Inc. shut its El Cubo 
mine in Guanajuato for eight months in 2010. An-
other example is Grupo México’s Cananea mine (now 
renamed Buenavista del Cobre) in Sonora, which was 
closed for 35 months by an illegal strike.26 At the same 
time it is widely known that compliance with health 
and safety at work rules (norm 023) is usually in-
complete.27 While CAMIMEX calls for a reform of the 
labor law, civil society actors demand its effective 
application. There are also widespread complaints of 
a shortage of skilled labor. Exacerbating an already 
conflictual situation, the leader of the miners’ union 
!]]]Q$+	&&&
&%Q+8$	&
past six years been living in Canadian exile to avoid 
prosecution in Mexico. He is accused of embezzlement 
from the Mining Development Trust Fund, but has 
thus far managed to avoid extradition.29
Under the banner of community development 
(“desarrollo comunitario”), the integration of local 
groups (above all indigenous peoples and small 
farmers) in mining projects is regarded as an urgent 
priority. The social acceptance for mining projects 
presupposes the trust of local communities, which in 
turn rests on the population’s expectations that they 
will benefit from rising earnings, more jobs, and 
education and training programs. Voluntary corporate 
social responsibility can play only a supplementary 
role, and the abiding impression in many cases is one 
of mining companies raking in huge profits at the 
expense of local populations, while public authorities 
are interested above all in economic development.
 
30
 
26  CAMIMEX, ed., Informe Anual 2011 (see note 
 
2), p. 15. 
27  NORMA Oficial Mexicana NOM-023-STPS-2003, Trabajos en 
minas-Condiciones de seguridad y salud en el trabajo. Secretaría de 
Trabajo y Provisión Social, http://www.stps.gob.mx/02_sub_ 
trabajo/01_dgaj/nom23.pdf (accessed October 1, 2012). 
28  CAMIMEX, ed., Informe Anual 2011 (see note 2), p. 11. 
29  Mariana Hernández, “El mandamiento judicial está 
solicitando a elementos de la Policía Federal Ministerial de la 
PGR procedan a la localización y captura de los dirigentes 
mineros,” El Financiero, September 30, 2012, http://www. 
elfinanciero.com.mx/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&
^$	&%%-capturas-a-napole%C3%B3n-g%C3%B3mez-
urrutia-y-h%C3%A9ctor-f%C3%A9lix-estrella&Itemid=26 
(accessed 1.10.2012). 
30  For critical analyses of the negative impact of mining 
on farming communities see Claudia Garibay, Andrew Boni, 
Francesco Panico, and Pedro Urquijo, “Unequal Partners, 
Unenqual Exchange: Goldcorp, the Mexican State, and Cam-
pesino Disposession at the Peñasquito Goldmine,” Journal of 
Latin America Geography 10, no. 2 (2011): 153–76; and Matthew 
Fry, “From Crops to Concrete: Urbanization, Deagriculturali-
zation, and Construction Material Mining in Central Mexico,” 
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The treatment of communal property (“ejidos”) is thus 
a highly sensitive topic. According to the 2007 Censo 
³&	&	&'$	&%Q%&%$+&³$+·
and agricultural communities (“comunidades agra-
rias”) with a total area of 105.9 million hectares, or 
X$&	
&%$8&$]&
%%	&#31
Environmental problems also crop up in connec-
tion with mining. Underground mining tends to be a 
thing of the past today, with particularly environmen-
tally challenging supersized open-pit mines predomi-
nating. The use of cyanide in gold mining presents a 
particular problem, and there is also a lack of effective 
regulation of mine closures. At the same time many 
actors fear that environmental arguments are used to 
put a brake on mining. 
 
Consultants in this field recommend that mining 
companies negotiate with the official and informal 
leaders of the “ejidos,” who generally grant ownership 
or access in return for social and development pro-
jects. But there are numerous conflicts in connection 
with these contracts and compromises. 
Drug trafficking and organized crime represent a 
serious problem in Mexico, with repercussions for 
mining operations, which are often located in remote 
regions.32 Resource theft is a growing problem, espe-
cially in connection with coal, iron, and more recently 
polymetallic concentrates.33
International Raw Materials Governance 
 Extraction and transport 
are threatened by organized crime, and the physical 
safety of miners is often endangered. Where this leads 
to a decision to airlift workers to mines, additional 
costs are incurred. 
At the international level Mexico is a member of 
numerous initiatives and working groups. It is one 
of seventeen members of the Latin American Mining 
Organization (Organismo Latinoamericano de Mine-
	Q]`Q&+X+&%Q
+'&
of national coordinating units composed of sectoral 
representatives (trade unions, businesses, state 
agencies, researchers, etc.).
 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101, no. 6 
(2011): –306. 
 With more than two 
31  E&MJ, ed., Mexican Mining (see note 22), p. 56. 
32  CAMIMEX, ed., Informe Anual 2011 (see note 2), pp. 7f. 
33  CAMIMEX, ed., Informe Anual 2012, http://www.camimex. 
$	#'"8&+""""#84
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2012). 
  www.olami.org.ar (accessed August 17, 2012). The mem-
bers of OLAMI are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
hundred participants, the Mexican Global Compact 
network is the third-largest in Latin America.35 It was 
founded in 2005 and is transitioning from a UN frame 
(under the auspices of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization) to an industry-run mod-
el.36
]&
$³$%&&¬'X&	&=	$
&++%Q
 At the associated relaunch in June 2011 the Minis-
ter of the Environment and Natural Resources called 
on businesses to participate in this international 
initiative. 
37
Although a proliferation of mining-related inter-
national activities can be identified, some Mexican 
actors complain of the lack of global regulation on 
money-laundering. The federal government and cer-
tain state governments (for example in Coahuila) are 
currently working together to investigate whether 
mafia cartels have now moved into the mining sector 
(most likely in coal mining). Suspicions of this kind 
fuel demands for international control regimes. 
 and 
is a member of the International Copper Study Group, 
the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), and the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals 
and Sustainable Development. The Chamber of Mines 
(CAMIMEX) is a member of the International Council 
on Mining and Metals (ICMM). 
Evaluation and Outlook 
Although mining is intimately bound up with Mexi-
can history and identity, today an explicit, compre-
hensive strategy that could bring together the various 
dimensions in a concrete mining plan is lacking. 
Although environmental regulations have been 
tightened, mining policy still focuses one-sidedly on 
funding SME projects and attracting investment. That 
said, the extremely dynamic developments of the 
past decade demonstrate that Mexico is already a very 
attractive mining location, while the expansion of 
exploration suggests that mining’s future will not be 
 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 
35  The Regional Center for the Support of the Global Com-
pact in Latin America and the Caribbean was established in 
October 2009 in Bogota, Colombia. 
36  United Nations Global Compact, Global Compact Relaunches 
Mexican NetworkQ\%&QQhttp://www.unglobalcompact. 
org/news/135-06--2011 (accessed September 5, 2012). 
37  Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), Mexico, 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-process/ 
participant/mexico (accessed September 10, 2012). 
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without social and ecological problems. Already 
miners’ working conditions are a political hot potato. 
In the General Coordination of Mines, which is located 
rather low in the ministry hierarchy, and other agen-
cies and institutions involved in governance, existing 
political and administrative structures are inadequate 
for tackling these questions. 
Promoting mining in a socially and environmen-
tally acceptable manner while preserving proftability 
and observing contracts remains an important task for 
the government of newly elected President Enrique 
Peña Nieto of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI). But key actors in the mining sector are not ex-
pecting meaningful change in mining policy. 
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Russia 
Ognian N. Hishow 
 
Russia is one of the world’s largest economies. Its 
economic system is clearly characterized by resource-
X+&	$QX$&	
&%$8%+	
capital concentrated in the raw materials sector. 
Extraction and processing contribute 33 percent of 
GDP and 70 percent of exports by volume. Almost all 
of its production of aluminum, copper, and nickel is 
exported, and numerous other minerals are exported 
unprocessed. The sector is largely inaccessible to for-
eign investors, but dependent on foreign know-how. 
Joining the WTO in 2012 and attaining the political 
insight that an opening of the resource sector is un-
avoidable are likely to encourage cooperation with 
the European Union and Germany. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
The Russian Federation’s wealth of metal resources 
is a function of its size. The country contains about 
15 percent of the world’s known metal reserves – in 
X$&	
&%$8&$X%'++#%
mineral fuels, mineral oils, and mineral products 
accounted for 65.7 percent of Russian exports.1 In 
2011 the mining sector accounted for almost 11 per-
cent of Russian GDP,2 %&'$=&Q&$&#3
Six of the world’s hundred largest mining compa-
nies are Russian (as of 2010).
 

 
1  Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, ed., Länderprofil 
Russische Föderation (Wiesbaden, 2009), p. Q+^""# 
destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Internationales/ 
Laenderprofile/Russfoederation.pdf (accessed May 15, 2012). 
 United Company Rusal 
is the world’s biggest aluminum producer, although it 
sources most of its materials from abroad. Russia owes 
2  GTAI, ed., Wirtschaftsdaten kompakt: Russische Föderation, May 
2012, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/ 
Y """X#84

&++&]=Q
2012). 
3  Richard M. Levine, “Russia [Advance Release],” in USGS, 
2009 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
February 2011), p. #Q^""'%&	+#++#gov/minerals/ 
pubs/country/2009/myb3-2009-rs.pdf (accessed May 15, 2012). 
4  Barry Sergeant, “Top 100 Mining Companies: What a Differ-
ence a Year Makes,” Mineweb, January 12, 2010, http://www. 
mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page67?oid=95737
&sn=Detail (accessed June 6, 2012). 
its leading position in aluminum smelting to its 
Siberian hydropower, which supplies comparatively 
inexpensive electricity for the energy-intensive pro-
cess. Russia is the international leader in refining 
nickel from ores (about 260,000 tonnes in 2010), and 
production is set to increase.5 Russia also occupied 
8	+
&%8$		$
$%$8+X&+$+4#
&	
&%$8$X	$
$%`Q'4#&	-

&%`Q%&'§='$%+4#&	
&%`# It held 
second place for aluminum (9.6 percent), industrial 
'$%+4#&	
&%`Q$+4#&	
&%`Q-
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$'4#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concentrates (1.9 percent), and tungsten (3.6 percent).6 
It is also the fifth-largest producer of copper. In 2009 
three firms were producing raw and refined copper: 
Norilsk Nickel, Ural Mining and Metallurgical Co. 
(UMMC), and ZAO Russian Copper Company (RCC). 
Russia’s iron ore reserves of 56 billion tonnes are the 
world’s largest.7 With an estimated 9,000 tonnes, 
Russia also possesses the third-largest gold reserves.
The Russian non-ferrous metals sector retains its 
importance for the world market. Russia is a reliable 
supplier for other countries, while external demand in 
turn creates jobs and stimulates investment in Russia. 
The extraction and processing of non-ferrous metals 
currently contributes 2.6 percent of Russian GDP and 
represents over one tenth of industrial production. 
Almost all produced nickel is exported (up to 95 per-
cent), a$%&	
&%$8'%'%X$
three quarters of lead, titanium, and zinc. One reason 
 
 
5  Research and Markets, ed., Russia Mining Report, Q2 2012, 
^""#	&+&	
%'	&+#
$'"	&$	+""'&+
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6  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), ed., World Mining Data (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). Ranking and figures calculated by adding 
figures for Russia (Asia) and Russia (Europe). 
7  InfoMine, ed., Mining in Russia and CIS, 2012, http://www. 
infomine.com/countries/soir/russia/welcome.asp (accessed 
]=Q`# 
8  Dave Brown, “Gold Mining in Russia,” Gold Investing News, 
!$<&'X&	QQ^""$%<&+%%&+#
$'""$-
mining-in-russia.html (accessed May 25, 2012); InfoMine, 
Mining in Russia and CIS, 2012 (see note. 7). 
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for this clear export orientation is that Russia pro-
duces more raw materials than are required for 
domestic consumption. WTO membership and the 
associated opening of its internal market will increase 
the pressure of competition faced by domestic pro-
ducers. In its growth strategy of 2011, Norilsk Nickel 
prioritizes diversification, planning to move into iron 
ore and coal mining and to increase its production of 
steel alloy metals (chromium and molybdenum). The 
company has announced investments worth $35 bil-
lion in new plants and technologies. It remains to be 
seen whether foreign firms will now find it easier to 
gain a foothold. The ownership structure in the min-
ing sector still features a very small proportion of 
foreign companies (in 2010 just 96 of 5571 registered 
firms, plus 125 joint ventures).9
One general problem for foreign direct investment 
and thus for the development of the Russian raw 
materials sector in the international arena is that the 
Russian state and Russian private investors are heavily 
involved both in the banks and directly in the mining 
sector. Thus the diamond firm Alrosa belongs to 
the state, the iron ore and steel company Evraz to the 
Abramovich and Frolov families, Severestal to the 
Mordashov family. Norilsk Nickel, the world’s leading 
producer of nickel, copper, and palladium, is also 
family-owned (by the Potanin and Prokhorov families; 
the Abramovich family is planning to get involved 
here again). The aluminum firm Rusal (Deripaska, 
Prokhorov, Vekselberg, Blavatnik families), Uralkali 
(Kerimov, Nesir, Galchev, Mutsoyev families), and 
Metalloinvest (Usmanov, Skoch families), to name 
but the most important, are also owned by private 
investors. 
 
Because Russia’s non-ferrous metals sector is con-
centrated largely in eastern Siberia, state-owned 
corporations from neighboring China are actively 
seeking investment opportunities, despite the afore-
mentioned problems. They favor deposits of non-
ferrous metals, especially lead and zinc (China con-
+'&&	
&%$8&$	¨+%
%`#Y%&	
a partnership agreement signed in 2009 by Lunsin, a 
subsidiary of Zijin Mining Group, and the eastern 
Siberian Tuva Republic, the Chinese will invest in 
the extraction and processing of lead-zinc ores. The 
Chinese NFC acquired a 50 percent stake in the $1.3 
billion expansion of a processing plant for polymetals 
in Ozerny (Buryatia). 
 
9  See Statistical Yearbook of the RF 2011, table 13.7. 
While Russia possesses large reserves of rare earth 
&&'&%+4X$'$%$%%&++$8`Q&
viably exploitable volume is smaller: for category one 
(the best) it is 1.'$%$%%&+#10
The economic viability of Russian rare earth extrac-
tion is limited. The larger deposits in the Murmansk, 
4`Q%	+	&$%+
$'	+&&	-
cent very meager apatite-nepheline ores containing 
no more than 1 percent rare earth elements.
 Russia’s rare earth 
production remains small. In 2009, 73,600 tonnes 
were extracted at eleven approved mining sites and 
6,500 tonnes of concentrate produced. Converted into 
TR2O3, the produced carbonate amounted to 1,900 
tonnes. 
11 Richer 
deposits are found in northeastern Yakutia, where the 
Tomtor deposit is reported to contain ores with rare 
earth 
$%&%<&	%&	
&%4%$&	-
cent). However, production in Tomtor has not yet been 
licensed; harsh natural conditions such as the polar 
winter cause difficulties, as do strict environmental 
requirements associated with radioactive by-products. 
Although the Russian Federation possesses one third 
of global reserves of rare earth elements, it is esti-
mated to need at least ten years to build up adequate 
capacities in this sector.12 Russia exported about 2,000 
tonnes of rare earth elements annually from 2000 to 
2009, but still has to rely on imports from China, the 
United States and the United Kingdom to cover its 
own needs (about 2,000 to 3,000 tonnes annually).13
After South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the United 
States, Russia has the world’s fourth-largest known 
reserves of platinum group metals (PGMs). In 2010 the 
&$X&	&+&	<&+&	&X$Q$%%&+Q
and during the 2000s PGM extraction averaged about 
150 tonnes annually. Almost 90 percent of produced 
platinum group metals are exported.
 

 
10  IAZ Mineral, ed., Russia’s Raw Materials Complex, Rare Earth 
Elements (in Russian), http://www.mineral.ru/Facts/russia/ 
index.html (accessed October 12, 2012). 
 Known reserves 
of the better categories (A-B-C) remained roughly con-
11  A. K. Masurov, Introduction to Geological Exploration 
(in Russian), 2009, http://window.edu.ru/library/pdf2txt/299/ 
75299/56009/page7. 
12  Alfred Kueppers, “Russia Is in No Position to Fill the Gap” 
(in Russian), InfoSMI, October 22, 2011, http://www.inosmi.ru/ 
&
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2012). 
13  IAZ Mineral, ed., Russia’s Raw Materials Complex, Rare Earth 
Elements (in Russian) (see note 10). 
14  IAZ Mineral, ed., Platinum Group Metals (in Russian), March 
Q^""#'%&	#	">
+"	++"""#8
(accessed October 12, 2012). 
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have grown somewhat since 2009. Practically the 
entire PGM production is in the hands of Norilsk 
Nickel (in the Krasnoyarsk region) and its subsidiary 
Kola Enrichment Plant near Murmansk on the Kola 
Peninsula. Regional concentration is also strong, with 
95 percent of production coming from Krasnoyarsk. 
The Raw Materials Policy 
Institutional Setting 
At the national level the president and the following 
ministries and government agencies share significant 
responsibility for management and oversight of metal 
resources: the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Ecology (Ministerstvo prirodnykh resursov i ekologii 
Rossiskoi Federatsii, Minprirody), the Federal Agency 
for Subsoil Usage (Federalnoe agentstvo po nedro-
polzovaniyu, Rosnedra; subordinate to Minprirody), 
the Federal Service for Supervision in the Use of 
Natural Resources (Federalnaya sluzhba po nadzoru 
v sfere prirodopolzovaniya, Rosprirodnadzor), the 
Federal Service for Ecological, Technological, and 
Nuclear Supervision (Federalnaya sluzhba po eko-
logicheskomu, tekhnologicheskomu i atomnomu 
nadzoru), the Committee of the Federation Council 
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
(Komitet Soveta Federatsii po prirodnym resursam i 
okhrane okruzhayushchei sredy), the State Commis-
sion on Mineral Reserves (Gosudarstvennaya komissiya 
po zapazam polesnykh izkopaemykh – FBU “GKS”), 
and other federal agencies such as the Geological 
Committee (Geolkom). 
The central government also pays specialist com-
panies and institutes to supply geological services, 
including the state-run Central Research Institute of 
Geological Prospecting for Base and Precious Metals 
(Tsentralnyi nauchno-issledovatelskii geologorazve-
dochnyi institut tsvetnykh i blagorodnykh metallov, 
TSNIGRI) and the N. M. Fedorovsky All-Russian 
Research Institute of Mineral Raw Materials (VIMS, 
also state-run). Below the federal level, territorial 
administrations and municipal geological agencies 
also play a role. 
Cooperation between regional and local adminis-
trations on matters of resource exploration and utili-
zation is coordinated by the Government Commission 
on the Fuel and Energy Complex and Regeneration of 
the Mineral Raw Materials Base. The Constitution of 
the Russian Federation stipulates that the earth’s 
interior within the country’s borders is property of the 
state. It cannot be sold, given away, or inherited. On 
the other hand, resources extracted from the earth’s 
interior may be subject to all kinds of economic activi-
ty and pass into the ownership of involved actors, 
including regional and local authorities. Below the 
federal level, local authorities make their own deci-
sions about the use of the earth’s interior within their 
boundaries. But because licensing is conducted on the 
basis of tendering (auctions) regulated by federal min-
ing law (see below, p. ), federal and local instances 
make licensing decisions by mutual agreement.15
Concepts and Strategies 
 
There is great debate in Russia as to whether its rich 
mineral and energy resources represent a blessing or 
a curse. In academic circles, in the big cities of Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, and abroad, the resource depend-
ency of the Russian economy and the country as a 
whole is regarded critically. Studies of the so-called 
resource curse demonstrate that economies with a 
strong concentration on resource extraction tend to 
have greater income disparities than societies with 
stronger manufacturing and services sectors. Russia’s 
Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality) is 
considerably greater than the European Union’s and 
the United States’s, leading researchers to doubt the 
sustainability of resource-based growth and to warn 
against the prospect of the Russian state budget and 
national income spiraling into resource-dependency.16
On the other hand leading Russian politicians hail 
the country’s broad resource base as an advantage. 
The Russian modernization is based on the idea of 
efficiently using non-renewable natural resources to 
accelerate the process of catching up with the West 
economically. But government documents, including 
the latest concept for long-term economic develop-
ment through 2020, propose an innovation model for 
growth and development superseding the resource-
based model in the longer term. 
 
 
15  “Legislation on the Use of the Earths Interior” (in Russian), 
http://rudiplom.ru/lecture/ekologicheskoe-	<$"#'
(accessed October 12, 2012). 
16  For a concise discussion see, for example S. N. Bobylev, 
Modernization and the Raw Material Model for the Economy (in Rus-
sian), November 10, 2010, http://www.alternativy.ru/ru/node/ 
4
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Mining is organized and regulated on the basis of 
laws, decrees, and state programs. The Mining Law of 
the Russian Federation of February 1992, which has 
been amended many times, regulates the awarding 
of licenses for geological exploration, development of 
deposits, and extraction from waste tips. Other legal 
foundations include the Law on Precious Metals and 
Precious Stones and the Environmental Protection Law. The 
executive institution is the Geological Committee 
(Geolkom) and its regional departments, which are 
responsible for licensing mining activities. Once 
a mining company has received a license it pays fees 
for utilization rights, as well as taxes, octroi duties, 
and other levies. Where deposits are already partially 
exhausted, discounts may be granted on the license 
dues. 
Russia’s raw materials strategy is defined in a num-
ber of documents, of which Government Decree No. 494 
on the Use of the Earth’s Interior, the long-term Minprirody 
Program for Exploration and Expansion of the Resource Base 
of the Russian Federation, and Decree No. 1039, Strategy 
for Developing the Geological Sector Until 2030 of June 21, 
2010, are especially pertinent.17
Reflecting the central role of the state, most explo-
ration companies are state-run or share companies 
controlled by Rosnedra, with the Russian Federation 
as principal shareholder. Nonetheless, the state leaves 
important activities to the private sector. State-owned 
companies account for 20 percent of spending on 
exploration of deposits of non-energy raw materials, 
private-+&
$	8	'+&	
&%#	&+&
$+&
structure, it is planned to strengthen the role of Rus-
sian small and medium-sized businesses. 
 The latter document, 
describing the long-term development of the mining 
sector through 2030, was signed by then Prime Minis-
ter Putin. It treats the mining sector as a fundamental 
component of the Russian economy contributing to 
realization of the country’s geopolitical interests, 
which extend to the world oceans and the Arctic. 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
Promotion of Exploration and Investment 
Moscow is currently planning to expand the produc-
tion of important metals sharply by 2030, with copper 
production to rise by 27 percent compared with 2012, 
 
17  Document at http://www.asgeos.ru/article/233.html 
(accessed October 12, 2012). 
gold by 19 percent, nickel by 13 percent, and iron ore 
by 11 percent.
To achieve these targets and increase production 
by opening up new deposits, ways are being sought 
to strengthen the role of the private sector. Decree 
No. 1039 of 2010 establishes a legal basis for funding 
exploration projects through share capital, guarantee-
ing natural and legal persons who discover a deposit 
the right to participate in extraction even if the depos-
it is of national economic significance. 
 
Bureaucratic and other hurdles are also to be 
removed to make investment more attractive. Firstly, 
the list of minerals for which no public information 
is available has been reduced to beryllium, cobalt, 
nickel, niobium, lithium, certain rare earth elements, 
tantalum, and high-purity quartz, which the Russian 
Federation classified as strategic in 1996.19
Foreign Trade 
 Secondly, 
fees for geological data collected in the scope of state-
run geological expeditions were abolished, through a 
reform of the Law on Natural Resources that the govern-
ment of Federation laid before the State Duma in early 
2010. And thirdly, the list of “strategically important” 
companies has been reduced to lower market barriers. 
It is hoped that these moves will ease investment 
decisions. 
Foreign trade in many metals and metal ores is treated 
as a “strategic interest” relevant to national security, 
and correspondingly tightly regulated. Precious met-
als and their ores are subject to duties of 6.5 percent 
and export restrictions. Only one company is autho-
rized to export each precious metal. Other metals are 
merely subject to export duties or ad valorem taxes, 
although these can reach 50 percent in some cases. 
Certain metals, including aluminum, scrap nickel, 
and other scrap, are not permitted to fall below a par-
ticular minimum value per weight. It remains to be 
seen whether these export restrictions will be pruned 
back after Russia joins the WTO. Such measures are 
often justified in terms of “securing domestic supply” 
or “control over strategic resources.” 
The export of certain other raw materials is pro-
moted through special export incentives such as sub-
 
18  Decree No. 1039, Strategy for Developing the Geological Sector 
Until 2030 (in Russian), June 21, 2010, http://www.asgeos.ru/ 
article/233.html (accessed January 25, 2013). 
19  http://enc-dic.com/economic/Strategicheskie-Tovary-15177. 
html (accessed October 20, 2012). 
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sidized energy and transport costs. In this case Russia’s 
trading partners could initiate anti-dumping proceed-
ings under WTO rules. 
Cautious Opening to FDI 
Foreign mining companies currently have no access 
to deposits of diamonds, cobalt, lithium, nickel, nio-
bium, platinum group metals, tantalum, uranium, 
and certain other raw materials. Although certain 
Western corporations have been able to acquire Rus-
sian subsidiaries (Alcoa runs two aluminum smelters, 
for example), as a rule only Russian mining companies 
are permitted to use the earth’s interior – and only 
if they are at least 50 percent state-owned. While the 
Russian state and private sector are closely inter-
twined, the Russian Federation grants only weak 
protection to foreign investors, who mostly receive 
concessions only for small deposits or require a 
Russian joint-venture partner.20
There are, however, signs of an opening. In Decem-
ber 2011 the Russian Duma reformed two laws affect-
ing FDI. The acquisition of shares in strategic busi-
nesses remains in principle subject to approval, but 
the exempted share was increased from 10 to 25 per-
cent. Strategic businesses include the raw materials, 
defense, and media branches, as well as companies 
with a monopoly position or significance for national 
defense and security. The reform thus broadens the 
options for foreign investors and allows the list of 
strategic minerals and businesses to be “bypassed.”
 
21
The Russians emphasize that foreign venture 
capital and expertise are welcome in relation to 
the development of remote deposits.
 
However, foreign investors still need patience. Because 
the state plays a central role in managing exploration, 
granting licenses, and defining national interests, 
foreign access to the raw materials sector is likely to 
improve only slowly. 
22 According 
to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources,23
 
20  Dave Brown, “Gold Mining in Russia,” Gold Investing News, 
!$<&'X&	QQ ^""$%<&+%%&+#
$'""$-
mining-in-russia.html (accessed May 25, 2012). 
 pilot 
21  Norton Rose Group, ed., Russland lädt zu mehr Investitionen 
in die Rohstoffbranche ein, March 2012, http://www.hik-russland. 
de/images/stories/russland-wirtschaft-dateien/invest-rohstoff. 
pdf (accessed May 25, 2012). 
22  Basic Elements (in Russian), http://www.amtc.ru/ 
publications/articles/2691/ (accessed October 12, 2012). 
23  Interview with the author. 
projects approved at the highest level on a case-by-
case basis represent further steps toward easing inter-
national raw materials cooperation. Where approved, 
Russian and foreign companies may cooperate 
directly. 
Recycling: The Case of Rare Earth Elements 
While the development of rich but remote deposits is 
costly and time-consuming, the Russian Ministry of 
Natural Resources regards recovery from spoil as more 
viable. The reserves involved are sufficient to last for 
decades, and the technological wherewithal can be 
supplied by foreign partners. 
The very extensive spoil heaps left by five decades of 
apatite ore mining on the Kola Peninsula contain up 
to 2 percent rare earth elements. It is estimated that 
X$Q$%%&+$8		&&	&&'&%+
$X&
reclaimed annually. The apatite miner, OJSC Apatit, 
is a subsidiary of PhosAgro Holding, which is largely 
owned by the politician Andrei Guryev (70.9 percent 
share as of 2011). PhosAgro has to date expressed no 
intention of entering the rare earths business. It is 
problematic that the extraction licenses for areas 
where rare earth elements occur are held by a handful 
of owners who show particular inclination to invest in 
expanding their production. The biggest facilities, the 
Solikamsk Magnesium Plant (SMZ Perm region) and 
the Lovozersky Mining Company (LvZ, southeast of 
Murmansk), are controlled by the oligarch Suleyman 
Kerimov (co-owner of Uralkali), who has yet to show 
any interest in rare earth elements.25
Training of Engineers and Specialists 
 Nonetheless, 
more movement seems to be appearing in the rare 
earths market. A subsidiary of the Russian state nu-
clear operator Rossatom has expressed interest in 
acquiring the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant and the 
Lovozersky Mining Company. 
The great demand for skilled labor represents an enor-
mous challenge. In the course of the past fifteen years 
the number of university graduates in geology has 
fallen by 60 percent. An aging workforce and a chron-
ic inability to fill at least 10 percent of open posts have 
become a drag on growth. Currently there is a short-
age of about 20,000 young geologists, managers, and 
entrepreneurs, caused by a lack of incentives, image 
deficits, better advancement prospects in other 
branches, and unattractive working conditions in 
 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
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the more remote regions. As a result the average 
age of skilled workers has reached 50 to 60 years. In 
response, and in view of the great need for research 
in the mining sector, steps were taken in the 2000s to 
reverse the trend. Today the Russian Federation main-
tains thirty-four university institutes training highly 
skilled staff and the next generations of researchers. 
Transparency 
In terms of transparency and coherence of policy, 
Russia has long been regarded as rather unattractive 
for investors. The Fraser Institute’s Policy Potential 
Index placed Russia 71st out of 93 countries and 
regions.26 Nor does the Russian Federation participate 
in EITI. But it does rank third globally in the Revenue 
Watch Index (RWI), which assesses transparency of 
payments in the raw materials sector.27
The further the distance from the center, the 
weaker the control of the authorities and the larger 
the informal sector. According to the Duma, one third 
of companies operating in the scrap metal sector are 
unlicensed, bypassing the tax authorities as part of the 
black economy.
 Nonetheless, 
the Russian raw materials sector is marked by opacity, 
insider dealing, and bureaucratization. 

 
26  Fred McMahon and Miguel Cervantes, Fraser Institute 
Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2011/2012 (Vancouver, 
February 2012), p. 13, http://www.fraserinstitute.org/ 
uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/ 
publications/mining-survey-2011-2012.pdf (accessed May 
26, 2012). 
 In the Russian far east transnational 
Sino-Russian syndicates have sprung up, supplying 
metal ores and scrap to China. In view of the high 
unemployment rate in the Russian far east, the city’s 
proximity to markets in China, Japan, and Korea, 
presence of discharged military personnel, and low 
incomes, Vladivostok and the Pacific Fleet based there 
also play an active role in the illegal metal trade. The 
impact on the country’s legal exports is hard to assess. 
While the reduction in the legal supply causes prices 
to rise, the illegal supply has a price-reducing effect. 
“Resource criminality” is not restricted to the private 
sector. 
27  2010 Revenue Watch Index: Transparency: Governments and 
the Oil, Gas and Mining Industries (New York: Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2010), http://www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex2010/ 
pdf/RevenueWatchIndex_2010.pdf (accessed October 10, 
2012). 
28  Explanatory Text to Draft Law “Amendment to Federal Law on 
the Protection of Natural and Legal Persons …” (in Russian), http:// 
asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(ViewDoc)?OpenAgent&arhiv/ 
a_dz_5.nsf/ByID&3DBC1F2E05FCE3ECF. 
Since the beginning of the Putin era, the first-gener-
ation oligarchs have been largely brought under the 
control of the state bureaucracy, and “rent-seeking” 
in the sector can now be controlled administratively. 
Influential state instances now possess direct access to 
resource rents and can influence resource policy with-
out heed to economic efficiency. This tends to reduce 
the coherence of Russian raw materials policy. 
International Raw Materials Governance 
Russia participates in various international initiatives 
on mining and metal production. In 2005 it joined 
the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, 
Metals, and Sustainable Development (IGF), which 
emerged out of UNCTAD’s Global Dialogue on Mining, 
Metals and Sustainable Development. 
In order to secure international recognition of its 
documentation standards, the Russian Federation in 
+%&%	&&'&%&*$''&&8$	
Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards 
(CRIRSCO) of the International Council on Mining and 
Metals. Russia is a member of the International Study 
Group for Lead and Zinc, and its equivalent for nickel. 
However, Norilsk Nickel is not a member of the inter-
national business lobby organization, the Nickel 
Institute, in an indication that Moscow is keeping this 
strategic company on a tight rein. 
In the medium term WTO membership is likely to 
be helpful in integrating Russia into global govern-
ance structures for the raw materials sector. Although 
the examples of other WTO members show that uni-
lateralism still occurs and monopoly power can still 
be abused despite international agreements, the Rus-
sian economy relies heavily on raw materials and 
not – like the Chinese for example – largely on labor. 
Moscow will therefore continue to seek to generate 
revenue above all through raw materials exports and 
is unlikely to introduce blanket export restrictions. It 
will not massively violate WTO rules – which anyway 
do not fundamentally exclude export duties and taxes. 
With a few exceptions, Russian export duties on 
metals and critical raw materials are low, but there 
are widespread export restrictions and controls. Con-
sequently it is unclear what dynamics Russia’s WTO 
membership will initiate. With the production of 
metal ores largely in the hands of major Russian cor-
porations, it could remain difficult for foreign private 
firms to gain a foothold in the Russian mining indus-
try. At the same time WTO membership could help to 
expand Russia’s raw materials trade, if the lowering of 
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customs tariffs and the standardization of product 
norms removes trade barriers.29
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
Russian raw materials policy has traditionally been 
protectionist and keeps private actors – whether Rus-
sian or foreign – out of sectors regarded as “strategic.” 
These include no-go areas such as coastal waters 
and the continental shelf, all uranium deposits, and 
deposits containing more than 50 tonnes of gold or 
500,000 tonnes of copper.30
 
 From the perspective 
of Russian political leaders, its wealth of natural re-
sources gives the country an advantage over others. 
They hope to guide the economy to a new technologi-
cal path by exploiting this wealth. The Russians know 
that to achieve that they will need to create possibili-
ties for multilateral and bilateral cooperation. 
 
29  “Russlands Importe werden 2012 voraussichtlich weiter 
wachsen,” GTAI, March 9, 2012, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/ 
!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'4
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25, 2012); Florian Willershausen, Mathias Brüggmann, and 
Georg Watzlawek, “Deutschland profitiert von Russlands 
WTO-Beitritt,” Wirtschaftswoche, December 16, 2011, http:// 
www.wiwo.de/politik/ausland/welthandelsorganisation-
deutschland-profitiert-von-russlands-wto-X&	"# 
html (accessed May 25, 2012). 
30  Law N57-F3 $8$%	$
&	&+8$	%<&+'&%+	&%
to companies with strategic importance and security rele-
vance. 
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Saudi Arabia 
Eckart Woertz 
 
Saudi Arabia has three strategic raw materials 
priorities: (1) securing demand for its oil products 
by cooperating with Asian partners on refining and 
stockpiling; (2) supporting domestic energy supply 
and diversification in the petrochemicals sector by 
conserving gas reserves and developing nuclear and 
solar energy; (3) safeguarding its food supply through 
agricultural investment abroad and strategic stock-
piling at home.1
In comparison to energy and agricultural com-
modities, comprehensive strategic planning is less dis-
cernible for minerals and metals, which play a much 
smaller role in the Saudi economy. But individual 
products, such as aluminum, gold, phosphates, sulfur, 
and construction materials, are certainly significant. 
It is hoped that the mining sector will contribute to 
Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification.
 
2
Minerals in the National Economy 
 
Saudi Arabia’s extractive sector is dominated by 
energy. As the world’s biggest exporter of crude oil, 
'%&	$+%8&+'&&	
&%$8
exports, which in turn accounted for 57 percent of 
GDP in 2010.3
 
1  Giacomo Luciani, “GCC Refining and Petrochemical Sec-
tors in Global Perspective,” and “Domestic Pricing of Energy 
and Industrial Competitiveness,” in Resources Blessed: Diversifi-
cation and the Gulf Development Model, ed. Giacomo Luciani, 
pp. –212, 95–4 &	%Q012); “The Role of Nuclear 
Energy in GCC Economic Development,” in The Nuclear Ques-
tion in the Middle EastQ&#]&	%¬'	<Q#–4!&
York, 2012); Eckart Woertz, Oil for Food: The Global Food Crisis 
and the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, forth-
coming); “The Global Food Crisis and the Gulf’s Quest for 
Africa’s Agricultural Potential,” in Handbook of Land and Water 
Grabs in Africa: Foreign Direct Investments and Food and Water 
Security, ed. Tony Allen et #Q#–19 (London, 2012). 
 
2  Eckart Woertz, “The Mineral and Mining Industry of the 
GCC,” GRC Economics Research Bulletin (Dubai), October 2006 
(issue 2), pp. 2f. 
3  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Economy and Plan-
ning, Export Statistics Bulletin 2010, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/ 
english/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=
127&Itemid=113 (accessed April 27, 2012); World Bank, Ex-
ports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) (Washington, D.C., 2012), 
Metals like gold, copper, silver, and zinc are found 
principally in the western part of the country, while 
industrial minerals and the major oil deposits are in 
the east.
In 2010 Saudi Arabia produced barite, bauxite, 
copper, feldspar, gypsum, gold, iron, kaolin, lead, 
magnesite, salt, silver, sulfur, and zinc, but exceeded 
5 percent of global production only for sulfur.
 Saudi Arabia has a notable gold-mining sec-
tor and a well developed cement industry. With 0.3 
percent of global production of non-energy raw 
materials (by weight), Saudi Arabia is one of the G20 
countries with weak raw materials production (2010). 
5 There 
are also undeveloped reserves of bentonite, chro-
mium, iron, fluorite, mica, tungsten, and tin, as well 
as various types of rocks.6
The value of non-energy extraction amounted to 
US$659 million in 2010, representing just 0.2 percent 
of GDP and 0.11 percent of total exports. Exports of 
construction materials, earths, salt, sulfur, and stone 
'$%&$Y['$%Q$+&$8$	&+Q+&+Q%
slag just US$26 million.
 Aluminum (bauxite), con-
struction materials, gold, phosphates, and sulfur form 
the bulk of Saudi mining activities; projects for iron 
ore, copper, and niobium and tantalum are in plan-
ning. 
7
 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS (accessed 
	Q`# 
 
4  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources, Minerals – Background (Riyadh, May 2, 
2009), http://www.mopm.gov.sa/mopm/detail.do?content= 
min_bg (accessed April 27, 2012). 
5  Ibid. 
6  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Petroleum and Min-
eral Resources, Metallic Raw Minerals (Riyadh, May 2, 2009), 
http://www.mopm.gov.sa/mopm/detail.do?content=min_bg_
metallic (accessed April 27, 2012); Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Non-metallic 
Raw Minerals (Riyadh, May 2, 2009), http://www.mopm.gov.sa/ 
mopm/detail.do?content=min_bg_nonmetallic (accessed 
April 27, 2012); Ashgill Australia, “Kaolin in Saudi Arabia,” 
http://www.ashgill.com.au/pdfs/Kaolin%20in%20Saudi%20 
Arabia.pdf (accessed April 27, 2012). 
7  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics 
and Information, Gross Domestic Product by Kind of Economic 
Activity at Current Prices, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/index. 
php?option=com_docman&Itemid=151 (accessed April 27, 
2012); Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Minstry of Economy and 
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The Al-Jalamid mine is the pride of Ma’aden, which 
is far and away the country’s largest mining company 
and largely state-owned. The project is one of the 
world’s largest phosphate mines, with proven reserves 
of 1.6 billion tonnes and another 1.5 billion tonnes 
suspected. A US$3.2 billion processing complex is 
being built at Jubail to produce chemicals, cleaning 
agents, animal feed, and 3 million tonnes of diammo-
nium phosphate fertilizers (DAP) annually. This will 
make Saudi Arabia the world’s third-largest DAP ex-
porter, with a 10 percent share of global trade. DAP 
production began in early 2012. Phosphates are now 
reported to account for more than 60 percent of the 
value of Ma’aden, which is already considering devel-
oping further reserves at Al-Khabra in the Umm Wual 
area.
Otherwise, Ma’aden concentrates on aluminum. 
A joint venture with Alcoa is developing the Arabian 
Peninsula’s first integrated aluminum project, at 
Al-Zabirah in the north of the country. This connects 
a bauxite mine to an aluminum smelter at Ras al-Zour 
on the Gulf coast with a capacity of 623,000 tonnes 
&	%%'#&%	$
$%X&%+%]¨&%
will become one of the region’s largest aluminum 
producers alongside Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA) and 
Dubai Aluminium (DUBAL). 
 Because other chemicals required for DAP 
production, principally ammonia and sulfur, are also 
available on favorable terms, Al-Jalamid will make 
Ma’aden one of the world’s most competitive DAP 
producers. 
Gold has been extracted in Saudi Arabia for long-
er than oil. The American mining engineer Karl 
S. Twitchell began prospecting for metals in the 
1930s, and the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate he 
co-founded opened the Mahd al-Dhahab gold mine 
in 1939.9
 
Planning, Export Statistics Bulletin 2010, pp. 6–Q–13, http:// 
www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/index.php?option=com_docman& 
task=cat_view&gid=127&Itemid=113 (accessed April 27, 2012). 
 It and four other gold mines are today oper-
ated by Ma’aden, which plans to increase its annual 
8  Al Rajhi Capital, “Ma’aden Phosphate Drives Valuation,” 
+QQ^""
$%&%#	'#
$'#+-external-3. 
'$%+#
$'"
-393e--&-X#8 
(accessed September 29, 2012). 
9  Karl Saben Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, with an Account of the 
Development of Its Natural ResourcesQ&#4	%
&$%Q`#
Twitchell’s personal papers are held by Seeley G. Mudd Manu-
script Library at Princeton University, http://findingaids. 
	%
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September 27, 2012). 
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	$
$%X=&	
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Q$Q
ounces.10
Saudi Arabia is a major sulfur exporter, with a glo-
bal market share of more than 5 percent. Its main 
markets are China, Brazil, India, and Morocco. Most 
production is exported, with less than 10 percent 
remaining in the country. Given that sulfur occurs as 
an unavoidable by-product of sour gas (mainly in the 
Berri, Shedgum, and Uthmaniyah fields in the eastern 
provinces), additional opportunities to use it, as of-
fered by Ma’aden’s Al-Jalamid project, are more than 
welcome.
 
11
The Ghurayyah tantalum deposits are among the 
world’s largest, comparable with the Greenbushes and 
Wodgina mines in Australia that accounted for about 
8$8$X	$
$%%Q&%they had to 
suspend operations because of economic difficulties.
 
12
Saudi Arabia also possesses smaller reserves of iron 
ore, copper, magnesite, and zinc. Experts believe that 
new and more significant deposits could be found 
if deep drilling and detailed mapping were to expand 
the limits of existing geological knowledge. Ma’aden 
already mines magnesite, while joint ventures by 
private mining companies are in various stages of 
exploration for the other three. 
 
Tantalum is vital for the manufacture of computers 
and cellphones. Ghurayyah also contains reserves of 
niobium and rare earth elements. The British Tertiary 
Minerals acquired a five-year license in 2002, but 
whether this can be extended has remained unclear 
for unstated reasons since 2007. 
Steady expansion of infrastructure has also in-
creased demand for construction materials such 
as glass, sand, steel, stone, and cement.13
 
10  Al Rajhi Capital, “Ma’aden Phosphate Drives Valuation” 
(see note 
 Domestic 
production of these is to increase accordingly: sand 
and gravel from 300 million tonnes in 2010 to 370 
'$%$%%&+%Q cement raw materials from 
 $'$%$%%&+Q%
&'&%8	$'Q$
). 
11  Samir Pradhan, “World Sulphur Industry Trends: A Gulf 
&	+&
<&Q·%X+&$	%&	QXQ
8	$'&%*$%+%+Q# 
12  For analyses of the global tantalum market see http:// 
www.polinares.eu/docs/d2-1/polinares_wp2_annex2_ 
factsheet2_v1_10.pdf and http://www.ttiinc.com/object/ 
'&$X#' (accessed July 22, 2012). 
13  Philip M. Mobbs, “Saudi Arabia [Advance Release],” in 
USGS, 2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International 
(Reston, January 20`Q##Q^""'%&	+#usgs.gov/ 
minerals/pubs/country/2010/myb3-2010-sa.pdf (accessed 
April 26, 2012). 
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million tonnes. Although Saudi Arabia has a relatively 
advanced construction materials industry, it is still de-
pendent on imports. The low-price segment is largely 
covered by Asian suppliers, while high-quality mate-
rials mostly come from Germany and other EU mem-
ber states.
The Gulf steel industry produces for the domestic 
market, and Saudi Arabia is a net importer of iron 
and +&&#%&	
&%$8
$%+'$%+
imported.
 
15 There is vigorous demand from construc-
tion and plant engineering, whose growth is driven 
by population and economic growth. According to 
estimates by the Australian iron ore producer Grange 
Resources, which explored the possibility of engage-
men%&	&$%%Q&'%8$		$%$	&&-
lets for gas-based direct reduction will rise from 5 mil-
$%$%%&+%$'$%$%%&+%Q and 
50 million tonnes in 2017.16
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
The state occupies a dominant position in Saudi 
Arabia’s economic structures, and its reach extends 
far beyond distributive and regulatory functions. The 
largest companies, such as the oil company Aramco, 
the petrochemicals giant SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries 
Corporation), and the utility companies are largely or 
fully state-owned. The state also decisively influences 
the private sector through orders, public/private co-
operation, and advantageous financing through state 
funds like the Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
(SIDF) and Public Investment Fund (PIF). The private 
sector is most active in commerce, services, and con-
struction, but has also advanced into petrochemicals 
and mining. 
Although the Saudi state is hierarchically central-
ized around the royal family’s consensual decision-
 
14  Robert Espey, “Saudi-Arabien bietet Chancen für hoch-
wertige Baumaterialien,” GTAIQ\%&QQ^""# 
#&""!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'
(accessed May 26, 2012). 
15  NCB Capital, In Focus: The Saudi Steel Sector, Research Report, 
&&'X&	QQ^""##
$'"&%-US/About%20Us/ 
!&+&$	+"
$%$'
&$	"$
'&%+"%"& 
&&&&
$	&$	#
pdf (accessed September 27, 2012). 
16  Grange Resources, Southdown Magnetite and Kemaman Pellet 
Project, Project Update 2007, company presentation. Smelting 
with coke is not practiced in the Gulf states. 
making, it is also highly institutionally fragmented. 
In a system of “segmented clientelism” that has grown 
up over decades, individual ministries function as fief-
doms of different members of the House of Saud and 
their clients (clans, religious dignitaries, business fam-
ilies, other intermediaries).17
Alongside this fragmented institutional structure, 
state-owned companies like Saudi Aramco and SABIC 
have acquired notable freedoms. They are free from 
political interference and can often bypass adminis-
trative licensing procedures. The Saudi state ensures 
they are insulated from often phlegmatic bureaucratic 
structures and their political allocation mechanisms. 
These “efficiency islands” are expected to dedicate 
themselves above all to profit maximization.
 Ministries communicate 
little with one another, even though their spheres of 
competence overlap. The bloated bureaucratic appa-
ratuses have only limited reach within society, which 
creates further difficulties when it comes to imple-
mentation. This can even affect the impact of central 
directives from the king. 

Joint ventures with foreign minority partners are 
well established in Saudi Arabia, as an instrument 
for importing technical know-how and management 
practices. The 
 The 
leading Saudi Arabian mining company also stands in 
this tradition. Ma’aden was founded in 1997 to devel-
op Saudi minerals more extensively, especially to 
move beyond extraction of gold and non-metals. Origi-
nally fully state-owned, half the company was floated 
%# %$$8&+&+	&+	&X
8$Q
as a considerable proportion are held by state pension 
funds. 
Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA) was established in 2000 to attract 
international capital and initiate joint ventures in 
both the private and the public sector. SAGIA’s pur-
pose is to centralize administrative procedures for 
foreign investors and thus help to overcome vertical 
bureaucratic segmentation. Although various minis-
tries delegate representatives to SAGIA, it has never 
succeeded in overcoming the procrastinating resis-
tance of various bureaucracies. In particular the Min-
istry of Commerce and Industry and Interior Ministry, 
which issue necessary licenses, have insisted on their 
autonomy. 
 
17  Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the 
State in Saudi Arabia (London, 2010). 
18  Steffen Hertog, “Defying the Resource Curse: Explaining 
Successful State-Owned Enterprises in Rentier States,” World 
Politics 62, no. 2 (2010): 261–301. 
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SAGIA is also involved in strategic planning of eco-
nomic diversification and associated infrastructure 
measures. Creating jobs for its growing young popu-
lation is a top priority for Saudi Arabia, which aims to 
strengthen the private sector because the state alone 
can no longer provide the required jobs. The state has 
conducted cautious partial privatizations and floated 
shares in state-owned companies at discounted prices, 
partly as a means of redistributing oil wealth. The 
market capitalization of the Saudi stock market is the 
largest in the Middle East, but foreigners remain ex-
cluded from investing directly. Private Saudi compa-
nies have used the stock exchange to raise capital for 
new petrochemicals companies, and similar moves 
by private mining companies are conceivable. 
The Saudi Geological Survey (SGS) is an independ-
ent agency under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources. It was founded in 
1999 out of various predecessors, including the former 
Directorate General for Mineral Resources and the 
missions of the U.S. Geological Survey and the French 
Bureau de Recherche Géologiques et Minières, which 
operated in the country until 1999. The SGS has a 
branch in Riyadh, but its headquarters is in Jeddah, 
in the geological formation of the Neoproterozoic 
Arabian Shield. This western mountain region extend-
ing north-south the length of the Hejaz is the location 
of most of Saudia Arabia’s known and suspected min-
eral reserves. The SGS concentrates on basic geological 
survey work, but may also conduct project-specific 
research for public and private companies. 
The mining sector remained firmly in the hands 
of state-owned Ma’aden until 2005, when new mining 
legislation opened the sector to private investors. 
Since then, a series of joint ventures have been initi-
ated: Australia’s Alara Resources holds a mining 
license for zinc and copper jointly with United Ara-
bian Mining; Canada’s Diamond Fields International 
and the Saudi Manafa International Trade are explor-
ing for copper, silver, and zinc at a depth of 2,000 
meters in the Red Sea, 115 kilometers off Jeddah; and 
the British London Mining and Saudi National Mining 
own a license to produce iron ore at Wadi Sawawin, 
where 5 million tonnes of iron ore pellets could be 
produced annually (although the quality of the ore is 
poor according to experts).19
 
19  Mobbs, “Saudi Arabia [Advance Release]” (see note 
 
13); 
telephone interview with a Saudi ministerial adviser, Sep-
tember 17, 2012. 
Concepts and Strategies 
Because of their lesser economic significance, non-
energy minerals and metals play a smaller role in 
strategic thinking, whereas oil, gas, and food see 
greater institutional cooperation and the beginnings 
of strategic policy development (at the King Abdullah 
Petroleum Studies and Research Center, the King 
Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, and 
the King Abdullah Initiative for Agricultural Invest-
ments Abroad, founded for that purpose). The publi-
cations of the SGS and the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources are more technical in nature. It 
must also be remembered that Saudi Arabia is a ren-
tier state with restricted transparency and political 
participation, whose bureaucratic capacities and 
procedures are not comparable with OECD states or 
emerging economies. Official statements and policy 
papers are therefore less frequent and less extensive. 
In the country’s fragmented institutional structure 
they may also originate from different official in-
stances and contain contradictory information. 
Minerals and metals are regarded above all as a 
means of economic diversification, especially phos-
phates and aluminum. Known deposits are to be 
extracted and ideally used to establish processing 
industries. In areas where Saudi Arabia is dependent 
on imports, such as construction materials and iron 
ore, concern over security of supply can be observed. 
Export restrictions have been imposed and capital 
invested in foreign mines. Because of its large foreign 
currency reserves, Saudi Arabia could also develop an 
interest in deploying its gold deposits for currency 
diversification. 
Phosphates have become the core business of Saudi 
Arabia’s most important mining company Ma’aden, 
and aluminum will become a second important pillar 
%Q&	&+$&	%+	'&+ay a sub-
ordinate role.20
After petrochemicals, aluminum is another branch 
where the Gulf states wish to extend the value chain 
 With a target global market share of 
10 percent for DAP fertilizer, Ma’aden is in the pro-
cess of establishing itself as a global actor (similar 
to SABIC, founded in the 1970s and now one of the 
world’s biggest petrochemicals producers). The goal is 
to combine cheap energy supplies and local mineral 
resources to create successful export industries, espe-
cially for the booming Asian market. 
 
20  Al Rajhi Capital, Ma’aden Phosphate Drives Valuation 
(see note ). 
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of their energy production. With energy represent-
ing $&	
&%$8'%'	$
$%
$++Q
cheap gas gives the Gulf states a competitive advan-
tage. According to the Gulf Organization for Industrial 
Consulting (GOIC), they are planning to increase their 
global market share from 10 to 15 or 17 percent by 
2020.21 The Indian Tata Group, which owns Jaguar 
Land Rover (JLR), cited cheap aluminum supplies from 
Al-Zabirah as a reason to consider building a car plant 
in Saudi Arabia.22
Saudi Arabia has kept its gold reserves largely stable 
+%
&Q%=++$%+&8$X&$=$	
investor. Rather than hoarding gold, Saudia Arabia 
has sold its own production via its central bank, the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA).
 Creating jobs and establishing a 
manufacturing sector that does more than produce 
raw materials are high priorities for the Saudi govern-
ment. 
23 In 2011 
SAMA President Muhammad al-Jasser denied there was 
any interest in using gold as a diversification instru-
ment, because of its great price volatility. But this 
statement contradicts an estimate published by the 
World Gold Council a year previously indicating a 
doubling of Saudi gold reserves to 323 tonnes. The 
revision resulted from a change in SAMA’s accounting 
methods.25
 
21  “GCC to Raise Global Share of Aluminum Output to 15%,” 
Saudi Gazette, July 12, 2012, http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/ 
index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20120712129696 
(accessed July 22, 2012). 
 This would appear to offer further evi-
dence of the international gold market’s infamous 
lack of transparency. Because it holds such large for-
eign currency reserves – more than US$500 billion – it 
would come as no surprise if Saudi Arabia undertook 
some kind of diversification. The country’s own gold 
production could acquire growing importance as part 
of such a strategic currency diversification. 
22  “Global Auto Giant Plans Assembly Plant in Saudi Arabia,” 
Arab News, September 1, 2012, http://www.arabnews.com/ 
economy/global-auto-giant-plans-assembly-plant-kingdom 
(accessed September 27, 2012). 
23  Interviews with a former SAMA official, Dubai, September 
Q%>	%8	Q+Q# 
24  Martin Dokoupil, “Gold too Speculative to Buy, Says Saudi 
Central Bank Chief,” Al Arabiya, Ocotber 16, 2011, http://www. 
	X=#%&"	
&+""""#'4
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tember 27, 2012). 
25  “Saudi Gold Reserve Guesstimate Doubles,” BBC News, June 
QQ^""#XX
#
$#"%&+"4
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tember 27, 2012); World Gold Council, Reserve Statistics, http:// 
www.gold.org/government_affairs/gold_reserves/ (accessed 
July 22, 2012). 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
Investment Law 
In 1995 the Deputy Ministry for Mineral Resources 
identified four measures for a comprehensive mining 
strategy: modernize the mining law, build a railroad 
to Al-Jalamid and Al-Zabirah, establish a new national 
mining company, and found the SGS.26 The railroad 
is close to completion, Ma’aden was founded in 1997, 
the SGS in 2000. Also in 2000, SAGIA was established 
and a new foreign investment law passed, allowing 
foreign-owned firms full ownership in certain sectors 
including mining. For example, in 2011 Australia’s 
Citadel Resources took full control of Bariq Mining, 
its gold and copper joint venture with the Saudi Con-
solidated Mining Company Investments. The project 
was then sold on to Canada’s Equinox, which was in 
turn taken over by Barrick Mining in 2011. However, 
the start of production has been postponed from 2012 
$X&
+&$8%$%-compliance with Saudi safety 
and security standards. Since 2000 foreign firms have 
been entitled to the same benefit as domestic Saudi 
ones, including advantageous financing from SIDF. 
Taxation of foreign companies was reduced in 
8	$'$&	
&%Q27 but still remains higher than 
the 2.5 percent Islamic “zakat” that is paid by domes-
tic firms on profits and parts of the capital.
Saudi Mining Law 
 Goods 
required for industrial manufacturing are exempt 
from import duties. 
Un&		
&$8	X¨+Basic Governing 
Law,29 all minerals on or below the earth’s surface 
belong to the state, which is also the biggest land-
owner.30
 
26  Zuhair A. Nawab, Mining as a Pillar of Economic Diversifica-
tion: How Can the Kingdom Achieve This Vision? background paper 
(Riyadh: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, 
2002). 
 The abolition of collective tribal control of 
grazing rights in 1925 and the introduction of a 
formal registration system in 1952 gave the Saudi 
state ownership of large areas of land, which it has 
27  Al Swailem Consulting Group, Doing Business in the 
Kingdom, October 2005, http://www.agn-waa.org/pdf/Doing 
BusinessInKingdom.pdf (accessed September 12, 2012). 
28  KPMG, Corporate Tax Rates Table, http://www.kpmg.com/ 
global/en/whatwedo/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/ 
corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx (accessed September 17, 2012). 
29  The official constitution is the Koran and the Sunnah. 
30  Nawab, Mining as a Pillar of Economic Diversification 
(see note 26). 
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been distributing to build and maintain clientelist 
networks especially since the 1970s.31
Mining companies must complete the same 
approval process as all others, which centers on 
registration by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry. Under the Mining Law of 2005 licenses 
are awarded by the Deputy Ministry for Mineral 
Resources; Article 50 grants the state a right of 
participation after successful exploration.
 
32
Opening the Mining Sector, International Raw 
Materials Governance, and Trade Policy Measures 
 
As the examples of SAGIA and the part privatization 
of Ma’aden demonstrate, Saudi Arabia is seeking to 
strengthen the private sector and foreign direct invest-
ment in mining. Saudi Arabia’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization in 2005 served as a pacemaker for 
domestic economic reforms. In the sphere of trade 
liberalization, it is interested in achieving better mar-
ket access for its petroleum products. This could also 
=$'%'&%	$
$%X&%+%#
WTO negotiations are hampered by fragmented 
bureaucratic structures and restricted capacities.33 At 
the level of international organizations, Saudi Arabia 
plays a comparatively reserved role. Unlike Qatar and 
Qatar Petroleum, neither Saudi Arabia nor any Saudi 
mining company is a member of the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
An expanding heavy industry and a vigorous con-
struction sector in the Gulf region bring with them 
increasing worries about raw materials supplies. 
In the interest of securing its supply, Saudi Arabia 
X%%&&$	+$8+%Q+&&Q%
&'&%%#
These were partially lifted in 2009 but reimposed in 
2011 and 2012.
 
35
 
31  Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged 
Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA, 2010); Kiren Aziz 
Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in 
the Middle East, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, 
1997). 
 There is particular concern about 
32  Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Mining Code, 
http://www.saudiinfocon.com/dmmr/mining-code.htm (accessed 
September 12, 2012). 
33  Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats (see note 17). 
34  EITI, Stakeholders, http://eiti.org/supporters/companies 
(accessed September 12, 2012). 
35  “Kingdom Stops Cement Exports again as Local Demand 
Rises,” Saudi Gazette, February 15, 2012, http://www. 
saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon& 
contentID=20120215117617 (accessed September 27, 2012); 
“Contractors Seek Ways of Tackling Sand Crisis,” Gulf Daily 
NewsQ!$<&'X&	Q2009, http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/ 
!&+&+#++$	=4
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&'X&	Q
natural gas, which is scarce in all member states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council apart from Qatar. In the 
smaller Gulf states the same also applies to alumina, 
the intermediate product refined from bauxite. In 
order to meet its demand, Dubai Aluminium (DUBAL) 
has invested in alumina refineries in Guinea and the 
Indian state of Orissa. Given that Ma’aden’s Al-Zabirah 
project can draw on domestic bauxite deposits, com-
parable bauxite or alumina acquisitions by Saudi 
Arabia are unlikely in the immediate future. But the 
country is dependent on imported ore for its steel 
industry and has invested in foreign iron ore mines. 
Environmental Protection, Sustainability, and Recycling 
Environmental protection, sustainability, and recy-
cling have to date been rather secondary considera-
tions in Saudi policy. One exception is the shortage of 
water, which represents a serious production problem 
for mining (especially gold). The applied solutions in-
clude recycling used water, introducing water-saving 
techniques, tapping fossil water reserves by deep dril-
ling, and – where production sites are not too far 
inland – the costly option of piping in desalinated 
seawater.36
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
The contribution of metals und minerals to Saudi GDP 
and exports is small. The country has no major manu-
facturing industry and little demand for associated 
raw material imports, apart from steel and other con-
struction materials. Confidence in the functioning of 
international markets and their ability to provide the 
necessary supplies is more robust in this area than in 
the case of food. 
Mining is valued as a means of economic diversi-
fication, and its expansion has been vigorously en-
couraged since 2005. Phosphates and aluminum are 
most important. With its domestic bauxite reserves, 
Saudi Arabia’s nascent aluminum industry will be 
independent of raw material imports – unlike the 
United Arab Emirates, where Dubai Aluminium 
(DUBAL) has invested abroad to secure supplies. But 
in the case of iron ore the Saudi company Hadeed 
 
2012); “Bahrain Asks to be Excluded from Saudi Steel Export 
Ban,” Arab Steel, February 3, 2012, http://www.arabsteel.info/ 
$"$%%&+$&#+4
cessed September 27, 
2012). 
36  Interview with a Saudi consultant, Stockholm, August 29, 
2012. 
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has made such investments. It is also conceivable that 
the importance of Saudi gold mines could increase 
if Saudi Arabia decides to more strongly diversify its 
foreign currency reserves in view of global financial 
crises. 
If minerals and metals are to gain greater strategic 
weight in Saudi planning, bilateral approaches are 
likely to dominate (as in other policy fields). At the 
level of multilateral institutions like the G20, Saudi 
Arabia has to date generally exercised restraint. Ad-
ministrative capacities are often insufficient to com-
municate quickly and effectively at the institutional 
level with international organizations. 
 
 
Minerals in the National Economy 
SWP Berlin / BGR Hannover 
A Comparative Analysis of the  
Raw Materials Strategies of the G20 
March 2013 
 
 
125 
South Africa 
Denis M. Tull* 
 
South Africa is one of the world’s most resource-rich 
countries. More than sixty minerals are extracted 
there, so mining is very diverse and half of all leading 
international mining companies are active in the 
country. Nevertheless, the sector is currently experi-
encing a structural crisis. Domestic problems such as 
infrastructure inadequacies (e.g. transport and energy) 
and regulatory deficits prevented South Africa from 
benefiting from the global resource boom of 2001 to 
Q&&+X+&§&%$X&
$%$'
'&t-
down – followed by the Euro crisis – entailed further 
negative effects. Since 2009, there has also been an 
ongoing debate about strengthening regulation and 
even nationalization. The Chamber of Mines of South 
Africa called the present situation a “decade […] of lost 
opportunities.”1
Minerals in the National Economy 
 While South Africa has no explicit 
raw materials strategy, the government places great 
weight on mining because of its potential to help 
reduce poverty and unemployment. It remains un-
clear how exactly these goals are to be reached. The 
potential for political and social conflagration in the 
mining sector came to light in August 2012, when 
protests by striking miners escalated into violence 
and thirty-four workers were shot dead by the police. 
The South African mining sector is almost a century 
old and the nation’s industrial foundation. The coun-
try has the world’s largest deposits of platinum group 
'&+4&	
&%$8$X	&+&	<&+`Q'%%&+&
4 percent), chromium (72 percent), gold (30 percent), 
and aluminosilicates, and the second-largest reserves 
of fluorspar, titanium, vermiculite, and zirconium.2
 
*  The author would like to thank Maud Salber for her excel-
lent research assistance for this article. 
 It 
1  Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Annual Report 2011 
(Johannesburg, 2011), p. 10, http://www.bullion.org.za/ 
documents/AR_2011-small.pdf (accessed October 9, 2012). 
2  Government Communication and Information Service, 
South Africa Yearbook 2010/2011, Mineral Resources (Pretoria, 
2011), p. 372, http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/resourcecentre/ 
sa-info/yearbook2010-4
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prehensive data on South Africa’s minerals production, see 
is the leading producer of platinum (77.7 percent of 
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second-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'4.9 percent) 
and titanium (20.3 percent). Once very important, gold 
production has been declining for years and shrank 
by 50 percent during the past decade, leaving South 
Africa merely the fourth-largest producer of gold 
(7 percent share).3 Five products – platinum group 
metals, coal, gold, iron ore, and manganese – made 
up &	
&%$8$8	
¨+$'%&	+&+%
2011. About 3 percent of all direct investment in ex-
ploration for non-energy raw materials goes to South 
Africa, ranking the country only tenth globally.5 With 
a share of 9.6 percent of GDP (2011), mining remains 
an important pillar of the national economy.6
In 2010, 20 percent of private investment (12 per-
cent of total investment) went to the raw materials 
sector.
 The 
relative decline in its share of GDP (which was one 
88%&+`	&++8	$'&<&	+8
$%$8
the economy and the simultaneous growth of other 
sectors. High commodity prices have in fact produced 
significant growth in the real value of mining pro-
duction over the past decade. Raw materials represent 
about 35 percent of total exports earnings (2011). 
About 500,000 people work in mining and another 
500,000 indirectly depending on mining. 
7
 
Thomas R. Yager, “South Africa,” in USGS, 2010 Minerals Year-
book, vol. 3 Area Reports, International (Reston, February 2012), 
pp. 37.1–#Q^""'%&	+#++#$<"'%&	+"X+" 
country/2010/myb3-2010-sf.pdf (accessed October 9, 2012). 
 Iron ore in particular is considered to have 
3  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
4  Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Facts and Figures 2012 
(Johannesburg, 2012), p. 2, http://www.bullion.org.za/ 
documents/F_F_2012_Final_Web.pdf (accessed February 13, 
2013). 
5  Department of Mineral Resources, South Africa’s Mineral 
Industry 2009/2010 (Pretoria, 2010), p. 7. 
6  Susan Shabangu (MP, Minister of Mineral Resources), Budget 
Vote Speech to the National Council of ProvincesQ]=Q# 
7  Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Facts and Figures 2012 
(see note ), p. 2. 
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great medium-term growth potential. Platinum is also 
growing in significance, although declining demand 
from the European Union, which receives a quarter 
of South African platinum exports, has caused a deep 
production crisis, at least in the short run. 
South Africa exports 70 to 90 percent of its raw 
materials, and the government has declared it a high 
priority to increase added value (“beneficiation”) and 
the export of processed materials. In 2011, the Depart-
ment of Mineral Resources published a strategy paper 
covering these points, but its implementation has yet 
to be decided. Recycling is addressed by the National 
Waste Management Strategy. In 2007, 70 percent of 
'&
%+Q&	
&%$8+&&	Q%&	
&%
of used plastics were recycled.9
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
The Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) is respon-
sible for the formulation, implementation, and moni-
toring of policy for non-energy raw materials.10
The most powerful political actors after the govern-
ing African National Congress (ANC) are undoubtedly 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and the mining companies, which are mainly orga-
nized in the Chamber of Mines. The National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) is the largest constituent union 
 The 
three main sections of the DMR are responsible for 
raw materials policy, regulation, and health and safe-
ty. South Africa’s nine provincial governments have 
no powers of their own concerning mining. Since 
mining affects almost all areas of public life, certain 
other ministries are also tangentially involved, for 
example the Department of Water Affairs and the 
Department of Environmental Affairs in the licensing 
process. The DMR oversees several geological and tech-
nological agencies that support its work, including 
the Council for Geoscience, which is the country’s 
geological survey, and the Council for Mineral Tech-
nology Research (MINTEK). 
 
8  Department of Mineral Resources, A Benefication Strategy 
for the Minerals Industry of South Africa (Pretoria, 2011). 
9  Department of Environmental Affairs, Recovery, Re-use and 
Recycling (Pretoria, May 2010), http://www.wastepolicy.co.za/ 
$'&"%'+<""4

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
10  The Department of Minerals and Energy was divided in 
2009 into the DMR (www.dmr.gov.za) and the Department 
of Energy. 
of COSATU with 360,000 members. Apart from two 
smaller state-owned mining companies, the sector is 
in private hands, although the government plans to 
expand the state’s mining activities by establishing 
a major state-owned mining enterprise. Ownership 
structures in the mining sector have changed signifi-
cantly since the fall of apartheid. Major South African 
firms such as Anglo American, which used to be South 
African-owned, have been internationalized. At the 
same time, about 10 percent of the shares of almost 
all mining companies have passed to black South 
Africans. 
Despite undeniably positive social developments, 
even twenty years after the end of apartheid South 
Africa still faces enormous socio-economic problems. 
Its figures for income inequality remain among the 
$	¨+$	+#X$&	
&%$8&$$%
lives below the national poverty threshold of 500 rand 
per month (about €1.60/day). The official unemploy-
'&%	&+X$&	
&%4%$88
=%&	&	
percent).11
These grave social problems define the framework 
of the national raw materials policy – and the debate 
about it. From the government’s viewpoint, the top 
priority is to advance social and economic develop-
ment, especially for the black majority. Using the 
resource base for broader development effects and job 
creation is thus a strategic goal. Two arguments have 
pushed mining to the center of the South African 
debate: first, the sector was a pillar of the exploitative 
and discriminatory system of apartheid; second, the 
nation has not benefited adequately from its rich raw 
materials base. 
 
The clash between South Africa’s liberal economic 
order and political demands for intervention reflect 
the structural heterogeneity of the governing coali-
tion, whose three members are politically homogene-
ous neither internally nor with one another. The co-
existence of almost every political stripe within the 
ANC (Marxists, neoliberals, black nationalists, etc.) 
makes it near impossible to find a coherent political 
course, especially where the domestically weak Presi-
dent Jacob Zuma must take care not to alienate inter-
est groups that are important for his re-election. The 
debates about state intervention in the mining sector 
were initiated by the nationalist wings of the ANC; in 
particular its youth organization and the metalwork-
ers’ union have demanded nationalization of mining 
 
11  “South Africa’s Textbook Saga Shows Need to Tackle the 
Basics,” Financial Times, July 2, 2012. 
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and other strategic sectors (e.g. land, the banking 
sector), if necessary without compensation. That 
debate, however, does not alter the fact that the 
economy has remained orthodox liberal, even under 
Zuma’s presidency. Hardly anybody in South Africa 
believes that nationalization of mining is an option, 
while the heterogeneity of the ANC and the deep 
international integration of the economy will avert 
radical policy changes. 
Nonetheless, certain structural obstacles will pre-
vent full exploitation of national potential in coming 
years, with a massive lack of skilled labor and inade-
quate infrastructure only adding to the problems. 
After years of neglect, the government is now trying to 
catch up, for instance investing massively in transport 
and energy infrastructure (railways).12
Concepts and Strategies 
 Moreover, two 
major coal-fired power stations that are vital for creat-
ing added value in the mining sector will be added to 
&&%&	='X=# 
Even though the government and the ANC publish 
strategy documents on a regular basis, there is no 
official, comprehensive strategy on the raw materials 
sector. Nonetheless, certain strategic pillars can be 
identified. The government views the country’s raw 
materials endowment as a source of social and eco-
nomic development. There are two problems with 
this, the first being the unresolved relationship 
between state and private business. Like other re-
source-rich countries, South Africa tends to assign 
the state a larger role in important economic sec-
tors. In 2007, the ruling party officially adopted the 
concept of the “developmental state” or a “mixed 
economy,” wherein the state is ascribed a central 
strategic role in structuring the economy, allocating 
resources etc. This was done in order to overcome the 
triple problems of unemployment, poverty, and in-
equality: “The developmental state should maintain 
its strategic role in shaping the key sectors of the 
economy, including the mineral and energy complex 
and the national transport and logistics system. 
Whilst the forms of state interventions would differ, 
the over-riding objective would be to intervene stra-
tegically in these sectors to drive the growth, develop-
 
12  For an overview of government infrastructure policy, see 
Standard Bank, South African Quarterly Review (Johannesburg, 
August 2012). 
ment and transformation of the structure of our econ-
omy.”13 This approach coexists with a laissez-faire 
orthodoxy, with President Zuma advocating an inter-
nationally competitive mining sector as an accelerator 
for growth and employment. A rather optimistic gov-
ern'&%8$	&
+	&
+Q³$X+
$X&
created in the mining sector by 2020.15
The second problem is that the South African state 
lacks the capacity to drive development, as desired 
by the government. Paradoxically, government repre-
sentatives and critics agree on this point – but it 
remains undecided how the government will resolve 
the contradiction. Since a strategic framework is 
lacking, it is not surprising that policy measures and 
instruments have not yet been coordinated into a 
comprehensive raw materials policy. 
 
Policy Measures and Instruments 
Regulatory Framework 
While the South African regulatory framework is 
more investment-friendly than that of many other 
G20 members,16 conditions in the mining sector have 
worsened over the last decade in this respect. South 
8	
+8&%8	$'$	%&>	+&	%+-
tute’s Policy Potential Index of investment locations.17
Mining is regulated by the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRDA) $8Q

replaced private ownership of mineral rights with 
one of state custodianship. The state grants mining 
licenses to private firms on a first come, first served 
basis. Currently, the government is considering replac-
 
 
13  Polokwane National Conference Economic Transforma-
tion Resolution, quoted in Maximising the Developmental Impact 
of the People’s Mineral Assets: State Intervention in the Mineral Sector 
(SIMS) (Pretoria, February 2012), p. 71, http://www.anc.org.za/ 
docs/reps/2012/simsreport.pdf (acces+&
$X&	Q`# 
14  Jacob G. Zuma, State of the Nation Address (Cape Town, 
February 9, 2012). 
15  South African Government, New Growth Path (Pretoria, 
2001), p. 11, http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFile 

$%4
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$X&	Q`# 
16  World Bank, Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a 
More Transparent World (Washington, 2011), http://www. 
doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-
2012 4
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17  %"Q$8	
+	%&$$8
countries; Fred MacMahon and Miguel Cervantes, Fraser 
Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2011/2012 (Vancouver, 
2012), http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/ 
Content/research-news/research/publications/mining-survey-
2011-#84
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ing this method with public auctions to enhance 
transparency and competition. Applicants must fulfil 
certain social, environmental, and economic condi-
tions. Noted observers believe that South Africa missed 
out on the recent resource boom because of changes 
in the regulatory framework and the vagueness of 
some of the MPRDA provisions.
The awarding of mining licenses is often a time-
consuming process taking more than a year, especially 
since responsibility is not held by the Department of 
Mineral Resources alone. The water and environment 
ministries have their own approval systems with dif-
ferent timetabling, relating to environmental impact 
assessments, water rights, and advance planning for 
the environmentally and socially compatible closure 
of mines. Contamination of soil and groundwater 
caused by many of the six thousand neglected and 
abandoned mines is a serious public health problem. 
The DMR is currently drafting proposals for an inte-
grated and transparent interagency licensing pro-
cedure. An internet-based application system was 
introduced in 2011. 
 
Black Economic Empowerment and 
Corporate Responsibility 
One very distinctive feature of the South African 
mining business is positive discrimination in favor 
of historically disadvantaged mostly black citizens 
(Black Economic Empowerment or BEE).19
The MPRDA also requires companies to take action 
to foster economic development and provide social 
security benefits for workers and mining communi-
ties. These measures go well beyond conventional 
corporate social responsibility, in that they are codi-
fied in law and thus legally binding, while CSR else-
 The Mining 
Charter, which is part of the MPRDA, regulates BEE. 
It contains nine specific requirements that mining 
companies must fulfil in order to support economic 
participation in the mining industry by black South 
Africans. The government’s aim is for at least 26 per-
cent of every company to be owned by black citizens 
X=#]%%
$'%&+'++$	
+&+-
&+4&	
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&+4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&%`8	$' com-
panies where black South Africans own at least 25 per-
cent (so-called BEE companies). 
 
18  Peter Leon, South African Mining Industry at the Cross Roads, 
address to the African Mining Network (Johannesburg, June 
2012). 
19  BEE is obligatory for companies in all sectors that wish 
to do business with the state, which means de facto that BEE 
is obligatory for all companies. 
where is most often a discretionary matter. Mining 
companies are required, for example, to organize and 
fund development projects and to arrange regular con-
sultation with communities affected by mining activi-
ties. These obligations often require the construction 
of education and health facilities as well as the pro-
motion of job opportunities outside the mining 
industry.20
There is, however, a great discrepancy between the 
aspirations and reality of the MPRDA requirements. In 
the mining industry (and elsewhere), BEE has failed to 
produce social transformation. Even representatives 
of the government admit that its focus on property 
rights has only contributed to the creation of a small 
circle of wealthy elites, whose companies often benefit 
from public procurement and corrupt business prac-
tices.
 
21 Moreover, the DMR has a reputation for being 
influenced by political lobbying by ANC elites.22 This 
is not surprising, given the lack of strict divisions 
between government and party. As conceived by the 
ANC, in the political hierarchy of South Africa the 
ruling party is positioned above the government, 
which acts as the executive body of the former liber-
ation movement. Conceived as an instrument to cor-
rect historical injustices, BEE thus ends up fueling 
political machines. According to conservative esti-
mates by the National Prosecution Authority, at least 
20 percent of the state procurement budget is lost to 
corruption and mismanagement every year.23
Furthermore, mining companies fail to properly 
implement the social and economic measures listed 
above. Five years after the Mining Charter took effect, 
the Department of Mineral Resources found “shocking 
levels of non compliance.”
 

 
20  Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 
The Rise of Resource Nationalism: A Resurgence of State Control in an 
Era of Free Markets or the Legitimate Search for a New Equilibrium? 
4*&$%Q`Q#88#Q^""#+''#
$#" 
Conferences/ResourceNationalism/ResourceNationalism-
#84
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 Social and labor stan-
21  “Mantashe: I Have Serious Issues with BEE,” Fin24, August 
QQ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^""#8%#
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22  “Special Report – Why South African Mining’s in Decline,” 
ReutersQ>&X		=QQ^""#	&&	+#
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23  “South Africa’s Textbook Saga Shows Need to Tackle the 
Basics,” Financial Times, July 2, 2012. 
24  Department of Mineral Resources, Mining Charter Impact 
Assessment Report (Pretoria, 2009), p. 22, http://www.info.gov.za/ 
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dards in mining regions remain appalling. Health and 
safety rules are often ignored, resulting in about 120 
fatalities every year (2010 and 2011).25
The willingness and ability of mining companies 
to abide by CSR standards is often limited. This is even 
the case with BEE companies, including those owned 
by members of the political elite. The prevalence of 
strikes and social protests has accordingly increased in 
recent years, and the resulting production losses have 
become a serious problem not just for the companies. 
They also represent a growing challenge for the ANC 
and the mainstream unions (especially the NUM), 
which claim to represent the interests of the miners 
and their families. Growing social tensions and un-
fulfilled promises of economic wealth have repeatedly 
resulted in violence, either between rival unions, or 
between miners and the police.
 
26
Support of Domestic Production 
 These developments 
culminated in the incident near the Marikana Mine, 
run by Lonmin, where thirty-four people were shot 
dead during a strike in August 2012. The event threw 
the government into its worst political crisis since the 
end of apartheid and led to an expansion of protests 
into almost all parts of the mining industry and 
beyond. Two months after the shootings, almost 20 
percent of the mining workforce was on strike. 
As demanded by radical elements in the ruling tri-
partite alliance, nationalization of the mining sector 
stands no chance of realization. However, like other 
major producers, South Africa is considering measures 
to maximize the income generated by its resource 
wealth. Even though results from this discussion had 
yet to be legislated by early 2013, it is already clear 
that they will include certain elements that can be 
expected to increase state intervention in the mining 
sector. 
For example, the government is considering raising 
taxes, perhaps by implementing a “supertax” on ex-
ceptionally high company profits similar to the new 
Australian tax,27
 
the Bojanala District of the North West Province (Johannesburg, 
2012), http://www.bench-marks.org.za/research/rustenburg_ 
review_policy_gap_final_aug_2012.pdf (accessed October 9, 
2012). 
 and hopes to collect revenues as high 
25  Shabangu, Budget Vote Speech (see note ). 
26  On social and labor conditions, see Bench Marks Foun-
dation, A Review of Platinum Mining in the Bojanala District 
(see note ), pp. 70–9. 
27  See also “Australia” in this volume, pp. 30ff. 
as US$5 billion. Mining firms currently pay a cor-
$	&%
$'&$8&	
&%%	$=&+$8#
to 7 percent of gross revenue.29
A second option under consideration is the creation 
of a major state-owned mining enterprise uniting all 
state-owned companies in the sector. Industry fears 
competitive disadvantages if the state were to act as 
both regulator and market participant, for instance 
in the form of joint ventures with private firms. It is 
questionable how competitive such a national mining 
enterprise would be, considering the performance of 
other South African state-owned firms. The fate of the 
ailing state-owned diamond producer Alexkor is a cau-
tionary tale.
 
30
Third, the government is likely to declare “strate-
gic” certain metals or minerals that are of central 
significance for economic growth and employment 
in downstream sectors (e.g. iron ore). The definition is 
based on the premise that South Africa’s economy has 
not to date been obtaining domestic raw materials at 
fair prices. It is argued, for instance, that the state-
owned electricity generator Eskom pays excessive 
prices for low-quality coal, while higher-quality coal is 
exported. It is argued that this phenomenon leads to 
bottlenecks and overpricing.
 
31
The government hopes that added value (benefici-
ation) will provide growth and employment at home 
rather than abroad, but has yet to make any specific 
proposals for establishing sustainable value chains. 
Attempts to promote added value in the diamond 
sector have failed.
 Considering the overall 
objective of creating greater added value, the govern-
ment will consider imposing export restrictions on 
minerals deemed to be strategic. 
32
 
28  Maximising the Developmental Impact (see note 
 In any case, the leeway for intro-
ducing export duties on un-processed minerals is 
heavily circumscribed by WTO rules and bilateral 
13), p. 352. 
29  “Draconian Aussie Taxes Worry AngloGold More than 
Nationalization,” Reuters Africa, July 5, 2012, http://af.reuters. 
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30  Maximising the Developmental Impact (see note 13), p. 52. 
31  “Coal Mooted as Strategic Resource,” Fin24, June 15, 2012, 
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cent of the energy produced in South Africa stems from 
domestic coal. 
32  “South African Diamond Industry No Longer Sparkling,” 
Mining WeeklyQ\%&QQ^""#'%%&&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trade agreements and would provoke the ire of 
trading partners.33
International Governance 
 
The South African debate about the political and eco-
nomic dimensions of its raw materials policy is still 
in its infancy. The government expects growth in 
emerging Asian economies to enhance the diversity 
and profitability of South Africa’s trading relation-
ships – even in light of the financial and economic 
crisis in the European Union, which has led to a dras-
tic decline in demand for platinum.
On the level of the African Union, raw materials 
policy is a relatively young topic that has not moved 
beyond the consultative phase.
 And South 
African admission to the BRIC club (to create BRICS) 
has raised high, albeit vague hopes. Critics note that 
the economic advantages expected from BRICS mem-
bership are by no means guaranteed, especially since 
South Africa’s interests (for instance on added value) 
are quite different from those of China or India. 
Resentment towards the European Union, South 
Africa’s most important trading partner, has been 
articulated more openly, with criticism of the way 
the EU’s trade interests inhibit industrialization and 
diversification. 
35 The South African 
Department of Trade and Industry has urged the 
creation of consistent conditions for investment with-
in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).36
 
33  Peter Leon, “A Fork in the Investor-State Road: South 
Africa’s New Mineral Regulatory Regime Four Years On,” 
Journal of World Trade Q%$#4`^# 
 The government supports international 
initiatives to improve transparency in the raw mate-
rials sector, but these so far have remained non-
binding on the grounds that South Africa already has 
transparent procedures and institutions in place. 
Nonetheless, there are signs that South Africa would 
not in principle reject shared targets, standards, and 
norms within the G20 such as including transparency 
34  Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu: White Paper 
on South Africa’s Foreign Policy (Pretoria, 2011), p. 6, http://www. 
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35  Africa Mining Vision, agreed by African national leaders in 
2009; http://www.africaminingvision.org (accessed October 9, 
2012). 
36  “SA’s New Investment Policy to Forge Minerals, Indus-
trialisation Link,” Mining Weekly, July 26, 2012, http://www. 
miningweekly.com/article/sas-new-investment-policy-to-forge-
minerals-industrialisation-link-2012-07-26 (accessed October 
Q`# 
in awarding and negotiating fairer and more sustain-
able mining contracts, EITI membership of all G20 
countries, and reform of economic and trade arrange-
ments (for instance Economic Partnership Agree-
ments) that restrict the freedom of mineral-producing 
countries to commercialize their raw materials. 
Evaluation and Outlook 
South Africa’s raw materials policy is currently expe-
riencing a phase of great change. The government is 
under pressure to keep social and economic promises 
made in the course of the liberation struggle. The 
potential for social conflagration in the historically 
tainted mining sector is tremendous, as the Malikana 
tragedy demonstrated. Even though the political 
dominance of the ANC will not be challenged for an-
other decade or so, discontent over cronyism and the 
political arrogance of elites is growing within the 
country. This has already become an obvious chal-
lenge to the National Union of Mineworkers, which 
has lost members to more radical unions. 
A coherent reaction by the South African govern-
ment is still awaited; enhanced, but moderate state 
intervention in the mining sector can be expected, 
which business will no doubt perceive as excessive. 
The government will have to make the best of the 
limited capabilities of the state and address the chal-
lenge of adapting national priorities to the inter-
national economic context. In a context of limited 
mobility of investment, growing global demand, and 
an enormous metals and minerals base, South Africa 
will be able to demand more value for its raw mate-
rials. Maximizing taxes collected from mining com-
panies will not suffice, without a coherent policy in-
vesting in education and infrastructure and providing 
a more transparent policy framework for investors, 
workers, and voters. Such a policy must ensure that 
state-owned mining companies do not undermine 
competition and regulations and that licenses are 
granted through transparent procedures. And it will 
have to abide by and enforce the laws and principles 
of CSR and BEE. 
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South Korea 
Hanns Günther Hilpert* 
 
Due to its highly specialized industrial production, 
South Korea is heavily dependent on reliable imports 
of raw materials. In order to secure supply in the long 
term, a program for systematic procurement and 
development of foreign sources of raw materials, with 
an allocation in the national budget, was initiated in 
2001. The development of organizational and indus-
trial competence in the raw materials sector, the 
establishment of a recycling industry, and state-run 
reserve management and stockpiling of critical raw 
materials complete the South Korean supply strategy. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
South Korea is a young, modern, industrialized coun-
try with specific competitive advantages in the steel, 
shipbuilding, plant engineering, vehicles, electronics, 
and information technology sectors. Due to a lack of 
domestic raw materials, manufacturing production is 
heavily dependent on imports for metals (99 percent) 
and minerals (29 percent),1
With a share of 0.1 percent of global production of 
non-energy raw materials (by volume), South Korea 
is one of the G20 countries with a small extractive sec-
tor.
 as well as for refinery and 
industrial supplies, which are primarily obtained 
from Japan. 
2 Raw materials also play a secondary role in South 
Korea’s national economy and exports. In 2010, non-
energy minerals and metals accounted for 6.7 percent 
of total exports.3
 
*  The author would like to thank Malte Paolo Benjamins for 
his research and assistance. 
 
1  Data from the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral 
Resources (KIGAM). 
2  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
3  Trade Competitiveness Map, ed., Trade Performance HS: 
Exports of Korea, Republic of, 2010 (in USD thousands), http://legacy. 
%	
&%#$	""	&*$'"*#+ 
2010 (accessed May 9, 2012). The proportion refers to HS-
*$&+QQQQQQQQQQa%# 
While the country possesses relatively large depos-
its of non-metallic minerals (feldspar, limestone, 
siliceous earth, quartz sand, sulfur, serpentine, talc, 
zeolite), it has only limited domestic deposits of 
metals (gold, iron, lead, molybdenum, silver, tita-
nium, tungsten, zinc). In 2010, only gold, limestone, 
and sulfur exceeded the US$100-million threshold. 
On a global scale, South Korea is the second-largest 
	$
&	$8
''4&	
&%`%d the third-
largest of talc (9.6 percent),5 although the cadmium 
originates not from domestic extraction, but from the 
smelting of imported zinc and lead ores. Otherwise, 
South Korea produces raw materials in small quan-
tities, as evidenced by its small shares of global pro-
duction (feldspar 2.3 percent, gold 0.01 percent, iron 
0.02 percent, kaolin 3.3 percent, silver 0.01 percent, 
titanium 1.1 percent).6
Mining and production are, however, expanding. 
Woulfe Mining, a Canadian-South Korean joint ven-
ture, is leading a consortium reopening an abandoned 
tungsten mine and is prospecting for gold in an aban-
doned Korean deposit. Mining and processing of tung-
sten is scheduled to start in 2013.
 
7 As documented by 
this and other examples,
The northern part of the Korean peninsula is en-
dowed with far greater mineral resources than the 
South. Although little is known about the size of the 
deposits or actual production volumes, it is certain 
that North Korea possesses major deposits of fluor-
 foreign direct investment in 
the South Korean raw materials sector is welcomed, as 
it introduces innovative modern mining and process-
ing technologies. 
 
4  Production value according to KIGAM. Conversion into US$ 
at current exchange rates. 
5  Lin Shi, “Republic of Korea [Advance Release],” in USGS, 
2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
April 2012), p. 15.1, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ 
country/2010/myb3-2010-+#84

&++&]=Q`# 
6  BMWFJ, World Mining Data 2012 (see note 2). 
7  Frank Robaschik, “Förderung von Rohstoffen wird in Korea 
(Rep.) wieder attraktiver,” GTAIQ	QQ^""# 
#&""!<$%""	&"'&	&Q#'
(accessed August 15, 2012). 
8  For example gold mining by the Canadian Ivanhoe Mines 
Ltd. and the investment in Korean uranium mining by the 
Australian enterprise Stonehenge Metals Ltd. 
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spar, gold, graphite, iron ore, lead, magnesium, rare 
earth elements, silver, tungsten, and zinc. Iron ore, 
tungsten, and zinc are currently mined. Upbeat esti-
mates claim North Korean mining deposits are worth 
US$6 trillion.9
Its large industrial production makes South Korea 
one of the most important consumers of raw materials 
and one of the world’s leading importers of commod-
ity metals, non-ferrous metals, and rare metals. South 
Korean supplies of certain minerals are highly con-
centrated. In 2011, for example, 99 percent of its mag-
%&+'%&	
&%$8+		&&	'$	+$	-
nated from China, and 91 percent of lithium imports 
came from Chile.
 Foreign investment into the North 
Korean raw materials sector is almost exclusively in 
Chinese hands. So far, South Korea has no access to 
deposits in the North. 
10
Although the state-owned Korea Resource Corp. 
(KORES) is the country’s largest and most important 
raw materials enterprise, the industry is in fact domi-
nated by private enterprises, including a number of 
industrial heavyweights. South Korea is one of leading 
countries for smelting and metal processing. Posco, 
the world’s third-biggest steel producer, is active in 
raw material importation and processing, and par-
ticipates in a number of mining projects in Australia 
and Brazil. According to Posco, raw material inputs 
today make up roughly 70 percent of the total costs 
of producing steel. Korea Zinc, which claims to be the 
largest zinc producer worldwide with a global market 
+	&$8&	
&%Q	&8%&+%
Q
$&	Q gold, lead, 
and silver in Korea and abroad. Major resource trading 
companies with an emphasis on metals include 
Daewoo International, Samsung C&T, and LG Inter-
national. Daewoo and LG have extended their port-
folios vertically through direct investment in foreign 
mines (copper, lithium, nickel, zinc). SK Networks and 
LS Nikko have also invested in mining and processing 
overseas (copper, gold, lead, nickel, zinc). LS Nikko 
also operates a major copper smelting and processing 
 
 
9  Adam Currie, “Could North Korea Be the Next Rare 
Earth Power House?” Rare Earth Investing News, August 20, 
2012, http://rareearthinvestingnews.com (accessed August 
31, 2012); Lin Shi, “North Korea [Advance Release],” in USGS, 
2010 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, International (Reston, 
July 2012), http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/ 
2010/myb3-2010-kn.pdf (accessed August 31, 2012). 
10  Frank Robaschik, “Korea (Rep.) steckt Milliarden in Roh-
stofferschließung im Ausland,” GTAI, March 30, 2012, 
http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/maerkte,did= 
#'4

&++&]=Q`# 
plant in Korea and is expanding its activities into rare 
earths, deep-sea mining, and recycling. 
The recycling sector is in a nascent phase. The 
recycling rate for electronic scrap rose from 17 per-

&%%$&	
&%%#	&
=
%%+-
try association was established in April 2011, and in 
May 2011 a subsidiary of LS Nikko opened the first 
recycling smelter for copper, gold, silver, and other 
metals.11
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
South Korea’s raw materials debate is rooted in a 
consensual recognition that value creation in manu-
facturing is the basis of the nation’s economic growth 
and prosperity, and that hardly any other country 
is so dependent on reliable imports of energy and 
resources as resource-poor and highly-industrialized 
South Korea. Rising and volatile commodity prices, 
the growing resource nationalism of certain emerg-
ing economies, and concentration tendencies in the 
global resources industry create an increasing sense 
of the vulnerability of the domestic manufacturing 
base. Moreover, major challenges emanate both from 
China, which has been restricting its raw materials 
exports and aggressively expanding resource invest-
ment overseas, and from Japan, which is a leader 
in metal production and processing. Sandwiched 
between these two heavyweights, South Korea’s manu-
facturing industry suffers from a lack of raw material 
resources and a weak supporting industry. Trapped 
between China and Japan, industrial strategies to 
escape this position include securing overseas raw 
materials supplies, stockpiling reserves, technological 
innovation, and developing a recycling industry.12
 
11  Robaschik, “Förderung von Rohstoffen wird in Korea 
(Rep.) wieder attraktiver” (see note 
 In 
contrast to many other political issues, the raw mate-
rials debate is not ideologically driven. There are con-
troversies regarding the environmental sustainability, 
7). 
12  Jung-chan Bae, “Strategies and Perspectives for Securing 
Rare Metals in Korea,” in Critical Elements for New Energy Tech-
nologies: An MIT Energy Initiative Workshop Report, April 29, 2010 
(Boston, 2010), p. 129, http://web.mit.edu/miteicomm/web/ 
reports/critical_elements/CritElem_Report_Final.pdf 
(accessed August 15, 2012); Stefania Paladini, “Shopping 
Abroad the Korean Way: A Study in Resource Acquisition,” 
in Korea 2011: Politics, Economy, and Society, ed. Rüdiger Frank 
et al., Korea Yearbook 5 (Leiden, 2`Q#–50; Robaschik, 
“Korea (Rep) steckt Milliarden in Rohstofferschließung im 
Ausland” (see note 10). 
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the relationship between mining and development 
cooperation, the role of the state, and efficient use of 
government funds. Raw material supply issues have 
received even greater political attention since the 
conservative President Lee Myung-bak (former CEO 
of Hyundai Construction Corp. and close to South 
Korea’s business community) came to power in Jan-
	=# 
Institutional Setting 
Numerous institutions and organizations deal with 
raw materials policy and the raw materials economy. 
The Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) is respon-
sible for industry, technology, regional development, 
trade, international cooperation, energy, and re-
sources, and is the central actor designing and coordi-
nating raw materials policy. Two units with around 
twenty staff are responsible for metals and minerals. 
Their tasks include monitoring imports, contingency 
planning, defining criticality (of raw materials) and 
identifying strategic resources, managing reserves, 
and raising funds for investment in exploration and 
resource development overseas. The technology divi-
sions of the MKE are responsible for promoting inno-
vation and new technologies, including material sub-
stitution, recycling, and rare earth processing. A mine 
registration office and four local mine safety offices 
are attached to the MKE. The Korea Energy Economics 
Institute (KEEI), which is answerable to the MKE, 
analyzes economic, political, and technological trends 
in the resources sector and provides the MKE with 
statistical information, expert reports, and advice. 
All other ministries play only a complementary or 
supportive role in raw materials policy. The Ministry 
of Environment (ME) is in charge of planning in the 
recycling sector, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(MOSF) is responsible for approving budgets and 
managing stockpiling, the Ministry of Land, Trans-
port, and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) arranges domestic 
exploration, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT) is responsible for trade policy and develop-
ment cooperation, and the MKE itself is in charge of 
industrial policy (for example supervising the research 
programs of the Korean Institute for Rare Metals, 
KIRAM). Where necessary, the Prime Minister’s Office 
coordinates the ministries. Legislation is the respon-
sibility of the National Assembly (Gukhoe). 
The interests of South Korea’s raw materials indus-
try are represented and promoted by the Energy and 
Mineral Resources Development Association of Korea 
4]`Q&+X+&%#+&+&'³$	+&-
owned enterprises (KNOC, KOGAS, KORES, KEPCO),13
The fully state-owned Korea Resources Corp. 
(KORES) plays a central role in the practical imple-
mentation of the government’s raw materials con-
cepts and strategies. Founded in 1967, its official task 
is to ensure a stable supply of mineral resources by 
focusing on three tasks:
 
virtually all large private sector companies producing 
or consuming raw materials are members of EMRD, 
which participates in the drafting of national strat-
egies and concrete measures. EMRD takes an active 
role in policy implementation, for example in infor-
mation dissemination, personnel training, and credit 
risk management. 

Various government institutions support South 
Korean mining investments overseas, in particular 
Korea Export-Import Bank (KEXIM), which grants loans 
and guarantees; Korea Trade Insurance Group (K-sure), 
which insures political and economic risks; and the 
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), 
which provides foreign trade-related information and 
services in its 111 offices worldwide. The Korea Insti-
tute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM) is 
the country’s leading geological research institute, 
X&$8Y['$%%Q$8

percent came from government sources. The Institute 
employs 350 staff, including 302 researchers and engi-
neers, to explore and assess mineral deposits in South 
Korea, abroad, and under the oceans; to develop new 
technologies for mining, recycling, and waste manage-
ment; to supply knowledge and information to Korean 
 developing mineral re-
sources overseas (as consultant, investor, creditor, and 
consortium leader); supplying technical and organiza-
tional support and credit to Korean mining compa-
nies; and stockpiling mineral resources itself. To allow 
it to fulfil these obligations, its authorized capital was 
	+&8	$'$QX$%$%4	$#Y[#
billion) in 2009. KORES aims to become one of the 
world’s twenty largest mining companies by 2025. 
Privatization of KORES is not planned. KORES has com-
mitted itself to observing various international stan-
dards such as the UN Global Compact, ISO 26000, and 
the World Bank’s Environment, Health, and Safety 
Guidelines. 
 
13  KNOC = Korea National Oil Corporation, KOGAS = Korea 
Gas Corporation, KEPCO = Korea Electric Power Corporation. 
14  See article 1 of the Korea Resources Corporation Act, 
^""&%#$	&+#$	#	^"'+"&%"'+"	&+$	
&+"$%" 
eng_law1.pdf (accessed August 15, 2012). 
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businesses; and to teach geosciences to foreign special-
ists. KIGAM attaches great importance to international 
cooperation and invests extensively in exchanges of 
scientists, engineers, and students, as well as orga-
nizing joint international research conferences and 
projects and conducting joint exploration projects 
abroad.15
Concepts and Strategies 
 Presently, exploration activities focus on the 
DR Congo, Mongolia, Peru, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 
Two new copper deposits have been discovered in 
Peru. 
MKE’s Basic Plan for the Development of Foreign Resources 
contains South Korea’s authoritative raw materials 
strategy.16
 
15  KIGAM, Annual Report 2011 (Daejeon, 2012). 
 In legal terms, the Basic Plan is not a law but 
merely a government document, on the basis of which 
the MKE spends funds for specified purposes and co-
operates with the private sector. Since the MKE pub-
lished the first Basic Plan in February 2001 it has been 
revised every three years, most recently in 2010. The 
basic plan originally named the energy resources of 
oil, gas, bituminous coal, and uranium, as well as non-
energy resources copper, iron ore, nickel, and zinc as 
strategic. Lithium and rare earth elements were added 
in 2010. Identification as a strategic resource is a pre-
condition for the allocation of budget funding, which 
in the case of non-energy metallic resources amounted 
16  Jisik Gyongje Bu, Je Sacha Hae Oi Ja Won Gae Bal Gibon Gye 
Hoek 2010–2019 [Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Basic Plan 
for the Development of Foreign Resources] (Seoul, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to roughly 90 billion won (ca. US$90 million) annually 
between 2001 and 2010.17
The Basic Plan specifies further measures and objec-
tives for developing the national raw materials supply, 
notably, improving the technological and professional 
competence of the domestic raw materials sector. 
Vis-a-vis resource-rich developing countries, the Plan 
recommends a specific national model based on the 
South Korean experience of rapid development and 
industrialization. Further promotion measures in-
clude developing a complementary raw-materials-
related service sector, workforce training, stockpiling, 
and stepping up exploration for rare earths in South 
Korea. 
 The Basic Plan seeks a grad-
ual increase in self-supply rates for the six strategic 
metals and sets ten-year targets (see Figure 1), which 
KORES is responsible for meeting. Self-sufficiency rates 
exceeding 50 percent are the long-term objective. 
Although South Korea’s industrial, environmental, 
and development policies each have their own para-
digmatic objectives, they each also have a specific 
focus on raw materials. For example, MKE introduced 
industrial incentives to nurture the development 
of South Korea’s domestic rare metal and rare earths 
industries. And South Korea’s National Strategy for Green 
Growth, which seeks to reduce CO2 and encourage 
green industries, promotes the recycling of industrial 
and household waste.
 
17  At an assumed exchange rate of US$#8$	,000 KRW. 
 The country’s official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) has basic development objec-
18  For a full description and assessment of the plan see 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Overview of 
the Republic of Korea’s National Strategy for Green Growth (Geneva, 
2010). 
Figure 1 
Self-supply rates and foreign sources for strategic metals 
Metal Self supply rate (%) 
2009 2012 2016 2019 
Foreign sources 
Current investments Planned investments 
Iron ore  .2 17 30 35 Australia, India, Brazil South Africa 
Copper   5.1 15 33  Chile, Peru, Indonesia,  
Australia, Canada 
Myanmar, Argentina, Mongolia, 
Zambia 
Zinc  33.    Canada, China, Australia, Peru, 
United States, Kazakhstan 
DR Congo, Iran 
Nickel  32.6 29   Madagascar, Indonesia,  
Australia, New Caledonia 
 
Lithium  – 12 20 26 – Bolivia 
Rare Earths  – 12 20 26 – Vietnam, Australia, South Africa 
Source: Own research, based on data from MKE, KEEI, KORES. 
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tives, but pursues political and economic interests, 
too. In foreign policy, South Korea is gaining inter-
national status as a new donor country taking action 
in the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and in the G20. ODA offers an instrument for 
gaining privileged access to foreign energy and raw 
materials and creating a favorable investment climate 
for South Korean companies.19
Policy Measures and Instruments 
 
Exploration, Processing, and Recycling 
Given that increasing domestic production is the 
simplest way to reduce dependency on foreign 
sources, the South Korean government is promoting 
resource-related exploration, research, development, 
and recycling through various programs. 
Exploration, research, and development are fun-
damental responsibilities of the KIGAM, which has 
been compiling geological maps of South Korea by 
airborne geophysical survey for approximately thirty 
years. Deposits of niobium, rare earths, and tungsten 
have recently been discovered.20 Feasibility studies 
will examine whether these deposits can be developed 
profitably. If so, licenses will be awarded under the 
Mining Act and Article 120 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Korea. Other activities of the KIGAM include 
developing geophysical exploration technologies for 
ore deposits, conducting a feasibility analysis of deep-
sea manganese nodule lifting pipes, and developing 
of new ore processing technologies. KIGAM’s recycling 
research focuses on carbonation technologies to turn 
industrial waste into an alternative resource, on the 
leaching of low grade uranium ore, and on technolo-
gies for extracting minerals from seawater. In the lat-
ter case, the KIGAM has developed a system for extract-
ing lithium and is operating a pilot plant with 
POSCO.21
As mentioned above, the MKE’s industrial policy 
specifically incentivizes rare metal production to 
create a strong vertical basis in production and pro-
cessing for South Korea’s manufacturing industry. 
 
 
19  Philipp Olbrich and David Shim, Südkorea als globaler 
Akteur: Internationale Beiträge in Entwicklung und Sicherheit, 
GIGA >$
+$X"4¡'X	^Q`Q#–5. 
20  Robaschik, “Förderung von Rohstoffen wird in Korea 
(Rep.) wieder attraktiver” (see note 7). 
21  KIGAM, Annual Report 2011 (see note 15`Q#–59; 
KIGAM, ed., Change and Challenges Beyond History (Daejeon, 
2012), pp. 19–26. 
Between 2010 to 2019, technological capacity and 
industrial locations are to be established. A budget of 
US$300 million is available to develop technologies in 
refining, smelting, processing, recycling, substitution, 
and reduction, controlled by the Rare Metals Industry 
Governing Committee comprising the MKE, busines-
ses, universities, and institutes. The newly established 
Korea Institute for Rare Metals (KIRAM) addresses tech-
nology issues and manages research and development 
programs. There are also three local rare metal com-
mercialization centers specializing in indium, magne-
sium, niobium, platinum, and titanium. KORES is in-
<&+%Y['$%$fund specialist rare metals 
companies, such as the Kwang-Yang FerroAlloy Co.,22 
and in 2011 the MKE announced it would spend 300 
billion won promoting rare earths processing tech-
nologies.23 The MKE also funds teaching staff and 
materials for resource-related courses at South Korean 
universities, as well as vocational training run by the 
EMRD. To support domestic copper refining, a 5 per-
cent tariff is levied on imports of refined copper.25
The government places increasing weight on recy-
cling and “urban mining.” Recycling laws and regu-
lations for waste separation, recycling, waste man-
agement have been tightened up. Increasing recycling 
rates in order to develop new raw materials sources 
and reduce industrial consumption is an overarching 
objective.
 
26
Raw Materials Investment Overseas 
 
Foreign direct investment in overseas mining oper-
ations is pursued to secure South Korea’s industry its 
supply of strategic metals. State-owned KORES is the 
most important vehicle promoting foreign invest-
ment, offering an attractive and specifically South 
 
22  Min-ha Lee, “Current Status and Perspectives of Rare 
Metals in Korea: Industrial Technology Aspect,” in The EUREKA 
Day Seminar on Industrial Manufacturing and Transport, March 17, 
2011, http://new.e	&=#	"$%$"¬$	&%+& 
of_Industrial_Technology_KITECH_Min_Ha_Lee.pdf (accessed 
August 31, 2012). 
23  “Yonhap, Korea to Spend 300 Bil Won on Rare Earth 
Processing R&D,” Korea Times, October 6, 2011, http://www. 
$	&'&+#
$#	""%&+"X"""#'
(accessed August 31, 2012). 
24  Verbal statement by a representative of the Korea Energy 
Economics Institute (KEEI). 
25  BDI, Übersicht über bestehende Handels- und Wett-
bewerbsverzerrungen auf den Rohstoffmärkten, unpublished 
manuscript (Berlin, 2012), p. 53. 
26  “Koh Young-aah, Korea to Boost Mineral Recycling,” Korea 
Herald, April 15, 2011, http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view. 

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Korean package in global competition for access to 
raw materials: employing only workers from the host 
country in its mining and production and providing 
training; supplying benefits to local communities 
through donations, new school buildings, and com-
munity centers; constructing hospitals and a sustain-
able, environmentally friendly energy and transport 
infrastructure; transferring South Korean industrial 
development knowledge through courses and on-the-
job-training of local managers; and developing con-
crete suggestions for industrial diversification. South 
Korea’s successful experience in industrial develop-
ment and democratization serves as a reference case.27
Resource development financing is not offered only 
by KORES. Loans and guarantees are also provided 
by the state-owned financial institutions KEXIM and 
K-sure. KEXIM grants loans of up to 100 percent to 
finance equity purchases, development, and operating 
costs with a maturity of up to seventeen years and a 
grace period of mostly seven years. KEXIM also pro-
vides guarantees to cover political and commercial 
risks. Being a government-owned financial institution, 
KEXIM holds only South Korea’s A rating, and is thus 
at a competitive disadvantage against certain other 
commercial and development banks. In order to pro-
vide Korean companies with competitive financing, 
KEXIM is permitted to improve its terms and condi-
tions to remain competitive. The trade insurer K-Sure 
offers similar financing terms for raw materials invest-
ments abroad. While K-Sure insures political and 
commercial investment risks, an international com-
mercial bank with an excellent rating supplies the 
long-term financing.
 

Further financial and tax incentives also facilitate 
investments in extractive operations abroad. South 
Korean companies that participate in a KORES-led 
development consortium receive a temporary finan-
cial subsidy. Profits earned in a foreign resource 
investment enjoy a 3 percentage point tax discount.
 
29
Trade and economic cooperation policy play a 
supportive role. In bilateral free trade agreements, 
chapters on raw materials grant South Korean com-
panies special access rights. South Korea has already 
 
 
27  Paladini, “Shopping Abroad the Korean Way” (see note 
12)Q#–50, 161–62; verbal statement by a representative 
of the Korea Resources Corp. (KORES). 
28  Export-Import Bank of Korea, Guide to the Export-Import Bank 
of Korea (Seoul, 2012), pp. 29–30; verbal statement by a repre-
sentative of the Korea Export-Import Bank (KEXIM). 
29  Verbal statement by a representative of the Korea Energy 
Economics Institute (KEEI). 
concluded bilateral free trade agreements with 
resource-rich developing economies, such as Chile, 
Peru, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and is 
negotiating with Australia, Canada, and China. South 
Korea’s economic cooperation policy pursues both 
trade and investment goals. While countries with 
abundant natural resources or attractive markets are 
preferred ODA recipients,30
South Korea’s efforts to develop sources of minerals 
have born fruit. The most important metal projects (in 
terms of investment volume) are the iron ore mines at 
Roy Hill (Australia) and Namisa (Brazil), and the nickel 
ore project at Ambatovy (Madagascar). In a forward-
thinking agreement, KORES, POSCO, and the Bolivian 
state enterprise Comibol have set up a joint venture 
to manufacture lithium-ion battery parts, tapping the 
vast lithium deposits of Salar de Uyuni. 
 there is no direct link 
between ODA and mining project acquisition. The 
ministerial responsibilities are strictly separate. 
Reserves and Stockpiling 
Strategic reserves are held to secure South Korea’s 
economy against the risks of supply disruption or 
unexpected price increases.31 The Public Procurement 
Office (PPO) draws up plans for building and stockpil-
ing reserves according to MKE requirements. KORES, 
which runs nine domestic storage facilities, is in 
charge of implementation. Its management system is 
regarded as cost-efficient and innovative. Stocks are 
released to the markets on MOSF approval, with small 
and medium-sized enterprises given priority. Reserves 
of the commodity metals aluminum, copper, lead, 
nickel, tin, and zinc are held, as well as the rare 
metals cobalt, indium, lithium, manganese, molyb-
denum, silicon, vanadium, and rare earth elements. 
Metal stock+<&%
	&+&8	$'#=+4`$
13.5 days (2011),32
 
30  For empirical data see Eun-mee Kim and Oh, Jinhwan, 
“Determinants of Foreign Aid: The Case of South Korea,” 
Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 2 (2012): 251. 
 and are reported to have been 
raised further in 2012, especially in the case of rare 
metals (60 days). It is planned to increase rare earth 
31  For stockpiling policy see Public Procurement Service, 
http://www.pps.go.kr/englis (accessed August 30, 2012); 
Paladini, “Shopping Abroad the Korean Way” (see note 12), 
pp. 159–61. 
32  Paladini, “Shopping Abroad the Korean Way” 
(see note 12), p. 160. 
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Evaluation and Outlook 
 
Raw materials security is of great importance for 
South Korea, which lacks its own domestic deposits 
and is vulnerable to external market shocks. By ex-
perience and tradition, politicians and government 
rely on industrial planning and are ever ready to 
provide sufficient funding. From the private-sector 
perspective, raw materials planning and administra-
tion are well-organized, coherent, and transparent. 
National programs promoting research and develop-
ment, recycling, and mineral investments overseas are 
all clearly focused on the supply security goal, and 
harmonize efficiently and smoothly. Given growing 
engagement in international raw materials markets 
and positive returns on recent foreign investments, 
the national supply strategy can be expected to be 
successful. 
The idea of global governance of the international 
raw materials economy is not yet an issue in South 
Korea’s resource policy. To date the country has joined 
only the International Lead and Zinc Study Group 
(ILZSG). However, policymakers are open-minded 
about multilateral cooperation.  
South Korea’s one-sided focus on security of supply 
has its own risks and weaknesses, however. Problems 
with environmental and developmental sustainability 
are foreseeable, and since KORES is a state-owned 
enterprise, investment disputes can easily turn into 
foreign policy conflicts. A general question also arises 
regarding investment risks. It is not unlikely that 
South Korean companies’ lack of experience in the 
international mining business will cause some invest-
ments to fail, confronting government and industry 
with the question: Is the use of tax revenues for min-
ing investments actually justifiable during the cur-
rent high-price phase, in light of the low level of social 
security provided by the South Korean state? 
 
 
 
33  Yonhap News Agency, “S. Korea Insulated from Immediate 
Rare Earth Elements Shortage: Gov’t,” Yonhap NewsQ	Q
2012, ^""&%+#=$%%&+#
$#	"%&+"""
(accessed August 30, 2012). 
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Turkey 
Günter Seufert 
 
Turkey possesses numerous minerals and metals, but 
sells few on world markets. It is the world’s largest 
importer of scrap iron,1
Minerals in the National Economy 
 and one of the largest of gold. 
Domestic industry’s great demand for raw materials 
produces a strongly negative foreign trade balance for 
mining products. The Turkish government is working 
on an import substitution strategy to address its struc-
tural current account deficit, but this touches only 
tangentially on mining and strategic raw materials. 
Turkey has comparatively large reserves2 of metallic 
and non-metallic raw materials such as bentonite, 
'
&4'$%
X
'&&	+`QX$	$%4'$%
tonnes), chromium (25 million tonnes), feldspar (130 
million tonnes), gold (6,500 tonnes), limestone, calcite, 
magnesite, marble (3,X$%$%%&+`Q&	&Q+	$%-
tium, and trona.3 Borates (72 percent of known global 
reserves), feldspar (23 percent), and perlite (about 50 
percent) are particularly significant.
 
1  “Türkei will Wiedergewinnung von Rohstoffen steigern,” 
GTAI, June 6, 2011, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/ 
	&"'&	&Q#'4

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
 According to 
2  Turkish data on raw materials deposits and production 
are not always reliable, partly because certain companies use 
outdated systems for data collection and analysis, which do 
not conform to international reporting standards; see Mining 
Turkey: Mining & Earth Science Magazine 2, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 
32f., http://www.madencilik-turkiye.com/engdergi/sayi2/ 
MiningTurkey_sayi2.pdf (accessed October 11, 2012); Engi-
neering and Mining Journal (E&MJ), ed., Mining in Turkey, 
\%	=Q#Qhttp://www.gbreports.com/admin/ 
reports/EMJ-Turkey2012.pdf (accessed October 12, 2012). 
Finally, there are often discrepancies between the figures 
given by the two main state agencies, the Turkish Office 
of Statistics (TÜK) and the General Directorate for Mining 
Affairs (MGEM). DPTM (State Planning Organization), Doku-
zuncu Kalk	

–2013, Madencilik Özel Ihtisas Raporu 
(ninth development plan), March 2006, pp. 29f. 
3  Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, ed., Natural 
Resources, http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf= 
webpages&b=tabiikaynaklar_EN&bn=216&hn=&nm= 
4

&++&]=Q`# 
4  “Turkey,” Mining Journal, March 2012, p. 2, http://www. 
mining-journal.com/__data/assets/supplement_file_ 
World Mining Data, Turkey is among the world’s top 
ten producers of boron (first); chromium, bentonite, 
feldspar, magnesite, and perlite (fourth in each case); 
barite and antimony (sixth); and gypsum and an-
hydrite (ninth).5
The main markets for Turkish mining exports are 
China (39 percent) and the United States 4#&	
&%`#
 
6 
&	$&%Y%$%+$	
&+&	
&%$8+'%%
imports from Turkey.7 There are no export restrictions 
on mining products. The most important Turkish 
'%%&$	+%&	&'	X&4&	
&%X=
value), chromium (13 percent); copper (10 percent); 
borates, zinc, and feldspar (5 percent each); magnesite 
and ferrochrome (3 percent each); bentonite and quartz 
(1 percent each); other metals (3 percent); and indus-
trial minerals (5 percent).9 Marble aside, there is plain-
ly considerable untapped potential for export and pro-
cessing. Turkey is a net importer of ores, with an aver-
age import surplus for 2007–2011 of 32.7 percent.10
From 2005 to 2011 Turkish mining contributed 
$%=X$#&	
&%$8Q&++	&$8
exports rose from 2.1 to 2.9 percent. Because of the 
country’s long economic boom, these figures fail 
to adequately reflect the sector’s strong absolute 
growth – an annual average of 21.6 percent.
 
11
 
attachment/0010/295579/Turkey_scr2011.pdf (accessed 
October 11, 2012). 
 
5  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Fami-
lie und Jugend (BMWFJ), ed., World Mining Data (Vienna, 2012), 
http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt Bergbau 
Daten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed February 
27, 2013). 
6  Deloitte, ed., Turkish Mining Industry Report, July 2010, http:// 
www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/publications/Documents/ 
MINING.INDUSTRY.PDF 4

&++&
$X&	Q`# 
7  Günther Tiess, General and International Mining Policy (Vienna 
and New York, 2011), p. 73. 
8  World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review Turkey, 
January 17, 2012, pp. 52ff. 
9  E&MJ, ed., Mining Turkey (see note 2), p. 19. 
10  Ekonomi Bakanlºº4 ]%+	=$8
$nomy), ed., Sektör 
Raporu Madencilik, 2012, p. 9, http://www.ibp.gov.tr/pg/sektorpdf/ 
sanayi/madencilik_2012.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012). 
11  General Directorate for Mining Affairs, http://www. 
migem.gov.tr (Istatistikler); Sahil Madencilik, http://www. 
sahilmadencilik.net/index.php/tr/turkiye-maden-haritasi 
4X$

&++&+Q`# 
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The Turkish construction sector is traditionally 
strong both at home and abroad. In the current boom 
this allowed the domestic steel industry to double 
production within ten years. Turkey is today the 
world’s tenth-	&++&&	$
&	QX&	
&%$8
the iron processed in the country has to be imported12 
and known domestic iron ore is likely to be exhausted 
within ten years.13 Only 31 percent of the raw material 
for iron production is mined ore; the rest is recycled 
scrap.
Most mining companies are small or medium-sized, 
and often lacking in basic management, training, and 
exploration skills. Turkey has none of the large com-
panies that set standards and drive innovation, and 
domestic capital has been slow to get involved in min-
ing. Foreign investment has flown primarily into gold 
extraction, and the great wave of investment that had 
been expected from privatization has failed to mate-
rialize.
 Imports of iron ore and scrap have topped the 
import statistics since 2006, and are largely responsi-
ble for Turkey’s large current account deficit. Alu-
minum, gold, and copper are also significant imports. 
15
Beneficiation and processing capacities are still 
underdeveloped. Although Turkey does today export 
significantly more processed than raw boron and 
marble products,
 Hopes are directed toward stronger inter-
national cooperation. 
16
To a certain extent the problems of mining reflect 
structural weaknesses of Turkish industry. Between 
%	&=¨+	&8	$'[X$%$ 
[X$%%&	
%
$'&	$+&8	$'[Q
$[Q# &+'&'&&
		&%

$%
deficit also increased,
 capacity expansion – especially for 
base metal processing – is still hindered by the long-
term nature of required investments and unusually 
high energy prices. As a consequence the value added 
in mining remains limited. 
17
 
12  Information provided by Dr. Abdülkerim Yörükolu, 
deputy director of the General Directorate of Mineral Re-
search and Exploration (MTA), Ankara, September 6, 2012. 
 largely because of the absolute 
volume of imports resulting from dependency on im-
ported energy, the widespread use of imported semi-
13  E&MJ, ed., Mining Turkey (see note 2), p. 20. 
14  Ninth Development Plan (see note 2), p. 116. 
15  Information provided by Engin Yalçin, head of the mining 
department at the Minerals and Metals Exporters Association 
(MMB), Se&'X&	QQ%+%X# 
16  Ninth Development Plan (see note 2`Q## 
17  Müstakil Sanayici ve  Adamlarº&	%&i (MÜSIAD), ed., 
Türkiye Ekonomisi Raporu, 2012, p. 15. 
finished products, and the relatively high share of 
imported raw materials. 
The Raw Materials Policy 
Institutional Setting 
In 1997 state-$%&
$'%&++

$%&8$	
percent of Turkish mining activities, private firms just 
15 percent. Since then, privatizations have reversed 
the figures. The only remaining state corporation of 
any significant size is the Eti Mine Works, which holds 
a monopoly on the extraction and processing of bo-
rates as well as producing zeolites, sulfuric acid, and 
pyrite. In 2011 Eti Mine Works ranked fourth in the 
list of Turkish businesses with the highest net profits, 
and third in terms of profitability.19 The National 
Boron Research Institute (BOREN) established in 2003 
concentrates on diversifying the production and 
application of borates.20
Minerals in Turkey are the property of the state, 
regardless of land ownership, which grants public and 
private businesses exploration and extraction licenses 
for a specific area, mineral, and period. 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
(ETKB) has two general directorates: the General Direc-
torate for Energy and the General Directorate for 
Mining Affairs (MGEM). The latter is responsible for 
tendering and issuing licenses, which as a rule run 
for ten years and may be extended for a further ten. 
MGEM verifies that labor law, health and safety, and 
environmental regulations are observed. The General 
Directorate for Mining Affairs also watches over the 
national interest, ensures that production, stockpil-
ing, and marketing plans are observed, and maintains 
data on mines. 
Answerable directly to the Ministry, the General 
Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA) 
is a research agency conducting geological and geo-
physical studies, preparing exploration projects, and 
conducting research commissioned by state instances 
and private firms. More than 3,000 staff, 1,500 of them 
 
18  E&MJ, ed., Mining in Turkey (see note 2`Q## 
19  Eti Maden, http://www.etimaden.gov.tr/turkiyenin-500-
buyuk-sanayi-kurulusu-arastirmasinin-2011-yili-sonuclari-
acikland-#'4

&++&&&'X&	Q`# 
20  National Boron Research Institute, http://www.boren.gov.tr/ 
en/ (accessed August 20, 2012). 
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academics, work in its Ankara headquarters and 
twelve regional offices.21
The Planning Ministry (KalkB) prepares five-year 
development plans for all branches of the economy.
 
22
The central legal basis for raw material extraction is 
the Mining Law (Maden KanunuQ]¬`$8#&8$	'+
in %

&&	&&
&%+&-granting pro-
cess, improved transparency, legal security, and effi-
ciency, defined the responsibilities of the various min-
istries more clearly (decoupling approval procedures 
in other ministries from the process at the General 
Directorate for Mining Affairs), and gave companies 
more time for geological exploration. Turkey’s rate 
of corporation tax, which at 20 percent is among the 
lowest in the OECD, has a positive effect on the 
branch. Profits are taxed at 15 percent, while the level 
of license fees depends on the ore; for gold and silver 
there is no fee at all. Businesses that process ores after 
extracting pay only half the license fee.
 
In earlier decades, when the state still occupied a 
stronger position in the economy, such plans were 
implemented directly. Today they principally in-
fluence the course of state development and invest-
ment policy. It is the experts in the Planning Ministry 
who follow the international and European discussion 
on questions of mining and raw materials. 
23
The trend to lower environmental protections is 
welcomed by investors – and condemned by environ-
mentalists. One such example is the absence of any 
requirement for an environmental impact assessment 
for exploratory drilling. The health and safety situ-
ation is also poor. Turkey has Europe’s worst record 
for fatal accidents at work, with coal mining particu-
larly badly affected.
 

 
21  Ninth Development Plan (see note 
 
2), p. 106, and Maden 
Tetkik ve Arama Genel Müdürlügü (MTA; General Direc-
torate of Mineral Research and Exploration), ed., Stratejik Plan 
2010–2014Q#Q^""#'#$<#	"<#"8$
"+	&³-
plan.pdf (accessed August 20, 2012). 
22  Although the name of the institution (Kalkº%'Bakan-
lºº`&	='&%+&<&lopment ministry,” the term Plan-
ning Ministry better describes its nature, as it emerged from 
the State Planning Organization (DPT, later DPTM), and is 
therefore used here; http://www.dpt.gov.tr/Kalkinma.portal 
(accessed +Q`# 
23  MBendi Information Services, ed., http://www.mbendi. 
com/index.htm (accessed August 20, 2012), and E&MJ, ed., 
Mining in Turkey (see note 2`Q## 
24  %+8<&=&	+Q'%&	+<&&$		-
mentary question by the CHP on January 11, 2012, http:// 
#X''#$<#	"""-+#84

&++&+Q
2012). 
Concepts and Strategies 
In the interests of efficient public administration and 
putting political initiatives into practice rapidly, all 
government agencies prepare strategic plans. To date, 
however, mining and security of raw materials supply 
have played only a marginal role in these, for reasons 
that include Turkey’s great dependency on energy im-
ports and the associated financial and political costs 
(centrality of relations with Russia, Iran, and Azer-
baijan). Even in the responsible ministry, securing 
industrial raw materials is a secondary consideration. 
For some time there have been calls for the establish-
ment of a separate mining ministry.25 The 2010–2014 
Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
mentions mining on only six of forty-three pages, sole-
ly in the context of increasing marble production and 
further diversifying boron products.26
The most recent five-year development plan already 
demands fundamental reforms: expand and systema-
tize exploration, restructure the MTA research agency, 
annual reporting, an overhaul of the relevant statis-
tics, formation of an expert commission for research 
and development, preparation of a strategic mining 
plan, and establishment of a separate mining minis-
try.
 
27 Work on the Strategic Mining Plan has made 
progress and the document is with the Planning Min-
istry for preparation of the next five-year plan.
A specially created expert commission for export 
production in the Ministry of Economy (EB) has begun 
work on a strategy for securing raw materials and sub-
stituting imported semi-finished products. One prior-
ity of its work is vehicle manufacturing. In 2010 semi-
finished products for vehicles and machine-building 
(machine construction) represented 19 percent of total 
imports of semi-finished products (compared to just 
9.5 percent for textiles). Vehicle manufacturing is the 
Turkish industry with the smallest domestic produc-
tion share.
 
29
 
25  Ninth Development Plan (see note 
 
2) and information pro-
vided by Engin Yalçin (see note 15). 
26  Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanl ºº4¬ ]%+	=$8
Energy and Natural Resources), ed., 2010–1014 Stratejik Plan, 
pp. 50–5, http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf= 
webpages&b=yayinlar_raporlar&bn=550&hn=&id=3273 
(accessed August 15, 2012). 
27  Ninth Development Plan (see note 2), pp. 179–# 
28  Information provided by Engin Yalçin (see note 15). 
29  All figures from EB, Ihracata dönük üretim stratejisi ve GITES, 
pp. 5, 20, http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/BAC-DD3-
-AF6BBFBA9/gitessunumu.pdf (accessed August 
Q`# 
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Policy Measures and Instruments 
The thrust of current proposals for reducing depend-
ency on semi-finished products is that industry and 
government-administered research facilities should 
cooperate more closely, and that universities and re-
search centers should conduct more applied research 
under the direction of the Research Council.30 But 
mining and raw materials are not mentioned directly. 
Nor does the Industrial Strategy 2011–2014 of the Minis-
try of Industry and Commerce (SvTB) touch more than 
briefly on the central role of raw materials for vehicle 
manufacturing and the textiles and steel industries. 
And it says nothing about the necessity of drawing up 
a coherent raw materials strategy.31
Nonetheless, attempts are being made to address 
certain structural weaknesses in mining. Although 
limited in its financial scope, the 2012 Investment Pro-
gram takes up at least some of the guidelines of the 
Ninth Development Plan and in particular improves the 
situation for exploration by increasing the budgetary 
and extra-budgetary mining research and documenta-
tion funding available to the MTA research agency, 
the state-owned Eti Mine Works, Istanbul University, 
and Istanbul Technical University.
 
32 Expanded state 
research funding and easing conditions for private 
exploration increased the number of explored areas 
thirteen-fold between 2002 and 2011, with the dis-

$<&	=$8$%%&+$8$Q#X$%$%%&+$8
-

&QQ$%%&+$8
$&	Q%'lion tonnes 
of raw material for the ceramics industry.33 The MTA 
in particular increased the efficiency of its work and 
identified lead, nickel, sodium sulfate, and tin depos-
its. New iron ore and molybdenum deposits have 
also been found. In order to safeguard the supply of 
iron ore, the MTA has expanded its contacts, especially 
to Kazakhstan.35
 
30  Ibid., pp. 21ff. Similar research and planning can be found 
on chemicals, textiles, and agriculture. 
 The agency is generally intensifying 
31  Bilim, Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanl ºº4< ]%+	=$8
Industry and Commerce), ed., Türkiye Sanayi Stratejisi Belgesi, 
http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/Files/Documents/sanayi_stratejisi_ 
X&&+#8 4

&++&+Q`# 
32  Kalkº%' %ºº4¬ ; Planning Ministry), ed., 2012 
Y, pp. 27f., 32f., 191, http://www.dpt.gov.tr/ 
PortalDesign/PortalControls/Webiceri$+&	'#+%
D 
5A6FF03C7BFC5EDFFEDF4

&++&+Q`# 
33  ETKB, ed., 2012 Plan ve Bütce Konusmasi, p. 12, http://www. 
enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=yayinlar_ 
	$		X%%4

&++&+Q`# 
34  ETKB, ed., 2012 Plan ve Bütce Konusmasi (see note 33), p. 25. 
35  Information provided by Abdülkerim Yörükolu (see note 12). 
its international engagement, working with the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to deepen 
contact with geologists in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Moldova, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, and 
Uzbekistan. In collaboration with the International 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TKA), the MTA 
is exploring possibilities of joint research with the 
newly independent Turkic states and Georgia,36 and 
has agreed an exchange with South Africa on mining 
technology and the marketing of mining products, 
as well as joint projects with South Korea on marine 
geology.37 The MTA also expresses great interest in an 
exchange with Germany.
The mining industry is pushing for further-reach-
ing reforms. Although domestic and foreign compa-
nies are basically legal equals today, foreign firms tend 
to be more concerned about unpredictability of bu-
reaucratic and legal decisions,
 
39 and mistrustful over 
transparency and impartiality in the licensing process. 
One focus of anxiety is the absolute centrality of the 
General Directorate of Mineral Research and Explora-
tion (MTA) as the final arbiter of resource licensing.
Financing represents another structural weakness 
of the sector. A specially established mining fund was 
diverted to other purposes during the crisis of 2001.
 
 
Turkish banks possess little experience in this sector 
and have yet to adapt to its needs, and the country has 
few qualified and certified experts capable of prepar-
ing geological reports of the kind required by banks, 
nor are its mining companies familiar with internation-
al reporting systems. Few are registered on the Istan-
bul Stock Exchange (which has yet to make specific 
rules for mining companies anyway). On the other 
hand, the government’s new Industrial Development 
Strategy, which replaces an outdated system of incen-
tives for underdeveloped regions with support for par-
ticular sectors including mining, is likely to have a pos-
itive effect. The new funding guidelines of June 2012 
provide a raft of investment stimuli including exemp-
tion from sales taxes and customs duties, income tax 
breaks, and subsidization of social security taxes.
 
36  MTA, http://www.mta.gov.tr/v2.0/birimler/uiab/index. 
php?id=tika (accessed September 2, 2012). 
 
37  Ibid. 
38  Information provided by Abdülkerim Yörükolu (see note 12). 
39  E&MJ, ed., Mining in Turkey (see note 2`Q#Q# 
40  Ibid., p. # 
41  Ninth Development Plan (see note 2`Q## 
42  E&MJ, ed., Mining in Turkey (see note 2), p. 65. 
43  stanbul Serbest Muhasebeci Mali Müavirler Odasº
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Rare Earth Elements 
No coherent strategy for promoting and securing 
rare earth elements can be discerned to date either. 
Turkish industry is hardly yet in a position to process 
and use these metals, so its participation as a third 
party in the WTO complaint against China by the 
European Union, the United States, and Mexico over 
export restrictions imposed on numerous metals must 
be regarded as a precautionary measure. Turkish 
reserves of bastnaesite-fluorite-barite and thorium 
in particular were long regarded as unviable, with 
thorium discussed exclusively as an alternative fuel 
for nuclear power. Figures in the exporters’ asso-
ciation and the Planning Ministry report, however, 
that the new development plan will discuss the export 
importance of rare earth elements in detail. The MTA 
reports that mining industry applications to explore 
for rare earth elements have jumped, and plans to 
step up its own search efforts. In fall 2012 the state-
owned Eti Mine Works invited tenders for “the pro-
duction of oxides of rare earth elements” in the 
thorium deposits of Sivrihisar in the province of 
Eskiehir, where it intends to implement a new 
business model including technology transfer and 
joint marketing.
 
(SMMMO; Chamber of Certified Public Accountants of Istan-
bul), ed., Yeni tevik sistemi 2012 (the new incentive system 
2012), http://archive.ismmmo.org.tr/docs/yayinlar/kitaplar/ 
2012/yeni_tesvik_sistemi.pdf (accessed September 10, 2012). 
 The authorities in Ankara were 
largely unaware of reports that U.S.-based Black Sea 
Metals (formerly Texada Ventures) had gained access 
to deposits of dysprosium, erbium, gadolinium, lan-
thanum, neodymium, samarium, and yttrium by 
taking a 95 percent stake in Ankara-based Anadolu 
Madencilik. Anadolu Madencilik is also reported to 
be planning a production facility for heavy rare earth 
44  Information provided by Ismail Gencay Oguz and M. 
Kemal Günay, General Directorate of Economic Research and 
Assessment, Ministry of Economy, Ankara, September 5, 2012. 
45  European Union, China – Measures Related to the Exportation 
of Various Raw Materials (DS395), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
$
X"'"#'4

&++&&&'X&	Q`# 
46  Muammer Kaya, Toryum nükleer yakit dönüsümün perspektifi, 
http://www.slidefinder.net/t/toryum_nukleer_yakit_donusum
%&	+&8""4

&++&+Q
2012). 
47  Information provided by Engin Yalçº%4+&&%$&15) and by 
Tülay Yikdirim and Anil Altunay, mining coordinators at the 
Planning Ministry, Ankara, September 5, 2012. 
48  Eti Maden, ed., Ihale Ilanlar, http://www.etimaden.gov.tr/ 
tender.php (accessed September 16, 2012). 
49  Information provided by Abdülkerim Yörükolu 
(see note 12). 
elements in Karasu, in Sakarya province on the Black 
Sea coast.50
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
Turkey does not yet possess a comprehensive and 
coherent raw materials strategy, but government 
documents do underline the importance of mining 
for ameliorating dependency on the export of raw 
materials. In recent years recycling has attracted 
increasing attention. Research and development are 
being expanded to allow technologically advanced 
products to be produced domestically, in the interests 
of import substitution. But there is a lack of joined-up 
planning linking the manufacture of new products 
with the necessary raw materials and their sourcing 
from domestic production and/or import.51 Accord-
ingly there is also no list of raw materials whose pro-
duction or export is of medium- or long-term strategic 
importance and whose extraction, processing, or im-
port should be supported by incentives or specific 
legislation. One reason for this deficit is certainly 
that to date none of the major business associations 
(TÜSAD, MÜSAD, TUSKON) has embraced mining. 
Nor do non-energy raw materials play any great role 
in foreign policy.52
 
50  Black Sea Metals, http://www.blackseametals.com/default. 
+4

&++&+Q`Q% 
&
Metals – Global Player Seltener Erden?” Ariva.de, http://www. 
ariva.de/forum/Black-Sea-Metalls-Global-Player-Seltener-Erden-
4

&++&+Q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 Turkey participates in none of the 
transparency initiatives such as EITI. But in particular 
the Planning Ministry and the MTA research agency 
have begun to devote greater attention to the nation-
al raw materials supply and especially rare earth 
elements. The mining industry itself is also directing 
more attention to the issue of rare earth elements, 
if primarily with the goal of opening up a new source 
of exports. 
51  Information provided by contacts at the Planning Minis-
try and the Ministry of Economy, and by Erbay Dökmeci, 
Director of Investor Relations at the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources, Ankara, September 6, 2012. 
52  Numan Hazar, Turkey in AfricaQ	+'&$	4%	^
Ortadou Stratejik Aratº	'	]&	&±	+'*&%&	8$	
Middle Eastern Strategic Studies], July 2012), http://www. 
$	+'#$	#	"&%"&%Y$+"	
&">&+"%Y]# 
pdf (accessed February 5, 2013); Gero Erdmann and Olga 
Herzog, Die Türkei in Afrika: Im Schatten des Neo-Osmanismus? 
GIGA Focus Afrika 1/2012 (Hamburg: GIGA, 2012). 
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United Kingdom 
Anja Dahlmann and Johannes Häußler 
 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (UK)1
Minerals in the National Economy 
 is one of the G20 countries with a com-
paratively weak extractive sector. Strategies to reduce 
supply risks focus mainly on resource efficiency and 
recycling. The country supports free trade and (volun-
tary) international transparency initiatives, but has 
not asserted an active role on minerals and metals 
within the G20. 
Industrial minerals such as barite, limestone rocks, 
salt, clay, and fluorite and construction minerals like 
sand and gravel were particularly important in the 
British extractive sector in 2009. The value of domestic 
production amounted to £2,671 million (about €3,313 
million) in 2010. The United Kingdom also produced 
smaller amounts of gold, silver, and aluminum (from 
imported ore), as well as lead, tin, and tungsten. Brit-
ish production of most minerals is below the world 
average (2009). The small iron ore production has 
ceased, and exploration for nickel has been aban-
doned. The reasons for declining production include 
high energy costs for production and processing and 
falling demand in the course of the economic and 
financial crisis. Because of high energy costs, alumi-
num production will remain at a relatively low level. 
British manufacturing is therefore strongly dependent 
on imports.2
With regard to other minerals, however, domestic 
production could rise again. The British Geological 
Survey (BGS) believes that the United Kingdom has 
major deposits of barite, gold, and base metals like 
tin and tungsten.
 
3
 
1  In the following: “United Kingdom”; “British” as adjective. 
 According to the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the 
2  Alberto Alexander Perez, “United Kingdom [Advance 
Release],” in USGS, 2009 Minerals Yearbook, vol. 3, Area Reports, 
International 4&+$%Q\%&`Q##Q^""'%&	+#++# 
gov/minerals/pubs/country/2009/myb3-2009-uk.pdf (accessed 
April 22, 2012). 
3  British Geological Survey (BGS), Minerals UK – Mineral Poten-
tial UK (Nottingham, 2012), http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/ 
exploration/potential/home.html (accessed August 21, 2012). 
Hemerdon Mine in Devon contains the world’s fourth 
largest deposit of tungsten, which is often listed as 
critical and is currently produced mainly in China. 
Annual production in Hemerdon could meet British 
&'%+	+$&$	Q
$<&	%&	
&%
of global demand.
Domestic and foreign-owned private companies 
can be found in the British mining sector. One foreign-
owned company is Rio Tinto Alcan Ltd., which is head-
quartered in Canada, but belongs to British Rio Tinto. 
Castle Cement UK belongs to Heidelberg Cement AG, 
while Cleveland Potash Ltd. is a subsidiary of Israel 
Chemicals Ltd.
 
5
Mining and processing firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange play an important role in internation-
al projects. Six of the world’s twenty largest mining 
companies in 2011 were partly or completely British 
or listed on the London Stock Exchange: Australian-
British BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto plc (part of the Rio 
Tinto Group); formerly South African Anglo Ameri-
can plc; Indian Vedanta Resources; European-Indian 
ArcelorMittal, and the Kazakh Eurasian Natural 
Resources.
 
6
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
The British government considers a secure supply of 
raw materials an important topic, but regards itself 
merely as a catalyst for the markets. 
UK raw materials policy is decentralized, with 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales each 
 
4  Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS) 
and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), Resource Security Action Plan: Making the Most of Valuable 
Materials 4$%$%Q]	
`Q#Q^""#&8	#$<# 
uk/publications/files/pb13719-resource-security-action-
plan.pdf (accessed August 21, 2012). 
5  Perez, “United Kingdom [Advance Release]” (see note 2), 
pp. #–## 
6  PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Mine 2011 – The Game 
Has Changed: Review of Global Trends in the Mining Industry (n.p., 
2011), p. 39, http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/mining/pdf/ 
mine-2011-game-has-
%&#84
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responsible for their own sphere but cooperating with 
one another and following broadly the same goals. 
British raw materials policy, especially in the case 
of minerals, revolves around DEFRA. Together with the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
DEFRA published a Resource Security Action Plan out-
lining the framework for cooperation between govern-
ment and industry.7 The Department for Transport 
(DfT), the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) (via the 
Small Business Research Initiative, SBRI), and the Brit-
ish Geological Survey (BGS) are also concerned with 
minerals and metals policy. The BGS, for instance, 
advises the House of Commons Science and Technol-
ogy Committee on strategically important metals. 
During its recent deliberations, the Committee inter-
viewed representatives of government, industry, and 
science, and concluded that domestic raw materials 
production had to be supported, urging the govern-
ment to recognize mineral deposits as strategically 
important infrastructure.9 The bipartisan Associate 
Parliamentary Minerals Group also addresses the 
topics of raw materials consumption, policy, and 
regulation and acts as link between parliament and 
industry.10
Like the government, representatives of British 
industry consider security of supply of metals and 
minerals to be an important topic, pointing to three 
major risks: competition, price volatility, and supply 
risks. These problems are believed to stem from a com-
bination of different factors, such as growing global 
demand, concentration of supply in certain states, 
trade barriers, lack of alternative materials, and delays 
in balancing supply and demand.
 The Parliamentary Office of Science 
and Technology (POST) also sporadically informs and 
consults parliament on matters of security of supply. 
11
 
7  BIS and DEFRA, Resource Security Action Plan (see note 
 Supply risks and 
price volatility already impact the economy today. 
According to a survey by Ernst & Young, 29 percent 
), 
p. 23. 
8  BGS, Annual Report 2010–11 (Nottingham, 2012), http://nora. 
nerc.ac.uk/16702/1/Annual_Report_2010_2011.pdf (accessed 
August 29, 2012). 
9  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 
Strategically Important Metals: Summary, May 17, 2011, http:// 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/ 
cmsctech/726/72603.htm (accessed August 29, 2012). 
10  “Register of All-Party Groups [as at 13 September 2012], 
Minerals,” Parliament.uk, http://www.publications.parliament. 
uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/minerals.htm (accessed Septem-
X&	Q`# 
11  BIS and DEFRA, Resource Security Action Plan (see note ), 
p. 5. 
of British companies’ profit warnings in 2011 were 
based on rising raw materials prices. The Confeder-
ation of British Industry (CBI) and the manufacturers’ 
organization EEF urged the government to address 
resource risks. In its report, Made to Last: Creating a 
Resource Efficient Economy in 2010, the CBI stressed the 
importance of resource efficiency and advocated 
policies that specifically focus on this topic.12
Non-governmental organizations lobbying in par-
ticular for transparency, environmental protection, 
and human rights in the mining sector are also im-
portant policy actors. The Green Alliance is particu-
larly noteworthy, having headed a working group on 
resource risks aiming to connect government, busi-
ness, and other actors more closely with one an-
other.
 
13 In connection with transparency in revenue 
flows, the NGO Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is par-
ticularly important, urging the government to adopt 
the transparency rules of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). The London Mining 
Network (LMN) is a network of environmental and 
human rights groups that in 2009 published a report 
on human rights abuses and environmental degrada-
tion by mining companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. LMN calls on the government to monitor 
more strictly at least whether these companies comply 
with UK law.15
The Material Security Working Group (MSWG), a 
consortium of various business associations and en-
vironmental organizations,
 
16
 
12  Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Made to Last: 
Creating a Resource Efficient Economy (London, 2010), http:// 
#
X#$	#"'&""
X-_made_to_last_-_ 
creating_a_resource_efficient_economy.pdf (accessed 
&&'X&	Q`# 
 urges the government to 
more strongly support recycling and to formulate raw 
13  BIS and DEFRA, Resource Security Action Plan (see note ), 
p. 9. 
14  Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Activities United Kingdom, 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/where/coalitions/united-
kingdom (accessed September 5, 2012). 
15  London Mining Network (LMN), UK-listed Mining Com-
panies and the Case for Stricter Oversight (February 2012), http:// 
londonminingnetwork.org/docs/lmn-the-case-for-stricter-
$<&	+#84

&++&&&'X&	Q`# 
16  Members: ADS, British Glass, British Plastics Federation, 
Confederation of Paper Industries, the manufacturers’ feder-
ation EEF, Packaging Federation, UK Steel, Metal Packaging 
Manufacturers Association, Institute of Environmental 
Management and Assessment, the environmental organiza-
tion Friends of the Earth, the Resource Association, Professor 
Steve Evans (University of Cambridge, Institute of Manufac-
turing), North East Sustainable Resources Board. 
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materials policy with a longer time horizon than 
that of the Resource Security Action Plan of 2012. In 
August 2012, the MSWG proposed establishing an 
Office of Resource Management to coordinate the 
commodity policies of the different ministries, criti-
cized the waste of raw materials due to inadequate 
recycling, and urged the government to take appro-
priate action.17
The United Kingdom is a center for global com-
modities trading, especially due to the London Metal 
Ex
%&4]`#&]+&	&'$	&%0 per-
cent of all non-ferrous metal futures are traded, 
including contracts for aluminum, aluminum alloys, 
lead, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, nickel, ferrous 
steel, zinc, and tin,
 
 and sets global prices for these 
commodities.19 In June 2012, the LME was taken over 
by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), allowing 
its traders greater access to the Chinese market and 
strengthening the HKSE’s position in the commodities 
business.20
The London Bullion Market (LBMA) is an important 
over-the-counter market for gold and silver, loosely 
overseen by the Bank of England. Trading takes place 
between its members, which are mostly major inter-
national banks, bullion dealers, or refiners. Twice 
daily, five member banks negotiate the gold price, 
which serves as an important reference point for 
traders worldwide. A similar procedure takes place 
daily for silver.
 
21
 
17  EEF, “Government Must Take Stronger Action over 
Looming Raw Material Shortage,” August 20, 2012, http:// 
www.eef.org.uk/releases/uk/2011/GOVT-MUST-TAKE-STRONGER-
ACTION-OVER-LOOMING-RAW-MATERIAL-SHORTAGE.htm 
(accessed August 29, 2012). 
 Prices for platinum and palladium 
are fixed daily at the over-the-counter London Plati-
num and Palladium Market (LPPM). 
18  “Londoner Metallboerse heute (LME),” Marketmetal.de, 
http://www.marketm&#&"&+"&4

&++&]=
29, 2012). 
19  London Metal Exchange (LME), A Guide to the LME (London, 
2011), p. 6, http://www.lme.com/downloads/Guide_to_the_ 
LME_V2_WEB.pdf (accessed May 29, 2012). 
20  LME, “Board of LME Holdings Limited Recommends 
GBQ]$%*+88&	4 #&		&`X=¡$%
Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited Be Proposed to Ordi-
nary Shareholders,” London, June 15, 2012, http://www.lme. 

$'"'&	&+$	
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2012). 
21  The City UK, Commodities TradingQ]	
QQ# 7, 
http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Commodities-
Trading-2011.pdf (accessed May 29, 2012). 
Concepts and Strategies 
Until recently, the National Minerals Policy Statement 
of 2006 was the central planning document of Brit-
ain’s raw material policy.22 It refers exclusively to 
domestic raw material production and emphasizes 
the need for an adequate supply of raw materials and 
environmentally friendly production. But this is a 
land-use planning document and thus not equivalent 
to the commodity strategies of certain other G20 coun-
tries. With the Resource Security Action Plan of 2012, the 
government has published a document more closely 
resembling a raw materials strategy.23 The Action Plan 
identifies risks relating to security of supply and offers 
guidance on how to address them.
Security of supply is also part of the British Geo-
logical Survey’s (BGS) Five Year Plan 8$	$#
According to the BGS, connecting British geoscientific 
institutions more closely with one another and with 
stakeholders from government, local authorities, the 
private sector, and universities represents a particular 
challenge. The aim is to improve the advice given to 
politics and business and the sustainable use of raw 
materials.
 Its central ele-
ments are sustainability and resource efficiency, recy-
cling, research on critical raw materials, and analysis 
of vulnerable sectors. 
25
The BGS has also conducted a study on the supply 
risks of forty-one raw materials of central importance 
to the British economy; factors used to classify the 
risks are availability, location of production and re-
serves, political stability in producer countries, recy-
cling rate, and the substitution options. In 2012, the 
supply of antimony, bismuth, molybdenum, tungsten, 
and rare earths was considered particularly vulner-
able. The main producer of the nine most critical raw 
materials is China. To manage the supply risk, the BGS 
 
 
22  Department for Communities and Local Government, 
Mineral Policy Statement 1: Planning and Minerals (London, 
November 2006), http://www.communities.gov.uk/ 
documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/152993.pdf (accessed 
September 5, 2012). 
23  BIS and DEFRA, Resource Security Action Plan (see note ). 
24  While the action plan relates primarily to England, it 
assumes close cooperation between the four parts of the 
United Kingdom in the areas under discussion, BIS and 
DEFRA, Resource Security Action Plan (see note ), p. 6. 
25  BGS, BGS Science Strategy 2009–2014 (Nottingham, 2009), 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/about/strategy2009-#'4
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recommend promoting recycling and reducing 
demand.26
Apart from the aforementioned studies, a multi-
tude of analyses and reports on the British raw mate-
rials situation have been conducted by or on behalf 
of government ministries. Like the Resource Security 
Action Plan, these focus mainly on the economic im-
portance of raw materials and recycling. For example, 
in its Review of the Future Resource Risks Faced by Business 
and an Assessment of Future Viability, DEFRA found 
long-term supply risks in various sectors concerning 
indium, lithium, phosphorus, and rare earth ele-
ments, and recommends that companies should 
closely monitor developments on the markets and 
within supply chains and increase their use of 
recycled materials.
 
27 In 2010, the Department for 
Transport and the Department for Business, Innova-
tion and Skills (BIS) took a closer look at the supply 
and demand for rare earth elements. The authors of 
the study recommended in particular improving 
recycling infrastructure, fostering international co-
operation in research and development, and increas-
ing transparency in commodities trade.
Policy Measures and Instruments 
 
Domestic Extraction 
In England, Wales, and Scotland, energy resources 
such as coal, oil, and uranium belong to the state, as 
do silver and gold, while most other mineral resources 
are privately owned. In Northern Ireland all minerals 
 
26  BGS, Risk List 2012 (Nottingham, 2012), http://www.bgs.ac.uk/ 
mineralsuk/statistics/riskList.html (accessed September 29, 
2012). 
27  DEFRA, Review of the Future Resource Risks Faced by Business 
and an Assessment of Future Viability – EV0458 (London, 2010), 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Default.aspx?Menu=Menu&Module=
More&Location=None&ProjectID=17161&FromSearch=Y& 
X+&	&	
&_$		%	$³&
*$& 
SortOrder=Asc&Paging=10#Description (accessed August 
29, 2012); DEFRA, A Review of National Resource Strategies and 
Research (London, March 2012), pp. 71–72, http://www.defra. 
gov.uk/publications/files/pb13722-national-resource-
strategies-review.pdf (accessed August 29, 2012). 
28  Oakdene Hollins – Research and Consulting, Metals and 
Mining (Aylesbury), http://www.oakdenehollins.co.uk/metals-
mining.php (accessed August 29, 2012); DEFRA, A Review of 
National Resource Strategies and Research (see note 27), pp. 72–73, 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/pb13722-national-
resource-strategies-review.pdf (accessed August 29, 2012). 
rights are owned by the state.29
Mineral Planning Authorities (MPAs) are respon-
sible for planning and licensing mining projects, in-
cluding land-use planning and oversight of explora-
tion and extraction activities. Furthermore, the MPAs 
are responsible for extending exploration projects, 
which are usually limited to six months (in England).
 The law on explora-
tion and exploitation is formulated in the Minerals Act 
of 1971, while the opening of new mines and related 
exploration activities are also regulated at the local 
level by the Town and Country Planning (Minerals) Regu-
lations of 1971 and the Town and Country Planning (Min-
erals) Act $8#	'&	&+$%+X=8or mining 
activities lies with local land-use planning authorities 
(Mineral Planning Authorities, MPA), which are co-
ordinated and overseen at the national level by the 
Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). In England, the county councils serve as MPAs. 
30 
%
&Q]+<&X&&%	&§	&$	&	&
Minerals and Waste Development Framework (MWDF), 
setting goals for raw materials supply and waste dis-
posal. In order to coordinate the raw materials policies 
in England, the DCLG published the National Planning 
Policy Framework in 2012.31 This core document 
replaces multiple earlier planning documents.32 
Similar provisions apply in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland.33
Domestic resource extraction in the United King-
dom has been in decline for several years. This could 
change, however, as rising global demand for raw 
materials and corresponding price increases make 
extraction of certain raw materials profitable once 
again. The British Geological Survey (BGS) is there-
fore working on a project to study local raw material 
deposits, focusing in particular on rare earths in 
northwestern Scotland.
 

 
29  Minerals UK, United Kingdom Mineral Statistics, http://www. 
bgs ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/UKStatistics.html (accessed 
May 1, 2012). 
 The BGS supports the 
30  Minerals UK, Legislation and Policy (Nottingham 2012), 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/planning/legislation/ 
home.html (accessed February 2, 2013). 
31  Department for Communities and Local Government, 
National Planning Policy Framework (London, March 2012), http:// 
www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/ 
pdf/2116950.pdf (accessed 1 September 2, 2012); formerly 
Planning Policy Statements or Planning Policy Guidance 
Notes. 
32  For example, Minerals Policy Statement 1 and 2, and the Min-
eral Planning Guidance Notes. 
33  BGS, Minerals UK – Legislation and Policy (see note 30). 
34  BGS, Annual Report 2010–11 (see note ), p. # 
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management of local raw materials through a series 
of documents such as Minerals Safeguarding in England: 
Good Practice Advice35 %&&X+&%%%]%-
erals,”36
Marine Resources 
 which offers an interactive introductory 
course on regional planning for local government 
officers. 
In 1997, the United Kingdom ratified the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
and is a member of the International Seabed Author-
ity (ISA). In July 2012, UK Seabed Resources Ltd. was 
awarded an exploration license for manganese 
nodules in the Pacific Ocean.37
Sand, gravel, and salt are extracted in British coast-
al waters, in particular off southern and eastern Eng-
land. According to DEFRA, eleven companies were 
involved in the extraction of British marine minerals 
%Q	$
%#'$%$%%&+$8
$%+	c-
tion materials. The achieved turnover amounted to 
¸'$%Q&	$++<&$¸'$%#
 

Resource Efficiency, Recycling, 
Development of Substitutes 
 The 
British Marine Aggregate Producers Association 
(BMAPA) is responsible for documenting these activi-
ties, while the Aggregate Levy Sustainability Fund 
monitors and analyses their environmental impact. 
The volume of reserves would suggest that extraction 
of these seabed minerals on the sea floor will con-
tinue. No other minerals or metals are extracted from 
the seabed. 
%"Q&	
&%$8%+$+&$+&
was recycled, representing a significant increase over 
the figure for 2000/2001 (11 percent). The British gov-
ernment aims to increase the recycling rate to 50 per-
 
35  BGS, Mineral Safeguarding in England: Good Practice Advice, 
]%&	+%+&	$	''&Q&%&$	""
(Nottingham, 2011), http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/ 
planning/legislation/home.html#safeguarding (accessed 
September 3, 2012). 
36  BGS, Planning 4 Minerals, http://www.bgs.ac.uk/ 
%%%]%&	+"4

&++&&&'X&	Q`# 
37  International Seabed Authority – Council, Decision of 
the Council Relating to a Request for Approval of a Plan of Work 
for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by UK Seabed 
Resources Ltd. (Kingston, Jamaica, July 26, 2012), http://www. 
+#$	#³'"8&+"$
'&%+"!"Sess/Council/ISBA-*-27.pdf 
(accessed September 11, 2012). 
38  DEFRA, Charting Progress 2 – Productive Seas: Mineral Extrac-
tion (London, July 21, 2010), http://chartingprogress.defra. 
gov.uk/mineral-extraction (accessed September 2, 2012). 
cent by 2020, with availability of minerals and metals 
for industry also in mind. This goal has already been 
reached for industrial waste, of which 52 percent was 
recycled in 2009.39
The Government Review of Waste Policy in England docu-
ments existing action, obstacles, and future steps for 
recycling and improving resource efficiency.
 

The central government also wants to support the 
authorities of the four countries in the fight against 
the illegal trade in waste and scrap, and encourage 
the exchange of information between ministries. The 
British government’s focus on recycling and resource 
efficiency was confirmed at a workshop at the British 
Embassy in Berlin, led by the Royal Society of Chem-
istry, the UK Science and Innovation Network, and 
Security Special Interest Group, where participants 
emphasized that good cooperation between politics, 
science, and business will determine the success of 
measures taken.
 Under 
the Resource Security Action Plan, numerous projects are 
in planning or have already been implemented. Five of 
seven key measures in the Action Plan concern waste 
management and recycling. Thus, DEFRA’s Innovation 
Challenge Fund will collaborate with the Small Business 
Research Initiative to support research and development 
in 2012 and 2013. The deadline for proposals and 
appli
$%+&	&$%&&'X&	#>	&r-
more, producer liability is to be increased and over-
seen by the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS). Under BIS leadership, resource processing 
companies are to be kept better informed about recy-
cling capabilities regarding electronic equipment in 
order to increase the availability of recycled materials. 
A network of the Environmental Sustainability Knowl-
edge Transfer Network, the BGS, the BIS, and DEFRA’s 
Waste and Resource Action Programme (WRAP) will inform 
the business sector on critical raw materials. In addi-
tion, WRAP will conduct a material flow analysis for 
critical raw materials and evaluate recycling oppor-
tunities. 

 
39  DEFRA, Government Review of Waste Policy in England 2011 
(London, March 27, 2012), pp. QQQ^""#&8	# 
$<#"X
$%+"8&+"X-waste-policy-	&<&# 
pdf (accessed May 29, 2012). 
 
40  Ibid. 
41  Royal Society of Chemistry, Resources that Don’t Cost the Earth 
(Berlin, 2011), p. 11, http://www.rsc.org/images/Resources-
that-dont-cost-the-&	
'-223030.pdf (accessed Decem-
ber 15, 2012). 
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Stockpiling 
>	$'$Q& 	+$<&	%'&%eld a 
reserve of strategic minerals, in order to secure supply 
for at least three months in case of interruption. The 
concept of “strategic minerals” takes into account 
both the economic and military importance of each 
material. Today, the government rejects national 
or European stockpiling, preferring to advocate 
free markets and the lowering of trade barriers.
Trade Policy and Support for British Companies in their 
International Business 
 
Although it does not outline trade measures specifi-
cally targeted at raw materials, the Resource Security 
Action Plan emphasizes the government’s support for 
free trade and rejection of trade restrictions. Accord-
ingly, the country participated in the formulation of 
the EU strategy for commodities trading. 
The government does not strongly promote the 
activities of British mining companies abroad. 
Although the Export Credits Guarantee Department 
of the UK export finance agency, UK Trade and Invest-
ment, offers Overseas Investment Insurance, there are 
no special programs tailored to mining companies. 
UK Trade and Investment provides a platform for the 
international tendering of resource projects. 
Development Initiatives 
The Department for International Development 
believes the mining sector in developing countries to 
be an important socio-economic factor and an integral 
part of sustainable development.
 
42  D. E. Highley, G. R. Chapman, and K. A. Bonel, The Economic 
Importance of Minerals to the UK (Nottingham: British Geological 
	<&=Q`Q# 15, http://www.bgs.ac.uk/downloads/start. 
cfm?id=1301 (accessed May 1, 2012). 
 It supports various 
projects designed to strengthen government institu-
tions involved in raw materials policy, for example 
in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, British development cooperation 
focuses especially on strengthening the legal mining 
sector. 
43  Pratima Desai and Silvia Antonioli, “Government Says 
Critical Material Stockpiles Undesirable,” Reuters, September 
QQ^""#	&&	+#
$'"	
&""""-britain-
criticalmaterials-idUKTRED2JY4

&++&&&m-
ber 11, 2012). 
44  Department for International Development (DFID), 
Growth, October 3, 2011, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-
do/Key-Issues/Economic-growth-and-the-private-sector/ 
Growth/ (accessed September 11, 2012). 
Transparency 
The United Kingdom initiated EITI and supports it 
financially. After the British parliament called for 
full membership, the government seems to be fol-
lowing that path. In late 2011 the government 
strongly opposed the application of EITI rules on its 
own extractive sector, arguing that membership is 
not necessary given the United Kingdom’s marginal 
mineral resources. Joseph Williams, Senior Advocacy 
and Communications Officer at Publish What You Pay, 
however, believed the real reason to be the country’s 
position as the European Union’s largest oil producer 
and second-largest gas producer.
In an about-face, British Prime Minister David 
*'&	$%%\%	=	&&'&'X&	+&+
to follow EITI rules and stated that the United King-
dom would re-evaluate its attitude towards the organi-
$%#+
%&$8'%
$'&+& 	+
presidency in 2013, which aims to foster global trans-
parency and accountability.
 

The United Kingdom takes an ambivalent position 
on the European Commission’s proposals for trans-
parency and accounting directives.
 
 While the gov-
ernment broadly supports the proposals, it calls for a 
higher disclosure threshold for payments (€500,000 
rather than €25,000) and opposes project-by-project 
reporting.
 
45  House of Commons, ed., Tax in Developing Countries: Increas-
ing Resources for Development – Conclusions and Recommendations, 
4$%$%Q+Q), www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
"
'"
'+&&
"
'%&<""#'4

&++&
September 3, 2012). 
 The British branch of the International 
46  Sean O’Hare, “UK Refuses to Sign up to Oil, Mining 
and Gas Transparency Initiative,” Telegraph, September 21, 
2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/ 
$88+$	&8%%
&""Y¬-refuses-to-sign-up-to-oil-mining-
and-gas-transparency-initiative.html# (accessed September 3, 
2012). 
47  David Cameron, Announcement: Prime Minister’s Letter to 
G8 Leaders (London, January 2, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/news/prime-ministers-letter-to--leaders 
(accessed February 7, 2013); Publish What You Pay, PWYP UK 
Letter to David Cameron 4$%$%Q\%	=Q`Qhttp:// 
www.publishwhatyoupay.org/resources/pwyp-uk-letter-david-
cameron-january-2013 (accessed February 7, 2013). 
48  *]±²$%	&<+%	%+	&%
=	&
<&" 
"*Q%*]±²$%	&<+%&8$	'&	

$%ing 
	&
<&+""*%""*; see also “European 
Union” in this volume, pp. 59ff. 
49  Benjamin Fox, “David Cameron Must Force Extractive 
Companies to Be Transparent,” guardian.uk, July 26, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jul/26/david-
cameron-extractive-companies-transparent (accessed Septem-
ber 3, 2012). 
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Chamber of Commerce also supports the two pro-
posals, while opposing project-by-project reporting, 
pointing to high implementation costs for compa-
nies.50 British government and industry thus hold 
the same position as their German counterparts.51
With regard to due diligence in raw material sup-
ply chains, the United Kingdom welcomes the trans-
parency rules of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act (Section 1502)
 
52, 
but in general prefers voluntary transparency initia-
tives that seek to curtailing the trade in so-called 
conflict minerals from the DR Congo and neighboring 
countries.53 The United Kingdom supports the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, the Kimberley Process, the UN Convention 
against Corruption, and the UN Global Compact, and 
heads a G20 working group on raw materials. In 2000, 
the United Kingdom and the United States compiled 
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 
whose participants – the UK and the U.S. governments, 
companies in the extractive and energy sectors, and 
non-governmental organizations – commit to respect 
and promote human rights in mining.
International Raw Materials Governance 
 At the nation-
al level, the UK Bribery Act, which makes bribery in 
British business illegal at home and abroad, also con-
tributes to transparency in commodity trading. 
The United Kingdom is a member of the Nickel Study 
Group and is represented by the EU in the Copper 
Study Group and the Study Group for Lead and Zinc. It 
is also involved in the Common Fund for Commodities 
(CFC) and is a founding member of the Intergovern-
mental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sus-
tainable Development. A British network within the 
United Nations Global Compact acts as a contact and 
coordination point for signatory companies. 
 
50  International Chamber of Commerce UK, “EU Trans-
parency Directive” (London, April 26, 2012), http:// 
www.international-
'X&	#
$#"X$""""&-
transparency-	&
<&"4

&++&&&'X&	Q`# 
51  See also “Germany” in this volume, pp. 73ff. 
52  Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), “Introduction 
to Conflict Minerals,” 2012, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-
issues/conflict-minerals/intro-to-conflict-minerals/ (accessed 
September 3, 2012). 
53  See also “United States” in this volume,pp. 150ff. 
54  Governments of the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
RightsQ&
&'X&	QQ^""#8
$#$<#"	&+$	
&+" 
en/pdf/pdf7/fco_voluntaryprinciples (accessed September 27, 
2012). 
The Resource Security Action Plan stresses that the 
United Kingdom supports EU raw materials projects, 
notably the Raw Materials Initiative, and their con-
sequences, for instance the European Union’s WTO 
complaint against China’s export restrictions on 
certain minerals. 
Business Initiatives 
One key measure of the Resource Security Action Plan 
is the creation of a new consortium led by the Brit-
ish industry and convened by Green Alliance, which 
brings together interested companies to strengthen 
cooperation between government and the business 
sector, discuss problems and opportunities, and 
promote innovation. 
Evaluation and Outlook 
The Resource Security Action Plan underlines the growing 
importance of raw materials security in British poli-
tics. It constitutes the first document to bundle mea-
sures fostering raw materials security. The driving 
force is the British industry, but the number of other 
interested parties such as think-tanks and research 
institutes is increasing steadily. 
Overall, the leading UK decision-makers focus on 
national action to address supply risks. Strengthen-
ing recycling and resource efficiency is the preferred 
route. Increasingly, domestic resource extraction 
attracts the attention of politics and economy. The 
United Kingdom’s own approaches regarding inter-
national collaboration outside the EU framework 
(e.g. via raw materials partnerships) mainly aim at 
promoting a transparent raw materials sector. Brit-
ain’s new attitude to EITI membership gives this 
aspect greater importance. While the government and 
industry representatives broadly support these initia-
tives, they favor voluntary arrangements over legally 
binding regimes. 
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United States 
Stormy-Annika Mildner and Julia Howald 
 
The United States of America has large reserves of 
many minerals and metals and is one of the world’s 
largest raw materials producers, but still depends 
on imports. This is partly because it is also one of the 
largest consumers and partly because domestic 
production of certain raw materials (including rare 
earths) was unprofitable for many years and now 
requires time to restart. Washington’s raw materials 
policy currently focuses on the supply of critical and 
strategic raw materials for the “green tech” and 
defense sectors by encouraging domestic production 
and research into recycling, substitution, and resource 
efficiency. The United States is open to international 
cooperation in many fields of raw materials policy, 
for example trade policy. With respect to improving 
transparency, it has already taken a leading role inter-
nationally. 
Minerals in the National Economy 
The United States is among the leading producers of 
numerous minerals and metals. A share of 5.2 percent 
of world production of non-energy raw materials (by 
weight) puts it among the G20 members with strong 
raw materials production. In 2010, the United States 
+&$	¨+	&+	$
&	$8X&%$%&4#
per
&%$8$		$
$%`Q$'&4#&	
&%`Q
kaolin (19.7 percent), and sulfur (16.3 percent). It 
was also the second-largest producer of boron min-
&	+4#&	
&%`Q'$=X&%'4#&	
&%`Q&	-
&4#&	
&%`Q$+&4#&	
&%`Q+4#
percent), and vermiculite (21.1 percent).1
One of the major U.S. mining companies, operating 
at home and globally, is the integrated aluminum 
producer Alcoa. Alcoa is a world leader in mining 
of bauxite and its processing into alumina and then 
aluminum. Other noteworthy operators include the 
leading copper miner Freeport-McMoRan, gold pro-
ducer Newmont, iron and steel companies Cliffs and 
 
 
1  Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ), World Mining Data 2012 (Vienna, 
2012), http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Welt 
BergbauDaten/Documents/WMD2012druckbar.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2013). 
U.S. Steel, and the potash and phosphate producer 
Mosaic. 
While the United States was not a major producer 
of rare earths during the past decade, that could soon 
change. With almost 12 percent of global reserves of 
rare earths located in the United States, the only coun-
try with larger reserves (as of 2011) is China. In 1990, 
the United States still accounted for one third of 
global rare earth production, in particular from the 
Mountain Pass Mine in California. But a global price 
collapse, high labor costs, and strict environmental 
laws made domestic production unprofitable and 
imports from China grew. Today, however, the situ-
ation has changed, with the owner, Molycorp Inc., 
reopening the mine in February 2012. The area 
around the mine holds the bulk of the country’s esti-
mated 13 million tonnes of rare earths.2 The principal 
elements extracted here are cerium, lanthanum, neo-
dymium, and praseodymium, and in smaller quanti-
ties heavy rare earths such as dysprosium, europium, 
terbium, and yttrium.3
Despite relatively large raw material reserves, the 
mining sector makes only a minor contribution to 
GDP and employment. In 2011, its share of GDP was 
1.9 percent (2010: 1.6 percent).
 

 
2  USGS, Rare Earth Elements in U.S. Not So Rare – Significant 
Deposits Found in 14 States, November 17, 2010, http://www. 
usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID¢#TPTGdV1CSo 
4

&++&]=Q`%&\#*$	&	Q	&rths,” 
in USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries (Reston, 2012), http:// 
minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/ 
mcs-2012-raree.pdf (accessed May 9, 2012). 
 The non-energy min-
erals and metals component of total U.S. exports 
(by <&`+#&	
&%%%&	&8$	&+$
of minor importance. In 2010, 122,000 persons were 
employed in the mining industry, compared to 
166,000 in 1990. The states with the largest mining 
production (2010) were Nevada (13.2 percent of 
3  Molycorp, Current and Future Production, http://www. 
molycorp.com/Technology/CurrentFutureProduction.aspx 
4

&++&]=Q`# 
4  U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Durable-Goods Manu-
facturing Led Growth in 2011 – Advance GDP Industry Statistics 
for 2011Q	QQ^""#X&#$<"%&+	&&+&+" 
industry/gdpindustry/2012/pdf/gdpind11_adv.pdf (accessed 
May 3, 2012), p. 7. 
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national production), Arizona (11.7 percent), Utah 
(7.7 percent)Q]%%&+$4#&	
&%`Q%+
(5.7 percent).5
Because of its great demand, the U.S. economy 
remains dependent on imports. In 2010, the United 
States was the second-largest consumer of aluminum 
(10.7 percent of global consumption), copper (9.0 per-
cent), lead (15.1 percent), steel (6.2 percent), and zinc 
(7.3 percent), and the third-largest consumer of nickel 
(10.2 percent) and tin (9.6 percent).
 
6 In 2011, the 
United States had a net import quota of 100 percent 
for nineteen raw materials (including arsenic, bauxite, 
fluorspar, indium, niobium, and the rare earths 
group). It also sources many of its metals from just 
a few countries, especially China.7 For example, in 
2011, 79 percent of U.S. rare earth imports came 
from China.
In December 2010, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) published a report identifying critical metals in 
the “green tech” sector (technologies for renewable 
energy, e-mobility, etc.),
 
9 which it updated in Decem-
ber 2011.10
Materials required for defense applications have 
also been subjected to a criticality analysis. In the 
context of the defense industry, the government calls 
critical materials “strategic.” In March 2012, the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) published a report iden-
tifying seven of the seventeen rare earth elements – 
dysprosium, erbium, europium, gadolinium, neo-
dymium, praseodymium, and yttrium – as strategic 
 Critical materials are those which are of 
great relevance for the sector and subject to consider-
able supply risks. The report names the rare earth ele-
ments dysprosium, europium, neodymium, terbium, 
and yttrium as critical in the short and medium term. 
 
5  U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining: 
Mining, Mineral Industries, 2012, Table 901, 902 und 907, http:// 
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0907.pdf 
(accessed May 9, 2012). 
6  BGR and DERA, Deutschland – Rohstoffsituation 2010, DERA 
Rohstoffinformationen (Hannover, December 2011), http:// 
www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/ 
DERA_Rohstoffinformationen/rohstoffinformationen-07.pdf 
(accessed October 10, 2012). 
7  National Mining Association (NMA), U.S. Mineral Material 
Ranked by Net Import Reliance – 2011, April 2012, http://www. 
%'#$	"8"'	&%
&#84]=Q`# 
8  Cordier, “Rare Earths” (see note 2). 
9  Department of Energy (DOE), Critical Materials Strategy, 
December 2010, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/piprod/ 
documents/cms_dec_17_full_web.pdf (accessed May 3, 2012). 
10  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, December 2011, http:// 
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE_CMS2011_FINAL_Full.pdf 
(accessed May 3, 2012), p. 3. 
for the U.S. defense industry. According to the DOD’s 
projections, however, domestic production of these 
metals is increasing, and it is anticipated that by 2013 
the defense industry’s demand could be satisfied from 
domestic sources (except in the case of yttrium).11
The Raw Materials Policy 
 
Institutional Setting 
The federal government and the states share respon-
sibility for raw materials policy. The administration of 
land and resources resides with the U.S. Department 
of the Interior (DOI) and is executed by the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM), the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEM), 
and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement (OSMRE).12 The U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS), a scientific agency of the DOI, collects and 
manages raw materials data. The Department of 
Energy (DOE) deals with minerals and metals required 
in renewable energy technologies.13 The most impor-
tant agencies of the DOE in this respect are the Energy 
Information Agency (EIA), the Office of Science, the 
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE), and the Advanced Research Projects Agency – 
Energy (ARPA-E). The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) is responsible for foreign trade 
policy and thus also for matters concerning raw mate-
rials trade. The U.S. State Department is responsible 
for international aspects of raw materials policy. For 
example, it works through government-to-government 
diplomacy to end the use of “conflict” minerals that 
fund armed violence in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and elsewhere.
 
11  Department of Defense (DOD), Report to Congress: Rare Earths 
Materials in Defense Applications, 2012, http://www.hsdl.org/ 
<&4

&++&\=Q`# 
 In this matter, it works 
hand in hand with the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), the federal agency pri-
marily responsible for administering foreign aid. Since 
March 2010, the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP), in close coordination with the National 
12  Department of the Interior (DOI), Strategic Plan for Fiscal 
Years 2011–2016, http://www.usgs.gov/budget/docs/DOI_ 
StrategicPlan_FY11-16.pdf (accessed July 12, 2012), pp. 5f. 
13  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, 2011 (see note 10), p. 100. 
14  State Department, “Conflict Minerals,” http://www. 
state.gov/e/eb/tfs/tfc/minerals/index.htm (accessed February 
27, 2013). 
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Economic Council (NEC), the USTR, and the National 
Security Council (NSC), has been convening an inter-
agency working group to improve coordination 
between the different departments and to develop 
the necessary understanding of the critical mate-
rials situation.15
Congress holds the legislative power over the min-
ing sector through legislation. Congress also partakes 
in the decision which raw materials are to be stock-
piled for strategic purposes and can influence the 
mining sector through the allocation of funds (for 
example for research and development). Various 
House of Representatives and Senate committees are 
responsible for raw materials issues, including those 
for natural resources, energy, trade, research, tech-
nology, and defense. 
 
Two industry associations are particularly note-
worthy with regard to raw materials policy: the 
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) 
and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). 
The mining industry is represented in Washington 
by the National Mining Association (NMA). The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, unlike its German counter-
part, does not specifically address raw materials 
issues, illustrating the point that U.S. industry is still 
not too concerned about its raw materials supply. A 
number of NGOs, such as Enough, Resolve, and Global 
Witness, raise specific issues especially concerning 
transparency in financial flows and supply chains in 
the mining sector. 
Concepts and Strategies 
Security of supply of minerals and metals has played 
an important role in the country’s defense policy for 
decades. The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act 
of 1939 established a national stockpiling system for 
the defense industry, and the Defense Production Act of 
1950 sought to increase the capacity of the defense 
industry and improve the supply of strategic raw ma-
terials at the beginning of the Korean War. 
 
15  John P. Holdren, Statement of Dr. John P. Holdren, Director, 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President 
of the United States, to the Subcommittee on Investigations and Over-
sight, Committee on Science, Space and Technology, on the Adminis-
tration Perspective on a National Critical Minerals StrategyQ\%&Q
2011, http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house. 
$<"8&+"$
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July 12, 2012). 
While the topic fell off the radar during the 1990s 
due to low world market prices, recent price hikes and 
great dependency on imports (especially from China) 
of many critical metals used in the high-tech and 
defense industries have created a new awareness of 
the problem. It was China’s unexplained rare earth 
export embargo against Japan that painfully demon-
strated the vulnerability of an import-dependent 
economy.16 China’s export restrictions on various raw 
materials are a particular concern of the United 
States, in terms not only of supply risk but also com-
petitive disadvantage. By protecting its manufacturing 
sector through low domestic raw material prices, 
China gives its domestic producers a competitive edge 
vis-à-vis U.S. producers. In general, the United States 
views the country’s unfair trade policies as an impor-
tant reason for its large trade deficit with China. In 
2011, the trade deficit with China accounted for about 
&	
&%$8&Y%&&+¨&%	&Y[Xion 
trade deficit in goods.17 New strategic moves on raw 
materials must also be seen in the context of President 
Barack Obama’s climate and energy policy, which 
seeks to substantially increase the share of renewable 
energy.
Despite this new awareness, only the DOE has so 
far published a raw materials strategy, the Critical Mate-
rials Strategy (2010).
 
19
 
16  See also “Japan,” pp. 
 It aims to secure the production 
of renewable energy by safeguarding supplies of the 
raw materials required for the relevant technologies: 
permanent magnets used in wind turbines and elec-
tric cars, batteries in electric cars, phosphorescent ma-
terials in energy-efficient lamps, and thin-film semi-
conductors in photovoltaic cells. In order to reduce 
supply risks, (1) global supply chains are to be diver-
sified, (2) alternative materials and technologies are 
to be developed, and (3) increased recycling and more 
efficient use of raw materials are to significantly 
reduce global demand. The following elements of a 
raw materials policy are put forward: research and de-
velopment; collection of data on production and con-
ff., and “China,” pp. 51ff., in 
this volume. 
17  U.S. Census, U.S. Trade in Goods and Services – Balance of 
Payments (BOP) Basis, June 2012, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf (accessed October 10, 
2012); U.S. Census, Trade in Goods with China, http://www. 
census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html (accessed Octo-
ber 10, 2012). 
18  Discussion with representatives of the DOE, October 3, 
2012. 
19  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, 2010 and 2011 (see notes 9 
and 10). 
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sumption, trading prices, material intensity, and sub-
stitutability; accelerated approval of mining claims 
and increased financial support for domestic mining 
projects; improved education and training for the 
mining sector; and cooperation with countries facing 
similar challenges, for example on research and devel-
opment, data collection, and enforcement of inter-
national trade rules. Additionally, the report on criti-
cal minerals and metals is to be updated regularly. 
The Critical Materials Strategy of 2011 upholds the three 
core objectives listed above. 
The DOD has not yet published an official strategy 
on raw materials but picked up the conclusions of a 
2010 report by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply Chain, in 
early 2012. The GAO report concluded that the lack of 
domestic production had put the country in a danger-
ous position of dependency.20 The DOD Report to Con-
gress: Rare Earth Materials in Defense Applications thus 
includes, apart from the criticality analysis mentioned 
above, certain strategic considerations. The DOD rec-
ommends a three-pronged approach: (1) diversify sup-
pliers, (2) develop substitutes, and (3) improve the 
recycling of rare earth elements.21
Measures and Instruments 
 
Mining Law and Domestic Raw Material Production 
Mining law in the United States is based on a multi-
tude of laws and regulations. Mineral deposits on and 
below public lands are administered by the federal 
government on behalf of the people, and thus – strict-
ly speaking – belong to the people rather than the 
government.22 The Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act (FLPMA) of 1976, as amended charges the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) with the administration of 
public lands and their resources.23
 
20  Government Accountability Office (GAO), Rare Earth Mate-
rials in the Defense Supply Chain, GAO-10-617R, 2010, http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d10617r.pdf (accessed July 30, 2012), 
pp. –16. 
 Deposits on private 
21  DOD, Report to Congress: Rare Earths Materials in Defense 
ApplicationsQQ^""#+#$	"<&
(accessed May 23, 2012), pp. 8# 
22  Discussions with representatives of the BLM and the 
USGS, October 2 and 3, 2012. 
23  Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Mining Claims and 
Sites on Federal Lands, 2011, http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/ 
medialib/blm/wo/MINERALS__REALTY__AND_RESOURCE_ 
PROTECTION"&%&	=#	##>&#"]%%*'+#8
(accessed July 12, 2012), i. 
land usually belong to the landowner, although in 
the case of “split estate” surface and subsurface have 
different owners. In this case, the landowner (i.e. the 
owner of the surface) has no direct claim to any raw 
material reserves beneath his or her land. The “split 
estate” phenomenon dates back to the settlement of 
the western United States. Initially the federal govern-
ment granted settlers ownership of mineral rights 
together with the land. As the settlement process 
extended into western areas rich in gold, coal, and 
oil reserves, the federal government began to fear the 
concentration of reserves in the hands of a few, with 
negative (price) consequences for industry. At the 
same time, demand for cattle pasture was strong. In 
order to reconcile these competing interests, Congress 
passed a number of laws, such as the Agricultural Entry 
Act of 1914, to enable “split estate.”25
Mineral reserves on public lands are divided into 
three categories: locatable, leasable, and salable. 
Locatable minerals, including various metals (such 
as copper, gold, lead, nickel, and zinc) and nonmetals 
(such as fluorspar), are regulated under the General 
Mining Law of 1872, as amended, which allows U.S. citi-
zens to search for raw materials on designated public 
lands in nineteen different states
 
26 and to claim pos-
sessory rights to the minerals found (“stake a claim”). 
Exploration projects entailing significant disturbance 
(“surface disturbance greater than casual use”; casual 
use activities are those that cause only negligible dis-
turbance of public lands and resources) must be regis-
tered in advance with the BLM. Claims must be 
renewed regularly.27
To extract locatable minerals, a mining permit or 
patent must be obtained. A mining patent gives the 
applicant the exclusive title to the locatable minerals, 
and in most cases, also grants the title to the surface. 
%
&Q&%'$	$	'+'$+&$%%&
patent applications, mining permits have become 
more common. The application process for mining 
 
 
24  BLM, Split Estate, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/ 
energy/oil_and_gas/best_management_practices/split_ 
estate.print.html (accessed August 29, 2012). 
25  Timothy Fitzgerald, The Role of Split Estate in Environmental 
Performance of Coalbed Methane Development, working paper (Uni-
versity of Maryland, 2010), http://www.montana.edu/timfitz/ 
Water.pdf (accessed November 12, 2012). 
26  These are Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
27  BLM, Mining Claims and Sites on Federal Lands, 2011 
(see note 23), 27ff. 
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permits is very complex and time-consuming due to 
the need to satisfy numerous laws and application 
procedures at both federal and state level. 
Apart from the General Mining Law of 1827, as 
amended, states may enact their own mining and 
environmental laws. States laws must comply with 
federal law, but they may set their own rules govern-
ing the location and recording of mining claims and 
sites as long as they are consistent with federal law. 
Although several states have negotiated agreements 
with federal agencies to avoid duplication of adminis-
trative efforts, it still takes ten years on average (and 
six years minimum) for a mining permit to be 
awarded.29
Leasable minerals are regulated under the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920, the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired 
Lands of 1947, and the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, as 
respectively amended. A lease is necessary for extract-
ing oil, natural gas, geothermal resources and asso-
ciated by-products, other oil-bearing materials (such as 
oil sands and oil shale), coal, and certain non-energy 
mineral resources such as phosphates, sodium, and 
potassium.
 Royalties are not collected. 
30
Finally, the Materials Act of 1947, as amended, regu-
lates salable minerals such as sand, gravel, stone, and 
pumice,
 
31 allowing the BLM to sell these at fair market 
prices or grant government agencies (and on a small 
scale also non-profit organizations) a free-use permit.32
Whether domestic production can be increased, as 
recommended in the DOE strategy, is questionable. 
The time-consuming and expensive licensing pro-
cess is not the only obstacle. Since newly identified 
reserves are often located in remote areas where infra-
structure is lacking and finding skilled staff is diffi-
cult, their development often requires high upfront 
investment. Mining projects also often face the oppo-
sition of local communities due to environmental 
 
 
28  BLM, Mining Claims and Sites on Federal Lands, 2011 
(see note 23), pp. 1, 23f. 
29  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, 2010 (see note 9), p. #
And discussions with representatives of the BLM and the 
USGS, October 2 and 3, 2012. 
30  BLM, Leasable Minerals, 2009, http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/ 
fo/ely_field_office/blm_programs/minerals/leasable_minerals0.
html (accessed July 31, 2012). 
31  BLM, Mining Claims and Sites on Federal Lands, 2011 (see 
note 23), p. 1. 
32  BLM, Mineral Material SalesQQ^""#X'#$<" 
nv/st/en/fo/carson_city_field/blm_programs/more_-_other_ 
management/mineral_material_sales.html (accessed July 31, 
2012). 
concerns or conflicting land uses such as housing.33 
Mining has an especially bad reputation in the United 
States, not least because of the disastrous environ-
mental harm caused by open-cast coal mining, for 
example in West Virginia. It is thus no surprise that 
the individual states rank rather low in the Fraser 
Institute’s Policy Potential Index of attractiveness for 
mining investment.
So far, the United States has shown no interest in 
deep sea mining of non-energy minerals, in contrast 
to its interest in offshore gas and oil. One reason could 
be that the United States still has not ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
 
Congress has devoted great attention to the issue 
of domestic raw materials production in recent years 
and discussed numerous legislative proposals. Most 
bills introduced since 2011 focused on rare earths. 
Those that were not adopted during the 112th Con-
gress, however, died with the end of the legislative 
period. 
Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment 
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
(FINSA) allows the President to prohibit a foreign 
direct investment into the United States if he or she is 
advised by the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS) that national security would 
be threatened. A CFIUS review is compulsory where an 
acquisition concerns critical infrastructure. Potential 
effects on critical technologies (especially those crucial 
to the defense sector such as strategic raw materials) 
must be taken into consideration. Thus, for example, 
FINSA applies where a foreign investor plans to pur-
chase a mining company producing strategic raw 
materials. In 2009, a Chinese company planned to 
purchase the U.S. gold miner Firstgold Corporation, 
but the sale was stopped by CFIUS.35
 
33  PwC, Mining in the Americas, 2012, pp. 19f., http://www. 
pwc.com/en_CA/ca/mining/publications/pwc-mining-in-the-
americas-2012-03-en.pdf (accessed September 5, 2012). 
 
34  Fred McMahon and Miguel Cervantes, Survey of Mining 
Companies 2011/2012, Fraser Institute, February 2012, p. 11, 
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/ 
Content/research-news/research/publications/mining-survey-
2011-2012.pdf (accessed May 26, 2012). 
35  Matthew C. Sullivan, “Mining for Meaning: Assessing 
CFIUS’s Rejection of the Firstgold Acquisition,” Berkeley Journal 
of International Law Publicist 4`Q^""X³#=&#
$'" 
publicist/2010/02/mining-for-meaning-assessing-cfiuss-
rejection-of-the-firstgold-acquisition.html (accessed Septem-
ber 19, 2012). 
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Supporting Research and Development in Recycling, 
Substitutes, Material and Resource Efficiency 
Research promotion currently focuses on renewable 
energy, including mineral raw materials needed for 
associated technologies. One example is the company 
Toxco’s Vehicle Technologies Program: Toxco was 
awarded US$9.5 million by the DOE to expand its bat-
tery recycling facilities in order to conduct research 
on the recycling of lithium-ion batteries.36
The DOE Office of Science is planning to set up an 
Energy Innovation Hub for critical raw materials. Energy 
Secretary Steven Chu announced in May 2012 that the 
hub will be granted up to US$120 million over the 
next five years to help expand the security of supply 
of rare earths and other critical materials, improve 
the resource efficiency of these materials, and develop 
substitutes to reduce absolute consumption.
 
37
Several bills introduced during the 112th Congress 
proposed to increase support for research on critical 
raw materials, with most also calling for an expansion 
of domestic production. Various bills demanding the 
expansion of recycling were also discussed. None of 
these proposals were signed into law before the end 
of the session. 
 
The U.S. government also strives for international 
cooperation in research on critical materials. In Octo-
ber 2011, the DOE, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI), and the EU Commission 
held a conference in Washington, bringing together 
experts from politics, science, and industry to enhance 
critical raw materials cooperation among them. A sub-
sequent trilateral conference took place in Tokyo in 
March 2012.
National Defense Stockpiling 
 
Since World War II, the federal government has 
been storing critical (strategic) metals for the defense 
industry. These are administered by the Defense 
 
36  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, 2011 (see note 10), pp. 129, 
88# 
37  White House, Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, 2011, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint_ 
secure_energy_future.pdf (accessed July 19, 2012); DOE, 
Energy Department Announces Launch of Energy Innovation Hub 
for Critical Materials Research, May 31, 2012, http://energy.gov/ 
articles/energy-department-announces-launch-energy-
innovation-hub-critical-materials-research-0 (accessed July 
19, 2012), 39. 
38  New Energy and Industrial Technology Development 
Organization (NEDO), Trilateral EU-Japan-U.S. Conference on 
Critical Materials, http://www.nedo.go.jp/english/event_ 
20120326_index.html (accessed July 19, 2012). 
Logistics Agency’s Strategic Materials Division (DLA 
Strategic Minerals), which belongs to the Department 
of Defense (DOD). The stockpiling program lost signifi-
cance during the 1990s due to falling raw materials 
prices, leading the DOD to sell off various stocks. In 
recent years, however, the debate on national defense 
stockpiling has regained momentum, even if no major 
expansion of stocks has yet occurred. 
%Q&+++$	%%%&=88&	&%
materials at eighty-five sites across the country. By 
2010, the stockpile had been reduced to twenty-five 
materials at seventeen sites,39 including base metals 
such as zinc, cobalt, and chromium as well as precious 
metals such as platinum, palladium, and iridium. 
The DLA currently maintains constant stocks of beryl, 
beryllium, germanium, iridium, niobium, quartz, tan-
talum and tin, but is selling chromium, cobalt, ferro-
chromium, ferromanganese, manganese ores, plati-
num, talc, tungsten metal powder, tungsten ores and 
concentrates, and zinc. Stocks of aluminum oxide, 
antimony, bauxite, beryllium copper master alloy, 
cadmium, chromite, and fluorspar have already been 
completely sold, while the sale of vacuum-cast beryl-
lium metal has been suspended. Rare earths are 
currently not stored.
In 2006, in response to changing conditions, Con-
gress requested the DOD to review its stockpiling 
strategy. In response, the DLA developed the Strategic 
Materials Security Program (SMSP), which is designed to 
adjust reserves more rapidly. The fact that rare earths 
are currently not stockpiled provoked the introduc-
tion of various bills in the 112th Congress. Section 
 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 4¡##Q	`Q
	&+ent Obama 
signed into law in December 2011, directs DLA Stra-
tegic Materials to determine the feasibility of estab-
lishing a rare earths reserve.
 
 Stockpiling for the 
manufacturing sector, of the kind conducted in Japan 
and South Korea,
 
39  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, 2010 (see note 9), p. 59. 
 is rejected by Washington on the 
40  Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Strategic Materials, Com-
modities for Sale, https://www.dnsc.dla.mil/Commodities.asp 
(accessed March 29, 2012). 
41  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, 2010 (see note 9), p. 59. 
42  Govtrack, H.R. 1540: National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/ 
	4
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43  See also “Japan,” pp. ff., and “South Korea,” pp. 131ff., 
in this volume. 
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grounds that government purchases on such a scale 
would disrupt the markets.
Transparency 
 
As well as supporting international initiatives such as 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
the United States has taken a leading role in promot-
ing transparency in raw materials markets with sec-
$%+%$8&Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. On August 22, 2012, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
published the final rules for implementing the two 
sections. 
Section 1502 (and the respective implementation 
guidance) requires all SEC issuers (domestic and for-
eign) whose products include conflict minerals (tin, 
tantalum, tungsten, or gold) to disclose whether these 
minerals originated from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) or a neighboring country. Where a 
producer knows or has reason to believe this is the 
case, they must also report what measures they have 
taken to exercise due diligence with respect to origin 
and trading. A product is “DRC conflict-free” if neither 
production nor functionality require the use of con-
flict minerals from the DR Congo or a neighboring 
country. If the minerals originate from DR Congo or 
a neighboring country, the company must prove 
through its due diligence framework that they were 
not used to finance violent conflict. In so doing, the 
company may follow nationally or internationally 
recognized due diligence guidelines, such as those 
of the OECD. Companies will have to disclose their 
information on conflict minerals for the first time on 
]=Q48$	`Q%&	&8&	+X'%%
reports to the SEC. If a company is unable to demon-
strate that the minerals used were conflict-free, it may 
indicate for two years (or four years, in the case of 
small companies) that the conflict-free character of 
the minerals cannot be determined with certainty 
(“DRC conflict undeterminable”).
&
$%	&§	&+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foreign) that are engaged in the commercial develop-
ment of oil, natural gas, or minerals to disclose in an 
annual report certain payments made to the United 
 
 
44  DOE, Critical Materials Strategy, 2010 (see note 9), p. 107. 
45  Dodd Frank Section 1502, Dodd Frank Section 1502, http:// 
section1502.com (accessed February 21, 2012). 
46  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), SEC Adopts Rule 
for Disclosing Use of Conflict Minerals, August 22, 2012, http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-163.htm (accessed August 
30, 2012). 
States or a foreign government. Payments must be 
reported by country (or government, including lower 
tiers) and by project. The term “project” is not pre-
cisely defined in the implementation rules, in order to 
grant mining companies a certain degree of flexibility. 
Under SEC rules, payments exceeding US$100,000 
must be disclosed. Reporting is mandatory for all 
fiscal years ending after September 2013.
Industry harshly criticizes the reporting require-
ments, with the National Association of Manufactur-
ers (NAM) lamenting the high cost of compliance and 
warning of competitive disadvantages compared with 
companies that are not subject to strict reporting 
rules.
 

On November 15, 2011, the U.S. Department of 
State and USAID launched the Public-Private Alliance for 
Responsible Minerals Trade (PPA) to bring together com-
panies such as Motorola Solutions, Blackberry, Nokia, 
Sony, the German company H. C. Stark, and NGOs 
like Resolve to develop supply chain systems enabling 
them to use conflict-free minerals that are validated, 
certified, and traceable all the way back to the conflict-
free mine on the basis of common standards and 
mechanisms. The overall aim is to promote respon-
sible and sustainable minerals trading in the African 
Great Lakes region and to avert disadvantages for 
producing countries that might result from the new 
rules. 
 While NGOs such as Enough, Global Witness, 
%&+$<&
$%+&	+&
$%+%+
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they also stress that the initiative alone will not lead 
to good governance in resource-rich countries. 
Trade Policy and International 
Raw Materials Governance 
The U.S. government is actively trying to ban export 
restrictions on raw materials. In June 2009, the U.S. 
together with the EU filed a complaint against Chi-
nese export restrictions on a number of raw materials 
at the World Trade Organization (WTO); Mexico later 
joined the complainants. The WTO ruled in favor of 
the complainants. Motivated by their success, the U.S. 
and the EU, together with Japan, filed another com-
 
47  SEC, SEC Adopts Rules Requiring Payment Disclosures by Resource 
Extraction Issuers, August 22, 2012, http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2012/2012-#'4

&++&+Q`# 
48  National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), Testimony 
of Franklin Vargo Before the House Committee on Financial Services, 
Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade, May 10, 
2012, http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HHRG-
112-BA20-WState-FVargo-#84
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Evaluation and Outlook 
SWP Berlin / BGR Hannover 
A Comparative Analysis of the  
Raw Materials Strategies of the G20 
March 2013 
 
 
157 
plaint in March 2012  this time against Chinese 
export restrictions on rare earths.
The United States also strives to improve the 
general information available on export restrictions, 
which have traditionally been monitored less syste-
matically than import restrictions, and successfully 
advocated an OECD database on export restrictions. 
Together with the EU, the United States is seeking to 
establish a compliance checklist for the raw materials 
trade that could be used in ongoing and future WTO 
accession procedures. Also in cooperation with the EU, 
the United States is seeking to intensify the work of 
the OECD on raw materials in three different areas 
(timeframe 2013–`^$X%&	&&%&%
&+%
the raw materials trade, involving non-OECD members 
of the G20 in OECD work on raw materials, and moni-
toring of trade-distorting activities in the raw mate-
rials trade.
 
50 Ways to cooperate on research and devel-
opment for recycling and substitutes are under dis-
cussion at the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC).51
Evaluation and Outlook 
 
The United States is a member of the international 
metal study group on lead and zinc, and the copper 
study group, but has not joined the nickel study 
group. 
While the United States is a resource-rich country it 
is also highly dependent on imports of minerals and 
metals. Nonetheless, there is no comprehensive raw 
materials strategy for the economy as a whole. The 
Department of Energy seeks to secure domestic pro-
duction of renewable energy, while the Department 
of Defense focuses on guaranteeing the defense sec-
tor’s supply of strategic raw materials, especially of 
rare earth elements. Despite these different aims, the 
two departments propose similar threefold strategies: 
1. to diversify the supply chain, for example through 
substantially expanding domestic raw materials pro-
duction during the coming years; 2. to advance mate-
rial and resource efficiency and the development of 
substitutes for critical raw materials; and 3. to pro-
mote recycling. 
 
49  See also “European Union,” pp. 59ff., and “China,” 
pp.  51ff., in this volume. 
50  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eur-
asian Affairs, TEC Work Plan for Cooperation on Raw Materials 
Progress Report, April 3, 2012, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ 
r"&"&
"#'4

&++&\=Q`. 
51  See also “European Union” in this volume, pp. 59ff. 
Many of the legislative proposals presented during 
the 112th Congress concerning raw materials focused 
on single aspects of supply security, such as programs 
promoting rare earths, supplying the renewable en-
ergy sector with lithium, or examining the potential 
ofoffshore mining. These proposals have been tabled 
equally by Democrats and Republicans, and clear par-
ty alignments on specific topics cannot be observed. 
That almost none of the proposals have made it 
through one chamber, let alone Congress as a whole, 
can be attributed to the general political stalemate. 
The prospects for international cooperation vary 
from issue to issue. The Department of Energy strategy 
explicitly calls for cooperation with countries facing 
similar challenges. Initiatives in research and develop-
ment can already be seen in the form of trilateral con-
ferences with the EU and Japan. The United States is 
already working closely with the EU on trade policy, 
but in 2010 chose to act alone on transparency in the 
8$	'$8+&
$%+%$8&Dodd-Frank Act, 
which offered a unique opportunity to lay down 
stricter reporting obligations in federal law. 
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ADIMB Agência para o Desenvolvimento Tecnológico da 
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Development Agency) 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area 
AIST National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science 
and Technology (Japan) 
ALBA Aluminium Bahrain 
ALGA Australian Local Government Association 
ANC African National Congress 
ANIM Italian National Association of Mining Engineers 
ANM Agência Nacional de Mineração (National Mining 
Agency) (Brazil) 
AOMA Asociación Obrera Minera Argentina (Argentine 
Union of Mineworkers) 
ARPA-E Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy 
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ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development 
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(Federation of German Industry) 
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BGR Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und 
Rohstoffe (German Federal Institute for 
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BIS Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
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BKPM Indonesian Investment Agency 
BLM Bureau of Land Management (United States) 
BMAPA British Marine Aggregate Producers Association 
BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 
(Federal Ministry of Education and Research) 
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BMELV Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft 
und Verbraucherschutz (Federal Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Consumer Protection) (Germany) 
BMF Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Federal Ministry 
of Finance) (Germany) 
BMI Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of 
the Interior) (Germany) 
BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit (Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety) (Germany) 
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BMVBS Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadt-
entwicklung (Federal Ministry of Transport, 
Building and Urban Development) (Germany) 
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie (Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology) (Germany) 
BMZ Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) (Germany) 
BOEM Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement (United States) 
BOREN National Boron Research Institute (Turkey) 
BRGM Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières 
(Geological Survey) (France) 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
BREE Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 
(Australia) 
CAM Cámara de Empresarios Mineros (Argentine Mining 
Chamber) 
CAMINEX Cámara Minera de México (Mining Chamber of 
Mexico) 
CANMET Canada Centre for Mineral and Energy Technology 
CANMET-MMSL    CANMET Mining and Mineral Sciences 
Laboratories (Canada) 
CBI Confederation of British Industry 
CCCMC China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals & 
Chemicals Importers & Exporters 
CCP Communist Party (China) 
CETA EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement 
CETEM Centro de Tecnologia Mineral (Center for Mining 
Technology) (Brazil) 
CFC Common Fund for Commodities 
CFEM Compensação Financeira pela Exploração de 
Recursos Minerais (Financial Compensation for the 
Exploration of Mineral Resources) (Brazil) 
CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States 
CGMinería Coordinación General de Minería (General Office of 
Mining) (Mexico) 
CGS Chinese Geological Survey 
CICID Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Inter-
nationale et du Développement (Interministerial 
Committee for International Cooperation and 
Development) (France) 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
CIP Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Program (European Union) 
CISA Chinese Iron and Steel Association 
CLG Department for Communities and Local Govern-
ment (United Kingdom) 
CMA Chinese Mining Association 
CME Commissão de Minas e Energia (Committee for 
Mining and Energy) (Brazil) 
CNIA China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association  
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
COAG Council of Australian Governments 
Cofemin Consejo Federal de Minería (Federal Mining 
Council) (Argentina) 
COMES Comité pour les Métaux Stratégiques 
(Committee for Strategic Metals) (France) 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
CPRM Serviço Geológico do Brasil (Brazilian Geological 
Survey) 
CRIET Centro di Recerca Interuniversitario in Economia 
del Territorio (Inter-University Research Center for 
Local Development) (Italy) 
CRIRSCO Committee for Mineral Reserves International 
Reporting Standards 
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization (Australia) 
CSN Comanhia Siderúrgica Nacional (National Steel 
Company) (Brazil) 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
CTC Certified Trading Chains 
DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD) 
DAP diammonium phosphate (fertilizer) 
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (United Kingdom) 
DEG Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungs-
gesellschaft (German Investment and Development 
Corporation) 
DERA Deutsche Rohstoffagentur (German Mineral 
Resources Agency) 
DFAT Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(Australia) 
DfT Department for Transport (United Kingdom) 
DG Directorate General (European Union) 
DGM Dirección General de Minas (General Directorate of 
Mines) (Mexico) 
DGPM Dirección General de Promoción Minera (General 
Direction of Mining Promotion) (Mexico) 
DGRME Direzione generale per le risorse minerarie ed 
energetiche (General Directorate of Mineral and 
Energy Resources) (Italy) 
DIHK Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag 
(German Chamber of Industry and Commerce) 
DLA Defense Logistics Agency (United States) 
DMR Department of Mineral Resources (South Africa) 
DNPM Departamento Nacional de Produção Mineral 
(National Department for Mining Production) 
(Brazil) 
DOD U.S. Department of Defense 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
DOI U.S. Department of the Interior 
DORD Deep Ocean Resources Development Company 
(Japan) 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
DUBAL Dubai Aluminium 
EACI Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Inno-
vation (European Union) 
EADS European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 
EB Ministry of Economy (Turkey) 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment 
EEF Manufacturers’ organization for UK manufacturing 
companies 
EERE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(United States) 
Annexes 
SWP Berlin / BGR Hannover 
A Comparative Analysis of the  
Raw Materials Strategies of the G20 
March 2013 
 
 
162 
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
EIA Energy Information Agency (United States) 
EFG European Federation of Geologists 
EGS EuroGeoSurveys 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EIP European Innovation Partnership 
EMMC Energy and Mines Ministers’ Conference (Canada) 
EMRD Energy and Mineral Resources Development Asso-
ciation of Korea 
EP European Parliament 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 
EREP European Resource Efficiency Platform 
ERMG European Raw Materials Group 
ESDM Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
(Indonesia) 
ETKB Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (Turkey) 
EU European Union 
FATA Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act (Australia) 
FATR Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 
(Australia) 
FDI foreign direct investment 
FIFOMI Fideicomiso de Fomento Minero (Mining Develop-
ment Trust Fund) (Mexico) 
FINSA Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 
2007 (United States) 
FIPAs Foreign Investment Protection Agreements 
(Canada) 
FIRB Foreign Investment Review Board (Australia) 
FLPMA Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 
as amended (United States) 
FTA Free trade agreement 
G20 Group of 20 
GA Geoscience Australia 
GAC General Administration of Customs (China) 
GAI Indonesian Mining Agency 
GAO Government Accountability Office (United States) 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GEM Geo-mapping for Energy and Minerals 
GEMERA Grupo de Empresas Mineras Exploradoras de la 
República Argentina (Group of Exploring Mining 
Companies of Argentina) 
GEO Group on Earth Observations 
GeRI Global Development Policy Raw Materials Initiative 
(Germany) 
GIZ Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit 
(German Agency for International Cooperation) 
GOIC Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting 
GSI Geological Survey of India 
HKSE Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
IBRAM Instituto Brasileiro de Mineração (Brazilian Mining 
Institute) 
IBM Indian Bureau of Mines 
ICAA Instituto Correntino del Agua y del Ambiente 
(Corrientes Province Water and Environment 
Institute) (Argentina) 
ICEL Indonesian Center for Environmental Law 
ICMM International Council on Mining and Metals 
ICSG International Copper Study Group 
IEF International Energy Forum 
IFREMER Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation 
de la Mer (French Research Institute for Exploi-
tation of the Sea) 
ILZSG International Lead and Zinc Study Group 
IMA Interministerieller Ausschuss (interagency 
committee) (Germany) 
IMA Indonesian Mining Association 
IMRI Integrated Mineral Resources Initiative (Germany) 
INSG International Nickel Study Group 
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency 
IRP International Resource Panel 
ISA International Seabed Authority 
ISIJ Iron and Steel Institute of Japan 
ITV Instituto Tecnológico Vale (ValeTechnological 
Institute) (Brazil) 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature  
IUD Mining business license (Indonesia) 
JAMSTEC Japan Agency for Marine Earth Science and 
Technology 
JATAM Mining Advocacy Network (Indonesia) 
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
JISF Japan Iron and Steel Federation 
JLR Jaguar Land Rover 
JMEC Japan Mining Engineering Center for International 
Corporation 
JMIA Japan Mining Industry Association 
JNOC Japan National Oil Corporation 
JODI Joint Organizations Data Initiative 
JOGMEC Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation 
JST Japan Science and Technology Agency 
KADIN Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
KalkB Planning Ministry (Turkey) 
KEEI Korea Energy Economics Institute 
KEPCO Korea Electrical Power Cooperation 
KEXIM Korea Export-Import Bank 
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Bank for 
Reconstruction) 
KIGAM Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral 
Resources 
KIRAM Korea Institute for Rare Metals 
KNOC Korea National Oil Cooperation 
KOGAS Korea Gas Cooperation 
KontraS Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of 
Violence (Indonesia) 
KORES Korea Resources Corporation 
KOTRA Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency 
KPCS Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
LAB-MP Laboratorio Materie Prime (Raw Material 
Laboratory) (Italy) 
LBMA London Bullion Market Association 
LGEEPA Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección al 
Ambiente (General Law of Ecological Equilibrium 
and Environment Protection) (Mexico) 
LME London Metal Exchange 
LMN London Mining Network 
LPPM London Platinum and Palladium Market 
MAC Mining Association of Canada 
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MCTI Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação 
(Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation) 
(Brazil) 
ME Ministry of Environment (South Korea) 
ME Ministry of the Environment (Japan) 
MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common 
Market) 
MERI Metal Economics Research Institute (Japan) 
METI Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan) 
MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (Japan) 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) 
MFAT Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(South Korea) 
MIA Manifestación de Impacto Ambiental (Environ-
mental Impact Assessment) (Mexico) 
MIGEN General Directorate for Mining Affairs (Turkey) 
MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(China) 
Minprirody Ministerstvo prirodnykh resursov i ekologii Rossis-
koi Federatsii (Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Ecology) (Russia) 
MINTEK Council for Mineral Technology Research (South 
Africa) 
MK Maden Kanunu (Mining Law) (Turkey) 
MKE Ministry of Knowledge Economy (South Korea) 
MLTMA Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs 
(South Korea) 
MMAJ Metal Mining Agency of Japan 
MMDR Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation) 
Bill (India) 
MME Minsterio de Minas e Energia (Ministry of Mines 
and Energy) (Brazil) 
MMIJ Mining and Materials Processing Institute (Japan) 
MoEF Ministry of Environment and Forests (India) 
MOEP Ministry of Environmental Protection (China) 
MOFTEC Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (China) 
MOLAR Ministry of Land and Resources (China) 
MoM Ministry of Mines (India) 
MoS Ministry of Steel (India) 
MOSF Ministry of Strategy and Finance (South Korea) 
MP3EI Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of 
Indonesia’s Economic Development 
MPAs Mineral Planning Authorities (United Kingdom) 
MPRDA Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(South Africa) 
MRRT Mineral Resources Rent Tax (Australia) 
MSE Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico 
(Ministry of Economic Development) (Italy) 
MSWG Material Security Working Group 
(United Kingdom) 
MTA General Directorate of Mineral Research and 
Exploration (Turkey) 
MÜSIAD The Independent Industrialists’ and Businesmen’s 
Association (Turkey) 
MWDF Minerals and Waste Development Framework 
(United Kingdom) 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAM National Association of Manufacturers 
(United States) 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission 
(China) 
NEC National Economic Council (United States) 
NEDO New Energy and Industrial Technology 
Development Organization (Japan) 
NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association 
(United States) 
NEXI Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (Japan) 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NIED National Research Institute for Earth Science and 
Disaster Prevention (Japan) 
NIMS National Institute for Materials Science (Japan) 
NMA National Mining Association (United States) 
NMMT Nationaler Masterplan Maritime Technologien 
(National Masterplan for Maritime Technologies) 
(Germany) 
NNTT National Native Title Tribunal (Australia) 
NRCan Natural Resources Canada 
NSC National Security Council (United States) 
NUM National Union of Mineworkers (South Africa) 
ODA Official Development Aid 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OFEMI Organización Federal de Estados Mineros 
(Federal Organization of Mining States) (Argentina) 
OLAMI Organismo Latinoamericano de Minería 
(Latin American Mining Organization) 
OSMRE Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforce-
ment (United States) 
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(United States) 
PAN Partido Acción Nacional (The National Action 
Party) (Mexico) 
PDAC Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada 
PGM Platinum group metals 
PIF Public Investment Fund (Saudi Arabia) 
PND Plan Nacional de Desarollo (National Development 
Plan) (Mexico) 
PNM Plano Nacional de Mineração (National Mining 
Plan) (Brazil) 
POST Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 
(United Kingdom) 
PPA Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals 
Trade (United States) 
PPO Public Procurement Office 
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) (Mexico) 
ProgRess German Resource Efficiency Program 
PWYP-Canada    Publish What You Pay Canada 
REA Research Executive Agency (European Union) 
RET Department for Resources, Energy and Tourism 
(Australia) 
RMSG Raw Materials Supply Group (European Union) 
Rosnedra Federalnoe agentstvo po nedropolzovaniyu 
(Federal Agency for Subsoil Usage) (Russia) 
RPA Risk and Policy Analysts 
RSPT Resource Super Profits Tax (Australia) 
RWI Revenue Watch Index 
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SABIC Saudi Basic Industries Corporation  
SACP South African Communist Party 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SAGIA Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (China) 
SBRI Small Business Research Initiative 
(United Kingdom) 
SCP Action Plan for Sustainable Consumption and 
Production (European Union) 
SDF Sustainable Development Framework for Indian 
Mining 
SE Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of the Economy) 
(Mexico) 
SEC U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
SEGEMAR Servicio Geológico Minero Argentino (Geological 
and Mining Survey of Argentina) 
SGDSN Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité 
Nationale (Secretariat-General for Defense and 
National Security) (France) 
SGM Secretaria de Geologia, Mineração e Transformação 
Mineral (Secretary of Geology, Mining, and Mineral 
Processing) (Brazil) 
SGM Servicio Geológico Mexicano (Mexican Geological 
Service) 
SGS Saudi Geological Survey 
SHCP Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
(Ministry of Treasure and Public Credit) 
SIDF Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
SME Shanghai Metals Exchange 
SMSP Strategic Materials Security Program 
(United States) 
SNTMMSRM Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Meta-
lúrgicos, Siderúrigicos y Similares de la República 
Mexicana (National Mininig and Metalworkers 
Union) (Mexico) 
SOEs State-owned enterprises 
SRB State Reserve Bureau (China) 
SvTB Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Turkey) 
TEC Transatlantic Economic Council 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development 
TIKA International Cooperation and Development 
Agency (Turkey) 
TSB Technology Strategy Board (United Kingdom) 
TSX Toronto Stock Exchange 
TUSCON Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of 
Turkey 
TÜSIAD Turkish Industry and Business Association 
UK United Kingdom 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
UNEP United Nations Environment Program 
UNMIG Ufficio nazionale minerario per gli idrocarburi e 
le georisorse (National Mining Office for Hydro-
carbons and Georesources) (Italy) 
U.S. United States 
USAID United States Agency for International Develop-
ment 
USGS United States Geological Survey 
USTR Office of the United States Trade Representative 
VDI Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (Association of 
German Engineers) 
VDI ZER VDI Center for Resource Efficiency (Germany) 
WEEE Directive    Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
Directive 2012/19/EU 
WRAP Waste and Resource Action Program 
(United Kingdom) 
WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development 
WTO World Trade Organization 
YCF Yacimientos Carboníferos Fiscales (national mining 
company) (Argentina) 
YCRT Yacimientos Carboníferos Rio Turbio (Rio Turbio 
Coalfields [Company]) (Argentina) 
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Annex 3: Selected Global Governance Initiatives in the Area of Mineral Resource Markets 
Civil Society and (Inter-)Governmental Global Initiatives on Transparency in  
Revenue Flows and Supply Chains 
Stakeholders/ 
G20 Members 
Extractive Industries 
Transparency 
Initiative (EITI)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was 
launched in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in Johannesburg and is headquartered in Oslo. It aims to 
enhance transparency in the raw materials sector in countries 
that struggle with corruption and bad governance and remain 
poor despite their wealth in natural resources. Resource produc-
ing countries can participate in the initiative, disclosing their 
revenues from the raw materials sector on a voluntary and non-
binding basis. Corporations disclose the payments they make to 
governments. Payment figures are compared and published by an 
independent auditing consultancy, and government misconduct 
is publicly censured. This mechanism is designed to enable citi-
zens to keep track of payments made to their governments and 
to steer revenues from raw materials away from fraud and cor-
ruption and toward public goods like reducing poverty. The goals 
of the initiative were adopted by the United Nations in a resolu-
$%++&%#&]>Q&$	 %Q%%'&	ous 
private enterprises, NGOs, and investment funds have committed 
to the EITI standards. 
http://eiti.org 
Stakeholders:  
Australia, Canada, Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom (UK), United States 
of America (USA)  
 
Candidate:  
Indonesia 
Publish What You Pay 
(PWYP) 
The Publish What You Pay Initiative (PWYP) is a global network 
of various civil society groups that aims to enhance transparency 
in the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The initiative seeks to help 
the public in resource-rich countries to monitor payments in 
these sectors by organizing public campaigns and advising polit-
ical leaders. It has more than 650 member organizations. 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org 
Member organizations from: 
Australia, Canada, Germany, 
France, Indonesia, Mexico, 
United Kingdom (UK), 
United States of America 
(USA) 
Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme 
(KPCS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is a sectoral 
initiative for a single product, uncut diamonds. Its import-export 
certification system seeking to diminish the trade in so-called 
conflict or blood diamonds was launched in 2003 after nego-
tiations between governments, industry, and civil society organi-
$%+#&%<&+'&'X&	+4&Y
$%%+$%&`Q
%
$<&	+#ercent of global rough diamond production. 
Members agree to trade only with other members, to have their 
diamonds certificated by another member, and to prove their 
conflict-free origin. Participants agree to allow inspections and to 
report their trading and production activities. The chair of the 
scheme rotates between members. 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, European Union (EU), 
India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, United 
States of America (USA) 
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Civil Society and (Inter-)Governmental Global Initiatives on Corporate Responsibility G20 Members 
OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for 
Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas 
The OECD’s non-binding guidance on due diligence in the min-
erals sector was adopted and published in winter 2010. It gives 
recommendations for responsible minerals trading and helps 
corporations to conform to social and ecological standards. The 
guidance contains specific sections on tin, tantalum, tungsten, 
and gold. The OECD runs events and workshops to disseminate 
the recommendations and standards among corporations world-
wide. 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/mining 
Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, South Korea, Tur-
key, United Kingdom (UK), 
United States of America 
(USA) 
Global Compact The Global Compact is a worldwide initiative for corporate 
responsibility that provides a platform for the exchange of 
experiences and ideas between corporations, civil society orga-
nizations, and governments. The ten principles of the Global 
Compact address human rights, labor rights and standards, 
environmental protection, and anti-corruption. The aim of 
the initiative is to disseminate and anchor these principles in 
corporate activities worldwide, and to initiate measures that 
support the UN Millennium Development Goals. The Global 
Compact is constantly growing and has accumulated more than 
Q	
%+8	$''$	&%
$%	&+#++&
biggest initiative of civil society organizations, corporations, 
and other stakeholders. The participants are private companies 
(which pay a membership fee), as well as civil society organi-
zations, business associations, trade unions, academic insti-
tutions, and cities. 
www.unglobalcompact.org/index.html 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, United 
Kingdom (UK), United States 
of America (USA) 
World Bank Group 
Environmental, Health, 
and Safety (EHS) 
Guidelines (previously: 
World Bank General 
Environment Guide-
lines) 
 
The World Bank’s Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines 
are applied as binding standards by members of the World Bank 
Group. Both the General EHS Guidelines and the sector-specific 
documents cover: 1) the environment, 2) workplace and commu-
%=&Q`$	
&%
$''%=+&
	=Q%`$&%-
ing and closing of projects. The sector-specific guidelines for the 
mining industry contain recommendations for mine lighting 
and limits for metal contamination of waste water. The guide-
lines are regarded as realistic and not excessively costly when 
applied in new facilities with a certain level of technology. The 
guidelines were created in 2007; the ecological guidelines origi-
nated from the Work Bank General Environment Guidelines. 
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/ 
IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Sustainability+ 
Framework/Environmental,+Health,+and+Safety+Guidelines 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Ger-
many, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, United 
Kingdom (UK), United States 
of America (USA) 
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Civil Society and (Inter-)Governmental Global Initiatives on Corporate Responsibility 
(ctd. I) 
G20 Members 
World Bank 
Operational Policy and 
Bank Procedure on 
Involuntary Resettle-
ment (OP & BP 4.12) 
(previously: World 
Bank Operational 
Directive 4.30 – 
Involuntary 
Resettlement) 
 
Involuntary resettlement measures caused by development 
projects dislocate people from their working and social environ-
ment and can have negative economic, social, and environmental 
effects. Residents may be relocated to areas where competition 
for natural resources is especially strong. The World Bank’s Oper-
ational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement is designed to help 
prevent poverty and ecological harm. The guidelines apply to all 
projects that the World Bank is involved in and seek to avoid 
resettlement where possible. If resettlement is unavoidable, 
those affected must be advised about their options and enabled 
to participate in planning and implementation of resettlement 
measures. Resettled persons must be compensated financially 
to allow them at least to maintain their standard of living. The 
Bank Procedures provide recommendations for specific actions. 
^""$#$	X%#$	"] 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Ger-
many, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, United 
Kingdom (UK), United States 
of America (USA) 
Sector-Specific Corporate Initiatives for Transparency and Due Diligence in the 
Resource Sector 
G20 Members 
iTSCi (ITRI Tin Supply 
Chain Initiative) 
The iTSCi Initiative is a program run by the International Tin 
Research Institute (ITRI), a UK-based NGO that advises a large part 
of the tin industry. iTSCi was created to provide information on 
provenance and due diligence in the field of conflict minerals 
(for instance cassiterite) in the DR Congo and neighboring coun-
tries. The initiative seeks to help corporations – especially those 
operating at the beginning of the production chain, such as 
mines, traders, and refiners – to adhere to OECD and UN due 
diligence guidelines, as well as national laws, guidelines, and 
rules such as the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. Members of the initiative 
are required to abide by the due diligence recommendations of 
the UN Security Council and the OECD. 
https://www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=com_zoo&view= 
frontpage&Itemid=60 
Corporations from: 
Canada, China, Japan, South 
Africa, United Kingdom (UK),
United States of America 
(USA) 
Annexes 
SWP Berlin / BGR Hannover 
A Comparative Analysis of the  
Raw Materials Strategies of the G20 
March 2013 
 
 
168 
Sector-Specific Corporate Initiatives for Transparency and Due Diligence in the 
Resource Sector (ctd.) 
G20 Members 
Initiative by the EICC 
(Electronic Industries 
Citizenship Coalition) 
and 
GeSI (Global e-Sustain-
ability Initiative): 
Conflict-Free Smelter 
Program (CFS) and 
the Conflict Minerals 
Reporting Template 
and Dashboard 
 
The EICC and the GeSI have created an internet-based platform 
to inform corporations about their due diligence obligations 
concerning conflict minerals. The aim of the initiative and its 
“Reporting Template and Dashboard” is to reduce trade in con-
flict minerals. The platform is strongly orientated on the aims 
of the CFS program, which was initiated jointly by the EICC and 
the GeSI. The template, which is available in English, Chinese, 
Korean, and Japanese, allows corporations to review their supply 
chains by answering a range of questions (such as who they 
purchase materials from). The dashboard uses the information 
supplied via the template to aggregate the data from different 
suppliers and analyze them together. Companies can register 
free of charge for the template and the dashboard. The CFS pro-
gram seeks to help companies purchase conflict-free minerals. 
Participation in the program is voluntary. An independent third 
party monitors the activities of program participants and deter-
mines whether the materials they use used are conflict-free. Thus 
the complete supply and production chain is tracked. The pro-
gram covers the so-called 3TG minerals (tin, tantalum, tungsten, 
and gold). Most of the participating companies come from China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and the United States. The EICC and 
the GeSI regularly publish lists of CFS-compliant companies for 
all four metals. The names of non-compliant companies are not 
disclosed. Members of the EICC and the GeSI are not obliged to 
purchase exclusively from CFS-compliant companies. 
http://www.conflictfreesmelter.org/ConflictMineralsReporting 
TemplateDashboard.htm 
http://www.eicc.info/CFSProgram.shtml 
The lists of CFS-compliant 
firms for tin and tungsten 
are currently still under 
preparation. G20 states with 
CFS-compliant firms for 
tantalum include Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States; 
G20 states with CFS-com-
pliant firms for gold include 
Australia, Canada, Indo-
nesia, Japan, and the United 
States. 
Trade Regimes G20 Members 
World Trade  
Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) succeeded the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in January 1995. The WTO 
regulates international trade and other international economic 
activities of its members (currently 159, as of March 2013). Its 
mandate includes staging multilateral trade negotiations and a 
dispute settlement mechanism for trade conflicts. Together with 
forestry products, fish and fuels, the WTO defines mineral and 
mining products as natural raw materials subject to its mandate. 
http://wto.org 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, European 
Union (EU), France, Ger-
many, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, United 
Kingdom (UK), United States 
of America (USA) 
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Initiatives on Data Exchange and Transparency G20 Members 
International Metal 
Study Groups 
There are three international metal study groups: 1) the Inter-
national Lead and Zinc Study Group (ILZSG), established by the 
UN in 1959; 2) the International Copper Study Group (ICSG), 
formed in 1992; and 3) the International Nickel Study Group 
(INSC), formed in 1990. The study groups are independent inter-
governmental organizations open to all countries involved in the 
production, use, or international trade of the respective resource. 
These are generally industrialized countries, newly industrializ-
ing countries, and resource-rich developing countries. All three 
study groups are headquartered in Lisbon and have shared a gen-
eral secretariat since 2006. They work to enhance the exchange 
of information, to gather information on supply and demand in 
the international markets, and to provide solutions for problems 
in the raw materials trade. Their principal aim is to enhance 
market transparency. The groups publish monthly or biannual 
statistics and surveys. They generally meet twice a year, with 
national delegations often accompanied by industry represen-
tatives. Within each group there are various committees on 
topics such as statistics or the environment, each chaired by a 
representative of one of the national delegations. 
ILZSG: http://www.ilzsg.org/static/home.aspx 
ICSG: http://www.icsg.org 
INSG: http://www.insg.org 
ILZSG:  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, 
India, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
South Africa, South Korea, 
United States of America 
(USA) 
 
ICSG:  
Australia, China, European 
Union (EU), France, Ger-
many, India, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, United 
States of America (USA)  
 
INSG:  
Australia, Brazil, European 
Union (EU), France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
United Kingdom (UK) 
Civil Society and (Inter-)Governmental Global Initiatives on 
Sustainable Resource Provision 
G20 Members 
UNEP International 
Resource Panel (IRP) 
The UNEP International Resource Panel was created in 2007 as a 
first step towards a comprehensive approach to the management 
of natural resources. It aims to provide independent, reliable 
scientific reports on the sustainable use of resources and the 
effects of resource production on the environment, and to supply 
information on the possibilities of economic growth without 
negative effects on the environment. Twenty-three countries, the 
European Commission, the OECD, and three civil society organi-
zations participate in the IRP, which meets twice a year. The 
work of the Panel is linked to other initiatives such as the Marra-
kech Process on sustainable use and production, the 3R Initiative 
(“reduce, reuse, and recycle”), the Global Environment Outlook, 
and the UN’s Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, and is asso-
ciated with the closed-loop economy approach. 
http://www.unep.org/resourcepanel/Home/tabid/52020/ 
Default.aspx 
Canada, China, EU Com-
mission, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico , Russia, 
South Africa, United States 
of America (USA) 
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Civil Society and (Inter-)Governmental Global Initiatives on 
Sustainable Resource Provision (ctd.) 
G20 Members 
OECD Working Group 
on Waste Prevention 
and Recycling 
The *¨+8	+	$³&
8$	'%'%+&	%8	$'$
%
$%
&%	&$%%8$	'$%&
%&$%+	&&+
to reduce waste within OECD countries. The first workshop was 
held in 1995, hosted by the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
The Working Group on Waste Prevention and Recycling seeks to 
encourage the sustainable use of materials by OECD members, 
with a focus on “sustainable material management,” on which it 
staged a first workshop in 2005 in Seoul, South Korea. Events and 
publications followed to provide institutional backing for the 
Working Group. 
Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, South Korea, 
Turkey, United Kingdom 
(UK), United States of 
America (USA) 
Broader Civil Society and Governmental Initiatives G20 Members 
ISO 26000 ISO 26000 is the global standard of the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO) for sustainability in the sense 
of community responsibility. It provides companies and organi-
zations with guidance on ethics and transparency by defining 
social responsibility and proposing effective measures that 
promote health and wellbeing in society. The standard is not 
awarded as a certificate like other ISO Standards. It was devel-
oped over a period of five years and published in 2010. 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Ger-
many, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, United 
Kingdom (UK), United States 
of America (USA) 
Sectoral Corporate Initiatives for Sustainable Resource Supply G20 Members 
International Council 
on Mining & Metals 
(ICMM) 
The International Council on Mining and Metals was created in 
Q%X	%+$&&	'%%
$'%&+%	&$%
and national mining associations and global resource asso-
ciations. The ICMM seeks to support ongoing improvements in 
resource production and mining management and thus to con-
tribute to sustainable development in the fields of environment, 
labor, and social issues. Since 2009, member states have been 
obliged to disclose their improvements in this regard publicly. 
http://www.icmm.com 
Mining companies from:  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
France, Japan, South Africa, 
United Kingdom (UK), 
United States of America 
(USA) 
Mining associations from: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, European Union 
(EU), India, Japan, Mexico, 
South Africa, United States 
of America (USA) 
Initiatives for Development Cooperation G20 Members 
Common Fund for 
Commodities (CFC) 
The Common Fund for Commodities was created by the United 
Nations and is headquartered in Amsterdam. It funds projects 
that support social and economic development in resource-rich 
countries, especially in the least developed countries. The three 
metal study groups are partners of the Fund. Agreement on the 
*$''$%>%+8%&%%&%&<%$$&88&

in #&>%+'&'X&	+&+%&%%+$%
members including the EU and CARICOM. 
http://www.common-fund.org 
Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Korea, United 
Kingdom (UK) 
 
Institutional member: 
European Union (EU) 
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Initiatives for Development Cooperation (ctd.) G20 Members 
Intergovernmental 
Forum on Mining, 
Minerals, Metals and 
Sustainable Develop-
ment (previously: 
Global Dialogue on 
Mining/Metals and 
Sustainable Develop-
ment)  
The Intergovernmental Forum is a discussion platform for the 
mining sector. It succeeded the Global Dialogue on Mining/ 
Metals and Sustainable Development, which brought together 53 
states in a partnership to implement the Johannesburg Plan of 
Action agreed at the United Nations World Summit for Sustain-
able Development in 2002. The members of the Global Dialogue 
&
&%%$
	&&&>$	m, and drew up its 
terms of reference, draft rules of procedure, and guidance for the 
program of work. The Forum began work in February 2005 after 
reaching 25 members. 
http://www.globaldialogue.info/intro_e.htm 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
India, Mexico, Russia, South 
Africa,United Kingdom (UK) 
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Annex 4: Mineral Resource Strategies of the G20 Countries
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Annex 4: Mineral Resource Strategies of the G20 Countries
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Annex 6a: Composition of GDP by sector in %
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Annex 6a: Composition of GDP by sector in %
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Annex 7: Production of Non-Energy Mineral Resources by G20 Countries (as of 2010)
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Annex 8: The Five Most Important Mineral Resources Produced by Each G20 Country
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Annex 9: Value of Production and Global Share
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Annex 11: Consumption of Selected Metals in G20 Countries, 2010
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n
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N
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d
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d
u
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s,
 s
u
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N
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N
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N
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C
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C
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d
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o
m
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N
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h
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n
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d
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ra
bi
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 b
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m
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u
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n
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h
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n
it
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gd
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“C
ru
d
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p
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n
d
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 f
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at
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